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The 2002-2003 edition of Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy is divided into three parts.
The first part, which concerns trade and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (chapters I and
II), analyses the main features of the international situation and their impact on the countries’ external trade in 2002
and 2003. It also examines developments in the regional integration process in Latin America and the Caribbean in
2002-2003 and the ambivalence demonstrated by some of the governments involved, which affirm their political
will to continue to deepen regional integration but make no specific commitments in that regard.
The second part is devoted to Latin American trade policy, particularly export promotion policy (chapters III and
IV). Chapter III deals basically with the export promotion policies of Mexico and the countries of Central America
and the English-speaking Caribbean. Chapter IV looks at some aspects of an export promotion policy for services, as
this area is largely undeveloped in the region.
The third and last part (chapters V and VI) analyses two important elements of the international trading system.
Chapter V examines the inclusion of the development dimension in multilateral negotiations, which is intended to
address the differences in development levels between the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to
strengthen the impact of trade on development, and chapter VI describes, from the region’s perspective, the changes
brought about by China’s accession to WTO. China’s role is analysed from several different angles: as a strong
competitor in world markets for labour-intensive products, as a consumer market for commodities and manufactures
and as an ally in defending the development process in international forums.
Abstract
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Summary
1. Positive and negative aspects of the structural
diversity of regional trade in  2002-2003
Merchandise exports from Latin America and the
Caribbean, which were already showing signs of
recovery in late 2002, strengthened further in 2003.
Some 10 countries saw their exports rally strongly in
terms of both volume and value. The most outstanding
cases were those of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti and Peru, which, given their
export structure, were able to benefit from better prices
for their principal products and, in some cases, from
robust demand in several Asian countries, notably China.
These price rises increased the value of agricultural and
mining products, especially soybeans and soybean
products, cotton, wool, copper and iron, while prices
for manufactures rose at a proportionally lower rate in
aggregate terms. The net effect of these variations was a
slight improvement in the region’s terms of trade.
Imports were up in a number of countries, although
external purchases by major importers such as Brazil,
Mexico and especially Venezuela, along with Bolivia,
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Panama,
remained low.
After recovering slightly in 2002, the world
economy seems to have advanced towards a moderate
expansion in 2003 and early 2004, on the basis of growth
in the Asian developing countries and, since late 2003,
the United States economy. According to data from the
World Trade Organization (WTO), world trade rallied
in 2002 and 2003, expanding by about 2.5% and 4.5%,
respectively, in terms of volume. However, these values
are nowhere near the average growth recorded in the
1990s, of more than 5%.
Starting in late 2002 and throughout 2003 prices
for Latin American and Caribbean commodities rose
sharply, fuelling the recovery of the region’s exports.
The increase in external sales was particularly
significant in the South American and Central American
countries, where commodities account for a large share
of exports. Agricultural exports from Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay were up, buoyed by higher prices for
soybeans and soybean products. Similarly, increases
in coffee prices boosted exports of this product from
Colombia, Brazil and the Central American countries;
the same was true of cotton and wool from Paraguay
and Uruguay. Peru and Chile benefited from an
extraordinary rise in the price of copper; at the end of
the year, the per-pound price exceeded the US$ 1 mark
–one of the highest levels of the last three years– and
in late February 2004 rose above US$ 1.30. For the
Central American and Caribbean countries, the biggest
boost came from the recovery in the price of sugar, the
main product in their export basket. Other countries
that benefited from higher commodity prices were
Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Trinidad and
Tobago, which recorded growth rates of over 20% in
the mining and oil sectors thanks to the sustained
buoyancy of oil prices.
14 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORT GROWTH, 1999-2003
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information and
estimates prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
a South America (oil-exporting) includes Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela; South America (non-oil-exporting) includes
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
b 
 Includes the 37 countries of the region considered in tables I.11 and I.12 of chapter I.
Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORT GROWTH, 1999-2003
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information and
estimates prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
a
  South America (oil-exporting) includes Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela; South America (non-oil-exporting) includes
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
b 
 Includes the 37 countries of the region considered in tables I.11 and I.12 of chapter I.
In 2003 the region’s exports grew by 8.3%, with
the biggest jump observed in the non-oil-exporting
South American countries. The stronger recovery of
those countries’ basket of exports to the United States,
the European Union and the Asian developing
countries –especially China– helped to improve the
region’s export position (see figure 1 and table I.17).
The region’s imports, meanwhile, were again very low
in comparison to their 2000 value, as noted above.
Here again, the non-oil-exporting South American
countries showed higher growth than the other
countries of the region (see figure 2). The combination
of more robust exports and clearly waning demand
for imports enabled the region to accumulate a
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The region’s merchandise trade surplus was
concentrated in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and, to a
lesser extent, Chile. This accumulation may be
attributed to four factors: (i) real exchange-rate
depreciation, especially in Brazil, Argentina and
Venezuela; (ii) higher prices for these countries’ main
raw materials exports (soybeans, copper and oil); (iii) an
increase in export volume in response to growing
demand for raw materials in Asian markets, especially
China and India; and (iv) continued low levels of goods
imports, which were still far below historical levels (see
figure 2).
The growth of Latin American and Caribbean
merchandise exports reflected increases in both price and
volume. Although this was the norm, the South American
countries benefited most from the rise in prices, which
generally exceeded 5%; the most outstanding case was
that of Venezuela, where a decline in export volume was
largely offset by higher prices. Meanwhile, prices had
less of an impact on exports from Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico, whose growth was much more
modest than that of South American exports. In aggregate
terms, the Andean Community countries were hard hit
by the adverse situation in Venezuela (see figure 4).
Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): MERCHANDISE
TRADE BALANCE, 2003
(Millions of dollars)
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Pressured by the appreciation of its currency,
Mexico, which accounts for more than 45% of the
region’s exports, has not managed to compensate for
the steep drop in its external sales in 2001, with the
result that its earnings are still lower than they were in
2000. In terms of sectors, Mexico’s non-oil exports are
the ones whose growth has slowed down the most; this
slump is worst by far in the manufactures subsector,
which shrank by 0.3% in 2003. Conversely, oil exports
surged by 28.7%.
Intraregional exports in 2003 recovered from a two-
year slide, as the climate for reciprocal trade improved.
Despite its ups and downs, this trade is still very
important in the region, especially in the case of
manufactures. Trade among Latin American and
Caribbean countries may be divided into two categories:
(i) trade between countries members of subregional
groupings (intra-group trade) and (ii) trade between
countries parties to the economic complementarity
agreements of the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA) or free trade agreements (inter-
group trade). Whereas inter-group trade accounted for
less than half the exports absorbed by the region in 1998,
the proportion rose to 57% in 2000 and 63% in 2003.
Between 2000 and 2002 total Latin American purchases
of products exported by other countries of the region
diminished from US$ 62.551 billion to US$ 52.816
billion. However, this reflected the fact that intra-group
trade fell sharply while total purchases between the four
integration arrangements –the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community, the
Central American Common Market (CACM) and the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)– and other
countries not affiliated with those groupings stayed
practically the same, rising only from US$ 33.415 billion
to US$ 33.45 billion (see figure 5). In 2003 intraregional
trade amounted to US$ 60 billion, which was still 4%
lower than the peak value recorded in 2000.
The estimated value of reciprocal trade within the
four subregional common markets in 2003 shows that
these trade flows followed a procyclical trend whereby
intra-group trade expanded and contracted in line with
third-party trade. What did vary significantly was the
relative extent of the expansion or contraction. In 2003
there was a pronounced upturn in trade within
MERCOSUR, CACM and CARICOM, which contrasts
Figure 4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISAGGREGATION OF GROWTH IN THE
VALUE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, BY SUBREGION, 2003
(Annual growth rates)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
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Figure 5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF INTRAREGIONAL TRADE,
1997-2003
(Percentages of total trade)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis








1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Intra-group trade Inter-group trade
with the continuing difficulties experienced by the
Andean Community since the last quarter of 2002. The
downturn in trade among the MERCOSUR countries
was reversed starting in the first quarter of 2003, and a
26% expansion was recorded for the year as a whole.
The relative share of reciprocal trade out of the member
countries’ total exports diminished, as its growth was
outstripped by the increase in the countries’ trade with
third markets, especially Asia, the European Union and
the United States. Likewise, trade within CACM and
CARICOM increased by 6.8% and 12%, respectively,
which represents an improvement after the economic
slowdown of 2002. At the other extreme, trade within
the Andean Community contracted by 5.5%; this,
together with the downturn in 2002, yields a cumulative
loss of 12% with respect to the value of intra-Community
trade in 2001 and of 1.5 percentage points in terms of
the ratio of intra-Community exports to total exports,
which slipped from 10.6% in 2001 to 9.1% in 2003.
The analyses in Latin America and the Caribbean
in the world economy, 2001-2002 stressed the idea that
the expansion of Latin American exports to new markets
in Asia was offsetting the effects of the sharp economic
slowdown in the main traditional import markets,
essentially the United States and the European Union.
In 2003 the stronger performance of the Asian economies,
including Japan, was reflected in increased demand for
Latin American products such as meat, fresh fish, cereals,
coffee, forestry products, certain minerals (copper, iron,
tin, nickel, lead) and agricultural raw materials. Although
the Asian countries together absorb between 8% and 13%
of the region’s total external sales, depending on whether
or not Mexico is included in the calculations, these sales
are particularly significant for Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
Argentina and Brazil, which sell between 8% and 32% of
their total exports to these countries.
For the first time in 13 years the Latin American
and Caribbean countries managed to accumulate a goods
and services trade surplus on the order of US$ 25.5
billion and a current account surplus that reached the
unprecedented figure of US$ 2.8 billion, or US$ 5.3
billion excluding the deficit recorded in the Caribbean
economies and Panama. Results comparable to these had
not been seen in the region for half a century. One of the
interesting things about this surplus is that it reflects the
combined effects of an increase in export supply and a
substantial, widespread increase in transfers from
abroad. And yet, while Mexico and the countries of
Central America and the Caribbean also benefited from
higher export values and volumes and from an increase
in current transfers, they still posted large trade deficits
and, consequently, negative current-account balances.
18 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
With respect to international trade integration, Latin
America and the Caribbean participated actively in
various negotiations in 2003. In terms of multilateral
negotiations, the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was
held in Cancún in mid-September. The meeting
concluded without agreement because of problems in
making headway with negotiations on the agricultural
sector, as well as the reservations of some developing
countries concerning the discussion of negotiating
modalities for the issues of investment, competition
policy, transparency in government procurement and
trade facilitation (the so-called Singapore issues), among
others. Negotiations in the framework of the Doha Round
are to continue within WTO, although they may extend
beyond the agreed time frames.
In terms of extraregional negotiations, in 2003 Chile
reached an important milestone –and one that
consolidates its trade policy– with the ratification of its
free trade agreement with the United States, which went
fully into effect on 1 January 2004. The Central American
countries held several rounds of trade negotiations with
the United States that culminated in the conclusion of a
free trade agreement between that country and El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These
negotiations prompted reactions from particularly
sensitive sectors in Central America such as the dairy,
grain, meat and sugar industries, especially in Costa Rica,
where the greater liberalization of sectors such as
telecommunications and insurance led to the conclusion
of an agreement different from the one reached with the
rest of the Central American Common Market countries.
In fact, Costa Rica did not reach agreement with the
United States until January 2004, after it had won special
treatment for its sensitive sectors and a longer period
for liberalizing telecommunications and insurance. In
mid-March the Dominican Republic concluded its trade
talks with the United States by becoming a party to the
United States-Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA).
In late 2002 the United States extended the term of
the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), which became
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA). Furthermore, the United States Trade
Representative announced his country’s interest in
negotiating free trade agreements with the Andean
countries. For his part, the Secretary General of the
Andean Community expressed the hope that the
negotiations would take place in a spirit of coordination
and collaboration. The United States is expected to begin
negotiations with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador on 18
May 2004 and with Bolivia at a later date. The countries
have not yet decided whether to negotiate as a group or
bilaterally. For the time being, they are organizing their
negotiating teams and strategies and have opened a
dialogue with business circles, workers and civil society
in general.
With regard to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) initiative, the participants in the eighth
Ministerial Meeting, held in Miami in November 2003,
decided to dispense with the “single undertaking”
approach, in which the issues were to be negotiated as a
whole, and adopted a mixed arrangement under which
the countries would undertake a common set of
obligations in certain areas, with the option of agreeing
to additional obligations in other areas through bilateral
or plurilateral negotiations. While this solution makes it
more likely that the negotiations will be completed
within the agreed time frame, the fragmentation of the
negotiating agenda could work to the detriment of
countries with less bargaining power.
Meanwhile, negotiations between MERCOSUR and
the European Union have continued on schedule. The
two blocs hope to sign an agreement in the course of
2004 in the framework of the European Union-Latin
America and the Caribbean Summit.
With respect to intraregional negotiations, both
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community issued
declarations (the Brazilian proposal “Target 2006”and the
Quirama Declaration, respectively) aimed at strengthening
these processes. These declarations call for the inclusion
of new items on the integration agenda, such as
macroeconomic coordination, the treatment of
asymmetries, sustainable development, border integration
and closer ties between the subregions and between them
and the rest of the region. The declarations express a clear
political will to deepen the regional process, which will
have to be translated into effective measures that give
priority to subregional trade and investment and give rise
to greater economic, regulatory and institutional
convergence among the economies involved.
In early April 2004 Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela and the MERCOSUR countries concluded
their negotiations on a free trade agreement at their
eighth meeting, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This
represented the culmination of a negotiation process
begun almost 10 years earlier and laid the groundwork
for the creation of a South American trading bloc
consisting of the countries members of the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR. However, the countries
have yet to agree on how the liberalization process will
take place in terms of timetables –which could extend
up to 2016– and final lists of products.
The CARICOM countries have maintained a
consistent stance in the various negotiating forums by
coordinating their position through the Caribbean
Negotiating Machinery.
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2. Policies for promoting and developing Latin American and
Caribbean goods and services exports
Almost all the Latin American and Caribbean countries
have formulated and implemented programmes to
promote and develop exports, with varying degrees of
success. This shows that the region’s governments are
aware of the importance of fostering export growth with
a view to achieving more balanced integration of their
economies in the global economy. However, after almost
four decades of Latin American and Caribbean
experience in attempting to promote and develop exports
through entities expressly devoted to this endeavour,
there is still no consensus as to the effectiveness of the
strategies used. In addition, the Latin American and
Caribbean countries have been characterized by sudden
institutional changes, and the export promotion area is
no exception. The lack of institutional continuity in this
area poses a twofold risk: that the services provided to
exporters will be discontinued and that the development
of statistical time series to serve as a basis for objectively
evaluating the technical, financial and human efforts
deployed in each case will be interrupted, so that the
impact of the export strategy and progress towards goals
will be harder to measure.
When policies are not subjected to a cost-benefit
analysis, they tend to be perceived as inefficient or
irrelevant. Given the widespread need for budgetary belt-
tightening in the region, the countries have tended to
cut funding for export promotion and financing
programmes, when, on the contrary, export development
activities should be adequately supported, in line with
clear and explicit priorities that give preference to the
firms most in need of such help.
The broad objective of public policies to expand
and diversify exports is to reduce the economy’s anti-
export bias and the transaction costs that must be borne
by exporters, which distort the relative profitability of
foreign- versus domestic-market-oriented production.
Clearly, this profitability depends on various prices that
change over time. Under the import substitution model,
for example, production costs and profit margins
depended to a large extent on the protection regime (tariff
and non-tariff barriers), which pushed up the cost of the
inputs used throughout the chain of production. By
eliminating competitive pressure from imports,
protection resulted in wider profit margins, making
import substitution sectors and sectors catering
exclusively to the domestic market extremely lucrative.
This meant that more efficient firms producing goods in
which the country had revealed comparative advantages
had a disincentive to export.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, institutions to
promote and develop exports have another important
role: to remove all obstacles that hinder this activity.
This involves improving infrastructure, streamlining
bureaucratic procedures, providing suitable financing
conditions, adjusting the tax burden, expanding market
access, increasing information availability and
encouraging practices that enhance productivity and
quality. Trade openness has drastically reduced the
degree of nominal and effective protection, although
exchange-rate appreciation has affected the relative
prices of tradable goods in most of the region’s countries,
creating another type of anti-export bias. Any export
promotion policy must be based on three pillars: policies
to reduce the export sector’s vulnerability to exchange-
rate volatility or misalignment, an appropriate protection
structure for producers and consumers and a system of
non-distorting incentives. It should be borne in mind
that the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures prohibits the use of fiscal or
financial incentives that are specific to certain production
sectors or branches of activity.
Unquestionably, the sectoral composition of
external sales ref lects a country’s degree of
development,  resource endowment,  average
productivity and technological advancement. In other
words, at any given time, the volume and composition
of a country’s exports are limited by its production
and technology structure.  The structure of
comparative advantages and the removal of distortions
and flaws in the domestic market define what products
a country can export today, while its policies on
technology, investment and education determine what
it will be able to export in the medium and long terms.
When countries fail to invest in technology training,
human resources development and infrastructure, their
policies to promote and develop exports will probably
not be viable, since underdevelopment in these areas
makes it necessary to compensate firms for the high
systemic costs of producing each unit of the good or
service to be exported. In the long run, these exports
are not sustainable once subsidies are reduced or
eliminated.
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As part of a broad effort by ECLAC to propose
effective policies for changing production patterns with
social equity in the region’s open economies, the
countries’ systems for promoting and developing exports
were analysed. This edition of Latin America and the
Caribbean in the world economy focuses on the
experience of Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean, while the next edition will look at the policies
and institutions of the South American countries.
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM)
An assessment of the institutional framework for
promoting exports in Mexico and the countries of Central
America and CARICOM and an analysis of domestic
and external constraints on export promotion show that
activities in this regard play an important role but are
not enough in themselves to increase exports. The small
economies of the Caribbean have lost market share
outside CARICOM. In the absence of a suitable
macroeconomic environment, certain aspects of systemic
competitiveness are essential, such as physical and
technological infrastructure, financial intermediation,
human resources development, trade facilitation and
non-price aspects of competitiveness (rules, international
standards, quality). The contribution of export promotion
instruments is still limited in terms of their impact on
the formation of linkages between different sectors of
the countries’ production structures. Furthermore, the
recent diversification of Mexican, Central American and
Caribbean exports has been determined more by the
decisions of foreign firms and preferential access to the
United States market than by traditional export
promotion and development instruments. This means
that export promotion activities must be seen as part of
the institutional structure of business services, whose
existence facilitates but does not determine the decision
to export.
The institutional framework for export development
was designed for the explicit purpose of steering
production towards external markets. However, the
goods exported by Mexico, Central America and some
Caribbean countries since their economies were opened
up do not come from a pre-existing supply of export
products, but rather from a new supply generated by
foreign investment and preferences in the target markets.
In turn, this new specialization, which is based on
international production sharing arrangements, has been
criticized as having too few linkages with the rest of the
economy and no sunk costs; this situation gives firms a
great deal of mobility, while giving the host countries
little bargaining power in relation to these firms.
Although some institutions have impact assessment
systems, the effectiveness of export promotion activities
is very hard to gauge. Export performance hinges on
the national and international economic environment;
as a result, export development policies, however well
designed and appropriate, may not lead to an increase
in external sales. In times of global economic slowdown,
indicators such as export growth or growth in the number
of export firms may decline even though sound export
promotion policies are in place. Similarly, in boom
periods, exports and the number of export firms may
increase without export promotion being the trigger.
All the countries of the region have used similar
export incentives. All the Central American countries
have provided export subsidies by giving export firms
exemptions from income tax and import duties, although
exports to the regional market are excluded from these
benefits. Since 1985 Mexico’s incentives have consisted
mainly of import tax exemptions, although its incentive
systems have virtually disappeared, primarily because
of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
requirements. Globalization and regional integration
have tended to reduce the economic and policy flexibility
enjoyed by the CARICOM countries. The tariff reduction
resulting from these processes force the countries to
expand their tax base, thereby limiting their ability to
offer tax incentives and, in general, to implement a
discriminatory economic policy.
In the context of the Doha Round, a procedure was
established for extending the transition period provided
for in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (article 27, paragraph 4). Under this procedure,
export subsidies, which are prohibited because they are
contingent on export performance, must be gradually
phased out starting in 2008 and must be completely
eliminated by the end of 2009. In the case of the Central
American countries, such subsidies consist of income
tax exemptions for export firms.
A compelling argument for changing the kinds of
export incentives offered is that even though export firms
are the most successful and fastest-growing sector of
the economy, they do not contribute to fiscal income.
Currently, income tax exemptions apply to two different
categories of firms: (i) foreign firms that operate on a
cost-centre basis and do not generate profits, for which
the income tax exemption is irrelevant, as the tax is paid
in the country of origin, where the profits are generated;
and (ii) foreign firms that do generate profits but do not
pay income tax in the host country, paying it instead in
the country of origin under the global income concept.
In view of these circumstances, a sensible solution would
be to negotiate double taxation treaties providing for
the payment of income tax in the country in which the
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1 In Central America, incentives are provided only for exports to countries outside the region.
profits are generated and for a corresponding reduction
in the income tax payable in the firms’ countries of
origin. There are also domestic firms that do not pay
income tax because they operate under special regimes,
and these are the ones that really reap the full benefit of
the exemption. As countries cannot extend income tax
exemptions to all firms, they should set their income tax
rates at internationally competitive levels.
Moreover, in order to boost the production of goods
for export, incentives should be designed to promote
domestic production regardless of the target market and
of whether the products are traditional or non-traditional.
This would not only bring them into line with
international trade rules, but would also help to make
more national products available for export directly and
automatically, without demanding that they meet special
requirements, and indirectly by creating a network of
suppliers for the export sector. It would also be a way to
overcome one of the main obstacles that have prevented
existing incentive schemes from having a “knock-on”
effect on the country’s other productive activities and,
in the case of the Central American countries, would
even strengthen regional trade. When incentives are
granted solely for export production1 –that is, when
imported inputs are exempted from tariffs and other
specific taxes– it is very hard for domestic firms to
become suppliers for export firms. Local companies have
to pay taxes and other charges on imported inputs, and
although some countries offer rebates of such taxes, the
procedures tend to be so complicated that foreign firms
prefer to import their inputs. It is often easier and cheaper
for companies operating under special regimes to import
inputs from abroad than to purchase them locally.
The adoption of incentive schemes not contingent
on target markets and compatible with international trade
rules would also encourage the establishment of joint
export promotion programmes, especially in the
Central American countries. The enhancement of
competitiveness, which is considered the prime objective
of policies to boost production sectors, requires the
construction of a new institutional framework in the
countries of the Central American subregion and Mexico.
This institutional framework should coordinate
simultaneous actions to promote production and place
exports on international markets.
Promotion of service exports
While they have no comprehensive policies for
promoting service exports, many countries of the region
have policies to boost specific service sectors, such as
tourism, audio-visual and information services and
consulting and engineering services. Such promotional
measures are usually coordinated by the relevant
ministries, rather than the public agencies responsible
for promoting merchandise exports, which would be
more appropriate.
Like trade in goods, trade in services involves
transactions between residents of different countries,
but the ways in which services can be delivered are
more varied. The residents of the countries involved
in a transaction may temporarily go to another country
to carry it out, either to acquire services (as in the
case of international tourists) or to provide them (as
in the case of a singer who gives a concert abroad).
Trade in services that can be digitized or incorporated
into a physical medium is identical to trade in goods
because the transactions take place via electronic
media or more traditional means of transport or
communication. The WTO General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) recognizes that residents
of the same country may establish a trade relationship
in which the service provider is a foreign-owned
enterprise. This is the case when the provision of
services requires the provider to be in permanent
physical proximity to the consumer (commercial
presence). These means of international service
provision correspond to the four modalities identified
in GATS: (i) cross-border trade, (ii) consumption
abroad, (iii) provision through the establishment of a
commercial presence and (iv) provision by movement
of the supplier.
Services are not only multimodal, but also
multifunctional, since they are critically important as
the foundation of the economic and social fabric
(transport, financial services, distribution, education,
health care, communications), as a vehicle for trade and
in their own right (professional services). In
contemporary economics, the generation of value added
along the chain of production stems precisely from the
provision of services, whether supplied within goods-
producing firms or sold on the market by independent
service firms. The information and knowledge used in
producing goods and services is generated mainly in
services related to product and process design,
information technology, research and development
activities, consultancy and management, to name just a
few. Therefore, to enhance their participation in the
global economy, the Latin American and Caribbean
countries must adopt public policy measures that enable
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them to progress further in producing and trading services,
particularly more knowledge-intensive services.
The Latin American and Caribbean share of world
trade in services is relatively modest, amounting to 3.5%
in 2003, which is less than the region’s share of world
trade in goods (5.3%). The region’s leading service
exporters are Mexico and Brazil, which account for
almost 37% of the regional total.
Service exports should be encouraged in Latin
America and the Caribbean not only because services
are important, but also because the region has
accumulated a significant trade deficit in this sector. The
major service exporters are also major importers, and
this presents the countries of the region with huge
challenges in terms of adapting and strengthening
innovative instruments for boosting service activities and
promoting service exports. The aims of service export
promotion are similar to those of merchandise export
promotion: to increase the number of export firms and
the value exported, to diversify target markets and to
increase the quality and value added of the export supply.
In the case of services, however, special complications
arise. Most service transactions involve the sale of an
intangible that cannot be stored or digitized, and
generally require more or less direct and simultaneous
contact between the provider and the consumer, which
is reflected in the multiple modalities of international
service transactions.
In view of this variety of modalities, national
strategies for integration into the global service economy
must combine a range of elements, including policies on
foreign investment, migration, competition, education and
technological development; dispute settlement
mechanisms; protection of intellectual property rights;
technical standards and criteria for the accreditation of
service providers; and a number of issues closely linked
to the sphere of domestic regulation. All these
interrelationships involve particularly sensitive areas such
as culture, national security and State sovereignty and may
therefore give rise to situations in which the legitimacy
of public policy objectives is called into question.
Moreover, as services are also exported indirectly through
their incorporation into the value chain associated with
exports of goods and services, measures to encourage
service production and import substitution by goods
producers should also form part of the countries’ service
export strategies. An appropriate promotional strategy,
then, is one that links instruments and institutions with
the formulation of medium- and long-term scenarios, with
a view to creating new competitive advantages.
Accordingly, it is hard to separate policy measures to
promote the development of the production system from
those designed to promote exports.
In this connection, the debate as to whether
promotional tools should be selective or neutral is
particularly relevant in the case of services. The fastest-
growing services are produced in a highly competitive
environment and quickly become obsolete. The useful
life and competitiveness of services are constantly
vulnerable to the emergence of new actors in a market
that is increasingly globalized and open. Thus, it is hard
for States to determine, a priori, which activities will
remain “winners” long enough to enable them to recover
the resources invested in promoting those activities. The
existence of a transparent and open market is what
enables countries to choose and support the services that
seem most likely to be “winners”; at the same time, they
must take steps to create conditions in which fast-
growing segments –especially those based on
knowledge and information technologies– can be
broadened and diversified, giving rise to services with
higher value added.
Policies to promote and develop service exports
should include at least three key elements: (i) the explicit
incorporation of services into the design and
implementation of macroeconomic policies to promote
and develop the country’s production system and exports,
since, with the exception of a few traditional services
such as tourism, transport, telecommunications,
construction and engineering, economic policies tend
to focus on firms that produce and export goods (in the
mining, fishing, agricultural and industrial sectors);
(i i)  the strengthening of the technological and
telecommunications infrastructure, together with long-
term investments for continuously upgrading the
country’s human resources; in Latin America, Costa Rica
is an example of a country that is strengthening its service
industries by making long-term investments in education
and infrastructure; and (iii) the modernization of specific
rules and regulations in each segment of the service
sector, with a view to retaining and strengthening those
of a prudential nature and those that encourage
competition in the domestic market.
The primary concern should be to give priority to
integrating service exporters into the formal economy,
defining support instruments on the basis of the four
modes of service provision. At the same time, given the
precariousness of the public resources available for
export promotion, the appropriateness and effectiveness
of the measures implemented should be constantly
monitored. The countries should have a well-defined
strategy for achieving sustainable export development.
To this end, they should adopt measures in the areas of
supply and demand (improvement of market access and
cost reduction, for example) that help to increase the
technology-intensiveness of services and reduce
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productivity differences between sectors and between
firms in the same sector.
Institutional improvements in areas such as
electronic signatures and billing, document encryption,
digital literacy and better access to information and
communication technologies are essential if countries
are to take full advantage of electronic commerce and
other means of reducing transaction costs and
overcoming existing information asymmetries.
Lastly, regional measures to expand service exports
are very important. Experience has shown that the natural
economic environment for the region’s service exporters
is found mostly in the markets of Latin America and the
Caribbean. This is due not only to geographical
proximity but also to cultural similarities, which largely
determine the degree to which services provided from
abroad are accepted. A number of trade facilitation
activities can be undertaken at the regional level.
Priority areas include the following: (i) the exchange
of experiences in meetings and contacts between
government officials responsible for implementing
development policies; (ii) cooperation with regard to
trade intelligence and the development of the region’s
image, and dissemination of the main available sources
of trade information; and (iii) the adoption by
governments of region-wide promotional measures
essentially involving the mutual recognition of
academic degrees, records and technical standards;
agreements on double taxation and double social
security contributions; protection and promotion of
investments; and facilitation of the temporary
movement of individuals –especially business people
and their representatives– through initiatives such as
the issuance of a regional business visa.
3. Highlights of trade and trade negotiations
From Doha to Cancún: the development dimension in
WTO negotiations
The fifth WTO Ministerial Conference (Cancún,
September 2003) ended without results, thus dashing
the countries’ hopes that the new round of multilateral
trade talks launched in Doha in late 2001 would become
a true “development round”.
In the two years of preparatory work and at the
Cancún Conference itself, developing countries’
demands and proposals in relation to the tasks agreed
upon in Doha received little attention. In Doha, the
participating ministers had pledged to ensure that the
benefits deriving from the increased opportunities and
welfare gains generated by the multilateral trading
system were extended to all members of WTO, and had
affirmed that enhanced market access, balanced rules
and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical
assistance and capacity-building programmes had
important roles to play in that regard.
Moreover, it had been intended that the Doha
negotiations should give priority to the interests of
developing countries, meaning that the participants were
to focus, among other things, on addressing outstanding
issues; guaranteeing full compliance with provisions on
special and differential treatment; correcting and
preventing restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets; reducing or eliminating tariff peaks,
high tariffs, tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers in
respect of exports; and implementing and interpreting
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) in a manner
supportive of public health, by promoting both access
to existing medicines and research and development into
new medicines.
The failure to reach a consensus in Cancún shows
how hard it is to translate rhetoric into action for
effectively incorporating the development dimension
into the multilateral trading system. The weakening of
the multilateral framework is forcing developing
countries to turn to various kinds of bilateral or
plurilateral liberalization agreements as an alternative,
even though they are sometimes placed at a disadvantage
by sharp disparities in bargaining capacity and power
relations. The international trading system should be
based on clear rules that apply to all countries regardless
of their economic and political power.
The consideration of the development dimension
within WTO should focus on the factors that enable
developing countries to benefit from integration into a
world economy that is hierarchical and asymmetrical in
terms of risks and opportunities, as well as on the
characteristics that the system of multilateral principles
and rules should have in order to ensure that trade
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2 Nepal and Cambodia were recently approved for admission to the system. They are the first two least developed countries to join since the
formation of WTO. Their accession confirms the universal nature of the organization. As of late April 2004 only Nepal had completed the
process of becoming a WTO member.
3 In 2003 Panama signed a free trade agreement with Taiwan Province of China.
liberalization and openness effectively contribute to
growth. Both ideas had been taken into account in the
provisions on special and differential treatment in the
application of disciplines in the multilateral system. The
voluntary and non-binding nature of many of these
provisions, however, has detracted from their
effectiveness. The need to reformulate special and
differential treatment has become more important as the
multilateral system’s scope of application has extended
further, to the point where it is no longer limited to customs
instruments, but also covers other aspects of national
policies, such as, to a large extent, the Singapore issues.
About 80% of the 147 countries members of WTO
are developing countries.2 Two main blocs of developing
countries have participated in the discussions and
negotiations of the past few years: the African and least
developed countries, which have made demands
concerning special and differential treatment, and some
larger and more proactive countries such as Brazil, Egypt
and India, which were joined by China at the most recent
Conference. These are heterogeneous groupings in
which the interests of developed and developing
countries converge in relation to specific issues, as
happens in the Cairns Group, which promotes the
liberalization of trade in agricultural products, and
among the so-called “Friends of Anti-Dumping
Negotiations”, which advocate tighter disciplines on anti-
dumping investigations. Developed and developing
countries remain divided, however, with respect to newer
regulatory questions, such as the Singapore issues. The
Latin American and Caribbean countries have been
leaders and have even represented the majority in some
of the groupings organized around specific interests,
especially since the Seattle Conference.
To a large extent, developing countries have taken
reactive or defensive positions in response to proposals
from developed countries, but they have also tried to
participate more proactively in the negotiations. UNCTAD
has helped them to formulate a positive agenda, as this
new type of developing-country participation is called.
This endeavour includes the identification of policy
development forums and the preparation of proposals for
broadening those forums, as well as opposition to rules
that limit them and recommendations for making
international policies more coherent, strengthening WTO
and implementing agreements and decisions aimed at
improving the system’s functioning.
In the run-up to the Cancún Conference and during
the Conference itself, various country groupings
emerged, including one led by Brazil, China and India,
referred to as the Group of 20 or Group of 22, which
became well known. These groupings played a pivotal
role in the deliberations at the Conference, initially in
the area of agricultural negotiations.
In the 1990s there was a major push among the
countries of the region to negotiate in various spheres
with a view to achieving “open regionalism”. This effort
initially focused on strengthening the countries’ trade
relations with their regional partners, sometimes by
deepening integration within long-standing subregional
blocs. All the countries except Cuba are involved in the
negotiations on the formation of the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA), and most –either individually or
as members of regional groupings– are also parties to
preferential or reciprocal agreements or negotiations
with the United States and the European Union. Only
two countries –Mexico and Chile–, which are parties to
a wide array of bilateral agreements with different
partners, have also participated in negotiations and
signed agreements with Asian countries.3 Many of these
agreements include rules for which no multilateral
framework yet exists.
In the multilateral sphere, the countries of the region
have participated in different interest groups at the most
recent WTO conferences. In general, they have shown
special interest in promoting further agricultural reform,
as many Latin American countries are members of the
Cairns Group. However, they have also put forward more
proactive proposals (in line with the “positive agenda”)
in areas such as affording more policy space to
developing countries and improving certain rules (such
as those on anti-dumping), and this has clearly been the
case in relation to intellectual property and public health.
Their coordination with other developing countries was
very issue-specific during the preparation and holding
of the Doha Conference. Even within the region, the
different countries have participated in different groups,
depending on the focus of their liberalization strategies,
their specialization, their target markets and their size
and geographical location. This means that they also
differ in terms of their reluctance or willingness to
support the new issues added to the agenda, such as the
environment or the Singapore issues. Prior to the Cancún
Conference, however, these countries participated to a
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greater extent in various groupings, especially the Group
of 22 in connection with agricultural issues.
The problems encountered in WTO deliberations,
negotiations and decision-making are attracting more
interest, as reflected in a number of communications to
the most recent Conference. The lack of results in
Cancún is but the latest example of the difficulties that
have emerged with the multilateral trading system’s
methods of work and decision-making, which attest to
the fact that WTO faces new, more complex challenges
owing to the increase in the number of member countries
and in the number of topics considered in its debates.
These challenges arise in areas such as transparency, the
WTO work process and its effects on the participation
of its 147 members, the role of the secretariat and the
decision-making process, the dispute settlement system
and so forth.
With regard to transparency, guidelines have been
formulated on how the Ministerial Conferences should
take place and proposals for improvement have been
put forward. Specifically, a group of developing
countries –including Cuba, Honduras and the
Dominican Republic– made a number of
recommendations on the definition of the agenda, the
role of the Committee of the Whole, the designation of
facilitators and consultation procedures, among other
matters. Some of these recommendations were
supported at the most recent Conference. In addition,
it seems that the organization of the negotiations ran
counter to the interests of these countries, since their
areas of concern were diluted among various
negotiating groups, as has happened in the case of
implementation-related issues and special and
differential treatment since the Doha Conference.
The number of members and the need for consensus
are definitely among the main causes for concern with
regard to the decision-making process, and the
secretariat’s role in that process has also attracted
attention and criticism. For example, CARICOM has
pointed out that the WTO secretariat should include more
experts from developing countries. The dispute
settlement system also poses problems for developing
countries with regard to how they should deal with cases
in which they may be interested or involved.
The developing countries do not have enough
resources to devote to the many events held for
discussions or negotiations, which cover a growing
number of increasingly complex issues. This means that
they find it hard to meet the multiple demands of the
organization’s regular work, as well as the preparation
and holding of formal and informal meetings and the
“green room” meetings involving a limited number of
delegations. Although some of their recommendations were
implemented in Cancún, recognition of these problems in
the system and of the need for reform has gained
momentum in the wake of the criticism levelled at WTO
even by developed countries, particularly the European
Union, for the Conference’s failure to produce results.
In general terms, this situation has drawn
attention to the governance of the multilateral system
and to the need for new approaches to cope with
differences and correct imbalances. Both the member
governments and the WTO secretariat have developed
strategies to strengthen the system’s credibility, which
include measures to improve the dissemination of
information, discussions with domestic actors,
linkages with non-governmental organizations, etc.
This, in turn, is related to domestic governance, which
is no less important for enabling the countries to
design development strategies and defend –in the
various negotiations, at different levels, in which they
are involved– proposals that would help them
implement those strategies.
As ECLAC has pointed out, different institutions
–multilateral, subregional and national– have
complementary roles to play in tackling development
tasks (ECLAC, 2002). Given the clear interdependence
between the negotiations held at these levels, societies
and governments should seek to foster complementarity
in their institutional development.
The effects of China’s accession to WTO on economic
relations with Latin America and the Caribbean
In 2003 China again surprised the world with a
huge expansion in its external trade, which made it the
world’s fourth largest exporter and third largest
importer. Its exports surged by 35% and its imports,
by 40%, with the result that its level of trade exceeds
that of Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole.
This is particularly striking in view of the fact that, in
1990, the region exported twice as much as China did
(see table 1). As noted previously, China is becoming
a very important market for some countries of the
region (see figure 6).
In the past two years the weight of intra-Asian trade
in the international economy has increased and new
patterns of export specialization have been established.
In the biennium 2002-2003 merchandise trade between
China and Japan exceeded the US$ 120-billion mark,
thus continuing the explosive growth posted for five
straight years. Even more significantly, China overtook
the United States, also for the first time, as the primary
origin of Japanese imports, reaching 21.3% of the total
over the same period, while its exports to the United
States exceeded those of Japan. China is thus
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Figure 6
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): RELATIVE PROPORTION OF EXPORTS TO CHINA, 2003
(Percentages of total trade with the world and with Asia)
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Table 1
CHINA: RELATIVE SHARE OF EXTERNAL TRADE IN DIFFERENT REGIONS
AND COUNTRIES, 1990 AND 2003
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Exports  Imports
Billions of Percentages of  Billions of Percentages ofRegions/Countries/Years dollars  worldwide total dollars worldwide total
1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003
World 3 448 7 274 100.0 100.0 3 538 7 557 100.0 100.0
United States 394 724 11.4 10.0 517 1 306 14.6 17.3
European Union (15) 1 509 2894 43.8 39.8 1 558 2 914 44.0 38.6
Japan 288 472 8.3 6.5 235 383 6.7 5.1
China 62 438 1.8 6.0 53 413 1.5 5.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 150 387 4.3 5.3 119 350 3.4 4.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
official information for Latin America and the Caribbean.
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consolidating its status as a major player in world trade,
on the basis of its strong trade relationship with Japan,
the newly industrialized economies of Asia and the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
According to the investment projections of leading
Japanese companies, production in northern Asia
should become even more closely integrated in both
the short and long terms, stimulated by the growth of
intra-industry and intra-firm trade in sectors making
intensive use of information and communication
technologies.
Most studies predict that China’s membership of
WTO since 11 December 2001 will have a strong impact
on trade through the significant gains which China is
likely to achieve in terms of access to fast-growing
markets in the global economy, at the expense of exports
from other developing nations, especially the low-
income countries of southern Asia and the western
hemisphere. Estimates of how strong this impact will
be, however, vary widely.
In 2003 China accounted for about 6.05% and
2.54% of world exports of goods and commercial
services, respectively. Some analysts think that China’s
output growth as a result of its accession to WTO will
be concentrated in the textile and clothing industry, to
the detriment of agriculture and the automotive sector.
Even China’s capital- and technology-intensive export
sectors specialize in labour-intensive assembly
operations. In fact, the Chinese economy’s large supply
of cheap labour is considered to be its most important
source of competitiveness, as its labour market consists
of an estimated 712 million workers, 499 million of
whom engage in agriculture-related activities in rural
areas of the country’s interior.
There is evidence, however, that China is gaining
market share in capital- and technology-intensive goods
and losing it in labour-intensive goods, including most
of its main textile exports. Thus, on the one hand, the
significant growth in Chinese-Japanese trade referred
to above has been stimulated by the expansion of
Japanese exports of capital goods and manufactured
production inputs, such as semiconductors, electronic
parts and accessories, metalworking machinery and
automatic cranes, in addition to traditional exports of
iron and steel products. On the other hand, the growth
of Chinese exports to Japan is led by shipments of
machinery, which are in this position for the first time
and are displacing traditional textile products. Shipments
of office, communications and telephone equipment have
also increased significantly, revealing new patterns of
intra-industry export specialization and China’s
advancement towards more high-technology
manufactures.
The impact of China’s accession to WTO on Latin
America will mainly be felt in traditional trade,
structured according to revealed comparative advantages
based on the relative supply of production resources.
The net static effect on the region will be produced by
the combination of increased exports to China –which,
in turn, will result from improved conditions of access
to its market and from its economic growth– and the
potentially threatening impacts associated with keener
competition from Chinese products in both domestic and
third markets. Specifically, the competitiveness of
Chinese products, as revealed by the profile of imports
of these products to Latin America and the Caribbean,
will result in the displacement of locally produced
textiles, clothing and footwear, as well as plastics and
rubber manufactures.
Except in the case of Mexico, the share of
manufactures, mainly light industry products, in Latin
American exports is not as high as in most Asian nations.
However, the region’s exports go mainly to the United
States, which is also the main market for China. Unlike
South-East Asia, which benefits from significant
complementary effects (growth of intra-industry trade,
cross-investment, strategic alliances), Latin America and
the Caribbean has much more limited and circumscribed
prospects in this area, confined to the intra-industry trade
that takes place in certain links of the production chain
in the automotive, electronics and information
technology sectors. Latin America and the Caribbean is
also unlikely to benefit directly from growth and
liberalization in the infrastructure sector, including ports
and airports, with the possible exception of a small group
of Brazilian and Argentine companies. The same is true
of tourism and professional services, where cultural
distance adds to the physical distance.
China’s new affinities and potential
complementarities with Brazil stem from the two
countries’ shared positions on major issues of the agenda
being negotiated in the multilateral economic system,
in particular the Doha Development Round of WTO. As
indicated previously, at the WTO Ministerial Conference
in Cancún, China largely agreed with the positions taken
by Brazil and 11 other Latin American countries with
regard to the agricultural agenda and the Singapore
issues. Brazil became the leader and spokesperson of a
coalition of developing countries dubbed the Group of
20+, which considered that the joint proposal on
agriculture put forward by the European Union and the
United States fell far short of the vision reflected in the
Doha mandate and threatened to compromise all the
negotiations. The Group of 20+ submitted an alternative
proposal that included an ambitious plan for eliminating
subsidies and a formula for giving differential market
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access to developed and developing countries. The
formation of that group and its continued existence, even
though some of the 12 Latin American members
eventually dropped out, preferring not to jeopardize their
chances of concluding free trade agreements with the
United States, has been interpreted in Brasilia and
Beijing as a triumph for the developing world.
Brazil is virtually the only country for which China
was not only one of the main target markets for exports
and a source of imports throughout the 1990s, but also a
partner with which it has a shared vision with respect to
many of the key issues being discussed and defined in
international trade organizations. In both countries there
are broad sectors that fear the establishment of regional
protection measures that will restrict the external
integration of the actors involved. In the 1990s the two
countries’ positive political dialogue was supplemented
by an expanding trade relationship. In the past two years
Brazil’s exports to China have outstripped those of Japan
and the ASEAN countries, as China became the country’s
second most important target market, after the United
States. Brazil’s imports from China were surpassed only
by those of Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole is
benefiting from the fact that China is now subject to
WTO-administered trade disciplines and, in general,
from the possibility of submitting complaints to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body with regard to practices that
adversely affect its rights. In areas in which multilateral
regulations are either absent or incomplete, as in the case
of agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping practices, the
Latin American and Caribbean region and China have a
common interest in reforming the rules and eliminating
provisions that are too restrictive or arbitrary. As has
been demonstrated in the recent work of WTO, China
can indeed be a valuable ally.
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Introduction
Trade in goods and services in Latin America
and the Caribbean in 2002-2003
Chapter I
Estimated export figures for most of the countries in the region for 2003, in volume and value
terms, show a significant expansion in comparison with the same period of the preceding
year, and in contrasts with the paltry performance observed in the 2001-2002 biennium. The
rally in exports in value terms exceeded 10% in ten countries, in particular Brazil and Argentina,
compared with 2002, when only a few Latin American countries managed to increase either
the volume or the value of their exports. Agricultural and mining products, especially copper
and iron benefited from the recovery in prices thanks to the favourable international situation,
at the same time as the prices of manufactures remained on the decline. The net effect was a
slight improvement in the region’s terms of trade. Imports into several countries in the region
expanded although the leading importers, that is, Brazil, Mexico and above all Venezuela,
continued to restrict their purchases from abroad. Reversing their fall of 0.6% in 2002, the
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean will grow by approximately 1.5% in 2003,
although preliminary estimates, which put rates at higher levels, were not achieved owing to
a lower economic activity in Uruguay, Dominican Republic and, above all, Venezuela (ECLAC,
2003d). GDP is expected to grow by 4.5% in 2004.
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Table I.1
CHANGES IN THE VOLUME OF WORLD TRADE AND
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 2000-2004
(Percentages)
Exports Gross domestic product
Institution
2000 2001 2002 2003a 2004b 2000 2001 2002 2003a 2004b
WTO 11.0 -1.5 2.5 4.5 7.5 3.8 1.5 1.7 2.0 3.7
UNCTAD 10.8 -0.9 2.0 ... ... 3.9 1.2 1.9 ... ...
DESA/UNCTAD 12.3 -0.8 3.8 5.1 7.3 3.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.5
IMF 12.5 0.1 3.1 4.5 6.8 4.0 1.3 1.8 2.7 3.8
World Bank 13.1 -0.7 3.0 4.6 7.9 3.8 1.3 1.9 2.0 3.0
OECD c 12.8 0.0 2.6 4.0 7.8 ... ... ... ... ...
United Nationsd 12.3 -0.8 3.8 5.1 7.3 3.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects
and the Developing Countries, 2004, Washington, D.C., September 2003; table 1.1, p. 3; World Trade Organization (WTO) (http://www.wto.org);
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2004, Washington, D.C., April 2004; Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), Economic Outlook, November 2003, Paris, p. 4; United Nations/Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA),
World Economic Situation and Prospects 2004, New York; table I.1, p. 4; UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2003, New York, September,
tables 1.1 and 3.1, pp. 2 and 42.
a Preliminary estimates.
b Projections.
c Arithmetic mean between growth in exports and imports.
d The data corresponding to GDP have been adjusted by the purchasing power parity (PPP), United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs.
Following a slight upturn in 2002, the world
economy seems to be advancing towards a moderate
increase in 2003 and the first few months of 2004,
although there is much uncertainty as to the vigour and
extent of this growth over time (see table I.1). The main
concerns are centred on the United States’ fiscal and
current account deficits, the cooling of the European
economies in the euro zone and the weak recovery of
the Japanese economy. According to data from the World
Trade Organization (WTO), world trade picked up in
2002 and 2003, with volume expanding by close to 2.5%
and 4.5%, respectively (WTO, 2003h, 2004). The
recovery was more pronounced in the developing
countries, especially those of East, South and South-
East Asia, with strong increases in exports from China
and India.
In the previous edition of Latin America and the
Caribbean in the World Economy, emphasis was placed
on the fact that the expansion of Latin American exports
towards new markets in Asia was counterbalancing the
effect of the sharp economic slowdown in the main
traditional import markets, such as the United States and
the European Union (ECLAC, 2003c, figure I.7). In
2003, a better performance by the Asian economies,
including Japan, was reflected in stronger demand for
Latin American products, such as meats, fresh fish,
cereals, coffee, forest products, some minerals, such as
copper, iron, tin, nickel and lead and various agricultural
raw materials. Although the Asian countries combined
account for between 8% and 13% of the region’s total
external sales, according to whether Mexico is included
or not, they are particularly important for Chile, Peru,
Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil, which export to those
countries between 8% and 32% of their total exports
(see chapter VI concerning China’s potential as a market
for exports from the region).
This chapter reviews the main trends in the trade in
goods and services in Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2002 and preliminary data for 2003. Section A is
devoted to the recent performance of the international
trade in goods and its impact on the region’s trade.
Exports from East, South and South-East Asia expanded
strongly while China’s demand for commodities, many
of which are exported by Latin America, was buoyant.
Section B analyses the performance of the trade in goods
and services in the region in the last two years, with
emphasis on the current account adjustments. The
determining factors of the performance of the trade in
goods are examined in section C. Attention is paid, in
particular, to the importance of trade within the region,
whether between countries that are members of regional
integration schemes or between those without formal
links. Lastly, section D considers in greater detail the
patterns of trade in services in the 2002-2003 biennium.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy • 2002-2003 31
Figure I.1
GROWTH IN THE VOLUME OF WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information
from the World Trade Organization (WTO), http://www.wto.org and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), International Financial Statistics.
a Preliminary estimates for the full year (world GDP growth and volume exported).
A. International trade in goods and services in 2002-2003
1. The world economy in 2002-2003
In 2002, the world economy experienced a slight
recovery compared with the sharp slowdown
recorded in 2001, when a series of factors led to a
reduction in international trade flows both in value
and in volume terms. With production rallying and
some degree of calm returning to international
financial markets, the third quarter of 2002 saw an
upturn in the exports of both goods and services. In
the first few months of 2003, geopolitical factors,
foremost among them the tensions in the Middle
East and the war in Iraq, introduced new
uncertainties in the prospects for economic growth.
Although these tensions remain, the gradual
restoration of confidence among economic agents
has contributed to an improvement in preliminary
estimates for the growth of economic activity by
specialized multilateral organizations. These prospects
boosted exports of goods and services in 2002-2003
(see figure I.1).
The most recent growth figures for output in the
United States are in line with the more optimistic
projections of a recovery starting in the third quarter of
2003, with an expansion of 2.5% for the whole year and
almost 3.5% growth for 2004 (United Nations, 2004).
Public spending, particularly on defence, personal
consumer spending and fixed investment, especially
sales of equipment and software are determining factors
of the expansion of the United States economy (BEA,
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2003a; 2003b; 2004a). In Japan, the increase in private
consumption and investment pushed up growth forecasts
for the whole year. Growth in output in the first three
quarters of the year exceeded 2% on average and was
accompanied by a rise in fixed gross capital formation
and purchases of machinery, which up to October
experienced an inter-annual increase of 13% compared
with the same period of 2002. In the euro zone, economic
activity maintains symptoms of cooling recorded at the
end of 2002. According to the Statistical Office of the
European Communities, during the first half-year, output
remained invariable while in the third and fourth quarters
of the year, quarterly growth did not exceed 0.4%
(EUROSTAT, 2003, 2004a; OECD, 2003a).
The meagre growth in the output in Latin America
and the Caribbean made the region the slowest growing
among all the developing economies in 2003, and the
second most sluggish of all the regions, bettering only
the low rates recorded in the euro zone. Despite
outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
the developing economies of Asia, especially those of
East and South-East Asia, expanded by an estimated
4.7% and 2.5%, respectively (ADB, 2003a; 2003b;
2004). In particular, China recorded a growth rate of
almost 9.1% (EIU, 2003a; ADB, 2004).1 In addition,
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia
experienced higher rates of growth, consistently posting
rates of 4% and 6%, respectively, in recent years. The
Middle Eastern, North African and Saharan economies
also posted important gains in output thanks to upswings
in consumption and investment, especially in the energy
and petroleum sectors (see figure I.2).
1 The economic authorities of China are adopting temporary measures to reduce credit and investment in order to avoid a possible overheating
of the economy and reduce the risk its exposure to a financial bubble. Moreover, they face strong external pressure to devalue their
currency.
Figure I.2
VARIATION IN WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY PRINCIPAL
COUNTRY AND SUBREGION, 2002-2003
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of information supplied by the United Nations.
a Preliminary estimates.
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2. Trade in goods: the dynamic of purchasing markets and products
Preliminary IMF data relating to the export value of
merchandise for the different countries project growth
at approximately 16% for the entire year 2003. As in
recent years, developing countries’ exports have been
the most dynamic segment, with China’s persistent
buoyant growth continuing to be the most outstanding.
Although the negative growth in Latin American
exports was reversed, average aggregate growth, as
discussed later, was lower than in other regions,
standing below the world average (see table I.2).
By the end of 2002, the value of world exports
was back at the 2000 level. Growth of just over 4%
cancelled out the fall by a similar rate recorded in
2001. Exports from the European Union and the
countries of South, East and South-East Asia and to a
lesser extent those of Japan, contributed to the
Table I.2
WORLD EXPORTS BY REGION AND PRINCIPAL ECONOMIES, 2001-2003
(Billions of current dollars and percentages)
Value exports of goods Annual variation
Countries/Regions
2001 2002 2003c 2001 2002 2003c
World 6 128 6 385 7 393 -3.7 4.2 15.8
Industrialized countries 3 872 3 984 4 555 -3.2 2.9 14.3
United States 731 694 725 -6.4 -5.1 4.4
Canada 260 252 271 -6.1 -3.1 7.6
Australia 63 65 70 -1.6 3.2 8.1
Japan 403 417 472 -15.9 3.5 13.2
New Zealand 14 14 16 3.0 5.1 14.8
Europea 2 363 2 504 2 951 0.6 5.9 17.8
Austria 67 73 88 3.9 9.0 20.9
Germany 571 613 749 3.8 7.4 22.2
Belgium 190 213 252 1.1 12.1 18.3
Denmark 51 56 66 2.0 10.1 17.9
Spain 115 124 157 1.7 7.2 26.3
Finland 43 45 53 -5.9 4.2 17.2
France 296 309 362 -1.3 4.4 17.0
Netherlands 216 222 265 3.3 2.8 19.2
Ireland 83 87 92 7.7 5.3 5.6
Italy 244 253 287 1.7 3.7 13.5
Luxembourg 8 9 11 0.0 12.5 18.8
Norway 59 60 69 -1.5 0.8 14.5
United Kingdom 267 276 306 -5.3 3.4 10.9
Sweden 76 81 99 -12.9 7.0 22.5
Switzerland 78 84 97 4.0 7.7 15.8
Developing countries 2 256 2 401 2 836 -4.6 6.5 18.1
Africa 119 121 148 -5.8 1.4 22.1
Developing Asia 1 183 1 279 1 519 -6.6 8.1 18.8
India 43 49 56 2.1 13.9 13.5
East and South-East Asiab 1 036 1 142 1 355 -7.1 10.3 18.6
China 266 326 438 6.8 22.6 34.5
Philippines 33 36 37 -17.8 11.0 1.7
Hong Kong
(Special Administrative Region of China) 190 200 224 -5.9 5.3 11.8
Malaysia 88 93 104 -10.4 6.0 11.5
Taiwan, Province of China 123 131 134 -17.1 6.5 2.4
Republic of Korea 150 162 193 -12.8 8.0 19.3
Singapore 122 125 144 -11.6 2.8 15.2
Thailand 65 69 81 -5.8 6.2 17.1
Central and Eastern Europe 358 393 503 5.4 9.6 28.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 356 358 388 -4.1 0.6 8.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
“International Financial Statistics” [on line] November and December 2003, and April 2004 (http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
ifsbrowser.aspx?branch=ROOT), and official information from Latin America and the Caribbean.
a Includes only the 15 European countries mentioned.
b Includes only China, Philippines, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), Malaysia, Taiwan, Province of China, Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Thailand.
c Preliminary figures.
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recovery of trade flows in 2002, insofar as a strong
contraction in United States exports was observed. An
analytical disaggregation of exports and imports in 2001-
2002 by major country and world region, showing both
increase and contribution to total growth, serves to quantify
the role that the developing countries have played in the
expansion of world trade in recent years (see figure I.3a
and I.3b).
In 2002, the remarkable expansion in exports from
developing countries, in particular those from South, East
and South-East Asia, accounts for 63% of the growth in
world trade, while the developed countries contributed the
remaining 37% (see figure I.3b). The scant contribution of
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is due to
the limited increase in their exports over the year. China,
whose exports in 2001 were equivalent to 78% of Latin
America’s, in 2002 added close to US$ 60 billion to the
total, that is, practically all that Brazil exported during that
period. China’s increase represents 1% of world trade or
one percentage point of the 5% total, that is, 23% of the
increase in the world export value. In 2003, exports from
China outstripped by 13% the total exported by Latin
America and the Caribbean.
In this context, it is appropriate to underscore the
interdependence of trade flows, which are the result of
complex relations of buying and selling, between firms of
different countries, of raw materials, inputs, parts and
components of products processed in distant parts of the
globe. This corroborates the statement that trade is not a
zero sum game in which the increase in exports in some
countries would necessarily represent the decrease in the
exports of others. The expansion of external sales of
countries such as China, India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Province of China, but also
of Central and Eastern countries converts them into new
poles of demand for products of Latin America and the
Caribbean. For its part, China has incorporated itself into
the global trade flows with an extraordinary demand for
agricultural raw materials and minerals.2 As a result of their
forthcoming incorporation into the expanded market of the
European Union, principal destination for garment exports,
chemicals, paper and cardboard, machinery and electrical
appliances as well as for iron and steel manufactures,
Central and Eastern European countries represent a
potential demand for products from the developing
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Figure I.3a
WORLD TRADE AND EXPORTS: GROWTH, CONTRIBUTION AND IMPACT,
BY REGIONS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2002a
(Growth rates and percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information supplied by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a The contribution is the ratio of the relative growth of each country’s exports during the period 2001-2002 to the absolute
variation in world exports between 2001 and 2002. The sign indicates the direction of that contribution. The impact rate is
measured as the contribution of the growth of exports of the country to the total growth of world exports. The sign indicates
the direction of that share.
-
2 The demand for steel from China could amount to 257 million metric tons, in 2003, an increase of 22% compared with 2002, according to the
International Iron and Steel Institute of Brussels and it is estimated that it could rise another 12.8% in 2004. Without China, world demand for
steel would have grown by as little as 1.2% from 2002 on, whereas China’s demand helps to drive the growth rate up to 6.4% (“El acero sube por
mayor demanda en Asia y débil oferta en Estados Unidos”, El Mercurio (The Wall Street Journal Americas, 15 October 2003, p. B9).
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Figure I.3b
WORLD TRADE AND IMPORTS: GROWTH, CONTRIBUTION AND IMPACT
BY SELECTED REGIONS AND COUNTRIES, 2002 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information supplied by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
a The contribution is the ratio of the relative growth of  each country’s imports during the period 2001-2002 to the absolute variation in world imports
between 2001 and 2002. The sign indicates the direction of that contribution. The impact ratio is measured as the contribution of the growth in the
country’s imports to total growth of world imports. The sign indicates the direction of that share.
-
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Box I.1
THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Following lengthy negotiations and the
eventual satisfaction of the European
Union’s demanding admissions
criteria, 10 countries –eight from
Central and Eastern Europe together
with Cyprus and Malta– acceded to
the Uniona on 1 May 2004. Although
the association transcends the
economic sphere, the removal of non-
tariff barriers and restrictions on the
movement of persons, goods and
capital will undoubtedly have an
impact on trade and investment. The
European Union’s current financial
commitments for the period 2004-
2006 to facilitate the association
amount to almost 41 billion euros and
will be used especially to finance the
reforms derived from the
implementation of structural policies
and policies for modernization of the
agricultural sector.
The table below presents data on the
structure of these economies:
Exports from the European Union to
the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe account for more than 12% of
European exports, while imports
originating in those countries account
for more than 10% of total European
imports. Data for 2002 indicate that this
group of countries has a relative weight
similar to that of Latin America (not
including Mexico) since it accounted for
2.3% of exports and 2.7% of global
imports. On the one hand, for the
region, the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe  are major competitors
on European markets in specific areas,
such as textiles, a few agricultural
products, steel and others. However,
the economic expansion of these
economies in transition and the wider
European market will signify
opportunities for the export of other
products from Latin America, such as
soybean and other grains, the iron and
copper manufactures and others.
a The countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have acceded to the European Union are the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Copenhagen criteria are democracy and institutional stability,
the rule of law, respect for human rights, market economy, competitive capacity and ability to comply with economic and
monetary union standards.
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ECONOMIC INDICATORS (2002)
Population (millions of inhabitants) 73.1
Exports (billions of dollars) 143.0
Imports (billions of dollars) 164.1
Current account balance (billions of dollars) -17.7
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Forecast Eastern Union”, 4 September 2003.
Note: Data for Cyprus and Malta are not included.
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) indicated that
trade between developing countries (South-South trade)
has been growing in the last few years at an average rate
of 10%, double the average for global trade. Between
1990 and 2001, the proportion of this segment in the
total of trade flows increased from 6.5% to 10.7%; or in
nominal values, trade between developing countries grew
from US$ 219 billion to US$ 640 billion. In 2001,
exports to other developing countries represented 27%
of the total exports of developing countries as a whole
and 41% of their imports originated in these same
countries. More than two thirds of this trade originated
in and was directed towards the Asian countries. In 2003,
China must surpass the United States as the main market
for the Republic of Korea.3 Exports from Latin America
to the other developing countries added US$ 82,000 or
13% of south-south trade, of which 72% were
concentrated in the same region. As analysed below,
trade within the subregional schemes represent
approximately 15% of the total exchange within the
region. On average, 40% of exports from developing
countries in Asia and Latin America (excluding Mexico)
are directed towards other developing countries. Some
items such as iron and steel, chemicals, textiles,
machinery and transport equipment, in particular office
and telecommunications equipment, agricultural and
mining products are important components of this south-
south trade (WTO, 2003h).
However, the strongest impetus to world trade
continues to come from the United States merchandise
imports. An economy equivalent to almost one third of
the world economy can have a profound influence on the
generation of world trade flows. In the last three years, it
had imported one and a half times more than it exported,
which was equivalent to more than 11% of GDP,
accumulating heavy deficits in the trade in goods, which
cannot be offset by the small surplus generated in the trade
in services.4 The larger deficits originate in consumer
3 In a recent article, Rubens Ricupero, Secretary General of UNCTAD explains the formation of the great alliance between Brazil, China,
India and South Africa during preparations for the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, owing to the economic success of the Asian
countries and the creation of autonomous sources of demand for imports from other countries (Ricupero, 2003).
4 The sum of exports and imports of the United States now corresponds to more than 19% of GDP.
5 Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela (http:///dataweb.usitc.gov).
goods, automobiles and intermediate inputs (including
oil), at a time when, in 2002-2003, United States trade
was in deficit with all its trading partners. The countries
which accumulated the largest surpluses in their trade with
the United States were China, Japan, Canada, Mexico and
Germany, which together accounted for almost 50% of
the United States total merchandise trade deficit (BEA,
2003c). A large number of countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean benefited from the increase in imports
from the United States in 2002 (see table I.3).5
In recent years, the question that analysts have been
asking is whether the United States can continue to be
the engine of global growth, if one considers the
adjustments that will be necessary to reduce the current
account deficit. The low dynamism of European Union
trade, oriented basically towards European countries that
are already integrated or in the process of integration,
makes it an unlikely candidate to replace the purchasing
power of the United States economy, principally for Latin
America and the Caribbean (see table I.4). If purchases
made within the European Union are discounted, world
trade stands at US$ 5.2 billion and the proportion of
United States imports increases from 20% to just over
23% of the total.
Trends in the prices of the main Latin American and
Caribbean export products
In the first half of 2003, uncertainties arising from
the invasion of Iraq, SARS and sluggish economic
activity in the main countries had an impact on the prices
of non-energy commodities. The fall in real terms was
not felt in the nominal dollar values owing to the
depreciation of that currency vis-à-vis other international
currencies (IMF, 2003a). In nominal values, the prices
of commodities (excluding oil) are estimated to rise by
5.8% in 2003 and by 8% in real terms in 2005 (WTO,
2003h) (see table I.5 and box I.2).
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Table I.3
UNITED STATES: GROWTH IN IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2002-2003
(Monthly and cumulative growth rates)
2002 2003 Jan.-Dec.
Subregions/Countries
Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 2002 2003
Latin America and
the Caribbean 14.2 7.1 14.7 11.6 3.6 1.2 4.8 3.1 -0.5 4.0 0.5 2.2 16.4 2.7 5.4
MERCOSUR 32.5 18.6 30.7 30.4 14.5 9.1 5.8 8.5 4.6 5.3 -4.9 4.1 5.5 8.4 9.8
Argentina 50.3 -11.9 45.3 -12.7 3.4 8.0 -0.8 -1.6 11.0 5.2 -21.6 -26.4 -6.8 5.6 -2.8
Brazil 29.4 26.2 28.6 40.2 16.7 9.8 7.1 10.7 3.0 4.7 -3.3 11.5 7.3 9.3 12.0
Uruguay 0.6 -3.7 -7.8 -12.6 17.6 -10.2 4.2 -5.8 63.6 72.4 142.0 42.0 91.9 -15.2 31.0
Paraguay 97.5 37.6 -13.1 161.8 12.9 -37.1 -2.3 4.2 -14.1 -4.1 60.8 50.5 -9.7 33.7 14.7
Chile 10.8 -14.7 6.4 10.8 6.8 10.0 -5.6 31.4 -6.0 29.0 0.8 7.5 3.6 6.4 5.2
Andean Community 21.3 -14.5 21.5 19.7 27.4 11.1 29.4 10.5 12.8 5.3 -6.2 7.5 50.8 -0.1 13.5
Bolivia -14.4 -4.6 24.9 31.2 24.7 21.5 40.7 59.7 14.1 11.9 -28.7 -5.9 57.7 -3.7 15.4
Colombia 41.9 15.5 34.7 16.2 27.7 16.4 32.4 19.4 21.1 10.5 -6.7 -6.6 -4.7 -1.6 13.2
Ecuador 46.6 46.4 59.2 26.7 18.1 -4.7 39.5 32.6 25.8 41.5 5.6 22.4 18.3 5.1 25.5
Peru 43.7 10.5 52.5 80.8 0.8 17.0 21.6 17.4 28.6 -7.4 23.3 42.4 39.1 5.0 25.1
Venezuela 6.4 -41.4 2.9 14.0 33.4 11.1 27.9 3.7 7.0 1.3 -10.9 6.4 89.5 -0.8 10.4
Mexico 8.7 7.4 10.7 5.4 -4.9 -3.9 -0.2 -2.1 -4.7 2.9 1.9 1.1 11.9 2.5 1.8
CACM 20.7 17.2 14.0 17.1 10.7 5.3 1.3 2.6 -4.6 -0.1 -2.3 -5.7 5.0 7.0 4.6
Costa Rica 16.2 36.0 23.5 19.5 10.3 8.4 5.7 7.6 -6.0 -4.1 -0.2 -6.1 -0.1 8.8 6.8
El Salvador 6.5 1.7 6.4 20.3 21.8 2.9 -24.6 0.1 -1.7 4.6 -1.1 -5.2 8.3 5.4 1.8
Guatemala 29.4 16.0 21.6 17.4 2.8 4.5 13.6 5.2 -3.7 2.4 -8.1 -7.6 8.0 8.1 5.5
Honduras 22.7 10.8 5.3 15.1 9.1 2.9 3.9 -4.4 -8.0 -1.7 -2.9 -6.6 0.7 4.4 1.5
Nicaragua 50.4 23.0 6.3 7.2 31.0 11.9 18.5 13.0 5.0 2.1 11.5 6.9 27.8 12.2 13.2
Panama 16.0 -0.7 -30.0 -14.2 -16.5 -4.4 -28.4 -22.2 47.6 13.4 6.4 -0.5 11.3 3.3 -4.1
Caribbean countries 30.7 43.1 39.7 43.0 44.8 30.0 23.2 35.7 14.8 10.7 15.4 6.4 37.2 -4.0 27.5
Bahamas 34.7 1.0 45.6 98.3 82.4 80.2 -21.6 -4.8 -14.7 -54.0 -13.9 -15.6 -9.3 46.5 3.2
Barbados -16.2 -7.4 0.0 -23.7 59.7 43.9 323.3 -16.4 8.7 -8.2 -57.6 20.2 44.8 -13.4 25.6
Belize 18.3 25.0 63.0 59.3 -21.3 -34.3 -10.8 106.7 54.0 69.9 52.9 51.9 6.9 -20.1 30.3
Guyana -36.8 -17.0 -4.8 -6.9 -6.3 27.8 17.2 12.1 -10.1 -11.0 -57.8 -15.3 1.9 -17.7 -8.4
Haiti 51.2 15.4 54.4 25.4 39.4 21.1 33.8 32.6 29.0 16.5 51.8 50.3 6.2 -3.1 30.3
Jamaica -7.3 41.1 -5.9 -2.2 25.5 -11.5 -4.1 38.3 -26.5 12.5 25.7 -9.4 -6.7 -15.1 5.1
Dominican Republic 12.5 16.4 7.3 16.3 15.3 5.9 6.0 4.9 -2.5 2.1 8.2 -6.3 15.1 -0.3 6.9
Suriname -2.1 15.0 -40.5 -23.0 112.3 -35.1 8.0 -0.9 83.3 68.6 -6.7 42.7 -42.3 -7.0 5.4
Trinidad and Tobago 76.2 142.1 122.2 126.9 113.8 55.7 59.0 123.7 68.6 53.1 40.0 18.7 91.4 2.4 76.4
Others 76.3 8.1 59.9 23.5 36.3 84.4 36.9 -1.4 -27.7 -16.6 -7.1 14.0 57.7 -24.9 22.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data supplied by the Department of Trade, Washington, D.C.
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Table I.4
EUROPEAN UNION: GROWTH OF IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, OCTOBER 2002-SEPTEMBER 2003
(Monthly and accumulated growth rates January-September)
2002 2003 Jan.-Sept.
Subregions/countries
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. 2002 2003
Latin America and
the Caribbean 5.8 -2.9 34.9 13.5 8.6 6.0 9.1 24.8 4.1 15.0 8.7 18.0 6.5 11.9
MERCOSUR 19.0 0.5 36.7 28.4 17.4 11.0 15.1 18.1 22.7 21.2 8.1 20.5 0.2 18.0
Argentina 13.8 -3.1 29.8 5.0 32.3 2.1 21.3 -0.4 4.1 8.7 7.8 22.5 18.5 10.7
Brazil 21.0 1.3 38.5 38.3 14.0 15.1 12.7 24.5 28.3 23.6 6.9 16.9 -5.1 19.8
Uruguay 39.9 31.3 54.2 -1.8 -14.1 -0.6 22.5 -5.9 43.8 42.6 47.4 58.1 21.9 21.9
Paraguay -27.4 -24.8 30.7 15.6 -40.1 -2.1 10.2 308.1 130.3 123.7 28.0 201.0 -38.2 93.2
Chile 3.9 11.2 14.4 2.4 0.4 28.6 -6.0 36.2 37.2 3.6 13.0 39.7 -2.4 16.6
Andean Community 1.6 20.5 17.0 -7.0 -18.1 -7.0 28.9 17.0 -3.8 -3.5 29.6 21.9 4.3 5.3
Bolivia -47.1 27.6 14.8 -22.5 5.3 -18.9 5.4 -3.1 23.8 -26.3 -21.1 -26.4 -44.5 -10.8
Colombia 18.8 14.8 24.7 16.3 -0.8 5.2 19.0 33.2 0.7 -6.8 60.1 28.5 -3.9 14.7
Ecuador 19.3 0.0 68.9 3.9 36.4 41.1 28.8 28.8 32.5 42.0 12.2 31.9 17.7 28.8
Peru 6.6 89.9 24.8 35.1 40.8 -4.2 19.2 29.8 28.4 -3.2 57.3 10.3 13.0 22.7
Venezuela -13.5 -18.4 -12.2 -66.3 -79.9 -40.6 48.7 -12.6 -42.8 -15.5 -10.2 26.0 3.8 -25.1
Mexico 3.2 -6.9 24.1 15.6 51.2 26.0 42.4 10.5 8.9 5.9 17.4 11.5 -15.6 19.4
CACM 23.8 25.7 51.6 15.0 51.6 14.6 7.4 35.9 -2.4 9.6 73.8 15.9 2.0 20.9
Costa Rica 41.7 40.4 54.6 7.0 70.8 18.1 5.6 31.3 -11.4 8.9 109.9 6.6 10.2 20.4
El Salvador 24.4 -40.0 62.0 55.0 16.0 -36.3 -12.8 94.9 122.7 -16.1 284.5 231.2 7.0 56.8
Guatemala 11.9 -5.1 20.0 25.5 24.5 5.2 28.9 25.6 14.6 24.7 -3.5 23.3 -24.1 18.4
Honduras -41.3 -13.9 65.3 83.3 -4.8 26.3 37.5 75.4 4.9 13.4 -21.9 -16.0 -7.2 18.9
Nicaragua -23.5 3.2 28.5 13.6 -3.3 14.8 -39.0 -34.9 -10.0 23.6 16.9 24.7 -33.9 -4.3
Panama -33.4 -33.8 26.4 24.3 97.3 -13.8 6.9 84.0 -63.4 123.5 -70.8 -55.5 7.9 -9.1
Caribbean countries -11.2 -28.6 56.4 6.0 -10.7 -11.9 -17.9 48.4 -17.8 22.8 -13.4 10.9 0.1 -0.4
Bahamas -22.4 -60.8 -23.3 45.2 -20.8 -24.6 -73.4 155.6 8.3 6.5 10.2 -6.1 41.1 7.1
Barbados -76.8 -17.5 52.2 -20.9 -38.2 -31.2 -52.3 11.9 113.9 5.0 -32.6 30.2 -24.3 -0.3
Belize 12.6 49.0 717.0 621.2 -31.6 693.9 211.1 58.4 -27.5 134.3 54.2 -40.5 -21.9 63.4
Guyana 37.6 55.3 -6.7 55.1 182.4 38.1 -10.7 64.4 160.7 -23.1 21.9 218.0 -18.6 40.1
Haiti 11.0 -30.6 1.3 -2.7 -19.2 24.8 49.2 92.4 8.8 -3.9 -3.5 71.2 -24.3 19.6
Jamaica -12.5 23.6 40.2 85.7 -23.8 -10.1 -0.4 53.3 -22.6 9.4 18.4 40.6 -12.0 10.9
Dominican Republic 59.4 -6.6 70.4 47.1 40.9 66.1 18.4 -9.1 24.6 16.4 -19.5 24.4 10.6 18.6
Suriname -40.0 51.3 72.1 6.9 85.2 10.5 35.4 586.3 53.8 496.7 -37.5 83.4 -30.5 55.8
Trinidad and Tobago 20.1 -4.3 37.7 0.4 43.2 14.9 63.2 10.8 26.8 -22.0 28.6 -9.0 6.1 17.4
Others -16.4 -36.9 112.3 -16.7 -21.9 -24.6 -26.9 41.3 -26.5 30.4 -25.9 7.0 -0.9 -10.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from EUROSTAT, “Intra and Extra EU Trade.
Monthly data” [CD-ROM] 2003.
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Table I.5
PRICES OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED BY LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1995-2003
(Indices (1995=100), in dollars and percentages)
Product/Year Unit 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003a Last price(Dec.  2003)
Agricultural products
Rice Ton 100.0 95.0 63.4 53.4 59.6 61.4 198.30
Sugar Pound 100.0 67.7 61.7 64.7 51.9 53.4 0.06
Banana Pound 100.0 108.5 95.5 132.7 121.1 85.4 0.17
Meat Pound 100.0 90.5 101.5 111.7 111.4 111.9 1.05
Shrimp Pound 100.0 113.6 116.9 115.3 89.8 88.1 0.05
Wheat Ton 100.0 72.1 66.6 72.6 84.8 84.1 170.00
Corn Ton 100.0 80.8 75.7 78.8 86.7 87.3 130.00
Soybean Ton 100.0 93.6 81.7 75.5 82.0 99.4 327.00
Soybean oil Ton 100.0 100.2 54.1 56.6 72.7 88.6 638.00
Soy meal Ton 100.0 89.9 94.8 93.9 90.7 106.6 277.00
Colombian coffee Pound 100.0 90.2 64.8 45.6 41.2 42.5 0.69
Brazilian coffee Pound 100.0 68.0 44.6 28.2 25.1 28.4 0.57
Cocoa Pound 100.0 117.2 62.0 76.0 124.2 122.5 0.74
Cotton Pound 100.0 62.5 56.7 45.9 44.3 60.7 0.74
Cowhides Kilogram 100.0 47.3 59.5 84.2 82.2 68.6 0.81
Fishmeal Ton 100.0 133.7 83.4 98.3 122.7 123.4 656.00
Wool Pound 100.0 79.5 98.3 76.5 95.4 118.2 219.90
Wood pulp Ton 100.0 50.9 77.3 52.4 48.5 53.0 448.00
Tobacco Ton 100.0 126.2 113.1 113.1 103.5 100.0 2 643.30
Minerals
Aluminium Pound 100.0 75.2 85.8 80.0 74.7 79.2 0.71
Copper Pound 100.0 56.3 61.8 53.8 53.1 60.6 1.00
Tin Pound 100.0 89.1 87.5 72.1 65.3 78.7 2.75
Iron Pound 100.0 110.0 102.6 107.0 105.9 114.8 0.31
Nickel Pound 100.0 56.3 105.0 72.2 82.3 112.0 5.48
Lead Pound 100.0 83.9 72.0 75.5 71.7 81.8 0.31
Zinc Pound 100.0 99.4 109.4 85.9 75.4 80.3 0.44
Gold Ounce 100.0 76.6 72.6 70.5 80.7 94.6 407.00
Silver Ounce 100.0 106.5 96.3 84.5 89.2 94.6 5.65
Petroleum Barrel 100.0 77.5 166.9 145.0 147.5 171.1 30.07
Compound indices
Latin American products ... 100.0 82.5 114.9 97.1 100.5 116.0
Agricultural products … 100.0 88.8 77.4 77.7 80.9 83.3
Mining productsb … 100.0 83.7 88.1 78.0 77.6 88.5
Mining productsc … 100.0 83.1 96.0 84.7 84.6 96.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Geneva, December 2003; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets,
Washington, D.C., January 2004; World Bank, Commodity Prices Data Pinksheet, Washington, D.C., December 2003.
a Index based on the average value January-December for 2003.
b Arithmetic mean excluding petroleum.
c Arithmetic mean including petroleum.
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Box I.2
RISE IN PRICES OF LATIN AMERICAN COMMODITIES
HOW LONG WILL THE CYCLE LAST?
Unexpectedly high rises in Latin
American commodity prices since the
end of 2002 and throughout 2003
contributed to a recovery in Latin
American exports. The industrial
commodity price index of the review
The Economist recorded rises of
close to 25% up to September. The
main Latin American commodities
experienced price rises of the order
of 7% and 15%, depending on
whether or not oil prices are included.
For the set of countries in the region,
the highest rises occurred in 2003:
petroleum and petroleum-based
products: 22%; oils, meals and seeds:
20%; mineral and metal products:
12%; and beverages: 5%. These four
groups of products account for 41%,
25%, 8% and 7%, respectively, of the
regional export basket.
The export value of primary
products improved in all of these
countries, except in Venezuela and
Bolivia, where short-term conditions
prevailed. Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay expanded their agricultural
exports aided especially by the rise in
the prices of soybean and soy
products (oils and meals).  Coffee
exports from Colombia, Brazil and the
Central American countries increased
following the rise in prices which was
in excess of 16% and 30%,
depending on the variety of the bean
(robust, arabica or others); Paraguay
benefited from the rise in cotton
prices (37%) and wool (24%). For
their part, Peru and Chile were
favoured by the impressive rise in the
price of copper, which at the end of
February was over US$ 1.33 per
pound, one of the highest levels in the
last three years.
For the Central American and
Caribbean countries, the greatest
stimulus came from the recovery in the
price of sugar, the main product in its
export basket. Other countries that
received a boost from the rise in prices
were Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Trinidad and Tobago and Belize, where
high oil prices –10% more than in
2002– led to growth rates of over 20%
in the mining and oil sectors (see table
I.18).
The price rises, especially in Latin
America, were due, inter alia, to the
following factors: (a) the devaluation of
the dollar, which spurred investment in
futures in raw material stock
exchanges, including copper, nickel
and gold exchanges; (b) the expansion
of new purchase markets, such as
China, India and Russia, which, given
their importance in the world economy,
pushed prices up; (c) persistent
geopolitical tensions in the middle east,
which kept oil prices high; (d) the
reduction in stocks in some major
markets such as soybean, cotton and
copper (for example, Indonesia closed
one of its main copper mines); and (e)
the renewed appeal of raw material
investment funds, which had become
low-risk diversification points under
hedging operations or positioning in
alternative assets.
While the dollar continues to
depreciate, expectations from raw
material prices will continue to be
positive. However, there is no empirical
evidence that can determine up to what
point the upward trend will last. The
only thing that economists are sure
about is that there is no long-term or
continuous trend towards a worsening
in the terms of trade, although they
recognize that relative raw material
prices deteriorated substantially over a
long period, especially in the case of
products as diverse as cotton,
aluminium, rice, sugar, banana, cocoa,
rubber, leather, wood, silver and wheat,
with annual variations of 1% or more
and cumulative falls of 60% on average
(Ocampo and Parra, 2003).
Prebisch and Singer’s hypothesis
that relative raw material prices would
trend downwards over time owing to
low income elasticity of demand of
these products implies that raw
material exports would be completely
unfavourable as a trade specialization
pattern. However, the recent expansion
in trade in this very segment of
exportable production in the developing
world seems to contradict this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the
weakness of the factors that
determined the upward trend in raw
material prices makes it doubtful that
this trend will persist at such a strong
pace for much longer.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of José Antonio Ocampo and María Angela Parra,
“The terms of trade for commodities in the twentieth century”, CEPAL Review, No. 79 (LC/G.2200-P), Santiago, Chile, April 2003;
Financial Times, 29 September 2003.
3. Trade in services: strong impetus given to trade
Trade in services recovered more strongly in 2002-
2003, after stagnating heavily in 2001. The main
expansion was due to the strong export potential of
the Asian developing countries, Central Europe and
Russia, which had higher rises than the world average.
The decrease of both imports and exports from the
Latin American countries in 2002 due to the lower
activity in the trade in goods, on the one hand, and
the decline in tourism in the countries of South
America and the Caribbean, on the other†contrasted
with the recovery in the world trade in services (WTO,
2003b) (see table I.6).
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Estimates of world tourism growth in 2002 show
that contrary to the flat growth and slower activity
expected, tourist travel expanded, surpassing the 700
million person mark, with greater frequency in Asia-
Pacific and Europe (WTO, 2003a). Among the different
sectors of the trade in services, in addition to the rise in
tourism and thus the travel and transport, the strongest
boost came from the category “other services” (WTO,
2003h). This category contemplates services, such as
construction, finances, telecommunications, computer
science, corporate services, insurance, royalties and
government services.
In 2003, international tourism closed with a 1.2%
decrease in international arrivals. This was the outcome
of a difficult year, which saw the conjunction of three
negative factors: the conflict in Iraq, SARS and the
economic instability worldwide (WTO, 2004). Although
circumstances improved gradually over the months, the
rally was not sufficient for tourism to recover in all
destinations. Thus Europe had zero growth (0%), Asia
suffered a contraction (-9%). On the other hand, South
America and the countries of the Caribbean recorded
significant increases in activity (12% and 8%
respectively) (see section D below).
B. The trade in goods and services in Latin America and
the Caribbean in 2002-2003: the balance of payments
1. The situation in 2003
In 2003, the region managed to reverse partially the
declining trend in its external trade prevailing in 2001 and
2002, thanks to the stronger performance of exports, while
in some countries, imports continued to decline in 2003,
although to a lesser extent than in 2002. According to the
projections of the Statistics and Economic Projections
Division of ECLAC for a set of 19 countries, the value of
exports increased by 8.3% with the exception of Panama
and Venezuela, which sustained considerable reductions
in export volumes. With the exception of Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama, all the other countries showed
increases in per unit values of exports (see table I.7a).
Table I.6
EXPORTS OF COMMERCIAL SERVICES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Exports Imports
Value Annual growth (%) Value Annual growth (%)
2003 2001 2002 2003 2003 2001 2002 2003
World 1 763 0.2 6.2 12.3 1 743 0.6 5.2 12.8
United States 282 -3.0 1.3 3.6 218 -1.5 1.8 6.0
Japan 70 -6.8 1.9 7.8 110 -7.5 -0.4 3.2
European Union 801 3.2 9.7 16.7 782 3.1 8.7 16.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 62 -2.6 -3.9 6.6 69 0.9 -8.6 3.3
Economies in transition 72 7.1 10.9 19.4 82 11.7 15.8 26.0
Africa 36 0.7 3.3 14.6 46 1.5 2.3 14.1
Middle East 33 -9.7 -1.3 11.9 49 -6.5 1.6 8.6
Developing Asia 275 0.9 8.0 9.4 284 0.1 4.9 11.1
China 45 9.1 19.7 14.3 54 8.9 18.1 17.2
Hong Kong (SAR of China) 43 1.8 9.0 -4.8 24 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8
Republic of Korea 31 -5.5 -3.6 14.5 39 -1.7 8.4 11.0
Singapore 30 -2.2 3.3 11.3 27 -5.9 1.2 31.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information supplied by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and information taken from the Balance of Payments of Latin America and the Caribbean (see table I.15).
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Table I.7a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORT TREND, VALUE, VOLUME




Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value
value  value  value
Latin America and
the Caribbean 1.7 -6.1 -4.5 1.4 -0.3 1.1 5.1 3.2 8.3
MERCOSUR countries 7.3 -3.3 3.8 6.3 -4.5 1.5 13.3 5.6 18.9
Argentina 4.1 -3.5 0.5 -0.1 -3.0 -3.1 5.2 8.6 14.3
Brazil 9.0 -3.0 5.7 9.1 -5.0 3.7 15.3 5.0 21.1
Paraguay -16.3 -3.4 -19.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 4.0 11.9
Uruguay -7.3 -3.0 -10.1 -9.4 -1.0 -10.3 12.6 5.0 18.2
Chile 7.5 -10.6 -3.9 1.3 -2.0 -0.7 5.3 9.0 14.8
Andean Community 1.1 -16.8 -15.9 -0.1 2.2 2.0 0.4 5.0 5.4
Bolivia 8.1 -4.6 3.1 4.1 -2.0 2.0 13.3 6.0 20.1
Colombia 2.5 -8.5 -6.2 -0.9 -2.8 -3.7 5.2 4.5 9.9
Ecuador 5.9 -10.7 -5.4 6.5 2.0 8.6 12.6 6.0 19.4
Peru 8.2 -7.9 -0.4 5.1 3.8 9.1 8.4 8.0 17.1
Venezuela -3.8 -18.6 -21.7 -4.2 6.0 1.5 -13.0 11.0 -3.4
Mexico -1.3 -3.5 -4.8 -0.5 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.5 2.9
Central America and
the Caribbean -6.7 -5.4 -11.7 8.3 -1.3 6.9 15.1 0.5 15.6
Costa Rica -10.7 -5.1 -15.3 9.6 -2.5 6.8 16.2 0.3 16.6
El Salvador 3.8 -6.0 -2.4 5.2 -0.8 4.4 4.0 0.8 4.8
Guatemala -1.3 -6.0 -7.2 -7.6 -0.5 -8.1 4.4 1.6 6.1
Haiti -4.3 -2.9 -7.1 -10.0 0.0 -10.0 18.4 1.8 20.6
Honduras 2.5 -5.8 -3.4 2.4 -3.0 -0.6 8.3 -0.6 7.7
Nicaragua 11.1 -11.1 -1.3 1.3 -1.6 -0.4 1.4 0.0 1.4
Panama 5.8 -3.0 2.6 -11.3 0.0 -11.3 -4.5 -0.5 -5.0
Dominican Republic -6.1 -2.0 -8.0 -1.8 0.0 -1.8 3.4 2.5 6.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Preliminary figures.
In turn, the sluggish performance of imports
compared with the two previous years reveals the constant
need of countries to maintain equilibrium in their balance
of payments, which owing to the high import propensity
in the region requires instruments for the control of
aggregate demand. In some countries, such as Bolivia,
Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic and Venezuela,
the growth in the import volume was negative, while in
others such as Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, growth was
scant (see table I.7b). These economies, which account
for approximately 79% of Latin American imports are
responsible for the flat growth of the import ratio in
regional GDP at levels below those of the export ratio,
with the consequent generation of surpluses in the
merchandise account (see figure I.4). In 2003, the overall
level of imports in the region was still 6% lower than its
highest level in 2000 and 4% lower than in 2001, with the
peculiarity that imports from outside the region were much
more strongly affected than imports from within the region
(see below). The combined recovery of the per unit value
of exports and imports in 2003 as well as the recovery of
export prices, together with the lower relative increase of
prices of manufactures, favoured trade in agricultural and
mining products, giving as a result a slight positive
variation in the terms of trade (see figure I.5 and tables
I.7a and I.7b).
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Table I.7b
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH IN IMPORTS, VALUE, VOLUME




Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value
value value value
Latin America and
the Caribbean 0.8 -3.2 -2.5 -7.4 0.7 -6.8 2.1 1.1 3.2
MERCOSUR countries -4.6 -2.1 -6.5 -20.5 -0.1 -20.6 9.2 1.0 10.2
Argentina -17.2 -3.0 -19.7 -54.9 -2.0 -55.8 54.2 0.1 54.4
Brazil 2.6 -2.9 -0.4 -13.3 -2.0 -15.0 1.2 1.0 2.2
Paraguay -9.8 -3.3 -12.8 -13.5 0.1 -13.5 4.0 5.0 9.2
Uruguay -8.3 -4.0 -12.0 -35.4 -0.5 -35.7 8.1 3.3 11.7
Chile 0.0 -3.9 -4.0 -1.6 -2.0 -3.6 10.6 3.0 13.9
Andean Community 13.7 -3.0 10.3 -12.0 0.1 -11.9 -5.5 3.1 -2.4
Bolivia -5.0 -3.4 -8.2 5.3 -1.5 3.7 -9.8 1.0 -8.9
Colombia 14.0 -3.0 10.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.6 7.1 2.5 9.8
Ecuador 46.3 -3.2 41.6 20.4 -0.6 19.6 -1.4 2.6 1.2
Peru 3.0 -4.0 -1.1 1.5 0.8 2.3 6.6 4.0 10.8
Venezuela 13.8 -2.8 10.6 -26.6 -0.5 -27.0 -22.5 1.4 -21.4
Mexico 0.0 -3.5 -3.5 -1.3 1.5 0.2 0.8 0.5 1.4
Central America and
the Caribbean 10.2 -3.6 6.2 12.2 -0.6 11.6 11.4 3.1 14.9
Costa Rica -0.9 -3.8 -4.7 14.7 -1.0 13.5 7.3 3.5 11.1
El Salvador 5.1 -3.0 2.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 8.2 2.1 10.4
Guatemala 13.0 -4.0 8.4 7.9 0.5 8.5 -1.1 3.5 2.4
Haiti 1.1 -4.0 -2.9 -8.0 1.0 -7.1 9.5 3.9 13.8
Honduras 9.2 -3.7 5.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 6.8 2.3 9.3
Nicaragua 1.1 -3.0 -2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 -4.1 3.5 -0.8
Panama -0.8 -3.5 -4.2 -6.0 1.0 -5.0 -4.8 1.6 -3.3
Dominican Republic -4.1 -3.5 -7.4 0.6 0.6 1.2 -9.7 3.0 -7.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Preliminary figures.
Figure I.4
LATIN AMERICA: TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 1970-2003
(Percentages of GDP, 1995 dollars)
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Figure I.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRICE INDICES OF MANUFACTURES,
COMMODITIES AND TERMS OF TRADE, 1990-2003
(1995=100)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), New York.
As a result of this combination of trends, the
countries of South America accrued a merchandise
trade surplus for the first time in 12 years. Amounting
to US$ 60 billion, this surplus was concentrated basically
in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The countries of
MERCOSUR achieved a trade surplus of goods and
services of the order of 4% of subregional GDP, with
the exception of Paraguay, whose deficit was -1.1% of
GDP. Chile’s surplus was 3.3% of GDP, a figure closer
to the average for the Andean Community, attributable
solely to Venezuela, since the other Andean countries
accrued a deficit on the account of the trade in goods
and services. Mexico continued to run a high deficit of
approximately US$ 10.07 billion (or 1.6% of GDP) on
its trade in goods and services.
The countries of the Central American Common
Market (CACM) give the most cause for concern; their
current account balance improved but only thanks to
current transfers –including remittances of workers
abroad– which are important cushioning mechanisms
which make it possible to cover the high payments to
external factors for portfolio investment rents (bonds,
notes, stocks or others) and foreign direct investment
(reinvested earnings), as well as the payment of
contributions to social security and private insurance
for non-resident workers. In general, the current
account deficits narrowed in absolute terms in most of
the countries, with the exception of Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras (see tables I.8a
and I.9a).
In the Caribbean countries, the current account
deficit shrank by approximately US$ 2 billion thanks to
the convergence of two positive factors: an increase in
current transfers and an upturn in the tourism sector,
which helped to offset the merchandise trade balance













1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Manufactures index (developed countries) Commodities index (LAC)
Commodities index (LAC) without petroleum Terms of trade with petroleum (LAC) 
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Table I.8a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GOODS AND SERVICES TRADE BALANCE
AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, 2001-2003
(Percentages of GDP)a
Goods and services trade balance Current account balanceSubregions/Countries
2001 2002 2003d 2001 2002 2003d
Latin America and the Caribbeanb -1.3 0.3 1.3 -2.8 -0.9 0.1
Latin America (19 countries)c -1.2 0.5 1.5 -2.8 -0.7 0.3
MERCOSUR countries -0.3 3.0 4.3 -3.4 0.3 1.5
Argentina 1.3 6.5 5.7 -1.5 4.0 3.1
Brazil -1.0 1.5 3.7 -4.5 -1.5 0.8
Paraguay -6.2 -1.1 -1.1 -3.7 1.3 0.8
Uruguay -2.4 1.0 2.0 -2.9 1.5 0.4
Chile 1.7 2.3 3.3 -1.8 -0.8 -0.9
Andean Community 0.3 2.2 3.6 -0.4 1.1 2.3
Bolivia -5.8 -6.1 -1.5 -3.4 -4.1 0.1
Colombia -1.1 -1.5 -1.6 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9
Ecuador -5.1 -8.4 -4.0 -3.1 -6.3 -2.2
Peru -2.1 -1.3 -0.5 -2.2 -2.2 -1.9
Venezuela 3.4 9.0 12.2 1.7 6.5 9.4
Mexico -2.2 -1.9 -1.6 -2.9 -2.3 -1.5
CACM -11.1 -12.6 -12.5 -5.7 -6.0 -6.2
Costa Rica -0.6 -3.5 -1.9 -4.6 -5.7 -5.5
El Salvador -16.1 -15.0 -17.1 -1.4 -2.7 -5.1
Guatemala -10.5 -13.6 -13.2 -6.1 -5.7 -5.2
Honduras -16.7 -15.7 -17.7 -4.6 -3.7 -3.8
Nicaragua -40.4 -41.3 -39.6 -36.6 -34.5 -30.7
Panama 2.0 -0.6 1.6 -1.7 -0.9 -3.9
Caribbean countries -5.4 -6.2 -4.1 -3.4 -4.2 -1.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Estimates based on data in current dollars.
b Includes the 35 countries listed in tables I.8a and I.8b.
c Includes 19 countries in the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.
d Preliminary estimates.
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Table I.8b
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GOODS AND SERVICES TRADE BALANCE
AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, 2001-2003
(Percentages of GDP)a
Subregions/Countries
Goods and services trade balance Current account balance
2001 2002 2003b 2001 2002 2003b
Caribbean countries -5.4 -6.2 -4.1 -3.4 -4.2 -1.9
Cuba -3.0 -1.9 -1.0 -1.9 -1.1 -0.7
Dominican Republic -7.8 -8.6 -1.8 -3.4 -3.9 3.8
CARICOM -7.3 -10.2 -9.9 -5.6 -8.5 -7.8
Bahamas -4.3 -2.8 -3.6 -7.5 -6.5 -6.0
Barbados -4.2 -7.0 -9.4 -4.1 -7.7 -10.1
Belize -25.1 -20.6 -19.8 -28.9 -24.5 -23.6
Guyana -13.7 -10.9 -20.3 -15.6 -12.7 -18.1
Haiti -29.8 -28.4 -32.2 -3.4 -1.7 -1.9
Jamaica -16.7 -21.4 -21.4 -10.2 -14.9 -15.2
Suriname -13.8 -11.0 -26.0 -15.6 -12.8 -17.8
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 5.2 11.7 7.2 -0.2 5.2
OECS -12.1 -13.6 -15.9 -14.7 -16.9 -19.8
Anguilla -28.5 -22.7 -28.5 -32.0 -25.4 -32.8
Antigua and Barbuda -4.9 -8.3 -11.3 -8.0 -12.7 -16.0
Dominica -17.5 -13.3 -15.7 -18.3 -16.6 -18.9
Grenada -17.5 -22.3 -21.9 -21.7 -27.6 -29.3
Montserrat -80.0 -105.1 -122.1 -18.5 -30.9 -48.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis -22.8 -26.1 -24.5 -28.3 -32.8 -32.5
Saint Lucia -3.2 -2.3 -4.6 -7.3 -6.5 -10.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -11.0 -13.2 -18.3 -12.1 -13.8 -16.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data supplied by ECLAC Subregional Headquarters
for the Caribbean.
a Estimates on the basis of data in current dollars.
b Preliminary estimates.
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Table I.9a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT, 2001-2003
(Millions of dollars)
Goods and services Current Income account Current account
Subregions/Countries trade balance transfers balance balance
2001 2002 2003c 2001 2002 2003c 2001 2002 2003c 2001 2002 2003c
Latin America and
the Caribbeana -25 123 6 339 25 523 26 982 30 126 35 916 -56 804 -53 124 -58 640 -54 945 -16 659 2 799
Latin America
(19 countries)b -22 953 9 105 27 908 24 938 27 898 33 512 -54 830 -50 869 -56 113 -52 845 -13 866 5 307
MERCOSUR countries -2 581 23 743 34 745 2 264 3 151 3 678 -27 622 -24 619 -26 296 -27 939 2 275 12 127
Argentina 3 432 15 548 14 746 432 576 620 -7 770 -6 498 -7 425 -3 906 9 627 7 941
Brazil -5 108 8 105 19 737 1 638 2 390 2 867 -19 743 -18 190 -18 552 -23 213 -7 695 4 051
Paraguay -457 -83 -81 167 116 115 16 59 25 -275 92 59
Uruguay -447 172 344 27 69 76 -125 10 -344 -545 251 76
Chile 1 136 1 556 2 249 428 426 438 -2 757 -2 536 -3 280 -1 192 -553 -594
Andean Community 900 6 196 9 998 5 192 5 374 6 216 -7 288 -8 447 -9 803 -1 196 3 123 6 412
Bolivia -459 -503 -124 396 369 431 -211 -202 -302 -274 -335 5
Colombia -921 -1 233 -1 430 2 263 2 473 2 773 -2 593 -2 820 -3 019 -1 251 -1 580 -1 677
Ecuador -920 -1 570 -763 1 639 1 654 1 772 -1 269 -1 262 -1 434 -550 -1 178 -425
Peru -1 102 -741 -286 1 042 1 043 1 243 -1 123 -1 509 -2 073 -1 184 -1 206 -1 116
Venezuela 4 302 10 242 12 601 -148 -165 -2 -2 092 -2 654 -2 975 2 062 7 423 9 624
Mexico -13 511 -11 964 -10 070 9 338 10 268 13 728 -13 929 -12 350 -12 808 -18 103 -14 046 -9 150
CACM -6 567 -7 629 -7 857 4 694 5 464 5 977 -1 531 -1 484 -1 994 -3 404 -3 649 -3 874
Costa Rica -92 -583 -337 148 169 197 -793 -532 -831 -737 -946 -970
El Salvador -2 208 -2 099 -2 443 2 284 2 003 2 117 -266 -287 -408 -190 -384 -734
Guatemala -2 165 -2 853 -2 834 997 1 959 2 136 -84 -298 -411 -1 253 -1 193 -1 109
Honduras -1 075 -1 034 -1 205 929 957 1 092 -148 -166 -145 -293 -243 -258
Nicaragua -1 027 -1 059 -1 038 336 377 435 -240 -200 -200 -932 -883 -804
Panama 203 -58 171 226 250 241 -602 -284 -820 -174 -92 -408
Caribbean countries -4 703 -5 505 -3 711 4 840 5 192 5 639 -3 075 -3 404 -3 640 -2 937 -3 717 -1 713
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean.
a Includes the 35 countries listed in tables I.9a y I.9b.
b Includes 19 countries of the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
c Preliminary estimates.
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Table I.9b
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: COMPOSITION OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT, 2001-2003a
(Millions of dollars)
Goods and services Current Income account Current account
Subregions/Countries
trade balance transfers balance balance
2001 2002 2003b 2001 2002 2003b 2001 2002 2003b 2001 2002 2003b
Caribbean countries -4 703 -5 505 -3 711 4 840 5 192 5 639 -3 075 -3 404 -3 640 -2 937 -3 717 -1 713
Cuba -863 -547 -285 813 820 910 -502 -600 -825 -552 -327 -200
Dominican Republic -1 677 -1 928 -400 2 028 2 188 2 350 -1 092 -1 135 -1 100 -741 -875 850
CARICOM -2 163 -3 030 -3 026 2 000 2 184 2 379 -1 481 -1 669 -1 715 -1 644 -2 515 -2 363
Bahamas -200 -131 -169 42 42 34 -190 -211 -146 -348 -300 -281
Barbados -94 -156 -216 94 86 95 -93 -102 -111 -93 -172 -232
Belize -161 -137 -137 48 46 46 -72 -72 -72 -185 -163 -163
Guyana -114 -92 -173 44 40 45 -59 -55 -26 -129 -107 -154
Haiti -856 -811 -927 769 776 885 -9 -14 -13 -97 -49 -56
Jamaica -1 235 -1 599 -1 618 916 1 088 1 095 -438 -606 -623 -757 -1 117 -1 146
Suriname -114 -92 -225 -59 -55 24 44 40 47 -129 -107 -154
Trinidad and Tobago 956 378 901 33 47 37 -476 -443 -539 513 -18 399
OECS -345 -390 -462 113 114 118 -188 -206 -232 -420 -482 -576
Anguilla -32 -26 -33 -4 -3 -5 -36 -29 -38
Antigua and Barbuda -33 -57 -80 6 6 6 -27 -36 -39 -54 -87 -113
Dominica -46 -33 -39 17 12 14 -19 -20 -22 -48 -41 -47
Grenada -71 -89 -88 22 22 24 -39 -43 -54 -88 -110 -118
Montserrat -26 -34 -40 21 26 24 -1 -2 -6 -10 -16
Saint Kitts and Nevis -78 -90 -86 18 19 16 -37 -42 -44 -97 -113 -114
Saint Lucia -22 -16 -33 14 14 13 -42 -43 -52 -50 -45 -72
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -37 -45 -63 15 15 21 -19 -17 -16 -41 -47 -58
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean.
a Includes all the countries mentioned in the table, except for Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, for which no information was available.
b Preliminary estimates.
2. The situation in 2002
adjustment in intraregional trade between Argentina and
Brazil meant that in the countries of MERCOSUR as a
whole, the accumulated surplus exceeded US$ 30 billion.
In addition, the higher exports from Venezuela, despite
the strong contraction in the last quarter of 2002 meant
that the country accumulated a positive balance of just
over US$ 13 billion (see table I.10).
Starting in 2001 and intensifying in 2002, the region
was able due to foreign exchange problems, the
adjustment of imports and the stronger recovery of
exports†first to reduce the merchandise trade deficit and
subsequently to accrue a surplus of the order of US$
14.7 billion, concentrated basically in Argentina, Brazil,
Venezuela and to some extent, Chile. The reciprocal
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Table I.10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION
IN THE GOODS TRADE BALANCE, 2001-2002a
(Millions of current dollars)
Exports Imports Trade balance
Subregions/Countries
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Latin America and
the Caribbean (37) 372 188 355 560 357 525 376 571 367 142 342 843 -4 384 -11 581 14 682
Latin America
(19 countries)b 358 865 342 712 346 416 355 272 346 442 322 780 3 593 -3 731 23 637
Latin America
(without Mexico) 192 410 184 269 185 654 180 815 178 046 154 101 11 596 6 223 31 553
MERCOSUR 86 208 88 793 89 878 85 812 80 143 59 727 397 8 650 30 151
Argentina 26 410 26 543 25 709 23 852 19 158 8 473 2 558 7 385 17 236
Brazil 55 086 58 223 60 362 55 783 55 572 47 219 -697 2 651 13 143
Paraguay 2 329 1 883 1 884 2 866 2 499 2 162 -537 -615 -278
Uruguay 2 384 2 144 1 923 3 311 2 915 1 873 -927 -771 50
Chile 19 210 18 466 18 340 17 091 16 411 15 827 2 119 2 054 2 513
Andean Community 60 486 52 097 53 108 40 573 44 858 40 868 19 914 7 239 12 240
Bolivia 1 246 1 285 1 310 1 610 1 477 1 532 -364 -193 -222
Colombia 13 620 12 772 12 302 11 090 12 269 12 077 2 531 503 225
Ecuador 5 057 4 781 5 192 3 657 5 179 6 196 1 399 -397 -1 004
Peru 7 034 7 007 7 647 7 351 7 273 7 440 -317 -267 207
Venezuela 33 529 26 252 26 656 16 865 18 660 13 622 16 664 7 592 13 034
Mexicoc 166 455 158 443 160 763 174 458 168 396 168 679 -8 003 -9 954 -7 916
CACM 14 602 13 340 13 556 19 792 20 110 21 464 -5 190 -6 771 -7 909
Costa Ricab 5 813 4 923 5 259 6 025 5 744 6 523 -211 -821 -1 263
El Salvadorb 2 963 2 891 3 017 4 703 4 796 4 922 -1 740 -1 905 -1 906
Guatemala 3 082 2 860 2 629 4 742 5 142 5 578 -1 660 -2 282 -2 950
Honduras 2 012 1 943 1 930 2 670 2 807 2 804 -658 -865 -874
Nicaragua 732 723 721 1 653 1 620 1 636 -921 -897 -916
Panama 5 839 5 992 5 315 6 981 6 689 6 352 -1 143 -696 -1 037
Caribbean countriesd 19 388 18 430 16 567 31 864 30 534 29 927 -12 477 -12 104 -13 360
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and national agencies.
a The figures presented here differ from those appearing in the statistical appendix because they have been compiled using different aggregations and
methodologies. Table I.10 was prepared using each country’s balance-of-payments statistics.
b Includes 19 countries of the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
c Includes the maquila sector.
d Corresponds to the total of countries indicated in table I.11.
In addition, despite the fact that 11 Caribbean
countries reduced their merchandise trade deficits,
Trinidad and Tobago’s smaller surplus and the increase
in the deficits of six other countries, including major
economies such as Jamaica and the Dominican
Republic, together with Aruba and Barbados, ended
up raising the overall deficit of the Caribbean
economies (see table I.11).
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 Trade in services followed the trend of trade in goods,
since the traditionally high and unfavourable trade deficits
declined considerably. In 2002, Argentina and Brazil saw
their deficits in services diminish by 43% and 65%
respectively. The reduction in the services deficit in the
MERCOSUR countries from US$ 11.2 billion to
approximately US$ 6.4 billion has been the consequence
of the contraction of imports given that Brazilian exports
were maintained at the same levels as in 2000 and
Argentine exports fell to half the level recorded in that
year. However, the Brazilian deficit remained the highest
in the region. The countries of the Andean Community,
with the exception of Venezuela, saw an increase in their
services trade deficit. Chile –despite a small reduction in
its services imports– saw its deficit widen owing to a
similar reduction in its exports. The highest surplus was
accumulated by Costa Rica, while Uruguay’s balance
contracted to half the 2000 figure (see table I.12).
Meanwhile, the economies of the Caribbean
suffered the ill-effects of the events of 11 September
2001 in the United States and saw their traditional services
surplus decline from US$ 8.2 billion to US$ 7.2 billion
(see table I.13).
The combination of high services deficits in Chile
and Mexico, together with the decline in services deficits
in the countries of the Andean Community and the smaller
surplus in the countries of the Caribbean yielded a negative
balance for the region of approximately US$ 9 billion,
that is, approximately US$ 4 billion less than in 2001
(see tables I.12 and I.13).
As a corollary, the current account balances of the
MERCOSUR countries individually and as a group,
reflected the far-reaching readjustment of their economies,
whose result was the generation of a moderate joint
surplus. The adjustment of the two main South American
economies turned the MERCOSUR current account
deficit, which was more than US$ 28 billion in 2001, into
a US$ 2.3 billion surplus in 2002. The latter was the result
of the accumulation of a positive balance of approximately
US$ 9.6 billion by Argentina, and a more modest balance
Table I.11
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: VARIATION IN THE GOODS TRADE BALANCE, 2000-2002
(Millions of current dollars)
Exports Imports Trade balance
Subregions/Countries
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Caribbean countries 19 388 18 430 16 567 31 864 30 534 29 927 -12 477 -12 104 -13 360
Netherlands Antilles 572 629 517 1 521 1 485 1 532 -949 -856 -1 015
Aruba 2 580 2 441 1 513 2 615 2 363 2 052 -35 78 -539
Cuba 1 677 1 661 1 402 4 877 4 838 4 161 -3 200 -3 178 -2 759
Dominican Republic 5 737 5 276 5 183 9 479 8 779 8 883 -3 742 -3 503 -3 699
CARICOM 8 822 8 423 7 952 13 374 13 068 13 299 -4 551 -4 645 -5 347
Bahamas 805 614 740 2 176 1 765 1 776 -1 371 -1 151 -1 036
Barbados 286 271 251 1 030 952 953 -744 -681 -702
Belize 295 275 310 487 489 500 -192 -214 -190
Guyana 505 490 495 585 584 563 -80 -94 -68
Haiti 328 305 274 1 087 1 055 980 -758 -750 -706
Jamaica 1 563 1 454 1 309 3 004 3 073 3 179 -1 441 -1 618 -1 870
Suriname 399 437 369 246 297 322 153 140 47
Trinidad and Tobago 4 288 4 273 3 894 3 333 3 544 3 701 955 729 193
OECSa 352 303 309 1 425 1 309 1 325 -1 073 -1 006 -1 016
Anguilla 4 4 4 83 68 61 -79 -65 -57
Antigua and Barbuda 42 43 39 342 321 336 -300 -278 -297
Dominica 55 44 43 130 115 102 -76 -71 -59
Grenada 83 64 44 221 197 191 -138 -133 -147
Montserrat 1 1 1 19 17 25 -18 -16 -24
Saint Kitts and Nevis 52 51 65 173 167 178 -121 -115 -113
Saint Lucia 63 54 74 313 272 276 -249 -218 -202
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 52 43 40 144 152 157 -93 -109 -117
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, the Central
Bank of Suriname, the Central Bank of the Eastern Caribbean; The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and
Suriname Country Report”, June 2003; “Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Turk and Caicos
Islands, Cayman Island Country Report”, August 2003; “Cuba Country Report”, June 2002; “Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico Country
Report”, June 2003.
a Includes estimates in the case of Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Lucia.
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by Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as the reduction of
Brazil’s current account deficit by 65% (see tables I.8a
and I.9a).
Among the Andean Community countries, the
current account deficits widened especially in the case
of Ecuador but also in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru,
notwithstanding the contribution of current transfers
–including remittances of workers abroad. For this group
of countries, with the exception of Venezuela, transfers
added up to a net value of US$ 5.4 billion, which
managed to cover 64% of the factor income account
deficit. The rest was absorbed entirely by Venezuela’s
goods and services trade surplus (US$ 10.2 billion) (see
tables I.8a and I.9a).
For Mexico, Dominican Republic and the CACM
countries, the downward trend was maintained, although
in the case of Mexico to levels that still remained very
buoyant. Between 2001 and 2002, an increase in the
remittances of Mexican workers abroad, which was higher
than net factor income outflows, contributed to the decline
in the country’s current account deficit and to a continuous
reduction in the current account balance/GDP ratio, which
moved from -2.9% to -2.3% (see tables I.8a and I.9a).
In 2002, the balance of payments of the region again
presented a very poor picture; the countries had to draw
on reserves of almost US$ 2.5 billion. The regional
balance-of-payments position was compensated with
extraordinary financing granted by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), delays in debt servicing payments
and a higher private debt on international markets,
especially in the case of Mexico and Chile (ECLAC,
2003d, annex).
Table I.12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SERVICES TRADE BALANCE, 2000-2002a
(Millions of current dollars)
Subregions/Countries
Exports Imports Trade balance
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Latin America and
the Caribbean (37) 62 062 60 426 58 082 72 745 73 366 67 080 -10 683 -12 941 -8 998
Latin America
(19 countries)b 49 232 48 016 46 188 66 375 67 237 60 720 -17 143 -19 222 -14 532
Latin America
(excluding Mexico) 35 520 35 355 33 496 50 339 51 020 43 980 -14 819 -15 664 -10 484
MERCOSUR 16 052 15 409 13 896 26 933 26 640 20 304 -10 881 -11 231 -6 408
Argentina 4 683 4 407 2 974 8 971 8 360 4 662 -4 288 -3 953 -1 688
Brazil 9 498 9 322 9 606 16 660 17 081 14 644 -7 162 -7 759 -5 038
Paraguay 595 548 541 420 390 345 175 158 196
Uruguay 1 276 1 132 775 882 808 653 394 324 122
Chile 4 078 4 105 3 960 4 726 5 023 4 917 -648 -918 -957
Andean Community 5 879 6 233 5 679 11 866 12 572 11 723 -5 987 -6 339 -6 044
Bolivia 224 236 235 469 503 516 -245 -267 -281
Colombia 2 044 2 180 1 858 3 320 3 604 3 316 -1 276 -1 424 -1 458
Ecuador 849 911 981 1 269 1 434 1 546 -420 -523 -566
Peru 1 580 1 510 1 545 2 373 2 345 2 493 -793 -835 -948
Venezuela 1 182 1 396 1 060 4 435 4 686 3 852 -3 253 -3 290 -2 792
Mexico 13 712 12 660 12 692 16 036 16 218 16 740 -2 323 -3 558 -4 048
CACM 4 117 4 354 4 508 4 039 4 151 4 229 78 203 280
Costa Rica 1 935 1 896 1 864 1 270 1 167 1 184 665 729 680
El Salvador 698 696 782 933 999 976 -235 -303 -194
Guatemala 778 1 045 1 140 826 928 1 044 -48 117 97
Honduras 485 493 527 667 704 687 -182 -210 -160
Nicaragua 221 223 195 343 353 338 -122 -130 -143
Panama 1 994 2 005 2 252 1 141 1 106 1 273 854 899 979
Caribbean countriesc 16 230 15 660 15 095 8 005 7 658 7 895 8 225 8 002 7 200
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a Includes all the countries in table II.4b.
b Includes 19 countries of the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
c Includes the 11 countries indicated in table I.13.
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Table I.13
THE CARIBBEAN: SERVICES TRADE BALANCE, 2000-2002
(Millions of current dollars)
Exports Imports Trade balance
Subregions/Countries
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Caribbean countriesa 16 230 15 660 15 095 8 005 7 658 7 895 8 225 8 002 7 200
Netherlands Antilles 1 485 1 562 1 250 686 703 703 799 859 547
Aruba 1 032 1 036 900 654 630 630 378 406 270
Cuba 3 114 2 954 2 836 808 640 625 2 306 2 314 2 211
Dominican Republic 3 228 3 110 3 055 1 373 1 284 1 284 1 854 1 826 1 771
CARICOMa 7 371 6 998 7 054 4 484 4 401 4 653 2 887 2 597 2 401
Bahamas 2 037 1 890 1 930 1 007 939 1 043 1 030 951 887
Barbados 836 821 798 233 234 252 603 587 546
Belize 160 175 184 125 122 131 35 53 53
Guyana 191 212 217 222 232 242 -31 -20 -24
Haiti 172 140 147 262 245 252 -90 -105 -105
Jamaica 2 026 1 897 1 920 1 442 1 514 1 649 584 383 271
Suriname 91 59 59 206 175 150 -115 -115 -91
Trinidad and Tobago 554 574 599 388 370 362 166 204 237
OECSa 1 304 1 230 1 201 599 570 574 705 660 627
Anguilla 65 62 60 27 29 29 38 33 31
Antigua and Barbuda 416 403 397 154 154 157 262 249 240
Dominica 90 77 74 53 52 48 37 25 26
Grenada 154 134 138 83 71 79 70 62 58
Montserrat 16 13 11 19 24 21 -3 -11 -10
Saint Kitts and Nevis 98 105 88 75 71 64 23 34 24
Saint Lucia 340 306 299 127 111 114 213 196 186
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 126 131 134 61 59 62 65 72 72
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
a Includes estimates for the group of countries for which no recent data were available.
C. Merchandise trade of Latin America and the
Caribbean in 2002-2003
6 This performance was the result of the international economic crisis which swept through the region through different channels, including
(i) weaker international demand; (ii) the weakness of intra-regional trade; (iii) the decline in external financial flows; (iv) the rising cost
of external financing, and (v) foreign exchange disequilibria (ECLAC, 2003c, chapter I).
1. Movements in merchandise exports and imports
In the 2001-2002 biennium, the export performance of
countries of the region was far from the expansion
recorded in 2000 (20% and 16% for exports and imports
respectively).6 On the other hand in 2003, the increase
in export volumes was compounded by the increase in
the per unit value of products. In ten countries in the
region, in particular Brazil and Argentina, export values
expanded by more than 10%, (see table I.14).
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Table I.14
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN GOODS TRADE, 2002-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentage growth)
Exports Imports Trade balance
Subregions/Countries
2002 2003a 2002-2003 2002 2003a 2002-2003 2002 2003a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 346 416 375 009 8.3 322 780 333 262 3.2 23 637 41 747
MERCOSUR 89 878 106 841 18.9 59 727 65 797 10.2 30 151 41 045
Argentina 25 709 29 375 14.3 8 473 13 083 54.4 17 236 16 292
Brazil 60 362 73 084 21.1 47 219 48 260 2.2 13 143 24 825
Paraguay 1 884 2 109 11.9 2 162 2 362 9.2 -278 -254
Uruguay 1 923 2 273 18.2 1 873 2 092 11.7 50 182
Chile 18 340 21 046 14.8 15 827 18 031 13.9 2 513 3 015
Andean Community 53 108 55 997 5.4 40 868 39 874 -2.4 12 240 16 123
Bolivia 1 310 1 573 20.1 1 532 1 396 -8.9 -222 177
Colombia 12 302 13 523 9.9 12 077 13 258 9.8 225 265
Ecuador 5 192 6 197 19.4 6 196 6 268 1.2 -1 004 -71
Peru 7 647 8 954 17.1 7 440 8 244 10.8 207 710
Venezuela 26 656 25 750 -3.4 13 622 10 707 -21.4 13 034 15 043
Mexico 160 763 165 355 2.9 168 679 170 958 1.4 -7 916 -5 603
Central America and
the Caribbean 24 328 25 769 5.9 37 679 38 603 2.5 -11 977 -11 533
Costa Rica 5 259 6 132 16.6 6 523 7 245 11.1 -1 263 -1 114
El Salvador 3 017 3 162 4.8 4 922 5 436 10.4 -1 906 -2 274
Guatemala 2 629 2 789 6.1 5 578 5 712 2.4 -2 950 -2 923
Haiti 274 331 20.6 980 1 116 13.8 -706 -785
Honduras 1 930 2 078 7.7 2 804 3 065 9.3 -874 -987
Nicaragua 721 731 1.4 1 636 1 624 -0.8 -916 -893
Panama 5 315 5 051 -5.0 6 352 6 143 -3.3 336 209
Dominican Republic 5 183 5 494 6.0 8 883 8 261 -7.0 -3 699 -2 766
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a Preliminary figures with estimates for some countries.
(a) Variation in merchandise exports
Regional exports grew on average by 8.3% in 2003,
but this masks a varied performance by the different
subregional groupings. Thus, while MERCOSUR,
CACM and CARICOM showed sharp increases, the
Andean Community’s exports were less dynamic. A
similar pattern occurs with goods imports with a better
performance in the cases of MERCOSUR, CACM and
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (see table I.15).
The sluggish activity in Venezuela within the Andean
Community is thought to have had an impact on the
region’s import profile (see figure I.6). In the case of
Venezuela, in addition to the decline in domestic
consumption, the exchange control imposed by the
Government accounts for the marked negative variation
in imports, much higher than in the rest of the countries
of the region. This performance of the Venezuelan
economy has had a strong impact on the trade figures of
the countries of the Andean Community, which show
declines both in exports and in imports (see below and
chapter II).
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Table I.15
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN THE TRADE
IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 2001-2003
(Growth rates calculated in current dollars)
Goods trade Services trade
Subregions/Countries Exports Imports Exports Imports
2001 2002 2003a 2001 2002 2003a 2001 2002 2003a 2001 2002 2003a
Latin America and
the Caribbean (37) -4.5 0.6 8.3 -2.5 -6.6 3.1 -2.6 -3.9 6.6 0.9 -8.6 3.3
Latin America and
the Caribbean (19) -4.5 1.1 8.3 -2.5 -6.8 3.2 -2.5 -3.8 7.6 1.3 -9.7 2.8
MERCOSUR 3.0 1.2 18.9 -6.6 -25.5 10.2 -4.0 -9.8 13.2 -1.1 -23.8 8.5
Andean Community -13.9 1.9 5.4 10.6 -8.9 -2.4 6.0 -8.9 -2.9 6.0 -6.8 -2.4
CACM -8.6 1.6 9.9 1.6 6.7 7.5 5.8 3.5 5.7 2.8 1.9 4.9
CARICOM -4.5 -5.6 12.8 -2.3 1.8 4.3 -5.1 0.8 1.6 -1.9 5.7 6.7
Major economiesb -4.1 -5.9 13.5 -1.6 1.8 4.5 -4.9 1.5 1.4 -1.4 6.5 6.1
OECS -13.9 2.0 -3.6 -8.1 1.2 1.9 -5.7 -2.4 2.5 -4.8 0.6 11.2
Other countries not
belonging to above groups           
Chile -3.9 -0.7 14.8 -4.0 -3.6 13.9 0.7 -3.5 21.3 6.3 -2.1 13.3
Cuba -1.0 -15.6 -14.4 -0.8 -14.0 -6.3 -5.1 -4.0 5.8 -20.8 -2.3 -6.4
Mexico -4.8 1.5 2.9 -3.5 0.2 1.4 -7.7 0.2 -0.3 1.1 3.2 2.3
Panama 2.6 -11.3 -5.0 -4.2 -5.0 -3.3 0.5 12.3 13.5 -3.1 15.1 1.7
Dominican Republic -8.0 -1.8 6.0 -7.4 1.2 -7.0 -3.6 -1.8 16.7 -6.5 0.0 -6.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a Preliminary estimates.
b Corresponds to the total of the major economies in that grouping: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago.
The rebound in exports in 2003 in the Caribbean
countries was greater than the average of the Latin
American economies as a whole, especially in the
countries of CARICOM. However, there were falls in
these flows in the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean,
because of the drop in production of some agricultural
products as a result of the destruction of plantations by
hurricane Lili in September 2002 (EACB, 2003). In the
larger Caribbean economies, the oil and energy sector
made a strong recovery in Aruba, Suriname and Trinidad
and Tobago, while the Dominican Republic benefited
from the increase in the prices of coffee, sugar, tobacco,
cocoa and its derivatives, as well as the increase in the
export volume of those commodities and manufactures.
In the Bahamas, Belize, Barbados and Guyana, sharp
reductions were recorded in both the production and
export of alumina, sugar and bananas.
Among the countries not belonging to any grouping,
the rapid recovery of exports in Chile and the Dominican
Republic contrasted with the lacklustre performance of
the external sector in Mexico and Panama, where the
decline was far greater than the regional average (see
table I.15).
(b) Variation in merchandise imports
The breakdown of the growth of imports, with
products grouped by main economic use, illustrates the
repercussions of the adjustment in the imported
component on the economic sectors. The figures of table
I.16 show that in 2002 the process of adjustment
occurred mainly in consumer goods for Argentina,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Honduras and
Nicaragua (by level of reduction). However, it also had
an adverse effect especially on imports of capital goods
and intermediate inputs, which in the medium term had
serious consequences on the modernization of the
production sector in the countries that lacked domestic
import substitution conditions for the goods in question.
In 2003, imports of capital and consumer goods
continued to contract, with a relative increase in imports
of intermediate goods.
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Figure I.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN TRADE QUARTERLY
GROWTH RATES, 1998-2003
(Percentages compared with the same period of the preceding year)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data supplied
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Table I.16
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATION IN GOODS IMPORTS,
BY ECONOMIC USE,  2002 AND 2003a
(Annual variation rates)
Consumer Intermediate Capital Total Impact on
Subregions/Countries goods goods  goods imports GDPb
2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
Latin America (16 countries) -6.8 -1.0 -4.5 3.0 -14.9 -0.9 -6.9 3.3 1.6 0.0
MERCOSUR -37.8 7.0 -20.0 4.3 -34.5 4.5 -25.5 10.2 -2.5 0.4
Argentina -71.1 72.8 -40.8 8.9 -62.8 67.4 -55.8 54.4 -5.1 1.7
Brazil -17.2 -6.2 -11.6 39.0 -21.7 -10.7 -15.0 2.2 -1.5 0.1
Uruguay -20.6 11.0 -71.6 23.4 222.6 16.6 -13.5 9.2 -3.6 1.5
Paraguay -46.5 -15.8 -27.5 -14.2 -50.2 -22.3 -35.7 11.7 -5.0 0.1
Chile -2.0 8.0 -4.0 14.7 -2.7 3.1 -3.6 13.9 -0.9 1.5
Andean Community -6.9 -13.9 -3.9 -2.7 -10.6 -3.3 -8.9 -2.4 -1.8 -1.3
Bolivia -8.7 0.9 7.3 1.8 8.5 -2.1 3.7 -8.9 0.5 -2.9
Colombia 7.8 -8.4 0.4 6.4 -7.7 8.9 -1.6 9.8 -0.6 0.2
Ecuador 27.5 3.9 14.7 11.2 22.5 -11.0 19.6 1.2 4.4 -1.0
Peru 5.0 1.8 4.3 13.8 -3.6 8.5 2.3 10.8 -0.4 0.2
Venezuela -26.1 -34.1 -18.6 -29.4 -27.4 -18.9 -27.0 -21.4 -5.8 -4.3
Mexico 7.2 1.6 0.3 1.8 -6.7 -3.7 0.2 1.4 -0.8 -0.3
CACM and the Dominican Republic 3.7 -1.6 1.7 9.3 11.6 -2.3 5.5 3.3 1.8 0.4
Costa Rica 9.0 -1.3 11.6 5.5 21.6 16.0 13.5 11.1 4.9 0.5
El Salvador 5.3 16.5 -4.5 12.3 -1.6 6.4 2.6 10.4 -0.2 2.4
Guatemala 0.0 -1.7 -2.7 10.6 29.3 -10.5 8.5 2.4 2.2 -1.1
Honduras 7.6 8.5 -4.3 17.8 2.2 -4.6 -0.1 9.3 -2.8 5.5
Nicaragua 1.1 10.6 -3.2 16.2 8.9 -16.1 1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -3.7
Dominican Republic 2.7 -15.7 -0.8 4.1 1.0 -13.5 1.2 -7.0 -2.3 -4.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the countries for 2002 and the period
January to September of each year, 2002 and 2003.
a Preliminary estimates for the full year.
b Corresponds to the absolute variation in the coefficient of openness measured by imports in GDP (M/GDP)*100, between the year referred to and the
preceding year.
2. Determining factors of the merchandise trade in Latin America
in 2002-2003
In 2003, the same factors that had an adverse effect on
regional exports in the previous year, now permitted
trade flows to expand favourably. Exports benefited
from: (i) the rally in international demand and its positive
impact on commodity prices; (ii) the recovery of intra-
regional forums; (iii) the improvement in external
finance conditions; (iv) the increase in financial flows
and (v) devaluations.
(a) Increase in international demand and signs of a
stronger recovery
As already indicated, although the strength of the
recovery of international production is still uncertain,
the more favourable growth prospects in the United
States, the maintenance of the levels of their imports as
well as the relative stability of markets in Latin America
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Table I.17
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATION IN EXPORTS OF GOODS IN 2002 AND 2003
(Rates of variation compared with the same period of the preceding year)
United European Developing Latin
Subregions/Countries States Union
Japan Asia America World
2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003
Latin America (16) 2.6 4.0 10.0 14.9 -3.9 14.3 23.0 30.3 -8.7 13.1 1.1 8.3
MERCOSUR 7.3 8.8 17.2 18.1 4.9 7.2 22.2 37.5 -14.3 17.1 1.5 18.9
Argentina 2.5 6.4 20.8 13.7 1.9 -7.5 12.5 54.7 -15.0 2.2 -3.1 14.3
Brazil 8.5 8.7 16.5 19.8 5.6 10.1 26.5 32.8 -13.9 30.5 3.7 21.1
Paraguay 15.3 18.2 -23.6 3.1 -30.9 -33.7 -4.4 31.1 8.5 25.8 0.0 11.9
Uruguay -19.4 69.3 14.6 14.2 15.7 -11.4 -2.7 4.3 -25.0 15.5 -10.3 18.2
Chile 11.9 -4.4 -4.9 15.3 -8.5 16.0 29.6 34.5 -15.8 10.6 -0.7 14.8
Andean Community 1.2 9.3 7.0 5.6 0.6 22.1 24.4 7.7 -0.4 13.9 2.0 5.4
Bolivia 3.7 21.6 -31.5 14.9 112.2 216.8 32.9 116.3 1.9 29.3 2.0 20.1
Colombia -3.3 11.6 7.8 14.4 17.6 2.5 3.7 8.4 -9.5 -10.9 -3.7 9.9
Ecuador 16.6 17.5 19.3 29.5 -19.9 -12.7 5.2 -17.3 -3.3 18.1 8.6 19.4
Peru 13.9 19.7 7.7 14.9 -2.3 4.5 39.1 15.4 -9.0 14.5 9.1 17.1
Venezuela -0.6 5.7 3.9 -23.3 3.9 109.6 3.9 -12.0 7.1 23.6 1.5 -3.4
Mexico 1.9 2.5 4.1 7.2 -25.3 30.2 25.1 0.7 -4.9 -5.9 1.5 2.9
CACM 6.9 6.1 -0.9 31.3 -16.4 14.3 -2.4 18.4 0.8 16.1 6.9 15.6
Costa Rica 7.1 11.2 5.1 19.1 -20.1 43.0 -7.8 26.1 6.2 -0.1 6.8 16.6
El Salvador 9.8 2.9 -2.4 90.8 8.4 27.4 310.9 15.4 2.3 3.9 4.4 4.8
Guatemala 4.6 6.8 -21.5 25.8 -30.7 14.3 1.0 6.7 -13.2 16.7 -8.1 6.1
Honduras 4.1 2.1 0.0 27.5 0.0 -24.5 0.0 18.1 0.0 29.9 -0.6 7.7
Nicaragua 18.2 12.7 -24.5 1.5 19.9 -16.4 -40.7 28.9 50.2 -14.6 -0.4 1.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information supplied by the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
and the Caribbean have had a positive influence on the
growth of regional exports.
In 2003, Latin American exports to the United
States, the European Union, Japan together with those
bound for other countries within the region rallied from
the low growth levels recorded in 2002, which
externalizes the greater boost of international demand.
In the case of exports to developing Asia, there was a
significant expansion in 2003 (with volumes
proportionately higher than those of exports bound for
other destinations), especially in the case of China, which
was Brazil’s second trading partner after the United
States in that year (see table I.17).
As pointed out above, Latin American commodities,
especially agricultural and mining products, benefited from
the favourable environment except in the case of bananas
and leather, which recorded slightly lower increases.
Whereas in 2002, growth in exports had been led by the
mining sector and oil in most countries in the region, in
2003, there was a stronger boost from agricultural products,
livestock, fisheries and mining, with manufactures playing
a secondary role. The higher rises in terms of export
volumes and values in the period January to September
were obtained by the countries of MERCOSUR, thanks
especially to soya, vegetable oils, meals, coffee, wheat,
cotton and other agricultural products. The same trend was
observed in the case of the countries of the Andean
Community. Except for Venezuela, the greatest rises took
place in oil- and gas-related mining. The same pattern was
reproduced in the case of Mexico and the Dominican
Republic, with a greater predominance of copper mining
in the case of Chile, where rising prices account for the
better performance of mining exports.
For the Central American economies, as for those
of MERCOSUR, the improvement in prices for the main
exports  coffee, cocoa, bananas and sugar†contributed
to an increase in merchandise exports. Thus, for Latin
America and the Caribbean as a whole, the recovery in
exports of crops, livestock and fishery products account
for most of the rally in total exports followed by the
mining sector and oil, with exports of manufactures
having a lesser impact (see table I.18).
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(b) Recovery of intra-regional schemes
While the renewed economic activity in the United
States and Asia has boosted sales of Mexican and Central
American and South American†products in that market,
the higher growth in the region has served as a catalyst
for trade within integration schemes in 2003, as analysed
below. In addition, in the last few years, trade has been
flourishing in the region, either between countries of
different subregional schemes or between countries that
do not belong to any subregional scheme. The
rapprochement between subregions and the extension
of economic integration to other economic, social and
political areas, such as the projected agreement between
the Andean Community and MERCOSUR will
contribute to the consolidation of intra-regional trade in
the expanded regional scheme. The Initiative for
Regional Infrastructure Integration in South
America (IIRSA) and the Puebla-Panama Plan play a
very important role in this regard (ECLAC, 2003c,
chapter VI).
(c) Improvement of conditions for external financing
The improved climate of the international financial
markets in terms of both capital flows and financing
conditions greatly alleviated the unfavourable external
conditions that had affected the balance of payments in
2002. Thus, highly indebted countries such as Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico, improved their sovereign risk as did
Ecuador and Peru (ECLAC, 2003d). International
investors are taking new risks and taking advantage of
the low prices of stocks in emerging markets to take
positions in public debt bonds. The low interest rates in
international markets have led many investors to turn
their attention to the region in search of higher
profitability. In this way, the profile of the issues
improved considerably in terms of maturity date and cost,
Table I.18
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN EXPORTS
BY MAJOR SECTOR, 2002-2003
(Rates of variation compared to the same period of the preceding year)
Agriculture, forestry, Mining and
Subregions/Countries hunting and fishing petroleum
Manufactures Total
2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
MERCOSUR -1.3 25.9 22.1 12.3 1.4 18.7 2.1 19.4
Argentina -13.0 26.6 7.4 5.6 1.1 12.4 -1.8 14.9
Brazil 4.5 24.0 29.8 14.9 2.0 21.5 4.3 21.3
Paraguay -6.7 44.2 … … 29.4 14.9 3.1 37.2
Uruguay 6.8 24.8 -68.0 65.8 -18.5 4.2 -10.1 14.0
Chile 14.2 -4.3 -5.3 13.7 0.8 10.0 -0.7 9.8
Andean Community 5.2 1.4 1.1 0.8 -2.5 -3.0 0.2 -0.7
Bolivia -2.8 15.2 8.6 23.0 -7.4 24.4 1.2 21.2
Colombia 3.4 0.3 -3.4 16.3 -5.5 0.1 -3.3 6.3
Ecuador 9.8 14.0 6.7 20.3 5.5 17.6 7.5 17.6
Peru 3.3 -4.0 16.5 23.7 -0.9 14.0 9.1 15.1
Venezuela 9.2 -29.3 -2.2 -14.5 -1.9 -9.5 -1.9 -12.4
Mexico -0.9 26.7 12.7 30.6 0.6 -1.7 1.5 1.6
CACM and Central America -5.3 4.5 23.7 1.4 3.2 16.6 1.4 11.8
Costa Rica 0.3 10.2 … … 6.4 20.8 5.0 18.1
El Salvador -21.4 n.a. … n.a. 6.3 n.a. 4.4 n.a.
Guatemala -7.5 5.9 47.7 23.1 -11.9 7.5 -7.6 7.8
Honduras -4.5 -6.6 3.5 -17.5 2.7 15.6 -0.7 1.7
Nicaragua -9.8 0.3 18.1 -15.4 4.9 -11.3 -1.4 -4.2
Dominican Republic 25.2 6.1 7.6 48.5 -2.7 5.8 -1.8 7.0
Latin America 0.2 16.6 5.3 11.5 0.6 4.5 1.3 6.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the countries.
a Period January-September.
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as well as in terms of the diversification of debt-holders,
which include not just private sector banks, but also other
types of financial institutions, such as Pension Fund
Managers or private investors (BIS, 2003; Prates, 2003).
(d) Increase in financial flows
Financial flows into the region in 2003 are estimated
at around US$ 40 billion, a figure achieved mainly
through the higher issue of sovereign bonds, especially
by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and
Venezuela (ECLAC, 2003d). In addition, some private
sector firms, such as Celulosa Arauco of Chile and Coca
Cola-FENSA of Mexico, organized interesting packages
of bond issues (Latin Finance, 2003).
The increase in capital inflows in the form of bond,
note and stock issues, as well as a new wave of opening
of syndicated loans,7 compensated for the stagnation of
the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the region,
which after having declined to US$ 45 billion8 in 2002,
again fell in 2003 to stand at US$ 36.5 billion (ECLAC,
2004a). This contrasts with the more dynamic FDI flows
to developing Asia despite its overall reduction. Thus, for
example, in 2002, strong FDI flows poured into China
and Malaysia and the estimates of the Chinese authorities
for 2003 project entries of the order of US$ 57 billion
(Eastern Economic Review, 2003).
(e) Currency devaluations
Currency devaluations contributed to the expansion
of exports in some countries of the region. Among the
countries whose currencies depreciated significantly
against the dollar in 2003 are Jamaica (13%), Dominican
Republic (25%), Venezuela (21%) and Mexico (9%).
While in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, the
devaluations were the result of the weakness of fiscal
accounts, in Venezuela, the devaluation was triggered
in February 2003 by the general strike which brought
the country to a standstill for two months. Then the
exchange rate against the dollar was set, at the same
time as exchange controls were introduced. The
depreciation of the Mexican peso was in keeping with
the need to recover competitiveness in some tradable
sectors hard hit by the expansion of Chinese exports to
the United States.
In another group of countries, currency
appreciation, which began to complicate the
performance of the export sector in the first semester
of the year, was offset by the weakness of the dollar
against the yen and the euro. To some extent, this meant
a relief for the exporters of MERCOSUR, Chile and
the Andean Community, as well as for the dollarized
economies of the region (Ecuador, El Salvador and
Panama).
3. Trade within Latin America and the Caribbean
7 Private financial sector and productive firms have received important sums as syndicated loans. The largest amount for the period June-
August 2003 was that received by the Brazilian firm Nova Transportadora (US$ 690 million) followed by BBVA Bancomer, which
received US$ 600 million (Latin Finance, 2003).
8 This value excludes FDI flows to financial centres.
(a) Trade within the region
As mentioned in section A2, trade among
developing countries has soared in recent years. In
Latin America, the markets of the countries of the
region absorb almost 16% of total exports. This
average reflects exports from Mexico, which account
for 45% of regional exports, of which 88% are
intended for the United States. For the other countries,
more than a quarter of their exports are destined for
other countries in the region, especially those that are
closest, owing to infrastructural problems which the
IIRSA and Puebla Panama initiatives seek to resolve
(see table I.19).
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Table I.19
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION
OF INTRAREGIONAL TRADE, 1997-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Composition Intraregional exports Annual variation
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003d 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003d
Intra-group tradea 28 688 28 735 22 202 26 776 25 191 19 366 21 898 0.2 -22.7 20.6 -5.9 -23.1 13.1
Inter-group tradeb 21 621 19 044 18 096 26 078 23 253 24 188 28 736 -11.9 -5.0 44.1 -10.8 4.0 18.8
Other non associatesc 9 619 8 866 8 185 9 697 10 162 9 262 9 404 -7.8 -7.7 18.5 4.8 -8.9 1.5
Intraregional trade 59 929 56 644 48 483 62 551 58 607 52 816 60 038 -5.5 -14.4 29.0 -6.3 -9.9 13.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.
a Includes trade within the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, CACM and CARICOM.
b Gives the total of all trade between groups, that is: Andean Community-MERCOSUR; Andean Community-CACM; Andean Community-CARICOM;
MERCOSUR-CACM; MERCOSUR-CARICOM; CACM-CARICOM; CACM-Andean Community; CACM-Caribbean countries; and exports from Mexico
and Chile to the rest of the LAIA countries.
c Takes into account the trade by Chile and Mexico and the rest of the countries of the region which are not members of LAIA, namely Cuba, Panama
and the Dominican Republic.
d Preliminary figures.
Whereas trade within the integration circuits
declined in 2002, exports between groups maintained
the same level as in 2001, while those originating in
non-associate countries strengthened by 6% in 2002, a
figure which contrasts with the sharp slowdown in the
value of trade within the groups (see table I.20).
In 2003, the proportion of exports traded between
groups and those originating in Cuba, the Dominican
Republic and those from Chile and Mexico to Central
America and the countries of the Caribbean accounted
for 63% of total flows within the region. The main trade
corridors between groups are the Andean Community-
MERCOSUR corridor, which highlights the greater
increase in exports from Venezuela to Argentina and
Brazil, which buy substantial quantities of oil and gas
products. In addition, Mexico, Chile and Colombia have
emerged as substitute destinations for Brazilian exports
in the face of the adverse conditions of the import sector
in Argentina, a country which is normally Brazil’s second
trading partners after the United States.9 Brazil’s export
basket to different MERCOSUR destinations includes
oil and gasolines, cellular telephones, television sets,
footwear, soybeans, orange juice and meats (SECEX,
2003a). For its part, Argentina increased its sales of fuels
and manufactures of livestock origin to Chile, and its
agricultural and fuel products to the rest of the countries
of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).
Chilean exports to Central America and the Caribbean
have also increased substantially.
In 2003, exports between groups maintained their
upward trend, having produced a greater expansion of
exported products from Chile and Mexico to the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and to a lesser
extent to the countries of the Caribbean. In addition,
Chile is importing more fuel from Argentina and Brazil,
while Venezuela is increasing its sales to Central America
and the Caribbean. Moreover, Mexico is expanding its
imports from the region. The outcome of these various
trends within the subregional schemes, on the one hand,
and the relatively dynamic behaviour of trade between
countries outside of the groups to which they belong,
on the other, is an increase in trade within Latin America
and the Caribbean for 2003 (see figure I.7).
(b) Trade within integration schemes
In 2003, trade within Latin American and Caribbean
groups showed a 13.7% recovery to stand at US$ 60.0
billion. The strongest recovery of exports within the
countries of MERCOSUR and CACM contrasts with the
intensification of the adverse situation suffered by
countries of the Andean Community since the end of
2002 (see figure I.7 and table I.20), and with the
continuous rise in exports between countries of the
region, outside of the agreements to which they belong
(for a more detailed analysis, see chapter II).
In 2002, Latin American and the Caribbean’s overall
intraregional trade contracted by as much as 10%
following the severe economic slowdown in output of
some economies in the region, especially Argentina,
Venezuela and Uruguay. In 2003, this trade had still not
regained the peak level recorded in 2000, and had in
fact accumulated a drop of 4% with respect to that year.
The performance of each regional grouping varied as a
function of its proximity to the focus points of
macroeconomic disequilibria, however. Thus the
MERCOSUR countries in general suffered the heaviest
slowdowns in 2002, when intraregional trade plunged
9 In 2002, Argentina was in fifth place after the Netherlands, Germany, China and Mexico (SECEX, 2003a).
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Table I.20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPORTS AND EXPORTS
BY SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES, 1998-2003
(Millions of current dollars and percentages)
Groups/years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003d
LAIA
Total exportsa 255 390 251 345 264 235 328 274 316 298 319 807 346 145
Percentage annual growth 11.4 -1.6 5.1 24.2 -3.6 1.1 8.2
Exports to LAIA 44 688 42 805 34 620 42 816 41 620 35 414 39 880
Percentage annual growth 18.3 -4.2 -19.1 23.7 -2.8 -14.9 12.6
Percentage exports within LAIA (2:1) (%) 17.5 17.0 13.1 13.0 13.2 11.1 11.5
Andean Community
Total exports 46 609 38 896 44 603 60 709 53 543 52 177 54 716
Percentage annual growth 5.0 -16.5 14.7 36.1 -11.8 -2.6 4.9
Exports to the Andean Community 5 628 5 504 3 940 5 167 5 656 5 278 4 988
Percentage annual growth 18.2 -2.2 -28.4 31.1 9.5 -6.7 -5.5
Percentage exports within the community (2:1) (%) 12.1 14.2 8.8 8.5 10.6 10.1 9.1
MERCOSUR
Total exports 82 596 80 227 76 305 85 692 89 078 89 500 106 674
Percentage annual growth 11.0 -2.9 -4.9 12.3 4.0 0.5 19.2
Exports to MERCOSUR 20 546 20 322 15 162 17 710 15 298 10 197 12 695
Percentage annual growth 20.3 -1.1 -25.4 16.8 -13.6 -33.3 24.5
Percentage exports within MERCOSUR (2:1) (%) 24.9 25.3 19.9 20.7 17.2 11.4 11.9
Central American Common Market (CACM)
Total exports 9 275 11 077 11 633 11 512 10 185 10 008 11 146
Percentage annual growth 26.5 19.4 5.0 -1.0 -11.5 -1.7 11.4
Exports to CACM 1 559 1 944 2 010 2 615 2 829 2 809 3 001
Percentage annual growth 12.4 24.6 3.4 30.1 8.2 -0.7 6.8
Percentage exports within CACM (2:1) (%) 16.8 17.5 17.3 22.7 27.8 28.1 26.9
CARICOM
Total exports 5 861 4 790 5 170 6 358 6 072 5 732 6 466
Percentage annual growth 3.1 -18.3 7.9 23.0 -4.5 -5.6 12.8
Exports to CARICOM 976 1 031 1 096 1 230 1 409 1 081 1 214
Percentage annual growth 11.5 5.7 6.3 12.3 14.5 -23.2 12.3
Percentage exports within CARICOM (2:1) (%) 16.7 21.5 21.2 19.4 23.2 18.9 18.8
Latin America and the Caribbean
Total exportsb 283 632 280 065 292 919 359 396 345 484 347 448 376 202
Percentage annual growth 11.7 -1.3 4.6 22.7 -3.9 0.6 8.3
Exports to Latin America and the Caribbeanc 59 929 56 644 48 483 62 551 58 607 52 816 60 038
Percentage annual growth 22.3 -5.5 -14.4 29.0 -6.3 -9.9 13.7
Intraregional percentage/Total (2:1) (%) 21.1 20.2 16.6 17.4 17.0 15.2 16.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the respective subregional
groupings and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics, October 2003.
a Includes maquila exports from Mexico.
b Includes LAIA, CACM, the set of CARICOM countries, Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
c Gives the total intra-group trade (Andean Community, MERCOSUR, CACM, CARICOM and that carried out between Chile and Mexico and LAIA), as
well as trade between groups plus the flow of exports from Cuba, Dominican Republic and Panama to the other countries in the region.
d Preliminary figures.
by close to 34%, due in particular to the strong impact
of the adjustment of imports in Argentina, which
accounted for 70% of the downturn in its trading
partners’ trade.10 In relative terms, the share of
intraregional trade in the region’s total trade rose by 0.8
percentage points to stand at 16% in 2003, a figure still
much lower than the highest level reached in 1997. The
Andean Community countries saw their intra-zonal trade
10 The Banco de la Nación was obliged keep a tight rein on international payments, which meant postponing payments due on imports and
less activity in the sector. In addition, in 2002, Uruguay had to devalue its currency, at the same time as unfavourable weather slashed the
production capacity of export crops such as soybeans, cotton and corn.
62 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
Figure I.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL AND INTRAZONAL TRADE,
1990-2000, 2001, 2002 AND 2003
(Growth rates)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of official data from the
respective countries.
Table I.21
SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR): QUARTERLY INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 2001-2003
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Export to the subregion on f.o.b. basis Growthb
Country 2001 2002 2003a 2003a
III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q
Argentina 1 947 1 698 1 506 1 524 1 316 1 378 1 464 1 264 1 356 1 503 -2.8 -17.0 3.1 9.1
Brazil 1 536 1 249 681 802 882 947 984 1 305 1 579 1 803 44.5 62.7 79.1 90.4
Uruguay 140 124 101 176 154 122 148 236 220 159 47.1 33.8 42.4 30.8
Paraguay 187 194 150 166 137 157 125 168 175 207 -16.6 1.2 27.0 31.9
MERCOSUR 3 810 3 264 2 437 2 667 2 489 2 604 2 721 2 972 3 330 3 673 11.6 11.4 33.8 41.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information supplied by the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior (FUNCEX) and MERCOSUR.
a Preliminary figures.
b Growth rate compared with the same period of the preceding year.
fall by 6.5% in 2002, mainly owing to the political instability
affecting Venezuela. The slowdown in intraregional trade
throughout the region was also attributable to the fall in
exports from Chile and Mexico to the rest of the LAIA
countries11 (see figure I.7 and table I.20). In 2003, the trend
in Chile was reversed while in Mexico and the Andean
Community, the situation remained stable.
In MERCOSUR, renewed confidence in the
economic upturn on the part of Argentine importers
helped boost exports from Brazil and the rest of
MERCOSUR, at the same time as the declining trend in
Argentine exports began to be reversed. Manufactured
goods are expected to benefit the most from the economic
recovery especially capital goods and intermediate inputs
imported from Brazil. The main recovery was
concentrated in the last quarters of 2003, with a higher
acceleration of sales in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
and, to a lesser extent, Argentina. In December 2003,
the growth of intraregional exports was 24.5% (see table
I.21 and figure I.8).
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Figure I.8
MERCOSUR: INTRA-GROUP TRADE BY QUARTER, 1998-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
The panorama for the countries of the Andean
Community is different, owing to the economic and
political problems that face them all. In particular, the
performance of the Venezuelan economy affected trade
of the countries of the Community, which show
decreases both in exports and in imports. In the first three
quarters of 2003, exports within the group plummeted
to less than 13% with sharper drops in reciprocal trade
between Colombia and Venezuela. Growth in
intraregional trade during 2003 declined by 9.3% despite
the recovery in exports from Bolivia and Ecuador, which
were not sufficient to offset the lower sales from
Venezuela (see table I.22 and figure I.9).
Trade within CACM recovered rapidly thanks mainly
to the boost from exports from Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Honduras and imports into Guatemala, which
translated into a growth in trade within CACM of the order
of 6.8% for the year 2003 (see table I.23 and figure I.10).
In 2002, the countries of CARICOM experienced a
sharp slowdown of 23% owing to the contraction in trade
in Trinidad and Tobago and the reduction in imports in
Jamaica and Guyana (see table I.24 and figure I.11).12
In 2003, reciprocal trade between the major trading
partners in that grouping was said to be recovering
considerably with a rise projected in intra-regional trade
of just over 12%.
12 An important component, which cushioned the fall in trade within CARICOM, was the increase in trade in Trinidad and Tobago in the
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Table I.22
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: QUARTERLY INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 2001-2003
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Exports towards the subregion on f.o.b. basis Growthb
Country 2001 2002 2003a 2003a
III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q
Bolivia 102 103 84 110 104 89 72 104 140 108 -14.4 -5.5 34.3 22.1
Colombia 809 718 575 622 610 510 388 422 510 565 -32.5 -32.2 -16.3 11.0
Ecuador 185 147 192 196 243 203 301 249 237 248 56.8 26.6 -2.4 21.9
Peru 128 136 117 121 128 131 106 122 139 170 -9.3 1.6 8.0 29.9
Venezuela 343 287 288 323 356 275 192 284 314 315 -33.3 -12.2 -11.8 14.6
Total Andean
Community 1 567 1 391 1 257 1 372 1 442 1 208 1 060 1 181 1 341 1 407 -15.6 -13.9 -7.0 16.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), on the basis of information from the Andean Community [on line] (http:/
/www.comunidadandina.org).
a Preliminary figures.
b Growth rate compared with the same period of the preceding year.
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Table I.23
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM): QUARTERLY
INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 2001-2003
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Exports towards the subregion on f.o.b. basis Growthb
Country 2001 2002 2003a 2003a
III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q
Costa Rica 172 166 161 173 173 179 183 186 193 203 13.6 7.3 12.1 13.4
El Salvador 183 178 171 186 187 194 187 179 185 195 9.8 -4.2 -1.0 0.5
Guatemala 262 360 256 231 249 272 253 282 266 288 -1.1 21.8 6.9 6.2
Honduras 52 58 51 60 64 66 61 62 64 72 20.2 4.7 -0.4 8.8
Nicaragua 45 41 49 50 48 49 53 52 57 61 9.4 3.6 16.7 23.7
CACM c 713 803 688 701 721 760 738 761 765 820 7.4 8.6 6.1 7.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Secretariat for Central American
Economic Integration (SIECA).
a Preliminary figures.
b Growth rate compared with the same period of the preceding year.
c The figures do not include the maquila sector.
Figure I.9
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: QUARTERLY INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 1998-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
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Table I.24
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM): QUARTERLY INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 2001-2003
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Export to the subregion on f.o.b. basis Growthb
Country 2001 2002 2003a 2002 2003
I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q IQ II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q
Barbados 27 29 25 27 26 24 26 29 30 29 5.3 5.2 14.1 22.0
Guyana 18 19 18 20 20 20 19 21 22 23 7.9 1.6 11.2 14.5
Jamaica 14 15 13 14 15 16 14 15 18 18 7.8 7.8 16.8 16.0
Trinidad and
Tobago 262 261 250 254 172 171 164 166 167 198 -34.4 -34.4 -2.9 15.8
CARICOM (4)c 321 324 306 315 233 231 224 231 236 268 -26.9 -26.8 1.5 16.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information obtained from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics and Bank of Jamaica, Statistical Digest, 2003.
a Preliminary figures.
b Growth rate compared with the same period of the preceding year.
c In addition to trade among the four members, exports towards the rest of the CARICOM countries are included. The fact that the rest of the countries
are not fully added in means that the series of this table differs from the annual totals presented in table I.20, which include the official data for all the
countries of this grouping.
Figure I.10
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM): QUARTERLY
INTRA-GROUP TRADE, 1998-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
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Figure I.11
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM): INTRA-GROUP TRADE BY QUARTERS
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
D. Trade in services in Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2002 and 2003
According to preliminary figures for 2003, both exports
and imports of services will improve moving from -3.9%
and -8.6% to 6.6% and 3.3% respectively. The countries
of South America will benefit the most thanks to the
recovery in tourism. Table I.25 presents goods and services
statistics for the first half of the year. It shows how the
main recovery is occurring in exports of services from
the MERCOSUR countries, Costa Rica and the
Dominican Republic. Another element to highlight is the
fact that the services trade balance up to the first half of
the year had been reduced substantially, contributing to
the accumulation of the surplus in the trade balance of
goods and services. In addition, the major increases in
the trade in services follow major increases in trade in
goods, especially in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic (see
table I.25). In the countries of the Caribbean, the recovery
of exports was more moderate than in the rest of the region
(see table I.15), except the spectacular growth in the travel
sector in the Dominican Republic. The main improvement
occurs in connection with the best time in tourism and
travel, which reversed the major losses in income in the
2001-2002 biennium. Nevertheless, overall, between 2001
and 2003, regional services exports remained at a level
comparable to 2000, at a time when world trade in services
grew at an annual rate of 6%, despite localized increases
in exports under some headings (see chapter IV). As a
result, the proportion of exports of services in the regional
total of goods and services is equivalent to almost 14%
(see table I.27).
As regards imports, the trend of the trade in goods
still continues, since a 4% reduction was accumulated
between 2001 and 2003, owing to the more sluggish
domestic demand for services, especially transport and
travel in the MERCOSUR countries, with the exception
of Brazil, the Andean Community and the Caribbean
countries. It should be pointed out, however, that in 2003,
the demand for transport recovered to the extent that the
flows of the trade in goods recovered (see table I.26).
In 2002, the trade in services represented less than
14% of the region’s exports in goods and services, or
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN THE TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 2002-2003
(Millions of dollars and percentage growth)
Trade in goods Trade in services Growth rates 2003a
Subregions/countries Exports Imports Trade balance Exports Imports Trade balance Exports Imports
2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a Goods Services Goods Services
Latin America and
the Caribbeanb 357 525 387 301 339 259 349 910 18 266 37 390 58 082 61 921 67 080 69 275 -8 998 -7 354 8.3 6.6 3.1 3.3
MERCOSUR 89 878 106 841 59 727 65 797 30 151 41 045 13 896 15 731 20 304 22 031 -6 408 -6 300 18.9 13.2 10.2 8.5
Argentina 25 709 29 375 8 473 13 083 17 236 16 292 2 974 3 855 4 662 5 402 -1 688 -1 546 14.3 29.6 54.4 15.9
Brazil 60 362 73 084 47 219 48 260 13 143 24 825 9 606 10 543 14 644 15 631 -5 038 -5 088 21.1 9.8 2.2 6.7
Paraguay 1 884 2 109 2 162 2 362 - 278 - 254 541 555 345 382 196 172 11.9 2.5 9.2 10.8
Uruguay 1 923 2 273 1 873 2 092 50 182 775 778 653 616 122 162 18.2 0.4 11.7 -5.6
Chile 18 340 21 046 15 827 18 031 2 513 3 015 3 960 4 805 4 917 5 571 - 957 - 767 14.8 21.3 13.9 13.3
Andean Community 53 108 55 997 40 868 39 874 12 240 16 123 5 679 5 516 11 723 11 446 -6 044 -5 930 5.4 -2.9 -2.4 -2.4
Bolivia 1 310 1 573 1 532 1 396 - 222 177 235 290 516 592 - 281 - 302 20.1 23.5 -8.9 14.8
Colombia 12 302 13 523 12 077 13 258 225 265 1 858 1 792 3 316 3 292 -1 458 -1 499 9.9 -3.5 9.8 -0.7
Ecuador 5 192 6 197 6 196 6 268 -1 004 - 71 981 898 1 546 1 590 - 566 - 691 19.4 -8.4 1.2 2.8
Peru 7 647 8 954 7 440 8 244 207 710 1 545 1 585 2 493 2 581 - 948 - 995 17.1 2.6 10.8 3.5
Venezuela 26 656 25 750 13 622 10 707 13 034 15 043 1 060 950 3 852 3 392 -2 792 -2 442 -3.4 -10.4 -21.4 -11.9
Mexico 160 763 165 355 168 679 170 958 -7 916 -5 603 12 692 12 658 16 740 17 125 -4 048 -4 467 2.9 -0.3 1.4 2.3
CACM 13 556 14 892 21 464 23 083 -7 909 -8 190 4 508 4 767 4 229 4 434 280 333 9.9 5.7 7.5 4.9
Costa Rica 5 259 6 132 6 523 7 245 -1 263 -1 114 1 864 2 041 1 184 1 264 680 777 16.6 9.5 11.1 6.8
El Salvador 3 017 3 162 4 922 5 436 -1 906 -2 274 782 824 976 994 - 194 - 169 4.8 5.4 10.4 1.8
Guatemala 2 629 2 789 5 578 5 712 -2 950 -2 923 1 140 1 173 1 044 1 085 97 89 6.1 2.9 2.4 3.9
Honduras 1 930 2 078 2 804 3 065 - 874 - 987 527 523 687 741 - 160 - 218 7.7 -0.7 9.3 7.8
Nicaragua 721 731 1 636 1 624 - 916 - 893 195 206 338 351 - 143 - 145 1.4 5.4 -0.8 3.8
Caribbean countries 16 567 18 117 26 343 26 025 -9 776 -7 908 15 095 15 887 7 895 7 374 7 200 8 513 9.4 5.2 -1.2 -6.6
Dominican Republic 5 183 5 494 8 883 8 261 -3 699 -2 766 3 055 3 566 3 055 3 566 1 284 1 199 6.0 16.7 -7.0 16.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data taken from the balance of payments of each country.
a Preliminary figures.
b Corresponds to the total for the 37 countries in tables I.10, I.11 y I.13.
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of services in world trade –approximately 20% (WTO,
2003b). In general, the average conceals highly diverse
specific situations. The lowest rates are recorded by Venezuela
(3.3%), Mexico (7.5%), Suriname (9.6%), Argentina
(10.9%), Trinidad and Tobago (10.9%), Colombia (12.2%)
and Brazil (12.7%), while the highest rates are recorded by
Saint Kitts and Nevis (89%), Antigua and Barbuda (87%),
Barbados (78%), the Bahamas (74%), Netherlands Antilles
(71%), Cuba (67%) and Dominica (66%) (see table I.27).
It should be noted that between 1990 and 2002,
there was a sharp reduction in the share of imported
services in total imports of goods and services, from
24% to 16%, due mainly to the expansion in the trade
in goods from Mexico and the reduction in imports
into Argentina. For Mexico, the rate of services imports
slumped by almost 20% to stand at less than 9% and
for Argentina, they declined from 46% to 29%.
However, for many countries in South America, imports
of services remained very high. In Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Peru and Venezuela, services were equivalent to
more than 24% of total imports of goods and services
(see tables I.27 and I.28).
Table I.26
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH IN TRADE IN SERVICES
DISAGGREGATED INTO MAIN SUB-HEADINGS
(Percentages)
Exports of trade services Imports of trade services
Subregions/Countries Transport Travel Other services Transport Travel Other services
2002 2003b 2002 2003b 2002 2003b 2002 2003b 2002 2003b 2002 2003b
Latin America and
the Caribbean (27) a -1.9 ... -9.6 ... -5.1 ... -12.6 ... -12.0 ... -7.8 ...
Latin America
(18 countries) -1.7 11.4 -4.2 4.7 -4.6 10.0 -11.7 0.3 -11.7 -4.0 -6.4 1.7
MERCOSUR countries -2.8 20.1 -21.9 26.7 -4.3 3.5 -29.0 4.7 -33.0 2.6 -15.1 13.2
Argentina -17.5 22.9 -41.9 37.2 -19.4 20.3 -54.8 15.8 -40.2 10.7 -41.5 24.5
Brazil 11.8 20.6 15.4 24.1 -2.4 2.1 -17.3 0.9 -25.1 -5.6 -9.2 12.6
Paraguay  -20.4 14.3 -10.0 15.7 4.4 -1.3 -16.9 16.7 -10.0 36.0 -1.4 -15.4
Uruguay -22.8 11.0 -42.5 -1.7 -11.3 -11.8 -29.2 9.2 -29.5 -4.9 13.0 -23.8
Chile -2.0 20.1 -0.4 17.4 -6.8 24.8 -0.1 13.7 15.9 5.9 -7.2 15.0
Andean Community -1.0 1.1 -12.4 -7.3 -10.0 1.4 -9.7 -0.5 -5.4 -6.0 -4.1 -1.8
Bolivia -10.6 30.6 8.0 18.8 0.4 23.1 3.2 14.5 -11.0 23.5 9.8 11.0
Colombia -4.8 17.7 -20.5 -15.5 -11.7 -3.4 -14.2 3.8 -7.6 -4.5 0.7 -2.8
Ecuador 13.8 -15.9 4.0 -9.1 6.0 6.4 16.7 1.2 7.0 -2.6 -0.9 8.4
Peru 11.0 3.8 1.7 3.8 -1.4 -0.1 3.2 3.7 4.0 1.6 11.3 4.6
Venezuela -12.6 -15.2 -28.6 -12.5 -28.6 -0.9 -21.6 -10.1 -11.5 -15.9 -17.4 -11.1
Mexico -10.9 7.5 5.4 -6.3 -9.6 16.4 -5.2 10.1 6.3 -0.5 13.7 -5.4
CACM 3.4 -2.1 4.2 6.1 2.5 9.6 6.1 4.0 1.4 2.1 -3.5 8.4
Costa Rica 0.3 10.7 -1.1 8.7 -4.3 11.0 8.2 12.4 -5.3 6.2 0.4 0.5
El Salvador 10.8 7.7 21.9 -7.9 5.4 16.6 7.7 16.6 -2.2 -16.4 -11.7 -5.5
Guatemala -7.5 4.9 9.4 3.5 13.1 1.7 10.1 3.3 18.4 7.8 11.7 1.1
Honduras 2.4 -81.6 13.6 15.8 -2.0 16.0 -1.1 -20.5 2.4 6.0 -7.9 70.8
Nicaragua -2.2 10.8 -16.4 -0.2 -8.6 14.0 2.2 7.1 -8.7 3.2 -11.1 -1.4
Panama 7.2 7.1 8.6 7.0 32.1 35.8 3.5 0.3 1.0 6.9 43.4 1.5
Caribbean countries (10) -4.1 ... -23.5 ... -10.3 ... -18.6 ... -13.8 ... -25.9 ...
Antigua and Barbuda -1.3 ... -1.1 ... -1.8 ... 3.7 ... 0.0 ... 2.9 ...
Dominican Republic 5.1 0.0 -2.2 15.0 1.4 40.6 -1.9 -4.9 1.5 0.0 4.4 -19.8
Belize 52.7 ... 8.3 ... -15.6 ... 2.9 ... 4.4 ... 13.7 ...
Barbados … ... -2.6 ... -4.6 ... 3.0 ... 5.1 ... … ...
Dominica -3.1 ... -4.6 ... -0.1 ... -8.2 ... -2.3 ... -6.7 ...
Grenada 11.1 ... 6.5 ... -5.5 ... -0.6 ... 1.0 ... 24.4 ...
Jamaica 5.2 ... -1.9 ... 8.7 ... 1.3 ... 25.4 ... 10.6 ...
Saint Lucia -27.2 ... -0.9 ... -0.8 ... 2.4 ... 1.0 ... 4.1 ...
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 2.3 ... 1.4 ... 2.7 ... 3.7 ... 4.2 ... 6.4 ...
Trinidad and Tobago -2.3 ... 13.4 ... 1.7 ... -68.3 ... 49.9 ... -54.1 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information taken from the balance of payments current
account of each country.
a Includes only information for the 27 countries incorporated in the table.
b Preliminary estimates.
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Table I.27
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF SERVICES IN TOTAL TRADE, 1985-2002
(Percentages of trade in goods and services)
Exports ImportsSubregions/Countries
1985 1990 1995 2002 1985 1990 1995 2002
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.1 17.5 16.1 13.9 24.7 23.8 19.3 16.1
MERCOSUR countries 10.8 13.3 13.8 12.6 26.5 29.6 22.8 25.5
Argentina 16.4 16.5 15.0 10.9 38.3 45.6 27.7 29.1
Brazil 7.5 10.7 11.7 12.7 22.3 26.7 21.5 25.3
Paraguay 24.7 26.5 12.2 18.0 21.5 21.9 13.7 11.2
Uruguay 32.1 21.6 38.8 25.8 33.5 23.7 24.0 22.8
Chile 15.4 18.1 17.2 18.2 27.0 22.7 20.0 24.2
Andean Community 10.3 11.9 11.8 9.4 26.0 27.3 22.4 21.8
Bolivia 13.4 14.9 16.0 14.8 34.7 28.6 22.2 26.0
Colombia 19.0 18.4 13.8 12.2 28.0 25.5 18.0 18.8
Ecuador 12.0 16.5 14.2 15.4 28.3 31.9 20.8 19.5
Peru 18.6 19.4 16.8 15.7 33.8 28.5 19.6 23.8
Venezuela 5.2 6.3 8.1 3.3 21.4 26.8 28.6 24.6
Mexico 15.2 16.6 10.9 7.5 23.1 19.9 11.8 8.8
CACM 16.4 24.6 20.6 24.5 18.8 21.0 17.7 16.0
Costa Rica 22.6 31.0 21.8 25.3 22.0 23.4 19.3 15.9
El Salvador 24.8 33.8 19.2 20.0 24.5 19.4 14.1 15.8
Guatemala 8.7 20.4 23.0 29.4 14.3 21.2 18.5 14.1
Honduras 11.4 13.3 15.8 21.8 18.0 19.5 17.9 19.2
Nicaragua 11.4 15.3 19.4 22.4 14.0 18.1 19.9 17.3
Panama 35.6 24.6 20.0 33.4 20.4 16.4 14.0 16.8
Caribbean countries 32.3 36.3 46.7 45.6 25.1 21.5 27.1 19.7
Netherlands Antilles 39.6 39.4 88.9 71.0 24.6 31.8 35.5 24.7
Aruba … 72.6 32.4 32.4 … 18.8 12.2 5.7
Cuba … 8.9 48.8 66.7 … 7.5 19.2 13.1
Dominican Republic 44.2 59.9 34.0 40.0 17.6 19.7 15.7 11.3
CARICOM 29.6 45.6 48.0 42.7 21.8 26.7 27.2 22.7
Bahamas 29.1 84.1 87.2 73.7 11.1 34.7 35.6 37.9
Barbados 54.9 74.9 77.9 77.7 20.3 28.5 34.4 20.6
Belize … 51.2 44.7 40.4 … 22.2 26.7 20.8
Guyana 22.0 … 21.2 37.2 31.1 … 24.3 42.1
Haiti 33.9 16.4 40.5 32.3 38.1 14.0 17.8 9.5
Jamaica 51.7 46.3 47.1 56.2 27.2 29.2 29.8 31.3
Suriname 11.6 4.3 20.0 9.6 20.4 20.4 35.6 14.3
Trinidad and Tobago 11.0 14.4 12.2 10.9 32.2 30.2 12.4 6.6
OECS 59.0 65.2 76.1 72.2 19.7 23.3 29.2 12.2
Antigua and Barbuda 88.3 94.0 92.1 87.1 18.4 29.6 32.9 5.8
Dominica 25.4 35.7 55.1 66.0 16.4 20.0 26.7 33.4
Grenada 60.5 68.5 79.3 57.1 23.1 23.4 23.5 11.9
Saint Kitts and Nevis 53.3 64.3 80.4 88.8 17.1 24.1 29.8 13.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 24.2 35.9 63.5 47.4 18.3 18.5 28.3 0.5
Saint Lucia 53.7 53.7 70.7 63.2 22.6 23.1 28.5 12.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information taken from the balance of payments of each
country (see tables II.5a, II.5b, II.6a y II.6b).
As cautioned in the 2001-2002 edition of Latin
America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, it is
important to analyse the composition of exports and
imports of services, owing to the different characteristics
of the categories of the IMF Balance of Payments
Manual, the main source of comparative statistical
services information (ECLAC, 2003c, p. 88). In 2002,
the most representative items for the region in terms of
exports are “travel” and “other services”. The category
“other services” encompasses exports and imports of
services such as: communications services; construction
services; insurance services; financial services; computer
and information services; royalties and licence fees; other
business services; personal, cultural and recreational
services; and government services (ECLAC, 2003c, box
I.2) (see tables I.29 and I.30).
A detailed review shows that around 1/3 of the trade
in services corresponds to the category “others”, with a
greater weight in the countries of MERCOSUR and
Chile. At the level of the subsectors, trade corresponding
to business services concentrates 48% and 32% of
exports and imports respectively, followed in importance
by insurance, finance, communications and computer
services (see tables I.29 and I.30).
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Table I.28
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION OF THE TRADE
IN COMMERCIAL SERVICES, 1990 AND 2002






1990 2002 1990 2002
World 783 200 1 578 000 22.9 32.5 44.6 1 367 200 1 546 000 28.5 30.2 41.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 30 664 57 929 17.6 52.4 30.0 36 877 66 508 35.1 26.6 38.3
MERCOSUR countries 7 171 13 896 18.9 28.4 52.8 11 494 20 304 24.7 24.5 50.8
Argentina 2 446 2 974 23.6 51.6 24.8 3 120 4 662 20.4 49.9 29.7
Brazil 3 762 9 606 16.6 20.8 62.6 7 523 14 644 24.8 16.4 58.9
Paraguay 498 541 12.7 10.9 76.4 458 345 51.5 18.8 29.7
Uruguay 466 775 33.6 45.3 21.1 393 653 39.5 27.2 33.3
Chile 1 849 3 960 41.0 21.5 37.5 2 077 4 917 35.1 13.7 51.2
Andean Community 4 266 5 679 27.6 48.1 24.3 6 563 11 729 39.6 26.5 33.9
Bolivia 146 235 25.5 34.8 39.7 311 516 56.6 14.3 29.1
Colombia 1 600 1 858 29.0 51.8 19.2 1 750 3 322 36.5 32.3 31.2
Ecuador 538 981 34.5 45.6 19.9 804 1 546 42.1 23.5 34.4
Peru 799 1 545 18.5 51.9 29.7 1 164 2 493 37.8 24.7 37.5
Venezuela 1 183 1 060 32.6 41.4 25.9 2 534 3 852 40.2 25.5 34.3
Mexico 8 094 12 692 9.0 69.8 21.2 10 323 16 740 38.2 36.2 25.6
CACM 1 455 4 508 16.9 53.8 29.3 1 596 4 229 45.9 23.7 30.4
Costa Rica 609 1 864 13.1 62.3 24.6 550 1 184 38.8 29.1 32.1
El Salvador 329 782 39.9 31.4 28.7 315 976 42.7 19.6 37.7
Guatemala 320 1 140 8.1 53.9 38.1 384 1 044 49.1 25.6 25.3
Honduras 137 527 17.0 55.2 27.7 220 687 55.4 19.0 25.6
Nicaragua 60 195 11.4 58.0 30.7 127 338 50.5 20.5 28.9
Panamaa 1 092 2 252 54.0 23.4 22.5 689 1 273 48.6 14.0 37.4
Caribbean countries 6 737 14 942 8.4 73.6 18.0 4 135 7 317 40.7 23.4 35.9
Netherlands Antilles Neerlandesas 1 161 1 250 14.2 33.3 52.5 518 703 29.1 30.8 40.1
Aruba ... 900 ... 86.0c 14.0d ... 630 45.6 17.8 36.6
Cuba ... 2 836 6.0 75.0 19.0 ... 625 45.6 23.5 30.9
Dominican Republic 1 097 3 055 2.3 89.6 8.1 440 1 284 58.3 23.0 18.7
CARICOM 4 479 6 902 12.1 71.7 16.2 2 442 4 075 36.2 23.1 40.7
Bahamasa 1 500 1 930 2.7 89.7 7.6 573 1 043 17.6 29.6 52.8
Barbados 654 184 9.8 70.7 19.5 250 131 28.8 32.5 38.6
Belize 115 798 0.0 87.2 12.8 60 252 54.7 42.1 3.2
Guyanab 106 217 24.8 50.8 24.4 140 238 40.0 12.3 47.7
Haitia 52 147 2.0 62.9 35.1 72 252 85.7 9.6 4.7
Jamaica 1 027 1 920 19.2 63.0 17.8 697 1 649 37.3 15.7 47.1
Surinamea 37 59 40.8 17.4 41.8 171 150 41.2 10.6 48.2
Trinidad and Tobago 329 599 33.8 38.0 28.1 479 362 32.5 48.4 19.2
OECS 659 1 049 10.7 70.9 18.4 316 477 38.3 19.4 42.3
Antigua and Barbuda 312 398 18.8 67.6 13.6 105 158 35.4 20.3 44.3
Dominica 33 74 8.0 59.4 32.6 30 48 41.1 18.6 40.3
Grenada 64 138 6.6 64.6 28.8 33 79 38.6 9.7 51.7
Saint Kitts and Nevisa 54 6 9.7 60.2 30.1 35 16 40.7 11.8 47.5
Saint Vincent and theGrenadines 45 134 7.3 60.8 31.9 32 62 43.0 16.6 40.4
Saint Lucia 151 299 4.1 85.6 10.2 81 114 38.0 28.0 34.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information taken from the balance of payments of each
country (see tables I.12 and I.13). The structure for the regional total and the set of countries of the Caribbean includes estimates for those
countries with partial or incomplete information (see notes a, b, c and d).
a The structure corresponds to information for 2000.
b The structure corresponds to information for 1995.
c The information relating to tourism inflows/outflows in the total exports/imports of services (year 1999) was used as a proxy to obtain this percentage.
d The total includes transport.
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LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF OTHER SERVICES, 2001
(Percentages of total)
Commu- Construction Insurance Financial Computer Franchise Business Personal Government Total other Percentagenication  of total
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
Latin America 15.0 6.3 0.2 0.5 13.8 29.0 4.1 7.2 1.6 2.7 2.6 11.7 47.9 32.0 3.1 4.9 11.7 5.6 100.0 100.0 30.0 37.9
MERCOSUR 5.9 6.4 0.2 0.5 3.0 15.2 5.0 8.2 2.8 4.3 4.3 16.5 67.1 38.7 1.1 6.9 10.4 3.4 100.0 100.0 52.6 50.5
Argentina 20.4 8.6 ... ... ... 12.8 0.5 8.0 19.8 7.9 2.7 20.1 34.2 22.7 3.7 9.9 18.7 9.8 100.0 100.0 23.8 27.8
Brazil 3.9 6.1 0.3 0.6 2.9 15.2 5.1 8.2 0.5 3.9 1.8 16.3 74.8 41.0 0.9 6.5 9.8 2.3 100.0 100.0 62.6 58.9
Paraguay 2.7 0.2 … … 5.2 56.1 1.5 4.1 0.1 1.1 48.2 2.5 37.4 2.7 … … 5.0 33.3 100.0 100.0 76.3 28.4
Uruguay 9.4 13.8 ... ... 9.4 21.6 19.1 7.1 6.6 6.4 … 5.6 46.9 12.2 ... 9.6 8.4 23.7 100.0 100.0 21.1 33.3
Chile 16.8 15.5 ... ... 11.8 10.9 ... ... ... ... ... 3.6 64.2 57.5 ... ... 7.2 12.4 100.0 100.0 39.1 52.4
Andean
Community 31.4 9.7 ... ... 11.7 18.9 4.1 7.5 0.5 1.3 0.4 5.2 16.0 41.4 3.6 3.7 32.3 12.3 100.0 100.0 22.5 31.0
Bolivia 33.5 11.5 … ... 38.9 51.1 4.3 2.5 0.4 3.5 1.5 4.2 4.5 11.3 1.0 1.7 15.9 14.2 100.0 100.0 39.7 29.1
Colombia 48.9 12.2 … … … 24.3 12.2 15.8 1.5 3.9 0.5 7.2 15.1 27.6 5.7 2.7 16.1 6.3 100.0 100.0 19.2 31.2
Ecuador 52.3 3.6 … … 0.4 12.2 … 2.3 … … … 9.7 0.0 51.6 13.1 13.2 34.3 7.4 100.0 100.0 19.9 34.4
Peru 20.3 8.0 … … 27.6 22.1 … 2.0 … … 0.3 5.8 24.8 46.4 … … 26.9 15.8 100.0 100.0 26.5 35.1
Venezuela 2.9 11.9 … … 1.3 9.5 … 7.2 … … … … 19.7 50.2 … 2.6 76.1 18.6 100.0 100.0 20.8 27.1
Mexico 26.1 3.5 ... ... 44.8 69.1 ... 5.9 ... ... 1.3 4.5 12.3 7.7 10.5 2.1 5.0 7.2 100.0 100.0 21.2 25.6
CACM 29.5 8.1 0.7 4.7 10.9 21.2 2.7 3.2 1.6 1.7 0.2 5.4 33.9 46.2 0.0 0.7 20.6 8.8 100.0 100.0 29.9 31.6
Costa Rica 35.6 17.3 … ... … 13.4 3.5 0.5 4.5 1.1 0.5 10.1 47.1 54.2 ... ... 8.8 3.3 100.0 100.0 26.0 34.9
El Salvador 39.7 6.5 3.3 2.8 32.6 35.3 6.0 9.3 … 3.7 0.6 6.3 7.9 29.4 … … 9.9 6.9 100.0 100.0 28.7 37.7
Guatemala 0.1 0.4 … 2.2 9.0 27.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.9 … … 51.2 48.6 … … 35.5 17.9 100.0 100.0 38.3 26.7
Honduras 55.2 8.4 … 22.6 11.5 9.4 … … … ... … 5.6 3.9 43.0 … 4.2 29.5 6.8 100.0 100.0 27.7 25.6
Nicaragua 17.3 2.8 … … 1.7 9.5 … … … … … … 56.7 73.6 … … 24.3 14.1 100.0 100.0 30.7 28.1
Panama 11.9 5.3 … ... 10.0 21.1 34.7 16.6 ... ... ... 8.6 36.4 35.4 ... ... 7.1 13.0 100.0 100.0 22.5 37.4
Dominican
Republic 47.0 21.2 … ... ... 36.8 ... 3.7 ... ... ... 12.6 24.2 11.5 ... ... 28.7 14.2 100.0 100.0 8.1 18.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information taken from the balance of payments of each country and presented using the methodology set out
in the Fifth Balance of Payments Manual of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Table I.30
LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF OTHER SERVICES, 2001
(Millions of dollars)
Communications Construction Insurance Financial Computer
X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M
Latin America 2 211 2 379 -168  24  174 -150 2 032 10 965 -8 933  600 2 728 -2 128  239 1 031 -792
MERCOSUR  456 1 426 -970  17  120 -103  233 3 404 -3 170  390 1 827 -1 437  217  969 -752
Argentina  172  198 -26    ...    ...    ...  0  297 -297  4  186 -182  167  183 -17
Brazil  241 1 202 -961  17  120 -103  180 3 015 -2 835  316 1 624 -1 308  28  772 -744
Paraguay  12  0  11    ...    ...    ...  22  51 -30  6  4  2  0  1 -1
Uruguay  31  26  5    ...    ...    ...  31  41 -9  64  13  50  22  12  10
Chile  204  190  14    ...    ...    ...  143  134  9    ...    ...    ...  0  0  0
Andean Community  428  321  107    ...    ...    ...  160  623 -463  56  249 -193  7  43 -36
Bolivia  35  14  22    ...    ...    ...  41  62 -21  5  3  2  0  4 -4
Colombia  205  120  85    ...    ...    ...   239 -239  51  155 -104  6  39 -32
Ecuador  96  19  77    ...    ...    ...  1  65 -65   12 -12    ...    ...    ...
Peru  84  63  22 … … …  115  173 -58   16 -16 … … …
Venezuela  7  105 -98   ...   ...   ...  3  84 -81   63 -63   ...   ...   ...
Mexico  787  331  456   ...   ...   ... 1 351 6 488 -5 137   557 -557  0  0  0
CACM  293  92  200  7  54 -47  108  242 -134  27  36 -9  15  20 -4
Costa Rica  92  53  40   ...   ... …   41 -41  9  2  7  12  3  8
El Salvador  81  21  60  7  9 -2  67  114 -47  12  30 -17   12 -12
Guatemala  0  1 -1    ...  5 …  19  60 -41  5  5  1  4  4 -1
Honduras  94  15  79    ...  40 …  20  17  3    ...    ...    ...    ...    ...    ...
Nicaragua  25  3  22    ... … …  3  11 -8    ...    ...    ...    ...    ...    ...
Panama  44  19  25    ... … …  37  74 -38  128  59  69    ...    ...    ...
Dominican Republic  139  50  89    ... … …  0  87 -87  0  9 -9    ...    ...    ...
Franchise Business Personal Government
X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M
Latin America 385 4 429 -4 045 7 050 12 109 -5 059 455 1 871 -1 417 1 721 2 130 -409
MERCOSUR 337 3 702 -3 365 5 212 8 666 -3 453 89 1 543 -1 454 811 752 59
Argentina 23 466 -444 288 526 -239 31 230 -199 158 228 -70
Brazil 112 3 223 -3 111 4 612 8 114 -3 502 58 1 295 -1 237 604 449 155
Paraguay 203 2 200 157 3 155    ...    ... … 21 31 -10
Uruguay 11 -11 156 23 133 0 18 -18 28 45 -17
Chile 0 44 -44 779 704 75 0 0 0 88 152 -64
Andean Community 5 172 -167 218 1 367 -1 149 49 123 -74 440 406 34
Bolivia 2 5 -4 5 14 -9 1 2 -1 17 17 0
Colombia 2 70 -68 63 271 -208 24 27 -3 67 62 6
Ecuador 52 -52 0 277 -277 24 71 -47 63 39 24
Peru 1 45 -44 103 363 -260 … … … 112 124 -12
Venezuela   ...   ... … 47 442 -395 23 -23 181 164 17
Mexico 40 419 -379 370 721 -351 317 198 119 152 674 -522
CACM 2 61 -59 336 526 -190 0 8 -8 204 100 104
Costa Rica 1 31 -30 122 165 -43 … … … 23 10 13
El Salvador 1 20 -19 16 95 -78    ...    ... … 20 22 -2
Guatemala    ...    ... … 109 108 1    ...    ... … 76 40 36
Honduras 10 -10 7 76 -70 8 -8 50 12 38
Nicaragua    ...    ... … 82 82 0    ...    ... … 35 16 20
Panama 31 -31 134 125 9 … … … 26 46 -20
Dominican Republic 30 -30 72 27 45 … … … 85 34 52
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information taken from the balance of payments of each
country presented using the methodology of the Fifth Balance of Payments Manual of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Chapter II
Introduction
Regional integration in Latin America and
the Caribbean, 2002-2003
As mentioned in chapter I, the growth of GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean was weak
during 2003, and constituted mainly a recovery of the ground lost in 2002. The resulting
adjustments have had negative effects on the integration process and have led to some non-
compliance with fundamental commitments in the four integration schemes. Independently
of progress made, the slack performance of the countries’ productive sectors continues to
cause serious problems. It is no coincidence that the last few years have been witness to
intensive efforts to redefine and implement the integration process with a view to making
more efficient use of the potential of a regional economic community.
Despite advances in tariff reduction and harmonization
through the use of common external tariffs, the
integration process is encountering difficulties in terms
of cooperation efforts to make progress in other areas
of economic, social and political integration. The
cooperative approach is weakened by individual strategies
to improve the international position of economies, while
the integration schemes are forced to tackle distribution
problems caused by countries’ heterogeneous levels of
development. On the one hand, each country’s attempts
to increase its productive complementarities with third
countries weakens the process of cooperation since it
deprives the common effort of the resources needed to
deepen integration. On the other hand, reinforcing trade
and investment relations between Latin American and
Caribbean countries that are not directly linked to each
other through regional integration progresses contributes
to trade diversification in the region (see chapter I).1
1 In various documents, the Secretary-General of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) has suggested the adoption of measures
to enhance the regional free trade area based on the network of agreements in force among countries and integration schemes, such as
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There is also a consensus that the integration model
based mainly on tariff reductions has become stale, and
that there is also a need to consider a degree of
coordination of macroeconomic variables, deal with
the restrictions imposed by limited physical integration
and demonstrate to the population that they can
influence and are influenced by the construction of a
regional community. The adoption of effective
mechanisms for macroeconomic coordination must
include countercyclical measures that enable
subregional schemes to support member countries in
the face of regional and international crises (ECLAC,
2002c). Similarly, the improvement of physical
integration, and broad initiatives such as the Initiative
for Regional Infrastructure Integration in South
America (IIRSA) and the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP),
have emerged as viable strategies for economic
integration (ECLAC, 2003b).2 Lastly, the inclusion of
effective social clauses and major advances in the
institutional development of integration schemes are
the main distinguishing factors between far-reaching
integration schemes and free trade areas.
This chapter reviews the main developments of the
past 18 months within the four subregional integration
schemes: Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR),
Andean Community, Central American Common Market
(CACM) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
This includes an examination of trends in intraregional
trade, progress in market access and trade facilitation
and policy issues on aspects of macroeconomic
coordination, institution building and the external
relations of each integration scheme.
A. Southern Common Market3
1. Introduction
The macroeconomic shocks experienced by
MERCOSUR countries had negative effects on the
integration process. This prompted considerable efforts
to renew community ties, especially the significant
trade between Argentina and Brazil, and to offset the
negative effects on smaller economies.4 GDP fell
considerably in 2002, only to recover in similarly
dramatic form in 2003 (ECLAC, 2003d and Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2003a).5 The devastating
effects of macroeconomic shocks on economic
integration gave rise to high-level discussions on the
present and future situation of MERCOSUR.6
Economic recovery, combined with the fact that the
new Heads of State in Brazil and Argentina clearly
prioritize the South American integration process, is
conducive to the deepening of MERCOSUR
those between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR, or between MERCOSUR and Mexico (LAIA, 2002b). See Resolution 55(XII)
on measures to strengthen the role of LAIA as the main institutional framework for regional integration, adopted at the twelfth meeting
of the LAIA Council of Ministers, 22 February 2003, Montevideo.
2 At the end of September 2003, a subregional seminar was held on regional and physical integration in the Andean Community and South
America to analyse the IIRSA and the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) as a contribution to the agenda of the third European Union-Latin
America and Caribbean Summit, held in May 2004.
3 The documents on which this section is based can be found on the web site of the Administrative Secretariat of MERCOSUR
(www.mercosur.org).
4 See the report of the Pro Tempore presidency of Brazil, Brasilia, 5 December 2002 (MERCOSUR/XXIII CMC/Di N° 05/02). The report
states that the work of MERCOSUR during 2002 was focused on efforts to relaunch trade, which had been seriously affected by the crisis,
and, with the problems solved, on achieving a situation conducive to negotiations on integration per se. The report also mentioned
progress made in social, educational, cultural, security and migratory matters.
5 See the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002-2003, ECLAC, September 2003, and various editions of the Country
Forecasts and Country Reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2003, www.ieu.com.
6 See the report of the Pro Tempore presidency of Brazil, Brasilia, 5 December 2002 (MERCOSUR/XXIII CMC/Di N° 05/02).
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integration. This is the purpose of the Brazilian proposal
entitled “Target 2006”, presented by the President of
Brazil at the twenty-fourth meeting of the Common
Market Council (CMC) held in mid-June 2003 (see
summary in box II.1),7 as well as the Argentine proposal
to create a MERCOSUR monetary institute,8 and the
Paraguayan proposal on the treatment of asymmetries
among member states.9
The various proposals were discussed at the fourth
extraordinary meeting of the Common Market Council
(CMC) on 6 October 2003, which also adopted a working
paper on CMC mandates with a view to approving the
programme of work for 2004-2006 at the twenty-fifth
ordinary meeting of CMC. The need for systematic
consideration of differential treatment to alleviate
asymmetries was also emphasized.
2. Market access and trade facilitation measures
(a) Intra-subregional trade
In 2003, intraregional trade increased to levels
comparable with previous periods, following the sharp
drop experienced in 2002 (-33%) (ECLAC, 2003c). This
confirmed the pro-cyclical relationship between the
integration process and significant variations in GDP
(see table II.1 and figure II.1). The proportion of GDP
represented by intra-group exports rose slightly in 2003
(remaining comparatively lower in Argentina and
Brazil), although it was below the historical highs
reached at the end of the 1990s.
The most significant upturn was in exports from all
members to Argentina, whose imports from the rest of
its trading partners recovered from the downturn in 2002
and expanded by about 90% (Argentine National
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), 2003;
Brazil Group, 2003). Brazil and Paraguay recorded the
largest rises in exports to Argentina, while Uruguayan
exports grew at a lower rate (see table II.2).
7 Some of “Target 2006” is included in Decision 10/03 adopted by the CMC at that meeting.
8 The monetary institute would mainly be a forum for the study, research and discussion of monetary issues and the design of concrete
monetary integration policies in the light of progress in other areas of integration (COMISEC, Sectoral Commission, Novedades
MERCOSUR No 1).
9 The treatment of asymmetries covers tariff and para-tariff measures; border development; external negotiations; infrastructure; and training
of the workforce.
Box II.1
SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL “TARGET 2006”
Political, social and cultural
programme
• Increasing participation of civil
society
• MERCOSUR Parliament, which
could be elected by direct voting by
2006
• Boosting cultural cooperation




• Dealing with development
asymmetries
• Common External Tariff
(perforations eliminated by 2006)
• Special common regimes
(negotiated until 2006)
• Free trade zones
• Common external negotiations
• Common measures of trade
protection, including safeguards
for extra-zone trade (regimes
negotiated until 2004 and
adopted in 2006)
• Definition of instruments for the
gradual elimination of
antidumping measures and
countervailing measures for intra-
group trade (negotiated until
2004, entry into force by 2006)
• Common policy on protection of
competition (entry into force by
2006)
• Productive integration with
promotion of competitiveness





• Discipline on incentives (negotiated
until 2004, entry into force in 2006)
• Macroeconomic coordination
• Reinforcement of institutions
Bases for a Common Market
• Liberalization of services
• Regional capital market
• Promoting regional investment
• Bases for a common currency
• Government procurement (agreement
scheduled for conclusion in 2003)
• Movement of labour force and
promotion of workers’ rights
Programme on new integration
• Education for MERCOSUR
• Cooperation programmes in science
and technology
• Advanced productive integration
• Physical integration
Source: MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat, MERCOSUR/XXIV CMC/DI N° 01/03.
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Table II.1
SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET: SHARE OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 1990-2003
(Percentages of total trade)
Country 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003a
Argentina 14.8 32.1 31.8 28.5 22.3 19.0
Brazil 4.2 13.2 14.0 10.9 5.5 7.8
Paraguay 27.4 12.5 23.8 27.5 29.3 36.2
Uruguay 35.1 46.2 42.9 39.1 31.7 29.6
MERCOSUR 8.8 20.6 20.5 17.2 11.3 11.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.
a Preliminary figures.
Table II.2
MERCOSUR: TRENDS IN THE NETWORK OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2002-2003
(Rates of variation compared with the same period of the previous year)
Destination Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR
Origin 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
Argentina -23.3 -4.5 -31.2 25.2 -29.3 -0.9 -24.5 -2.4
Brazil -53.2 94.7 -22.6 27.0 -35.7 -2.1 -47.9 71.3
Paraguay -43.3 94.0 27.1 24.1 -8.3 55.8 6.6 37.9
Uruguay -64.3 34.8 -1.2 9.4 -25.3 -24.4 -27.4 10.7
MERCOSUR -53.7 91.9 -20.0 -1.6 -26.1 23.0 -29.5 7.0 -33.3 24.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Brazilian Secretariat of
Foreign Trade (SECEX), the Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC),, the Department of Economic Studies of the
Banco del Paraguay and the Uruguayan Central Bank.
a January-December.
Figure II.1
MERCOSUR: GDP AND INTRA-SUBREGIONAL AND EXTRA-SUBREGIONAL EXPORTS, 1990-2003
(Annual percentage variation)



























Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy • 2002-2003 77
In terms of sectors and products, the recovery in
Argentine imports was concentrated on capital goods
and intermediate inputs, especially from Brazil, a trading
partner with whom Argentina has a high level of
productive complementarity.10 The main products
exported from Brazil to Argentina include electrical
transformers, mechanical diggers, engines, harvesters,
agricultural spray guns, crane trucks, milling machines,
refrigerators, tyres and construction and mining
machines (INDEC, 2003, 2004; SECEX, 2003b).
Despite the upswing in trade from Brazil to Argentina,
exports from Argentina to Brazil are still in a slump.
The peculiarity of this trend is that manufactures of
agricultural and industrial origin are even more
depressed –especially meat; fish and seafood; vegetable
fats and oils; and vehicles and spare parts, with this last
category representing a relatively large proportion of
total exports (25%) (INDEC, 2004; SECEX, 2004).11
Despite the heavier slowdown in Argentine trade,
trade between Argentina and Brazil still came to
represent a higher proportion of MERCOSUR trade
during 2003 (and accounted for a total of 72% of intra-
subregional trade in the period 2002-2003). As a
corollary to this, the share of trade moving between
Brazil and Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, and Argentina
and Uruguay declined (see table II.3).12 The exports from
the smaller countries depend heavily for their market
share of intra-subregional trade on the level of domestic
demand in the larger countries, given that 70% and 90%,
respectively, of Paraguay’s and Uruguay’s exports to
Latin America and the Caribbean go to their larger
MERCOSUR partners.
(b) Market access measures
Despite progress in automotive trade, disputes over
chicken and pork had to be taken to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of WTO. In mid-2002, Argentina
took advantage of the restructuring of the exchange rate
to lift the restraints it had been imposing (Institute for
the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean
(INTAL), 2003a). The fact that exports of Argentine
wheat were subject to various tax and tariff measures
and the effects of variations in the exchange rate gave
rise to continuous complaints and prompted Brazil and
Uruguay to make changes to the common external tariff.
This and other cases of export restrictions reveal as much
about shortcomings in the rules governing internal trade
as about significant productivity differences in some
sectors and a lack of production specialization, all of
which will be examined in this section.
The deep crises suffered by the two larger
economies (Argentina and Brazil) seriously affected the
smaller two (Paraguay and Uruguay) and generated
consequent reactions. Uruguay introduced a rate of 3%
on all imports, as a service charge of the Banco de la
República, and also demanded funding for accepting
Argentine exports. Along similar lines, Uruguay
implemented specific import duties in 2002 and the
ensuing complaints lodged by Argentina remain to be
resolved in the context of the Common Market Group
(CMG). These situations have led to disputes being
submitted to the group’s arbitration mechanisms.13
Paraguay established an import levy in 2001, on the basis
of what it refers to as the “shortcomings and inadequacy”
of the Group’s macroeconomic coordination.14
10 The upturn in imports of capital goods in Argentina is generally a reflection of the rehabilitation of sectors including ones with more
accelerated internal growth such as agriculture and services such as transport and construction (INDEC, 2003; Production Research
Centre (CEP), 2003).
11 Manufactures of industrial origin include chemicals, plastics, rubber, leather, paper and paperboard, footwear, common metals, machines
and equipment, transport equipment, car parts, motorized vehicles.
12 In 1990, bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil only represented 52% of total intra-group trade.
13 Uruguay’s complaint against the Argentine industrial regime is being examined by the MERCOSUR arbitration tribunal (INTAL, 2003a).
14 Special temporary measure for imports (ECLAC, 2002c).
Table II.3
MERCOSUR: MARKET SHARES OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total)
Millions of dollars Percentages of total
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR
Argentina  4 621 428 538 5 587  36.4 3.4 4.2 44.0
Brazil 4 561 707 404 5 672 35.9  5.6 3.2 44.7
Paraguay 67 438  257 762 0.5 3.5  2.0 6.0
Uruguay 152 475 47  674 1.2 3.7 0.4 0.0 5.3
MERCOSUR 4 780 5 534 1 182 1 199 12 695 37.7 43.6 9.3 9.4 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Brazilian Secretariat of
Foreign Trade (SECEX), Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), Department of Economic Studies of the Central
Bank of Paraguay and the Uruguayan Central Bank.
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In October 2002 the Central Bank of Brazil
responded by raising the limit of operations with a 360-
day term to 200,000 dollars and 300,000 dollars for
operations with terms between 180 and 360 days. In
addition, the Central Bank established new rules for the
use of the reciprocal payment and credit agreement
(CPCR) in trade with Argentina.15 The Bank also
included operations with longer terms, in accordance
with the payment regime, in which the Central Bank only
pays the exporter what it receives from the importer. In
May 2003, the Brazilian Government and the National
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES)
created a US$ 1 billion fund to grant credits to Argentine
importers of Brazilian products and committed to provide
up to US$ 3 billion to finance imports from Latin
American countries.16
(c) Physical integration and trade facilitation
Particular importance has been attached to initiatives
targeted at extending and improving infrastructure, both
in the negotiations with the Andean Community and
those held in the context of Peru’s association agreement
with MERCOSUR.17 These initiatives include projects
worth several billion dollars partly financed by BNDES
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
15 See INTAL monthly newsletter No 82, May 2003, Buenos Aires.
16 In April, BNDES had approved a credit line of US$ 1 billion for Venezuelan importers.
17 As part of IIRSA.
18 Administrative Secretariat of MERCOSUR, Decision 10/03 of the Council’s twenty-fourth ordinary meeting, June 2003. A similar
conclusion was reached by the fourth extraordinary meeting of the CMC, 6 October 2003.
19 Decision 01/03 of the Council’s twenty-fourth ordinary meeting (Asunción, 17/06/03).
20 Decision 10/03 of the Council’s twenty-fourth ordinary meeting (Asunción, 17/06/03), extended the deadline to 30 November 2004.
21 Decision 02/03 of the Council’s twenty-fourth ordinary meeting (Asunción, 17/06/03).
BNDES also approved a credit line of US$ 600 million
to finance investment in Bolivian infrastructure.
(d) Other aspects: services, government
procurement and trade protection
Despite the fact that only Argentina has ratified the
Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services, three rounds
of negotiations have been held with a view to liberalizing
trade in services during 2007. The CMC decided that
the fourth round of negotiations should be held before
November 2003.18 The ad hoc group on government
procurement must also complete its work by that date.
Still pending is a solution to the geographical and
institutional coverage of the government procurement
instrument; the existence of regional preferences; the
inclusion of concessions; and treatment of public or
mixed enterprises (INTAL, 2003a).19
To date, intra-group trade protection has been
governed by national provisions. In Decision 22/02, the
CMC adopted new disciplines for procedures and rules
on investigation, anti-dumping and subsidies for foreign
trade that were based on WTO rules. Decision 10/03
instructed the Common Market Group to submit a
proposal for the harmonization of intra-group trade
protection by November 2004.
3. Regulatory aspects and the Customs Union
(a) The common external tariff (CET)
The high-level group tasked with reviewing the
common external tariff has been postponing the
presentation of its findings.20 The result is the
continuation of special treatment, such as the temporary
rate of 1.5% that Argentina applies to capital goods,
which was extended to December 2003 in decision 02/
03. In other provisions, the decision awarded the same
extension to 100 tariff positions; extended the rate of
0% on the import of capital goods in favour of Argentina
to June 2003; extended to the end of 2003 permission
for Paraguay to impose rates of 0% to 6% on the import
of capital goods from third countries; and granted
Uruguay a similar extension for goods included in
Decree No 004/003.21
Access for merchandise from the special customs
area of Tierra del Fuego and the free trade zone of
Colonia were recently regulated, although the
formulation of common rules was postponed until the
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end of November 2004.22 The Council’s twenty-fourth
ordinary meeting issued instructions for the unification
of health, migration and customs entry forms.
(b) Macroeconomic coordination and investment
At its meeting in December 2002, the
Macroeconomic Monitoring Group reaffirmed
commitments to fiscal discipline and the targets of the
Florianópolis Declaration. The inflation target was fixed
at 5% from 2006, and the public debt/GDP ratio must
drop to 40% by 2010. The meeting also agreed to set up
an ex ante monitoring system for each country’s
convergence trajectory.
In May 2003, Argentina proposed a single currency
band between the real and the peso, and the creation of
a new currency to be used in trade and tourism operations
based on an enhanced version of the reciprocal payment
and credit agreement (CPCR). Other initiatives included
the creation of a compensation mechanism to protect
national producers in the event of exchange disparities
and the establishment of the Institute for Monetary
Cooperation to study macroeconomic convergence and
22 Decision 01/03 of the Council’s twenty-fourth ordinary meeting (Asunción, 17/06/03).
23 The foreign ministers of Argentina and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding that included an “anti-cyclical” clause urging
both countries to rapidly devise permanent ways of mitigating the effects of macroeconomic shocks on mutual trade (RelNET bulletin
No 159, 22 August 2003, quoting the newspaper La Nación, Argentina). Report of the Pro Tempore presidency of Brazil, Brasilia, 5
December 2002 (MERCOSUR/XXIII CMC/Di N° 05/02).
24 Set up by decision 23/02 of the twenty-third extraordinary meeting of the Common Market Group, 6 December 2002, as a programme for
competitivity forums of production chains in MERCOSUR.
25 There is a growing opinion that one of the main shortcomings of MERCOSUR resides in the lack of development of industrial production
chains (or joint vertical production) based on the competitive advantages of each country to export products with the brand “made in
MERCOSUR” to regional and international markets. This was emphasized by the President of the Association of Brazilian enterprises for
integration in MERCOSUR (ADEBIM) (RelNET bulletin N° 159, 22 August 2003, quoting the newspaper Gazeta Mercantil, Brazil).
26 ECLAC commented on the Olivos Protocol in Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy, 2001-2002 (ECLAC, 2003b).
other monetary, financial and exchange-rate matters and
(INTAL, 2003a).23
Although the meeting to promote intraregional
investment and Argentina’s proposal to study the creation
or strengthening of institutions to finance investment
have not yet borne fruit (INTAL, 2002a and 2003a), the
Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate
Basin (FONPLATA) and BNDES acceded to the Andean
Development Corporation (CAF) in December 2002.
Other initiatives include the organization of sectoral
productivity forums;24 a series of studies on the
promotion of subregional production chains and their
complementarity (Kosacoff, 2002; Figueroa and
Villalpando, 2003; Porta, 2003);25 and private-sector
negotiations on textiles, leather, white goods, poultry
and pig breeding. In September 2003, the Brazilian
Government announced its intention to authorize
BNDES, in conjunction with the Andean Development
Corporation and the countries of South America, to
devise a number of infrastructure projects that are
fundamental to integration. These are estimated to cost
between US$ 4.5 and 5 billion and some of them have
been considered among the projects of IIRSA.
4. Disputes and incorporating MERCOSUR rules
into national legislation
The signing of the Olivos Protocol on Dispute Settlement
in MERCOSUR in 2002 was an important achievement
for the Group.26 The number of disputes has tended to
rise as a result of economic difficulties. The Common
Market Council decided to set up a MERCOSUR Centre
for Promoting the Rule of Law on the same premises as
the Permanent Court of Review.
At the end of 2002, the Pro Tempore Presidency
stated that shortcomings in terms of incorporating
MERCOSUR rules into national legislation had
become one of the group’s main institutional problems
(Decision  20/02 of the Council’s twenty-third
ordinary meeting). Decision 07/03 of the Council’s
twenty-fourth ordinary meeting tasked the Common
Market Group (CMG) with presenting a study for the
direct incorporation into the legal system of
MERCOSUR rules that do not require legislative
treatment.
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5. Institutional aspects
27 See Administrative Secretariat, Decisions 11/03 and 14/03 of the Council’s fourth extraordinary meeting, 6 October 2003.
28 On 6 September, Marco Aurelio García, main adviser to the President of Brazil, was quoted as saying to the Clarín newspaper in Buenos
Aires that it was important to observe the attitude of developed countries at the WTO meeting in Cancún, especially their willingness to
reduce protectionism. Were developed countries to maintain their established positions, this would encourage integration between the
Andean Community and MERCOSUR (RelNET bulletin No 172), 8 September 2003.
29 The twenty-third meeting of CMC, held in December 2002, adopted Decision 31/02, which ratified the signature of this instrument.
At its twenty-third meeting, the Council decided to
establish a Technical Advisory Sector within the
MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat, which has since
become the MERCOSUR Secretariat. In October 2003,
the MERCOSUR Committee of Permanent
Representatives was set up and the former President of
Argentina, Eduardo Duhalde, was appointed Chairman.27
The Heads of State of Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
Peru, Venezuela and Suriname were invited to the
Council’s twenty-third ordinary meeting. The President
of Venezuela was invited to the Council’s twenty-fourth
ordinary meeting. The competitiveness forum for
production chains held two meetings in the second half
of 2002 and three during the first six months of 2003.
6. MERCOSUR external relations
The mediocre results of the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations mean that more emphasis is placed on the
group’s external relations28, including those with:
• Andean Community. On 6 December 2002,
MERCOSUR signed a framework agreement with
the Andean Community (economic complementarity
agreement (ECA) No. 0054) with the objective of
creating, by the end of 2003, a free trade area
through the convergence of their members’ trade
liberalization programmes (the Agreement extends
those agreements signed in the context of LAIA to
the end of 2003).29 At the Council’s twenty-fourth
ordinary meeting it was decided to conclude
negotiations for the free trade agreement between
the two groups during 2003 (INTAL, 2003a). On
25 August 2003, MERCOSUR and Peru signed a
free trade agreement that was intended to come into
force on 1 November. Brazil and Peru reached
agreement on major investments in road
infrastructure, multimodal transport, energy and
communications. In December 2003, negotiations
concluded on an economic complementarity
agreement with Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
This agreement is in addition to those MERCOSUR
concluded with Bolivia in 1996 and Peru in 2003,
and forms the basis for a South American trade bloc
comprising the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR countries. In some cases, however,
decisions remain pending on how to implement the
tariff  reduction process –which could last up to 15
years– and on definitive lists of products.
• United States. Although there were no significant
advances in negotiations, activities continued in the
working groups on trade in agricultural, electronic
and industrial goods and, to a lesser degree, in the
group on investment.
• European Union (EU). Agreements were reached
on mutual support for the democratic system,
cooperation in combating drug trafficking and
terrorism and on trade facilitation, customs,
agriculture and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Development asymmetries and the need for special
treatment for MERCOSUR were both recognized.
The MERCOSUR-EU negotiation committees and
groups met several times during 2002 and 2003.
Both parties hope to complete negotiations in 2004.
The ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12
November 2003 therefore agreed on an ambitious
programme of work including five meetings of the
biregional negotiations committee and two
ministerial meetings, the second of which would
be held in October 2004. On 1 October 2003, the
Iberoamerican foreign ministers met in Lisbon to
examine the report of former Brazilian President
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Cardoso, Chairman of the working group tasked
with analysing the summit system. The thirteenth
Iberoamerican Summit approved the creation of a
permanent secretariat to follow up guidelines issued
as part of the Summit process.
• Bolivia and Chile. In September 2002, Chile and
Argentina concluded an agreement to liberalize
trade in the automotive sector. In the second half of
2003, MERCOSUR was scheduled to hold meetings
with the administrative commissions of the
economic complementarity agreements with Bolivia
and Chile (ECA No. 35 and 36).
• Mexico. On 27 September 2002, an economic
complementarity agreement (ECA No. 55) was
concluded with the aim of laying the foundations
for free trade between MERCOSUR countries and
30 See the newspaper Diario MERCOSUR, Sectoral Commission, October 2002, Montevideo.
31 The documents on which this section is based can be found on the web page of the General Secretariat of the Andean community
(www.comunidadandina.org). In 2003, ECLAC published an analysis of the Andean integration process (Maldonado, 2003).
32 It is worthy of note that much of Ecuador’s increased participation in intraregional trade in 2003 was due to the positive effect of oil
prices remaining high in the first and last quarter of the year.
Mexico in the automotive sector and promoting
integration and production complementarity.30 In
the context of ECA No. 55, Mexico initiated
negotiations with Argentina and Uruguay in
November and December 2002, respectively, on the
conclusion of free trade agreements. On 3 July 2003,
Brazil and Mexico concluded ECA No 53, which is
intended to promote and regulate mutual trade and
encourage investment. A similar agreement was
concluded with Uruguay on 10 September.
• Other countries. Contacts and negotiations
continued with a series of countries and groups
including South Africa, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), China, the Central American Common
Market (CACM), Republic of Korea, India, Arab
Maghreb Union and the Russian Federation.
B. Andean Community31
1. Intraregional trade
In 2003, intra-subregional trade among the countries of
the Andean Community continued its downward trend
and posted negative growth for the second consecutive
year. This poor performance had the effect of
perpetuating difficulties within the process and
compounding the need, already apparent in 2001 and
2002, for major changes in different aspects of regional
integration, including the political, cultural and
economic dimensions, physical integration, border
development, sustainable development and institutions.
These were the conclusions of the fourteenth meeting
of the Andean Presidential Council, held in Quirama in
2003, which represents an important guide for the
integration process (see box II.2).
Similarly to the situation in MERCOSUR, trade
among the Andean Community countries tends to be
pro-cyclical and highly volatile in the long term (see
figure II.2). In 2003, the proportion of GDP represented
by intra-subregional trade dropped by almost 1% to
8.9%, with Bolivia and Colombia sustaining even greater
losses (see table II.4). Trade performance in 2002 and
2003 was in strong contrast with the expansion of intra-
subregional trade in the 1990s, particularly in those years
when trade expanded more rapidly than GDP. A drop in
intra-group exports poses a threat to the productive
structure of some domestic sectors, especially those that
are highly dependent on the subregional market
(automotive, chemical and engineering sectors, textile
industry, agribusiness and a few primary products such
as bananas, beans and lemons). Some of the Andean
enterprises that had improved their competitiveness in
the extended market might lose their positions as a result.
In this regard, Colombian investors and businessmen
could be hardest hit as a result of their greater presence
in Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador.
The most dramatic consequences of the downturn
have been experienced by Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and
Venezuela, the only buoyant performers being
Ecuadorian exports, which grew during 2002 and 2003.32
Comparatively speaking, reduced export activity has had
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Box II.2
SUMMARY OF QUIRAMA DECLARATION
The aim of this general programme is to enhance integration by launching a second generation of policies. It establishes the
following lines of strategic action and guidelines:
Political dimension
• Construction of a governance
agenda
• Preparation of Andean Common
Security Policy guidelines
• Start up of the Andean Plan for the
Prevention, Combating and
Eradication of Trafficking in Small,
Light Weapons
• Adoption of a Programme to
Disseminate and Implement the
Andean Charter for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights
• Implementation of the Operational
Plan for the Combating Illegal
Drugs and Related Offences
• Preparation of guidelines for an
Andean Plan to Combat Corruption
• Adoption of an Andean Plan to
Combat Corruption
• Preparation of guidelines for a
Subregional Food Security Policy
and action plans against poverty
and exclusion
• Organization of the first Andean
Community-MERCOSUR and Chile
Political Dialogue and Cooperation
Meeting, concluding the free trade
agreement by the end of 2003,
continuing negotiations for a
Political Dialogue and Cooperation
Agreement with the European
Union and continuing negotiations
with other countries and groups of
countries.
Social and cultural dimension
• Formulation of the Integrated Social
Development Plan
• Establishment of regulations for
decisions on labour migration,
social security and safety and
health at work. Also the adoption of
the necessary legal provisions to
recognize professional licenses,
degrees and accreditations
• Procurement of social participation
in the integration process and
protection of consumer and
indigenous rights
• Preparation of policy guidelines to
improve the quality, cover and
relevance of education
• Promotion of the establishment of
an Andean commission on
investment in health.
Economic dimension
• Fostering a process of reflection on
the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) and the Andean
Community’s international
positioning
• Analysis of the causes and
proposal of solutions for non-
compliance with Community
regulatory provisions
• Assessment of the integration
process for each country
• Formulation of a common
agricultural policy
• Formulation of programmes for the
liberalization of Subregional trade in
services and implementation of
actions for linking customs.
Border integration and
development
• Establishment of a comprehensive
plan for border integration and
development




• Promotion of border integration
zones.
Sustainable development
• Design and implementation of
programmes on the environment,
energy development and disaster
prevention and assistance
• Design an Andean Plan to follow up
the World Summit on Sustainable
Development held in Johannesburg
and that Summit’s Plan of
Implementation.
Institutions
• Supporting and strengthening the
Andean Integration System
• Preparing proposals for extrajudicial
conflict settlement
• Acceleration of the direct election of
an Andean Parliament.
Source: Andean Community, Quirama Declaration [on line], General Secretariat, 28 June 2003 (http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/document/
Quirama.htm).
Figure II.2
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND INTRA-SUBREGIONAL
AND EXTRA-SUBREGIONAL EXPORTS, 1990-2003
(Annual percentage variation)
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much more damaging effects on Colombia and Venezuela.
Reciprocal trade between the two countries in the period
January-July was down by around 58%, from US$ 1.14
billion in 2002 to US$ 660 million in 2003. The reduced
flow of exports is a result of a dramatic drop in demand
in the Venezuelan market, difficulties created by import
restrictions and the exchange control decreed by the
government. Trade within the Andean Community picked
up during the second half of the year, although it did not
recoup the historic level of US$ 5.7 billion recorded in
2001 prior to the crisis of the last biennium.33 The
Venezuelan crisis affected all of the subregion’s countries
indiscriminately, with declines of between 10% and 38%
in 2003, including Ecuadorian exports (see table II.6).
Despite the current slump, trade between Colombia and
Venezuela still represents a considerable 25.5% of intra-
group trade (see table II.6).34
The most significant changes are the increase in
trade between Colombia and Ecuador and between
Ecuador and Peru. Trade between the two pairs
considerably increased their market share and they are
now the second and third most important sets of partners
in the group. In 2003, Colombian-Ecuadorian and
Ecuadorian-Peruvian trade represented 23% and 16%,
respectively, of mutual trade at the intra-subregional
level, followed by trade between Colombia and Peru.
The emergence of these three sets of partners and
Venezuela’s lagging market share are consistent with
larger growth in Colombian exports to Ecuador and Peru
in 2002 and 2003, increased sales of Peruvian products
in Colombia and Ecuador and increased Ecuadorian sales
to Peru (see table II.6).35 The fastest-growing trade sector
is exports from Colombia, which represent just over 37%
of intra-group trade.
In terms of products, trade between the group’s main
trading partners is typified by a productive
complementarity of low-, intermediate- and high-
technology manufactures. Trade between Colombia and
Ecuador, for instance, is characterized by a large flow
of industrial commodities.36 In 2003, bilateral trade
between Colombia and Ecuador was hurt by the
Venezuelan crisis. In the period January-July 2003,
Colombian automotive exports to Ecuador dipped by
56%, and exports from Ecuador to Colombia were also
down (Proexport, 2003).37 In aggregate terms, sales from
Colombia to Ecuador slipped by 4% in 2003. Trade
Table II.4
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: SHARE OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE
(Percentages of total trade)
Country 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 a
Bolivia 7.2 20.9 24.9 28.6 29.6 27.0
Colombia 5.3 18.3 15.9 21.5 18.8 13.9
Ecuador 6.9 8.0 13.1 15.9 16.1 16.7
Peru 6.4 7.2 6.3 7.5 6.5 6.0
Venezuela 2.8 9.9 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.3
Andean Community 4.2 12.4 8.5 10.9 9.9 8.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Andean Community.
a Preliminary figures.
33 According to information from the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics and the Andean Community, bilateral
trade between Colombia and Venezuela only represented US$ 1.3 billion in 2003, i.e. only slightly less than the 1993 level (US$ 1.6
billion) and far less than the historic figure of US$ 2.7 billion recorded in 2001.
34 In 2003, trade between Colombia and Venezuela lost much of its market share, which had constituted 36% of subregional trade in 2002
and between 44% and 60% in 1990 and 1995.
35 In 2002, Ecuador and Peru were the two main destinations for Colombian exports within the Andean Community. Although table II.6
indicates that the level of sales of Colombian products to Ecuador was 4% lower in 2003 than in 2002, it also shows that Ecuador
nonetheless became Colombia’s second trading partner after the United States (Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics,
2004).
36 The main industrial commodities involved in this flow are iron and steel, chemicals and products of the paper industry, which account for
close to 30% of the two countries’ reciprocal trade. Perhaps the industry that deserves most attention is the automotive industry, which
grew by around 28% in 2002. In addition to industrial commodities, light manufactures such as garments, textiles, publications, plastic
goods, soap, cosmetics and leather and footwear are significant in the trade between Colombia and Ecuador. These showed major potential
in the period 1990-1998, but in 1999 suffered the effects of the slowdown in world trade, in common with other sectors.
37 The main products that Ecuador exports to Colombia are: tourism vehicles, canned products, tuna and sardines, beans, bananas and other
agricultural products such as mangoes, lemons, passion fruit and other fresh fruits (El Comercio newspaper, 2003).
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between Colombia and Venezuela also has a large
component of productive complementarity. Industrial
products represent around 88% of the trade between the
two countries, especially intermediate-technology
manufactures (engineering, chemical, automotive sectors
and spare parts industries), which are the most dynamic
sectors in the expansion of trade between the two
countries. These are followed by the food, textile and
pharmaceutical industry.
Trade from Ecuador and Venezuela to Peru, and, to a
lesser extent, from Colombia to Peru, is dominated by
exports of crude petroleum, diesel, lubricant oils, iron and
steel. Other products exported by Colombia and Ecuador
to Peru are bituminous coal, beet and cane sugar and gas
cookers. Peru supplies the refined copper, unalloyed zinc
and fish flour imported by Colombia and the clothing,
textiles, household appliances and foodstuffs imported by
Ecuador. The main exports from Peru to Venezuela are
textile products followed by cylinders, vials, unalloyed zinc,
and refined copper wire (Peruvian customs, 2002).
Bolivia’s trade with Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and,
to a lesser extent, with Ecuador, is dominated by
agricultural products or agricultural manufactures such
as soybean oil-cakes, soybean flour, chestnuts,
concentrated cream, powdered milk and beet and cane
sugars (Peruvian customs, 2002; Razón Digital
newspaper, 2003). Comparatively speaking, Bolivia’s
market share of intra-group trade is lower than the rest
of its trading partners, and represents 9% of total intra-
group exports and 3% of imports.
Venezuela’s complex macroeconomic situation
during 2002 and 2003 casts doubt over future
development of intraregional trade in the Andean
Community, particularly since empirical evidence
suggests that intra-subregional trade is more volatile and
pro-cyclical in this group. Furthermore, variations in the
effective exchange rate –the main measure of
competitiveness between group members– reveal
dangerous asymmetries that also point to an uncertain
future in the medium term.
Table II.5
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: TRENDS IN THE NETWORK OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2002-2003
(Rates of variation with respect to the same period of the preceding year)
Destination Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela AndeanCommunity
Origin 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
Bolivia   -27.0 22.5 -69.4 225.4 7.0 22.4 75.6 -10.1 5.7 9.6
Colombia -10.3 -6.0   16.5 -4.0 25.2 10.3 -35.1 -38.4 -15.5 -18.6
Ecuador -17.1 3.7 25.2 -4.3   29.9 56.2 -58.1 -17.9 9.8 24.0
Peru -7.8 13.3 1.7 19.4 8.3 10.5   -21.2 -13.9 -4.9 8.1
Venezuela 59.5 24.7 1.9 -24.0 29.0 6.0 -33.0 13.2   -1.8 -11.3
Andean Community -7.9 8.0 2.8 -9.7 17.2 0.4 7.1 29.8 -30.7 -32.3 -6.7 -5.5




ANDEAN COMMUNITY: MARKET SHARES OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total)
Millions of dollars Percentages of total
Bolivia  170 10 89 156 425  3.4 0.2 1.8 3.1 8.5
Colombia 35 778 383 690 1 886 0.7  15.6 7.7 13.8 37.8
Ecuador 5 345 631 53 1 035 0.1 6.9  12.7 1.1 20.8
Peru 103 184 151 100 537 2.1 3.7 3.0  2.0 10.8
Venezuelaa 4 582 288 228  1 105 0.1 11.7 5.8 4.6  22.1
Andean Community 148 1 281 1 227 1 330 999 4 988 3.0 25.7 24.6 26.7 20.0 100.0
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2. Market access, physical integration and trade facilitation
(b) Physical integration and trade facilitation
The Andean Community has been making sustained
efforts to encourage the adoption of community rules to
develop, facilitate and liberalize different forms of
transport. The tenth meeting of the Council of Ministers
of Transport and Public Works, held on 30 April 2003,
agreed to review the current situation by carrying out a
diagnostic analysis. The aim is to produce a programme
of action that takes into account security in the provision
of land transport services and, in the medium term, the
harmonization of national standards; monitoring and joint
public and private surveillance at borders; and increased
horizontal coordination and cooperation between transport
bodies. In connection with air and maritime transport, the
meeting considered air security and the capacity and
potential of Andean coastal shipping to stimulate intra-
subregional trade and competitiveness.
Following multiple preparatory activities, the ministers
for energy met at an open-ended session of the Commission
on 19 December 2002, where they adopted Decision 536
establishing a general framework for the subregional
connection of electrical systems and intra-community trade
in electricity.41 The Decision lays down the basic legal
guidelines for such activities, with a view to making up
temporary or permanent electricity shortages among member
countries.42 The Decision also stipulates the general principles
for intra-subregional interconnection contracts based on the
national treatment rule and calls for the harmonization of
domestic regulations governing international electricity
transactions with a view to promoting free trade (L’Extrategy,
2003b). The first meeting of the Ministers of Energy and
Mining of the Andean Community was subsequently held
on 19 June 2003.43
(a) Free trade zone
In 2005, Peru will become a full member of the
Andean Community’s four-country free trade zone. In
January 2004, Peru liberalized 54.47% of its trade,
leaving a little over 45% of its imports pending,
especially from Ecuador (79%) and Venezuela (63%)
(Andean Community, 2004).38 The free trade zone has
tended to function well although, as is common, there
has been some non-compliance and infringement of the
rules. The resulting disputes are dealt with in the context
of the due legal process established in the framework of
the Andean Community.39
For instance, to protect itself from the loss of
competitiveness caused by devaluation in Colombia and
Venezuela, Ecuador imposed safeguards on certain
subregional products such as flat ceramics, 47
agricultural subitems, oilseeds and brake pads
(Proexport, 2003).
It was in response to this that the Andean Presidents
adopted guidelines in Quirama instructing the
competent bodies to assess the process for each member
country, analyse causes of non-compliance and devise
a programme of work to move forward with the process
of liberalizing subregional trade in services (see box
II.2). Similarly, activities aimed at enhancing
community rules governing market access have
continued. One such initiative is the three-year
Competition Project aimed at improving and
harmonizing the legislative, administrative and legal
framework of the five countries in terms of competition
law; supporting institutions responsible for monitoring
and applying the law; and promoting a culture of
competition.40
38 Since July 2002, the Andean Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Commission of the Andean Community have issued
44 Decisions, many of which deal with administrative matters related to integration. There are five decisions related to trade: the creation
of the Andean Committee of export promotion authorities; the elaboration, adoption and application of technical regulations; competition;
and two on the trade in goods and services.
39 Since July 2002, the General Secretariat has issued 122 resolutions, approximately 33% of which concerned problems related to the free
trade zone, and 41% of which were related to agricultural development (although much of these dealt with management of the Andean
system of price bands (ASPB)).
40 See Andean Community, press release, 3 March 2003, Lima.
41 This first meeting served to analyse the following previously studied items: first, the agreements adopted for electricity and gas
interconnections; second, the Andean position in hydrocarbons trade and energy security; third, energy services and energy clusters,
intensive value-added in Andean development and international negotiations. Lastly, the Council of Ministers for Energy, Electricity,
Hydrocarbons and Mines was established and its plan of action approved (General Secretariat, Final Minutes of the First Meeting of
Minister of Energy and Mines of the Andean Community).
42 The Meeting created the Andean Committee of Regulatory Bodies and Regulators of Electricity Services.
43  Major economic benefits have already derived from trade in electricity between Colombia and Ecuador: savings of around US$ 5 million
were made in the first week of operation of the electrical connection between the two countries, which will ultimately enable reductions
in rates to final users (General Secretariat, press release, 14 March 2003).
86 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
In the area of telecommunications, in March 2001
the Andean Committee of Telecommunications
Authorities (CAATEL) approved the 2001-2006
Strategic Plan for the Development of Andean
Telecommunications. Andesat S.A. is an Andean
multinational enterprise (AME) authorized by Decision
480 to develop the indirect operation of the Simón
Bolívar Andean Satellite System. This included creating
Bolivarsat S.A., a consortium under the strategic
leadership of the French firm Alcatel Spacecom. Andesat
comprises 44 Bolivian, Colombian, Ecuadorian,
Peruvian, and Venezuelan firms that will conducted
activities and investments using their own funds. It is
proposed to put the Simón Bolívar satellite into orbit
and have it operational in 2004. 44
Activities related to physical infrastructure were
have been pursued in the context of IIRSA. The fourth
and fifth meetings of the Executive Steering
Committee (ESC) of IIRSA in July and December
2003 assessed progress and achievements in each of
the main areas and sectoral processes and specified
the main future challenges, i.e. implementing a new
operative scheme based on an overall work strategy in
the regional sphere and boosting work on the main issues.
Discussions on sectoral integration processes highlighted
countries’ political will to deepen permanent regulatory
and formative convergence. The meeting also
underscored the importance of public-private
associations as a mechanism for developing
infrastructure in the region.
3. Regulatory aspects and the Andean Customs Union
(a) The common external tariff (CET)
In June 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
of Foreign Trade of the Andean Community agreed on
guidelines for a genuine common external tariff. In a
meeting held on 11 March 2003, the Ministers instructed
Andean negotiators to reach rapid agreement on this
important matter.45 In October 2002, the meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finance,
External Trade and Agriculture agreed on a new CET
(Annex I of Decision 535) covering 62% of all tariff
items and set criteria for negotiating the remaining 38%
(ECLAC, 2003d). In April 2003, the Commission of the
Andean Community completed the adjustments to the
instrument, resulting in 100% cover for four countries
and 62% of items for Peru.46 The entry into force of
Decision 535 planned for 1 January 2004 was delayed
until 1 March 2004, and then further postponed until 10
May 2005, when it should finally take effect.47 During
the second half of June 2003, Ecuador regularized its
situation by re-establishing the tariff levels of Decision
370, eliminating the 0% rate it had been applying to
certain raw materials and capital goods.48
The Quirama Declaration urges the Commission to
further these advances through the interconnection of
customs systems in order to avoid smuggling and tax
evasion. It also calls for the rapid definition of a common
agricultural policy and the implementation of actions
for connecting customs based on the Integrated Andean
Tariff, the Sole Customs Declaration and the
harmonization of special customs systems.
The Commission adopted three Decisions: two
authorizing Colombia and Venezuela to defer application
of the CET to many iron and steel products until 2 October
2003 and one authorizing Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela to partially modify the CET for uncarded cotton
until the end of 2003. In its role as body of first instance,
the General Secretariat adopted 13 Resolutions on the CET
and many concerning the Andean system of price bands
(ASPB). The Andean Court of Justice has made intense
efforts to ensure compliance with Andean regulations.
Since mid-2002, the Court has passed more than 170
44 See General Secretariat, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/services/teleco.htm.
45 In regard to the basic norms of the CET, the General Secretariat was instructed to forward to the negotiating group a series of technical
analyses on tariff deferrals, goods not produced in the subregion and trade preferences with third countries; the negotiating group was
also to be presented with a proposal on special tariff systems and various studies on the Andean system of price bands (ASPB) (General
Secretariat press release, 18 June 2002).
46 In fact, Peru is applying Decision 370 of November 1994 that established the CET.
47 See Decision 577 of the Andean Community.
48 See General Secretariat press release, 23 July 2003.
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sentences on nullity proceedings, non-compliance
actions and prejudicial interpretations regarding the CET,
the free trade zone and other issues related to the
integration process. In this context, it is worth bearing
in mind the recommendation contained in the Quirama
Declaration on expanding the scope of extrajudicial
dispute settlement methods.
(b) Coordination of macroeconomic policies
Despite the economic difficulties faced by the
countries of the Andean Community, efforts to contain
inflation continued, with the convergence target of
achieving single-digit inflation from the end of 2003.
Four member countries reached that target at various
times during the second half of the 1990s, and were
expected to maintain it during 2003; Venezuela came
close to the target in 2001, but inflation more than tripled
in 2002 and was still more than double the target in 2003
(26%).
The second convergence target is a public sector
deficit of not more than 3% of GDP, although 4% was
authorized for 2002 to 2004.49 The third target requires
the stock of public debt (external and internal) not to
exceed 50% of GDP. Colombia and Venezuela have been
comfortably within that range since the mid-1990s;
Bolivia and Peru have been approaching the target since
1997 and 1998; and the figure for Ecuador was virtually
double the target in 2000, and 80% in 2003.50
On 14 April 2003, the Commission adopted Decision
543 approving the format for the convergence action
programmes which are to be presented by countries at
the end of each year and used as reference by the
permanent technical working group for the annual reports
it submits to the Andean Advisory Council of Treasury or
Finance Ministers, Heads of Central Banks and Economic
Planning Officers. The report for 2003 was due in June
of that year. At its meeting on 26 June, the Council agreed
to boost harmonization of macroeconomic policies with
a view to achieving the targets by 2005 and to reinforce
the monitoring mechanism. By 2005, the Council also
expects to have created conditions conducive to an Andean
financial market that supports savings and investment. The
Council also resolved to bolster the harmonization of
indirect taxes in the interests of greater legal certainty for
economic agents.
49 See General Secretariat, Macroeconomic Policy Harmonization, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/politics/policies.htm.
50 The percentages correspond to the ratio between the gross external debt and GDP (ECLAC, 2003b).
51 Tenth Andean Council of Foreign Ministers on the New Strategic Orientation of the Subregional Integration Process, 11 March 2003.
52 In February 2003, the General Secretariat announced that it was preparing a draft Decision to be submitted to the High-Level Group on
Border Integration and Development with a view to establishing a community rule to promote investment in such projects (General
Secretariat press release, 21 February 2003, Lima).
4. The political and social aspects of integration
As the Andean integration process matures, growing
importance has been attached to the political and social
aspects of integration, in terms of viability and response
to citizens’ aspirations. At several meetings of the
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, significant
agreements have been reached on these issues. The tenth
meeting of the Council, for instance, called on members
to analyse the political dimension of integration,
prioritize the social agenda, develop mechanisms for
regional cohesion combating against poverty and address
migration and social participation in the integration
process (concepts reiterated in the Quirama
Declaration).51
As a result of these concerns, the Commission and
the Council of Foreign Ministers have agreed on 17
Decisions since July 2002, including guidelines for the
integrated social development plan, social security and
health instruments, labour migration and various matters
linked to health, border health, health at work, consular
and migratory affairs, education, defence of consumer
rights, indigenous peoples, electoral matters, natural
disasters, the fight against terrorism and drugs and the
dissemination of information on integration.
The meeting of the Presidents of Ecuador and Peru
in Sipán contributed to the creation of the Andean zone
of peace and provided an opportunity to assess and
reinforce joint projects as part the binational development
plan for the border region between the two countries,
including initiatives on transport infrastructure,
strengthening binational border facilities and
education.52 In July 2003, the sixth ordinary meeting of
the Advisory Council of Ministers of Labour agreed to
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53 On 7 July 2002, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs approved Decision 523 on the basis of the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth
meetings of the Andean Presidential Council; Decision 391 (adopted in 1996) establishing a common regime for access to genetic
resources; and Decision 435 (1998) creating the Andean Committee of Environmental Authorities (CAAAM).
54 Economic Complementarity Agreement 54 defines its objectives and cover, economic and trade complementarity, administration of the
agreement and other provisions.
55 Nevertheless, the Peruvian Under-Secretary for Foreign Trade recently cast doubt over his country’s commitment to the CET by suggesting
a revision of Decision 535 (approving the CET) on the basis that this instrument is not necessary for Peru to be a member of the Andean
Community (L’Extrategy, 2003). The same Under-Secretary highlighted Peru’s interest in negotiations on FTAA. An Ecuadorian columnist
(Herrera, 2003) countered this by underlining the importance for Ecuador of negotiating the FTAA with all of South America and by
expressing disagreement with the Ecuadorian Minister for Foreign Trade over her consultation with United States authorities concerning
a possible understanding between the United States and the Andean Community, without carrying out appropriate consultations with
other member countries of the group.
56 The twenty-fourth MERCOSUR Presidential Summit, which was held on 18 June and attended by the President of Venezuela, ratified the
conclusions of the two groups’ negotiations from the above-mentioned meeting.
57 The Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela met on 25 April 2003. The Foreign Ministers met on 4 August.
formulate an Andean Work Administration Instrument
summarizing institutions’ main objectives in terms of
integration.
The Andean Business and Labour Advisory
Councils met several times, both individually and jointly.
In May 2003, Bolivia joined the ranks of Ecuador and
Peru by ratifying the Treaty establishing the Andean
Parliament and its Additional Protocol instituting Direct
Elections. The many forums that channel social
participation in the integration process were also very
active, and will now include one for mayors and
governors of the subregion.
Decision 523 of the Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs reaffirmed the Andean countries’ intention to
ensure the conditions necessary to achieve sustainable
development, through conservation and sustainable use
of natural resources and the environment.53 The Decision
defines a regional biodiversity strategy for the tropical
Andean countries and instructs the Andean Committee
of Environmental Authorities to draw up a Plan of Action
and a Portfolio of Projects. Activities will include studies
on subregional biodiversity; creating, maintaining and
increasing the Portfolio; and generating integration
proposals in this area.
5. The Andean Community’s external relations
There has been significant activity in terms of
international relations, with some clear results for the
region:
• MERCOSUR. Negotiations of a free trade area for
South America (ECA No 54)54 and of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) also have the effect
of enhancing the mechanisms of MERCOSUR and
the Andean Community, particularly in the case of
the CET.55 In this sense, guideline 19 of the Quirama
Declaration requests that the Commission
coordinate a working plan, with the support of the
Secretariat, aimed at concluding a free trade
agreement between the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR.56 Several meetings have been held
with a view to concluding the agreement: in June
2003, the Foreign Ministers of MERCOSUR and
the Andean Community set up a working group
comprising the Presidents and Secretaries of each
scheme, with a view to preparing a plan and
timetable for achieving that objective.57 The two
Secretaries were also tasked with identifying
sensitive negotiation issues. The meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and trade held on 31
October studied the results of the third Vice-
Ministerial technical meeting held on 24 October.
In this context, Venezuela and Argentina concluded
a series of bilateral trade agreements on 26 October.
In December 2003, Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela completed negotiations for an economic
complementarity agreement with MERCOSUR.
This agreement confirms the commitment to a South
American trade bloc, given that such agreements
have existed with Bolivia since 1996 and with Peru
since November 2003.
• Peru-MERCOSUR. In the context of ECA No 54
and the meeting between the Presidents of Brazil
and Peru on 25 August, MERCOSUR and Peru
concluded a free trade agreement.
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• European Union (EU). In September 2002, the
Foreign Ministers of the European Union were
presented with an aide-mémoire detailing the
Andean position and aspirations concerning the
main issues of the biregional relationship including
the fight against terrorism, drugs, migration,
corruption, sustainable development, the
environment, biological and cultural diversity and
protection of democracy.58 On 12 March 2003, the
tenth meeting of the Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs approved Decision 540 on the design
of a work plan for formulating a programme to
disseminate Andean integration in EU countries, and
Decision 542 tasking the Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs to negotiate with the EU through
the countries’ missions in Brussels and with the
support of the General Secretariat. At the tenth
Institutionalized Ministerial Meeting between the
Andean Community and the EU, held on 27 March
2003, both parties reviewed progress to date and
announced that negotiations for a political dialogue
and cooperation agreement would begin in May.
That round of negotiations concluded on 8 May,
with agreement reached on 90% of the text of the
agreement, especially in terms of cooperation and
trade. Further meetings were held in October and
November 2003, and the negotiations concluded
with the signing of the political dialogue and
cooperation agreement on 15 December in Rome.
This laid the foundations for initiating negotiations
on an association agreement including the creation
of a free trade area between the Andean Community
and the European Union, from 2004.
• United States. On 6 August 2002, the Andean Trade
Preferences Act (ATPA) was updated and broadened
to become the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which extended
preferences until the end of 2006, except for
Venezuela.59 In the context of the open regionalism
of the Andean Community, representatives of the
Secretary-General have mentioned the possibility
of a framework free trade agreement.60 On 18
November 2003, a United States Trade
Representative announced that country’s intention
to conclude a free trade agreement with four Andean
countries. The Secretary-General of the Andean
Community said he hoped the negotiations would
take place in a context of coordination and
collaboration (Andean Community, 18 November
2003). The negotiations between the United States,
Colombia, Peru and Ecuador are expected to begin
on 18 May, and talks with Bolivia are expected to
start at a later date. According to the new Secretary-
General of the Andean Community, no decision has
yet been taken on whether negotiations will be held
en bloc or bilaterally (newspaper El Nacional,
Caracas, 3 March 2004), although countries are
already coordinating their positions.
• Other countries. On the basis of the Agreement to
establish a Political Consultation and Cooperation
Mechanism, concluded in March 2000, several
activities have been carried out to forge closer links
between the Andean Community and the People’s
Republic of China. The first meeting of the Political
Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism was held
in October 2002. The parties agreed to
institutionalize biannual consultations between
Under-Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, with the first
meeting scheduled for the second half of 2004. In
June 2003, an Agreement to establish a Political
Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism was
concluded between the Andean Community and
India. The Andean Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and the Foreign Secretary of India will deal
with the political aspects, while the cooperation
aspect will be handled by the Andean Committee
of Heads of International Cooperation Agencies and
the Indian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Other
contacts were also made with a view to
strengthening economic ties between the Andean
Community and CACM and Caribbean countries,
Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation.
58 General Secretariat, aide-mémoire, Priorities in the Andean Community’s Relationship with the European Union, 14 September 2002.
59 Web site of the General Secretariat, common foreign policy/relations with the United States.
60 General Secretariat press release, Secretary General proposes Andean Community-United States framework agreement, 8 November
2002, Lima.
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C. Central American Common Market (CACM)61
1. Introduction
In 2003, efforts to deepen Central American integration
continued. Particular progress was made in activities
included in the plan of action adopted on 24 March
2002.62 By June 2002, Costa Rica confirmed that it
would be part of the CET, thereby enabling the subregion
to consolidate a Customs Union, albeit an imperfect one
(see below), from 1 January 2003.
The amendment of article 35 of the Tegucigalpa
Protocol, agreed by countries in February 2002, entered
into force in January 2003 when it was ratified by three
countries. It was subsequently ratified by Honduras and
Nicaragua, which resulted in full application of the trade
dispute resolution mechanism. It was on this basis that
the Council of Ministers for Economic Integration
(COMIECO) approved the relevant legal instruments:
mechanism, model rules of procedure and code of
conduct (Secretariat for Central American Economic
Integration (SIECA), 2003a and 2003b) by adopting
Resolution 106 on 17 February 2003 and Resolution 111
on 27 May 2003 (COMIECO XXVI and XXVII).63
2. Market access and trade facilitation measures
(a) Intra-subregional trade
In response to weak stimuli from the international
economy, growth of GDP in Central America was 2.3% in
2002 and 3.3% in 2003, thereby resulting in falling per
capita GDP for the third consecutive year (ECLAC, 2004b).
After modest growth in 2002, total Central American
exports rallied to achieve growth of 11.4%. Export growth
was strongest in Costa Rica and Honduras and, to a lesser
extent, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. This rise in
exports is due to certain products that are in increasing
demand in destination markets, although much of the
expansion is also because of other products for which
demand is not necessarily on the increase. Comparatively
speaking, exports to the subregion have a higher proportion
of such products (ECLAC, 2003d).
Exports within the group increased by 7%, i.e. by
less than the 11% increase in total exports. Unlike the
previous year, in 2003 intra-subregional trade ceased
to play the important countercyclical role it had adopted
previously. This was reflected in a reduced growth rate
for intra-subregional exports (less than 60% of the
average level of growth during the period 1997-2001).
This explains a decrease in the proportion of total trade
represented by intra-subergional exports, which
dropped from 28.9% in 2001 to 26.9% in 2003 (see
figure II.3 and table II.7). Nevertheless, the flow
patterns of intraregional trade within CACM are more
stable and less pro-cyclical in the long term than the
South American and Caribbean integration schemes
(see figure II.3).
In 2003, all trade partnerships improved
considerably except for exports from Honduras to El
Salvador, El Salvador to Nicaragua, and from Guatemala
to Honduras, which posted lower levels than in 2002
(see tables II.8 and II.9).
61 The documents on which this section is based can be found on the web page of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration
(www.sieca.org.gt).
62 In August 2003, the CACM Council of Ministers resolved to prioritize uncompleted tasks to match target timetables with the real
possibilities of countries (information from the newspaper La Prensa Gráfica, 8 August 2003, San Salvador).
63 As established by the Central American Presidents, between February and May 2002, the participation in the Council of Heads of Central
Banks was legally approved (SIECA, information bulletin No. 167 of 3 September 2002).
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Furthermore, the bulk of intra-subregional trade is
made up of manufactures. Of the 20 main products of
intra-subregional trade, 17 are manufactures –medication,
agroindustrial products (palm oil, bread and dairy
products), iron sheets, organic surface-active products,
plastics, paper pulp, soap, cosmetics, wire, aluminium
and alloys, boxes, file folders and packages, glass inners
and flasks– that represent about 40% of total intra-
subregional trade. Although many CACM exports have
a high import content of between 40% and 44% of total
exports, and between 70% and 84% of maquila and free
trade zone exports, they nonetheless make a relevant
contribution to regional industrialization (Kuwayama
and Durán, 2003). The agricultural sector does, however,
make a significant contribution to intra-subregional trade
that varies from a third of total exports to the region in
the case of Costa Rica and El Salvador, to 46% in
Honduras, 53.7% in Guatemala and 70.3% in Nicaragua
(ECLAC, 2003a).
The pattern of intra-subregional trade, in which
reciprocal trade figures show fairly similar products, is
an indication of the level of closeness and productive
complementarity of CACM economies (ECLAC, 2003b).
Furthermore, despite the absence of systematic
information on intra-subregional investments, many
significant reciprocal investments have been made in
Central America in recent years, including those made
by: the Guatemalan Telephone Company, a Honduran-
Guatemalan consortium, the Poma Group of El Salvador
in Guatemala, Nicaragua and other Central American
countries and the significant expansion of the Salvadoran
Taca Group, which increased its fleet of Airbus aircraft.
Table II.7
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: SHARE OF INTRA-SUBREGIONALa TRADE, 1990-2003
(Percentages of total trade)
Countries 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003b
Costa Rica 9.2 10.1 10.1 13.9 13.9 13.7
El Salvador 30.1 41.6 55.8 68.2 59.8 60.6
Guatemala 24.8 26.3 25.2 30.5 39.2 38.8
Honduras 3.2 14.8 20.9 25.5 25.0 24.7
Nicaragua 14.5 17.9 22.6 25.7 42.5 38.9
CACMc 16.0 21.4 22.6 28.9 28.1 26.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Secretariat for Central
American Economic Integration (SIECA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
a Does not include maquila or EPZ exports.
b Preliminary figures.
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(b) Market access and trade facilitation
There remain two restrictions to free trade
common to all five member countries (unroasted coffee
and cane sugar), but bilateral restrictions have now
fallen in number to 21 (including wheat flour, roasted
coffee and ethyl alcohol), from the 30 registered one
year previously. Nicaragua’s announcement that it
would soon eliminate the 35% tariff on wheat flour
imports from Honduras (the “sovereignty tax”, which
has been in force since 1999) was also welcomed. Trade
rules have been greatly enhanced by the approval of
the Central American trade dispute settlement
mechanism.64
According to the permanent register kept by SIECA,
the number of obstacles to free trade decreased during
2003. The number of complaints dropped from 29 in
August 2002 to 22 in January and February 2003 and
17 in March. The main complainant is still El Salvador,
and the most frequent respondent was Honduras
(Maldonado, 2003). Table II.10 shows 17 disputes in
September 2003, after only about 13 in August.65 The
countries in the group are also subject to the Central
American Treaty on Investment and Trade in Services.
64 Failure to comply with an arbitration award triggers sanctions consisting of the suspension of trade benefits for amounts similar to the
other party’s losses. There are also Central American regulations on the origin of goods; safeguards; unfair trade practices; international
customs transit procedures for the carriage of goods by land, with declaration form and instructions; standardization, metrology and
authorization procedures; and sanitary and phytosanitary measures and procedures, although harmonization is still pending in the case of
this last instrument.
65 There are sometimes two or more complainant or respondent countries, hence SIECA counts only 16 complaints in September.
Table II.8
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: TRENDS IN THE NETWORK
OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2002-2003
(Rates of variation with respect to the same period of the preceding year)
Destination Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua CACM
Origin 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
Costa Rica -9.8 21.4 8.5 5.3 19.6 -5.4 -1.8 34.4 3.8 13.2
El Salvador 12.7 1.6   6.4 7.9 -4.4 8.0 -6.4 -10.5 2.3 3.8
Guatemala -23.8 20.2 -15.4 3.5  -19.9 -1.1 -12.3 6.1 -17.5 4.9
Honduras 329.3 52.3 7.6 11.6 -5.6 26.7   64.9 168.5 14.0 30.0
Nicaragua 85.1 -26.0 44.5 -2.8 45.3 -20.3 54.2 -25.5   55.3 -15.8
CACMb 7.8 5.2 -5.4 7.2 7.3 7.4 -3.3 -1.9 -4.7 19.5 -0.6 6.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Secretariat for Central
American Economic Integration (SIECA) and official information from countries.
a Preliminary figures for the full year.
b Central American Common Market.
Table II.9
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: MARKET SHARES
OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total)
Millions of dollars Percentage of total
Costa Rica  169 246 142 221 777 5.6 8.2 4.7 7.4 25.9
El Salvador 105  371 190 101 767 3.5 12.4 6.3 3.4 25.6
Guatemala 143 418  234 121 916 4.8 13.9 7.8 4.0 30.5
Honduras 34 155 80  44 313 1.1 5.2 2.7 1.5 10.4
Nicaragua 50 106 26 44  227 1.7 3.5 0.9 1.5 7.6
CACMa 332 848 724 610 487 3001 11.1 28.2 24.1 20.3 16.2 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from each country. The information
from Honduras and Nicaragua is based on preliminary estimates.
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With the support of SIECA, customs authorities have
continued their efforts to modernize and simplify border
procedures and enhance transit control mechanisms. At
the end of 2003, border posts between Central American
countries were removed (SIECA, 2003a).66 The Central
American Uniform Customs Code (CAUCA) and its
regulations have applied to three countries since August
2003, and are currently entering into force in Costa Rica
and Honduras. The single manual for customs procedures
for integrated, juxtaposed and peripheral customs is
already in use between El Salvador and Guatemala, while
the other countries continue to carry out bilateral customs
procedures.
On 18 September 2003, the fourteenth meeting of the
Directors-General of Customs approved the draft Central
American Law for Penalizing Smuggling and Customs
Fraud. All of the above is leading to the formation of the
Customs Union, although common authorities, online
communication between administrations and the total
removal of border posts are still pending. Integrated,
juxtaposed and peripheral customs will be in operation until
the process is completed.67 Customs valuation is governed
by the 1994 GATT Agreement, except for El Salvador and
Guatemala, which do not yet use it.
At its twenty-second meeting, held in July 2002,
the Council of Ministers for Economic Integration
(COMIECO) gave instructions for the negotiation of a
Central American agreement on public-sector
procurement to establish rules concerning transparent
and non-discriminatory national treatment.
Table II.10
MEASURES RESTRICTING FREE TRADE IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM)
Complainant Respondent country
country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua CACM
Costa Rica 1 1 2 4
El Salvador 3 4 1 8
Guatemala 3 1 4
Honduras
Nicaragua 1 1
CACM 0 3 4 7 3 17
Source: Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), “Medidas contrarias al libre comercio intrarregional”, Extraordinary bulletin,
No. 80, 10 September 2003.
3. The Common External Tariff (CET) and other regulatory aspects
(a) The Common External Tariff (CET)
There are still exceptions to CET for textiles,
clothing, footwear, tyres and agricultural products
with tariffs set during the Uruguay Round. Also,
Nicaragua applies only a 5% (instead of 10%) tariff
to intermediate goods produced in Central America
and different tariffs to various agricultural goods,
partly protected by the Fairness in Taxation Act
(SIECA, 2003c). To date, 79% of the CET has been
harmonized and, according the decision taken by the
Presidents of the subregion at their meeting on 18
September 2003, the remaining 21% should drop to
8% in the first half of 2004.
66 Other actions aimed at facilitating trade, which are at various stages of advancement, include recognition of registers and harmonization
of specifications for foodstuffs, beverages, medication and similar products, agricultural inputs and hydrocarbons. Progress was also
made in terms of standardization (technical regulations).
67 In May 2003, there were three integrated customs, three juxtaposed, six peripheral and one trinational (SIECA, 2003d).
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(b) Coordination of macroeconomic policies
The difficult economic situation of Central America
during 2002 and 2003 has limited progress in achieving
the macroeconomic targets adopted, which consequently
had to be amended by the Central American Monetary
Council in November 2002. Current targets include the
harmonization of seven indicators based on specific
criteria (see table II.11). Between 2002 and 2003,
authorities’ efforts have generated better results in almost
all countries, although they are still far from sufficient.
The Central American Monetary Council monitors the
progress of these variables and, for the purposes of
evaluation, calculates each country’s compliance with
the various macroeconomic indicators mentioned in table
II.11, which also details the individual progress of
countries.
The Presidential Summit held on 27 September
2002 adopted a resolution in support of: transformation
and modernization of the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration (CABEI); the need to formulate a
plan of action to enhance its operation; improving
governance of the bank and securing more partners from
outside the region. In October 2002, the forty-second
Annual Meeting of the Assembly of Governors was given
over to implementing that resolution. In June 2003, the
Assembly of Governors appointed a new president of
CABEI.68 The bank’s standing in international financial
markets has improved. At the end of August 2003,
Moody’s Investors Services awarded grade Baa1 to its
short-term debt and P-2 to its long-term debt, and judged
it the second best Latin American institution in terms of
risk.69 At the most recent extraordinary summit of the
Central American Integration System (SICA), the
governors instructed CABEI to contribute US$ 1.25
million in non-refundable resources to support the
lobbying strategies of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which have all
concluded trade negotiations with the United States
(INTAL, 2004).
68 For the first time, the President was selected by means of a competitive process which attracted some 150 candidates (CABEI, News, 1
September 2003, Tegucigalpa).
69 In June 2003, Euromoney recognized CABEI as the best Latin American financial borrower.
70 It is widely believed that the problems encountered in the recent WTO meeting in Cancún will result in a consolidation of these negotiations.
In response to the resolution adopted by the Central American Presidents at their summit on 26 September 2002, CABEI has given each
country a non-refundable contribution of US$ 500,000 to support the negotiation process (CABEI, News, 26 February 2003). The Business
Coalition for United States-Central America Trade, which groups over 100 large United States enterprises, is lobbying hard for the free
trade agreement in the United States Congress and other levels of government.
4. External relations of CACM
• United States. Central American economies
consider the special schemes that link them to the
United States to be of vital importance. These
relationships were strengthened by the creation of
the United States-Central American Regional Trade
and Investment Council in 1998 and the opening of
negotiations for a free trade agreement in January
2003.70 Negotiators have met several times and
Table II.11
MACROECONOMIC CONVERGENCE TARGETS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Indicator Convergence Level of compliancecriterion (100% = maximum compliance)
Growth rate of real GDP 4.0 Countries 2002 2003
Average interest rate on deposits (ti) 0% ≤ TI ≥ 5%
Real effective exchange rate with the United States 95-105 Costa Rica 25 38
Net international reserves/money supply ratio ≥100 El Salvador 75 88
Public sector deficit/GDP ratio ≤2.5% Guatemala 50 50
Total public debt/GDP ratio ≤50.0% Honduras 25 38
Balance-of-payments current account deficit/GDP ratio ≤3.5% Nicaragua 25 13
Source: Executive Secretariat of the Central American Monetary Council.
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agreement has been reached on a wide range of
issues. In December, the United States concluded
its negotiations with Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua, while Costa Rica closed
negotiations with the United States in January 2004.
At the Presidential Summit held in July 2003, the
Federation of Private Businesses of Central America
and Panama stated the importance of linking these
negotiations to the Central American integration
process so that it may be reinforced by such
discussions.71
• European Union (EU). Trade between Central
America and the European Union is based on the
tariff preferences contained in the special regime
that EU extends to Central America and the Andean
Community alike. The regime provides for
cumulative origin treatment, which is governed by
CACM and the Andean Community through their
Permanent Joint Committee on Origin. Political
relations and cooperation are based on the Political
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement that has given
rise to many Presidential Summits. At the meeting
between Central American Presidents and the
President of Spain on 9 July 2003, the Spanish
Head of State pledged his support vis-à-vis EU
for efforts to start negotiations on an association
agreement, to include a free trade agreement.72
This Association Agreement was concluded in
Rome on 15 December.
• Mexico. All CACM countries have concluded free
trade agreements with Mexico. Ties between
Mexico and CACM have become increasingly
significant as a result of the Puebla-Panama Plan.73
• Canada. Costa Rica has already concluded a free-
trade agreement with Canada (ECLAC, 2002c) and
the other four countries are currently negotiating
their own agreements. The seventh round of
negotiations was held at the end of May.
• Dominican Republic. CACM countries concluded
a free-trade agreement on the basis of the framework
agreement adopted in 1997. Significantly, the
Dominican Republic has been included in the
negotiations for a free-trade agreement between
Central America and the United States.
• Taiwan Province of China. Central America has
concluded many cooperation agreements with the
Taiwan Province of China, the most important of
which is the economic complementarity agreement.
• Other countries. As part of the framework
programme with the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), Costa Rica is negotiating a free-
trade agreement with Caribbean countries. Since
1998, there has been a framework agreement on
trade and investment between CACM countries
and MERCOSUR, and a similar one with Chile,
on the basis of which Costa Rica and El Salvador
have signed similar instruments (ECLAC,
2003d).
71 See the report on the customs union in the newspaper Prensa Libre, 18 July 2003, Guatemala.
72 See SIECA, extraordinary bulletin No. 74, l0 July 2003.
73 The Puebla-Panama Plan involves the following eight countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua and Panama, i.e. Mesoamerica. It consists of eight initiatives, each with its own programmes and projects (Maldonado,
2003). The scope and complexity of the tasks involved have prompted an in-depth discussion concerning the best ways to implement
them. A study presented to the University of East Anglia School of Development Studies adopted a critical perspective on the Puebla-
Panama Plan (Di Meco, 2003). In July 2003, a high-level strategic analysis workshop proposed a strategic agenda based on the
following key issues: (i) strengthening of the management capacity of the governing bodies of the Puebla-Panama Plan; (ii) human
development; and (iii) production integration, trade and competitiveness.
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D. Caribbean Community (CARICOM)74
The Caribbean economies are still feeling the negative
effects that the tragic events of September 2001 have
had on tourism from the United States. Economic
growth, which was a meagre 1.7% in 2002, is estimated
to be only 3.3% in 2003 (ECLAC, 2003c). The individual
problems of member countries hampered the integration
process, which had already been the subject of criticisms
and major attempts at improvement (ECLAC, 2003d).
Of particular importance was the formulation of an
Agreement on the Caribbean Single Market and
Economy (CSME), although little progress was made
towards full approval of its content and application. In
mid-February 2003, the fourteenth extraordinary
meeting of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of
Government (CHG) was given over to analysing the
situation of the Caribbean Community and formulating
1. Introduction
the actions required for adequate governance of
Caribbean regional integration.75
On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of
CARICOM, the twenty-fourth Conference of Heads of
Government (CHG) adopted the Rose Hall Declaration
on “Regional Governance and Integrated Development”
in June 2003. The Declaration defines priorities for the
economic and social development of the subregion, as
well as its external relations, including the need to
maintain and strengthen alliances with developing
countries.76 The Declaration reaffirmed the objectives
of integration and stated that achieving them would
require actions in the political and legal spheres leading
to decisions (of the Conference or other institutions) that
should automatically come into effect with force of law
in the subregion.77
74 The documents on which this section is based can be found on the web page of the CARICOM secretariat (CCS) (www.caricom.org).
75 Many of the positions taken by Heads of Government were critical in nature. For instance, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago,
quoting various studies, pointed out that good intentions had not become reality and important decisions had not been implemented. He
said that most people in the Caribbean Community were concerned about the slow progress of the integration efforts (CCS, Prime
Minister Patrick Manning, Opening Remarks, XIV Inter-Sessional Meeting of the CHG, 14 February 2003, Trinidad and Tobago).
Participants had access to two key documents from the University of the West Indies, Barbados (Tewarie and Rampersad, 2003).
76 This will imply revising the Treaty of Chaguaramas, national laws and the Statute of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which should
take account of the constitutional provisions of member countries.
77 The decisions contained in the Declaration include one to set up a permanent CARICOM commission or other executive mechanism that
would be accountable to the Conference and other relevant institutions in terms of: proposing and implementing decisions; adopting the
principle of automatic resource transfers for the financing of Community institutions; reforming the CARICOM Secretariat; strengthening
the role of the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians; recognizing that, within this framework, it is both legitimate and
feasible for a group or groups of CARICOM Member States to forge close links among themselves as they collectively consider appropriate.
The meeting also examined the progress towards a regional energy policy, the regional strategy to develop the information and
communication technology (ICT) subsector, the Multilateral Air Services Agreement and security and the fight against crime in the
subregion. The Expert Group of Heads of Government, assisted by a technical group, was entrusted with the task of preparing these
proposals for presentation to a Special Meeting of the Conference towards the end of 2003.
2. Intra-subregional trade
During 2003, total exports from CARICOM countries were
up almost 12.8% on the previous year, whereas the level of
intra-subregional exports remained practically the same.
This resulted in a lower ratio between the two types of
trade flow, as shown in table II.12. Extraregional trade grew
at a similar rate to intra-subregional trade (see figure II.4).
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Since the mid-1990s, the share of intra-subregional
exports in total exports has fluctuated between 15% and
16%. These figures reflect the fact that trade integration
within CARICOM has not progressed in the last 10 years,
following a rise in intra-subregional exports during the first
half of the 1990s. Significantly, intra-subregional trade
represents a third of the total trade of the small countries of
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and
this proportion is even higher in the case of Dominica and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (see table II.12).
During the first half of 2003, intra-CARICOM
exports, measured by export flows from the subregion’s
four largest economies (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago), were up by 11.2% in relation to
the same period of 2002. The exception was Trinidad
and Tobago, which recorded the highest growth in
relative and absolute terms, mainly due to the recovery
of its oil and cement exports (see table II.13). This
represented a recovery from the 4.5% drop observed in
2002 (see table II.13).
Table II.12
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: SHARE OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE
(Percentages of total trade)
Countries 1990 1995 2000 2003a
CARICOM 12.3 15.1 21.2 17.5
Barbados 30.7 37.4 43.2 41.6
Belize 8.0 3.8 4.8 5.2
Guyana … 6.1 12.4 18.1
Jamaica 6.3 4.1 3.3 5.2
Suriname … … 10.7 17.6
Trinidad and Tobago … … 23.3 16.0
OECS … … 19.8 31.3
Antigua and Barbuda 64.8 … 8.4 25.2
Dominica 25.3 42.3 56.8 50.4
Grenada 28.1 25.8 14.5 28.9
Montserrat 33.8 5.7 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 10.6 10.9 6.9 5.2
Saint Lucia 17.1 16.0 25.4 23.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … 42.5 62.0
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Tables II.14 and II.15 offer a more detailed analysis
of the level of interconnectedness within the subregion,
which is mainly based on trade to and from Trinidad and
Tobago, since this represents between 70% and 80% of
intra-subregional exports and between 11% and 15% of
total CARICOM imports. Information available for 2000
shows the main trade partnerships based on bilateral trade
between Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica (26.7%);
Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (18.2%); Trinidad and
Tobago and Suriname (11.2%); and Trinidad and Tobago
and members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) (16%) (see table II.15).
A large part of the intraregional export mix within
CARICOM is accounted for by mineral fuels and
lubricants, particularly petroleum products, which
represented 40% in the period 1996-2000, followed by
food, beverages and tobacco (16%), and manufactured
goods (15%). The main importers of oil, hydrocarbons,
oils, fuels and minerals are OECS countries. Exports of
mineral fuels and lubricants have expanded considerably
in the past few years, and represented 53% of intraregional
flows in 2000 (CCS, 2002), with Trinidad and Tobago by
far the largest supplier. The main manufacturing exports
are paper and paperboard, non-alcoholic carbonated
beverages, miscellaneous processed foods, detergents and
soaps, cement and iron and steel. The subregional market
is particularly important for the exports of Barbados,
Dominica, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
(CCS, 2002).
Despite the fact that 80% of trade (exports and
imports) is carried out among the larger countries,
and that the least developed countries (i.e. OECS
Member States) accounted for only 20%, there is
enough complementarity among the latter group to
make the mutual manufacturing trade of its members
significant, especially in Dominica, Grenada, Saint
Table II.13
CARICOM: TRENDS IN THE NETWORK OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2002-2003
(Rates of variation with respect to the same period of the preceding year)
Destination Barbados Guyana Jamaica Suriname Trinidad CARICOM
 and Tobago
Origin 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2002 2003a 2001 2002a
Barbados 32.8 20.0 -13.6 6.3 12.8 30.4 0.7 21.0 1.2 17.3
Guyana 3.2 22.6 -9.0 -37.9 6.9 12.5 8.5 -34.8 -2.8 -23.8
Jamaica 9.0 19.9 -28.3 14.1 -15.7 82.9 -20.0 -6.6 -13.6 4.8
Suriname 21.6 11.9 9.7 14.7 11.4 -36.6 -6.0 14.3 2.4 6.1
Trinidad and Tobago -6.9 17.6 8.6 -8.8 -7.7 22.9 -1.7 -1.6 -5.1 15.2
CARICOM -4.7 17.6 8.7 -4.6 -7.7 15.6 -0.5 2.6 -5.7 3.4 -4.5 11.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),




CARICOM: MARKET SHARES OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2003
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total)
Millions of dollars Percentages of total
Barbados  3.0 8.6 3.0 17.3 32 0.7 2.0 0.7 4.1 7.5
Guyana 6.5 9.0 1.8 5.8 23 1.5 2.1 0.4 1.4 5.4
Jamaica 4.8 1.5 0.6 8.0 15 1.1 0.4 0.1 1.9 3.5
Suriname 6.6 3.9 2.9 18.4 32 1.5 0.9 0.7 4.3 7.5
Trinidad and Tobago 84.3 33.1 181.5 25.3 324 19.8 7.8 42.6 5.9 76.1
CARICOM 102.2 41.5 202.0 30.7 50.0 426 24.0 9.7 47.4 7.2 11.6 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
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Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis (see table II.16). For
instance, exports from Dominica to the rest of the
subregion in 2000 were dominated by chemical
products (88.4%),  foodstuffs (59.1%) and
manufactured goods (25,6%).78 Exports from Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat and Saint Lucia in 2000
were dominated by beverages and tobacco, which
represented 61.2% and 68%, respectively, of those two
countries’ intra-subergional exports. In the case of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, exports of
foodstuffs and live animals represented 73% of total
exports to the rest of the subregion (CCS, 2000).
78 Exports to the rest of the subregion accounted for around 87.4% in 1990 and 82.7% in 1995.
Table II.15
CARICOM: TRENDS IN THE NETWORK OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2000
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Millions of dollars
Barbados 3 7 19 3 36 49 7 5 7 0 6 14 9 118
Belize 1 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Guyana 9 0 33 0 15 12 0 2 2 0 0 4 4 69
Jamaica 8 4 3 1 21 12 3 2 2 0 2 3 1 49
Suriname 5 0 0 7 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53
Trinidad and Tobago 208 6 98 338 110 203 18 20 49 1 23 57 36 964
OECSa 14 0 4 15 1 11 39 11 6 3 1 7 9 2 84
Antigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
Dominica 2 0 3 13 0 3 9 4 0 0 2 2 1 31
Grenada 2 0 0 1 0 1 8 2 2 0 2 3 1 12
Montserrat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
Saint Lucia 5 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 1 1 0 0 0 11
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4 0 0 1 0 5 12 3 2 1 0 2 4 0 23
CARICOMb 105 11 34 89 0 83 193 33 25 30 8 20 50 28 515
2000 Percentage of total
Barbados 0.2 0.5 1.4 0.3 2.7 3.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.7 8.8
Belize 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Guyana 0.7 0.0 2.5 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 5.1
Jamaica 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 3.6
Suriname 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9
Trinidad and Tobago 15.5 0.5 7.3 25.1 8.2 15.1 1.4 1.5 3.6 0.1 1.7 4.2 2.7 71.7
OECS 1.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.8 2.9 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.1 6.2
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3
Dominica 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.3
Grenada 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9
Montserrat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Saint Lucia 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.7
CARICOM 18.1 1.0 8.4 31.0 8.5 9.5 23.5 2.9 2.6 4.7 0.2 2.8 6.5 3.8 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the CARICOM Secretariat
(CCS), CARICOM’s Intraregional Trade, Georgetown, 2002.
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3. Market access and the common external tariff (CET)
In addition to the consequences of the international
economic situation, intra-CARICOM trade is also
affected by lack of compliance with commitments on
the part of various member countries, some of which
have not included the agreements regarding the
formation of the customs union in their national
legislations. Non-compliance is a problem in a
considerable proportion of member countries, as shown
in table II.17. Most restrictions on free trade will have
to be eliminated in 2005. Ongoing tasks include those
relating to the liberalization of services and those linked
to the movement of persons and capital.
Although the rules on policies concerning
competition, subsidies and antidumping measures are
less of a problem than rules of origin, they are not yet a
part of the national legislation of member countries
(except Jamaica). However, Protocol VIII of the CSME
Table II.16
ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS): TRENDS IN THE NETWORK
OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL TRADE, 2000
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Millions of dollars Percentage of total
Antigua and Barbuda 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.3 2.8 1.8 0.6 0.3 2.4 1.4 0.6 7.1
Dominica 4.0 0.4 0.3 2.0 1.5 0.6 8.8 10.0 0.9 0.8 5.2 3.9 1.5 22.3
Grenada 1.7 1.9 0.0 1.5 2.6 0.5 8.3 4.4 4.8 0.1 3.9 6.6 1.4 21.1
Montserrat 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.4 1.7 0.2 3.9
Saint Lucia 1.9 1.2 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 5.4 4.9 3.0 3.2 0.5 1.1 1.1 13.6
Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines 2.8 1.8 1.4 0.2 2.3 3.9 12.4 7.0 4.5 3.6 0.5 5.9 10.0 31.5
OECS 10.6 6.0 3.3 1.0 7.3 9.3 1.9 39.5 26.9 15.2 8.4 2.5 18.6 23.6 4.7 100.0
Source: Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), CARICOM, Report No. 1, Buenos Aires, 2002 and Secretariat of the
























































































































stipulates that such rules must be included in national
legislations within 18 to 24 months, depending on the
item (INTAL, 2002).
Only a few countries had completed the final phase
for full application of the CET (Belize, Grenada, Saint
Lucia, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines). The other countries are
still in the early stages owing to fiscal difficulties
(Antigua and Barbuda, Suriname, and Saint Kitts and
Nevis), except Dominica, which has not yet decided
whether to participate. Furthermore, there are many
exceptions to the tariffs. The average tariff was between
9.7% and 11.2%, which was still higher than the CET,
especially for certain goods such as agricultural products.
Much remains to be done before the CET can be
considered harmonized, moreover its implementation is
dependent on prior fiscal reform (INTAL, 2002a).
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Work towards setting up the Caribbean Court of
Justice has been stepped up since the Agreement
establishing the Court entered into force on 23 July 2002,
once Barbados, Saint Lucia and Guyana had deposited
their instruments of ratification.79 This lays the
foundations for replacing the Privy Council in London
as the court of final appeal, one of the last remaining
colonial ties. The process of accession to the Agreement
is still incomplete. The following instruments were
signed on 4 July 2003: Protocol on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Caribbean Court of Justice and the
Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission;
Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean
Court of Justice; The Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund and Vesting Deed
of the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund.80 On 21
August 2003, eight of the 10 members were appointed
to the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission,
the body responsible for appointing judges to the Court.
There have, however, been allegations questioning the
validity of the new body, especially from Trinidad and
Tobago. In any event, activities linked to the Caribbean
Court of Justice continue, including the plan to
standardize the teaching of civil law and common law
in higher education.
Table II.18 provides a summary of the level of
compliance with fundamental integration commitments
among CARICOM countries.
Table II.18
CARICOM: STATE OF INTRA-SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
Subjects Number of countriesyet to take action
Revised Treaty ratified and instrument deposited 12
Strengthening regulations and institutional support 8
CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ) 3
Creation of national competition authorities 11
Free movement of goods (domestic taxes and charges, import licences
for community goods, unharmonized customs) 15
Free movement of services Not yet applicable
Free movement of persons 8
Free movement of capital Not yet applicable
Intrarregional Agreement on double taxation 2
Integration of capital markets 5
Common foreign policy 3
Harmonization of laws Not yet applicable
Source: Secretariat of the Caribbean Community (CCS), report on the state of intraregional integration, 2003.
Note: Refers to all stages of actions to be taken, except inclusion in national legislation.
79 The twenty-fourth Conference of Heads of Government insisted on the need to finalize all preparatory arrangements for the Caribbean
Court of Justice by 15 November 2003.
80 CARICOM Secretariat (CCS), various press releases from July and August 2003.
Table II.17
MEASURES RESTRICTING FREE TRADE IN THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
Measures Infringers
Import licences Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago
Quotas Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago
Price control Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Import duties Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago
Source: Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), CARICOM, Report No. 1, Buenos Aires, 2002 and Secretariat of the
Caribbean Community (CCS), report on the state of intraregional integration, 2003.
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4. Aspects of economic policy coordination
The Committee of Central Bank Governors is
responsible for monitoring member countries’
macroeconomic convergence indicators and eligibility
criteria for monetary union. The levels of convergence
for the various indicators, calculated by the Caribbean
Centre for Monetary Studies (CCMS), were relatively
acceptable during the 1980s, except those for growth,
inflation and indebtedness. The indicators have
subsequently deteriorated in line with economic
shocks.81
The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP) is
responsible for coordinating actions in terms of
movement of capital, exchange rate policies, balance of
payments and policies directed at less developed member
countries, and for setting up a development fund. At its
sixth meeting on 17 September, the Council stated the
need to step up efforts in these and other aspects of
economic policy coordination. The Treaty of
Chaguaramas and the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy (CSME) provide for special and differentiated
treatment for less developed and highly indebted
countries, although this is far from being implemented.
Furthermore, this treatment is undermined as it is
excluded from some of the negotiations (INTAL, 2002b).
5. Social aspects
CARICOM has adopted a series of significant social
initiatives (CCS, 2003): on 1 June 2003, the sixth
special meeting of the Council for Human and Social
Development (COHSOD) responded to the growing
emigration of professionals (especially teachers) by
deciding to consider the problem in the formulation of
a regional strategy for human and social development;
the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) and the
Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce
(CAIC), which are involved in various integration
bodies, have been tasked with formulating a proposal
aimed at institutionalizing a three-way regional social
dialogue between governments, workers, and
businessmen and other social stakeholders; the twenty-
fourth Conference of Heads of Government called for
finalization of work to establish the Regional
Stabilization Fund, the Regional Economic
Transformation Programme and treatment regarding
the movement of professionals and other aspects linked
to such movements.82
6. External relations of CARICOM
CARICOM countries have conducted free trade
negotiations with Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Mexico, the Group of Three, MERCOSUR and Chile,
the European Union (as part of a group of African and
Caribbean countries), the Andean Community, CACM
(Costa Rica), Canada, United States, Spain, India, Japan,
Russian Federation and the FTAA (INTAL, 2002a).
The twenty-fourth Conference of Heads of
Government was attended by the Presidents of Chile and
South Africa, the Secretaries of the Andean Community
and the Organization of American States (OAS), the
Directors-General of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and a representative of the
81 These include growth rate of GDP, inflation, fiscal balance, interest rate, wages, unemployment rate and the performance of the tourism
sector. The eligibility criteria are: maintaining the value of three months of import cover, a stable exchange rate within a 1.5% exchange
band and a debt service/export of goods and factor services ratio of no more than 15% (INTAL, 2002b).
82 CCS, Press Release No. 49/2003 of 28 March.
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Heads of State of French overseas departments. In
addition to the Council for Foreign and Community
Relations, the increasing negotiation commitments have
made it necessary to create the Regional Negotiating
Machinery (RNM), the main objective of which is to
coordinate the CARICOM position in the various
negotiating forums (FTAA, WTO and bilateral
negotiations).83 CARICOM countries also endeavour to
have their lower level of development taken into account
in their negotiations with third countries; this is explicitly
expressed in agreements concluded with Cuba and the
Dominican Republic.
83 CARICOM member countries have succeeded in adopting common stances in the face of difficult problems such as the questions on the
European Union’s sugar regime raised by Australia and Brazil in the WTO, or the United States threat of punitive action against six
countries in the context of the former’s demand for bilateral agreements on the provisions of the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court.
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Chapter III
In the mid-1980s, the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean began to adopt a
development model whose engine was intended to be the external sector, within a context of
trade and capital market liberalization. This failed to achieve the anticipated effects on growth
or to generate productive investment and quality jobs, however, regardless of the differing
characteristics of individual countries. ECLAC documents have attributed the mediocre results
of export-led growth to the region’s macroeconomic policy, due to its exclusive concentration
on controlling inflation and balancing fiscal accounts, to the detriment of growth and
employment goals. As a consequence, the behaviour of real variables in the countries’
economies was determined by the vagaries of the external situation, made even more volatile
by the procyclical bias of macroeconomic policy. In this climate of uncertainty, private agents
were cautious about making long-term investments, which led to low growth in productive
activity and high unemployment rates. Rapid growth in import-intensive exports in the last
decade, in addition to the region’s traditionally larger income elasticity of imports compared
to exports, has meant that expansion in the Latin American and Caribbean economies and
exports has consistently led to higher trade deficits (ECLAC, 2003d, chapter III).
Policy for the promotion and development
of merchandise exports in Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean
Introduction
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This shows that governments are aware of the
importance of fostering export growth with a view to
achieving more balanced integration of their economies
into the global economy. Almost all the Latin American
and Caribbean countries have formulated and
implemented programmes to promote and develop
exports, with varying degrees of success. However, after
almost four decades of efforts to promote and finance
exports through entities expressly devoted to this
endeavour, there is still no consensus as to the
effectiveness of the strategies used. Latin American and
Caribbean countries have been characterized by
institutional change, and the export promotion and
development area is no exception. Lack of institutional
continuity in this area poses a twofold risk: that the
services provided to exporters will be discontinued and
that the development of statistical time series to serve as
a basis for objectively evaluating the technical, financial
and human efforts deployed in each case will be
interrupted, making it harder to measure the impact of
the export strategy and progress towards goals.
When policies do not undergo a cost/benefit analysis,
they tend to be perceived as inefficient or irrelevant. Given
the widespread need for budgetary belt-tightening in the
region, countries have tended to cut funding for export
promotion and financing programmes when, on the
contrary, export development activities should be properly
supported, according to clear and explicit priorities that
give preference to the firms most in need of such help.
This chapter sets out the results of national studies
to describe, categorize, analyse and evaluate Latin
American and Caribbean export promotion and
development strategies in the last decade, with a view to
channelling future efforts in the region. This edition of
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy
focuses on the experience of Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean, while the next edition will summarize
studies on South America. The chapter is divided into
five sections, including the introduction. The next section
discusses the objectives, scope and limitations of export
promotion and development policies, based on all the
studies. Section three describes the domestic and external
constraints faced by Mexico, Central America and some
Caribbean countries, which contributed to reducing the
effectiveness of export promotion and development
policies. Section four describes the promotion and
development programmes and institutional framework
chosen in Mexico, Central America and some Caribbean
countries. The fifth and last section presents some final
considerations.
A. Objectives, scope and limitations of policies to
promote and develop exports
The broad objective of public policies to expand and
diversify exports is to reduce the economy’s anti-export
bias and the transaction costs that must be borne by
exporters, which distort the relative profitability of
foreign- versus domestic-market-oriented production.
Clearly, this profitability depends on various prices that
change over time. Under the import substitution model,
for example, production costs and profit margins
depended to a large extent on the protection regime (tariff
and non-tariff barriers), which pushed up the cost of the
inputs used throughout the production chain. By
eliminating competitive pressure from imports,
protection resulted in wider profit margins, making
import substitution sectors and sectors catering
exclusively to the domestic market extremely lucrative.
This meant that more efficient firms producing goods in
which the country had a comparative advantage had a
disincentive to export.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, institutions to
promote and develop exports have another important
role, which is to remove obstacles to exports. This
involves improving infrastructure, streamlining
bureaucratic procedures, providing suitable financing
conditions, adjusting the tax burden, expanding market
access, increasing information availability and
encouraging practices that enhance productivity and
quality. Trade openness has drastically reduced the
degree of nominal and effective protection, although
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exchange rate appreciation has affected the relative
prices of tradable goods in most of the region’s countries,
creating another type of anti-export bias. Any export
promotion policy must be based on three pillars: policies
to reduce the export sector’s vulnerability to currency
volatility or misalignment, an appropriate protection
structure for producers and consumers, and a system of
non-distorting incentives. It should be borne in mind
that the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties prohibits the use
of fiscal or financial incentives that are specific to certain
production sectors or branches of activity.
Unquestionably, the sectoral composition of external
sales reflects a country’s degree of development, resource
endowment, average productivity and technological
advancement. In other words, at any given time, the
volume and composition of a country’s exports are limited
by its production and technology structure. The structure
of comparative advantages and the removal of distortions
and flaws in the domestic market define which products
a country can export today, while its policies on
technology, investment and education determine what it
will be able to export in the medium and long term  (Motta-
Veiga and Iglesias, 2003). When countries fail to invest
in technology training, human resources development and
infrastructure, their policies to promote and develop
exports will probably not be viable, since
underdevelopment in these areas makes it necessary to
compensate firms for the high systemic costs of producing
each unit of the good or service to be exported. In the
long run, such exports are not sustainable once the
subsidies are reduced or removed.
1. Institutional framework of an export policy
The specific aims of policies to promote and develop
exports include: increasing merchandise exports in
general; promoting exports of higher value-added
products, or in other words, more highly processed
goods; and promoting service exports (see chapter IV).
Another aim of export development is to diversify target
markets and to broaden the spatial export base to include
the entire region, in addition to developing border
regions. A more advanced objective is to strengthen the
links in the export sector’s production chain, as well as
to boost the competitiveness of the component segments.
This may also include promoting regional and
international investment in export goods and service
sectors (including tourism services) and support for them
(Uribe Mosquera, 2003).
An institutional support structure is needed to
implement promotion and development instruments. The
existence of institutions specializing in the promotion
of exports and production depends on a number of
factors, including a country’s degree of maturity in
developing its export strategy and its own level of
institutional development. A country’s institutional
environment consists of the regulatory framework, the
advisory and supervisory authorities, the decision-
making body and process, the entity responsible for
promotion and steering decision-making (export
promotion organization), the entity responsible for
financing (export financing organization) and the joint
implementation body. Fundamental aspects of analysis
are the degree of stability of the regulatory framework
and of promotion and financing institutions, as well as
the level of support for their activities from public and
private sector institutions, together with the respective
degree of inter-institutional consultation.
The export promotion organization’s financial
environment is key to an effective policy to promote and
develop exports. Funds may come from the national
budget or the private sector, earmarked economic rents
or quasi-fiscal revenues, self-sustaining assets, external
cooperation, access to international credit or
contributions from beneficiary export companies or their
customers abroad. Financing is channelled to pre- and
post-shipment lines of credit, productive investment,
suppliers’ credit, transport subsidies, financial assistance
for buyers’ missions, and so on. Fundamental aspects of
analysis are the stability/sustainability of the export
promotion organization’s funding and the synergy
between the funding received from firms or their
customers and other instruments to promote and develop
exports.
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2. Criteria for classifying export promotion and export
development instruments
To evaluate the relative effectiveness of instruments
used in export promotion and export development
programmes, they can be classified according to their
specific objectives. Initially three groups of instruments
can be distinguished, which must remain consistent
with the macroeconomic environment, especially with
trade and exchange rate systems: (i) export promotion
instruments; (ii) export development instruments, and
(iii) activities to improve market access (trade
diplomacy). Export promotion instruments cover a
specific supply of export goods and their aim is to
improve information to exporting firms about potential
markets, as well as to enhance links between exporting
firms and importers (to reduce existing information
imbalances) and thereby diversify target export
markets. They include access to business and transport
information; market intelligence; setting up project
banks using information and communication
technologies; and identifying new export goods, new
markets and niche markets.
In addition to instruments that impact on
transaction costs, there are others that impact on the
competitiveness of goods and services as defined by
trademarks, product design, quality certification of
productive processes, partnerships (formation of
strategic alliances), the adaptation and tailoring of
products to gear them to more demanding markets, the
development of a “country trademark”, fostering an
export culture among business managers, and so on.
Not only do these instruments impact on the non-price
competitiveness of firms, they are also cross-cutting, in
that they can influence the behaviour of firms, products
and markets generally. They also include coherent
measures concerning not only customs procedures and
trade facilitation, but also sanitary and phytosanitary
controls; environmental, technical and quality
certification; improving means and channels of
communication; “de-bureaucratization”; enhancing
physical, tax and legal security; government
procurement transparency, and so on. In addition, they
are fully compatible with international trade rules.
In turn, since export development instruments
include incentives for increasing the volume of exports
and diversifying their composition, they impact on
firms’ investment decisions by reducing risks and
transaction costs. These instruments comprise a
competitiveness strategy based on national and regional
cooperation, consultation and management training,
which may be spatial in nature (clusters), or sectoral
(production chain and competitiveness agreements),
or regional/international, by means of technology-
linked investment, knowledge leverage and alliance
formation.
However, special regimes are still used extensively
in Latin America and the Caribbean, including free trade
zones, duty drawback, temporary admission for inward
processing, exemption/reimbursement of indirect taxes,
special conditions of origin and performance
requirements. A fundamental aspect of analysis is the
degree of consistency between such regimes and the
disciplines adopted in current multilateral, regional and
bilateral agreements. As already stated, changes in trade
policy, particularly the progressive decline in effective
tariffs in the region’s economies, has gradually eroded
the anticipated impact of traditional instruments on the
price competitiveness of exports.
In addition to such regimes are efforts to disseminate
the mass use of information and communication
technology (ITC). Efforts to increase public computer
literacy, the development of digital signatures and the
encryption of commercial documents (electronic
invoice) in order to increase payment system security,
may also be viewed as instruments to promote and
develop exports. The development of new financial
products to foster innovation also appears to be useful.
The implementation of mechanisms for venture capital
financing could plug a gap that is preventing the
application of new ideas and the search for new niches
with export potential. Normally this type of venture
experiences a tight financial situation in the early years,
which cannot be alleviated without suitable financial
products.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy • 2002-2003 109
3. Considerations for evaluating instruments to promote
and develop exports1
Generally speaking, experience in the region indicates
that it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of
policies to promote and develop exports  –and yet more
difficult to quantify it. Costa Rica and El Salvador
maintain monitoring systems designed more to verify
that the needs of firms are being catered to than to
evaluate results with respect to countries’ external
sector variables. Where attempts are made to carry out
such an evaluation, they often consist of a private or
corporate cost/benefit analysis to relate investment in
promotion and related activities (commercial and
technical training, market intelligence, subsidy implicit
in export financing, and so on) with the accompanying
evolution in the value, volume and diversification of
exports. Alternatively, econometric estimates are used
to express exports in relation to a number of basic
independent variables (real rate of exchange, external
demand, relevant international prices, and so on). This
often succeeds in “explaining” many export variations
in relation to changes in those variables, sometimes
leading to the “naive” conclusion  that the activities of
export promotion and financing organizations make
only a marginal contribution.
However, both types of analysis display a problem
of aggregation. In particular, they tend to overlook the
major differences between commodities and higher
value-added products, as well as between large
enterprises (which are often relatively self-sufficient in
penetrating the international market) and small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are much more
in need of institutional aid. Both types of analysis also
fail to take into account the dispersal of effort and
resources associated with the multiplicity of objectives
assigned to export promotion and export financing
organizations alike, with the similarly wide range of
export promotion and development instruments, and
sometimes, too, with duplication of tasks by the different
institutions involved. This makes it all the more difficult
to define and estimate a causal relationship between
export promotion and development instruments and the
above institutions. It is also important to establish
whether the problems arise at the programme’s design
or implementation stages.
Nor does the cost/benefit type of analysis properly
factorize exogenous variables, such as international
prices and the behaviour of the principal target markets
for the respective exports (which the economic-estimate
type of analysis does take into account, as it does also
domestic macroeconomic management). However, on
the assumption that export promotion and export
financing organizations tend to focus their activities more
on higher value-added exports, as well as on service
exports (including tourism services) than on exports as
a whole –thereby excluding commodities– the apparent
impact of these organizations on total export value is
bound to underestimate any impact they might be having
on their respective target universe. Clearly, the narrower
the effective coverage of the target universe and the less
disaggregated the statistical data, the larger the
underestimation.
1 This section is based on Uribe Mosquera, 2003.
B. Domestic and external constraints on export
growth and diversification
ECLAC documents have reiterated the importance of a
number of conditions in enabling economies to
successfully change their production patterns to foster
growth. First, relative prices must be conducive to the
production of export goods and the equilibrium of the
external sector. This means a real exchange rate that
depreciates in line with gradually decreasing import
protection; incentives and reimbursements for exporters,
and safeguard mechanisms against unfair competition
from foreign suppliers. Second, there must be a
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macroeconomic environment favourable to investment
and technological innovation. One of the requirements is
for a level of economic activity close to the production
frontier and for “reasonable” real interest rates compatible
with the profitability of the capital employed. Third, there
must be sufficient factors of production to meet the
demand of producers of export goods and efficient import
substitutes. Many of these factors originate in markets
that are currently imperfect, incomplete or non-existent.
This calls for an active and effective public support policy
to ensure that openness leads to self-sustaining growth,
which involves creating or improving the markets and
institutions needed to continually enhance productivity
(ECLAC, 1990; 1995b).
These conditions were, and continue to be, absent
from the region’s recent economic evolution. The key
instrument of trade reform has been more or less rapid
and indiscriminate import liberalization. In general,
firms whose production had been geared to the
domestic market were exposed to international
competition in the midst of an influx of foreign capital
attracted to State privatization programmes and of a
currency revaluation which, although it could have
helped to stabilize domestic prices, actually stripped
local products of their competitiveness, discouraged
the allocation of resources to export production and
helped to cause a trade imbalance. What is more,
better-prepared firms that had survived the adjustment
process did not receive help in the form of access to
technology, long-term finance at reasonable interest
rates, proper infrastructure and expanding external
markets.
1. Mexico2
Between 1990 and 2002, Mexican exports rose from
US$ 48 billion to US$ 171 billion as the dependence
of the United States market on Mexican external sales
grew from 79% to nearly 90%. The same happened
with Mexican imports, 80% of which come from the
United States, which is also the principal source of
direct foreign investment. With an external sector
(combined exports and imports) representing more than
52% of its GDP, Mexico’s economy is dependent on
developments in the international economy, especially
the United States. Throughout the last decade,
economic growth has been very patchy and, since 2001,
GDP growth has fluctuated between -0.4% and 2.4%,
which has been reflected in a decline in per capita
income. Recent economic policy has been characterized
by careful public finance management and monetary
caution, against the background of a floating exchange
rate, an appreciating currency, and an inflation rate of
close to 5% in the last three years. Government funding
for the private sector has declined significantly since
1995, which has heavily affected housing construction
and corporate financing, forcing firms to resort to credit
with suppliers, commercial banks and companies in
their own group.
Since 1998, Mexico’s trade deficit in goods and
services has fluctuated between 1.3% and 1.9% of GDP,
which contrasts with the surpluses of 1995-1996, and
the deficit of almost 5% in 1994. The revenue from
family remittances from abroad, which equal virtually
the entire revenue from oil exports and the revenue from
direct foreign investment, have been crucial to balancing
Mexico’s current account.
2. Central American countries
In the Central American countries, import liberalization
and the associated tariff reductions led to a drop in a
major source of tax revenue. In 1994, revenues from
import duties accounted for 15% of total revenues for
Costa Rica and El Salvador, rising to more than 20% for
the other three countries (ECLAC, 1998). In Guatemala
and Honduras, the value of taxes on foreign trade fell as
a proportion of total tax revenues, from 21% in 1995 to
around 11% in 2001, while in Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Nicaragua, taxes on foreign trade represented
between 6.5% and 8.5% of total tax receipts. In the main,
Costa Rica and El Salvador have generated
2 The information on Mexico and Central America is based on Alonso, 2003a.
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compensatory revenues principally by levying indirect
taxes on domestic consumption, which impact on the
cost structure of local production and export
competitiveness.3 El Salvador’s tax structure is based
on value-added tax (VAT), which contributes more than
half of total revenues, and on corporate income tax,
which contributes a little less than one third of total
revenues. In practice, these countries have to cope with
severe public financing problems, which limit the
design and realistic implementation of active policies
for changing production patterns and promoting
exports.4
The Central American countries differ in the ratio
between exports and total economic activities.
Guatemala is one of the countries in the region with the
least trade openness, with merchandise exports in the
order of 13% of GDP. In contrast, the merchandise
exports of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua represent between 22% and 32% of GDP.
Furthermore, Guatemala has combined exports and
imports of around 40% of GDP, whereas El Salvador
has 55%, Honduras 78%, Nicaragua 91% and Costa Rica
80%.5
In the last decade, El Salvador and Guatemala grew
at high average rates, whilst Costa Rica, Honduras and
Nicaragua experienced more patchy growth. However,
since 2001 the five economies have stagnated, with
average growth of around 2%, which fails to offset
population growth. Costa Rica’s economic growth,
measured in GDP terms, does not appear to reflect the
major structural changes that have occurred in the
external sector in recent decades. This becomes even
more apparent if one excludes the export sector covered
by the free trade zone and inward processing regimes,
which has still not been linked properly with the local
economy in order to boost the creation of jobs and
added value.
Similarly, the external sector of the five Central
American economies shares certain common features:
(i) all the countries target their foreign trade almost
exclusively at the United States and Central America;
(ii) albeit to differing degrees, export diversification led
to a shift from primary products to cross-border maquila
operations, mainly in the textile and clothing sector;
(iii) export diversification has not led to changes in the
productive structure, due to the concentration on low
value-added operations; (iv) all the economies exhibit a
large, chronic trade deficit, which is not reflected in the
current account deficit because it is partially offset by
remittances from Central American workers abroad, as
well as by revenues from tourism, donations and short-
term capital; and (v) Central American States are small,
measured in terms of government expenditure, which
ranges from 10% to 12% of GDP in El Salvador and
Guatemala.6 In particular, the small size of the
Guatemalan State seriously affects its institutional
capacity to meet the needs of its population and corporate
sector, thereby constraining its ability to deepen the
successes achieved through trade liberalization.
Honduras (20%) and Nicaragua (28%) show higher
expenditures, whilst the national accounts statistics
indicate approximately 15% for Costa Rica.7
Moreover, the Central American banking system has
not been capable of generating enough financing for
productive activity. El Salvador’s economy has been
relatively successful in maintaining low inflation levels
and the lowest interest rates in the region. However, in
recent years this has not been reflected in investment
growth, and the adoption of dollarization in 2001 has
increased intermediation costs. Honduras has one of the
3 Honduras recently carried out a tax reform to reduce its heavy dependency on indirect taxes, which account for three-quarters of tax
revenues, and thus promote a more equitable tax system.
4 In Nicaragua, the tax burden has been declining in recent years as a result of an economic slowdown, more exemptions, fewer selective
taxes, the transport subsidy and the impact of the tax concession process, which has reduced the size of foreign trade taxes as a percentage
of GDP in recent years.
5 The indicators increase significantly when trade in services is included.
6 Workers’ remittances represent more than 14% of El Salvador’s GDP. In the case of Honduras, family remittances received from abroad,
especially from the United States, which represented some 11% of GDP in 2002, have made it possible to reduce the foreign trade deficit,
together with the contribution from long-term and short-term capital. Furthermore, the tourism sector, which represented some 9% of
external revenues in 1980, had grown to 19% by 2002. In Nicaragua, the trade deficit, which reached 52% of GDP in 1999 and is still in
the order of 40%, is the highest in the region. In spite of this, Nicaragua has succeeded in controlling, and even reducing, the rate of
devaluation, thanks to its abundant foreign remittances, which amounted to 13% of GDP in 2001, and to the availability of donations,
which last year represented 5% of GDP but are now showing signs of declining. When El Salvador applied dollarization in 2001,
significant quasi-fiscal financial costs were generated for buying foreign currency in the market, which created new pressures on the
fiscal deficit.
7 In the case of Costa Rica, State participation is much greater than the national accounts might at first indicate, since the State plays a
dominant role in electricity generation, has a monopoly on importing oil, telecommunications and insurance, and is an important player
in sectors such as health, education and commercial banking. The reorganized national accounts suggest a State representing almost one
fifth of GDP (18.6%) in 2001.
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largest interest rate spreads in the region. Credit has been
concentrated on financing consumption, to the detriment
of productive activity. In Nicaragua, the fiscal gap of
the last three years has been close to 11% and this has
led to the adoption of a much tighter monetary policy,
which has managed to keep both domestic inflation and
the devaluation rate fairly well under control.8 In an effort
to control liquidity and prevent the collapse of the other
economic policies, minimum reserve requirements were
increased, the cost of credit was raised, interest rate
spreads were widened, and credit for higher-risk
activities was restricted. The results was that credit was
channelled into consumption, to the detriment of
agriculture and industry. In Costa Rica, the incomplete
transformation of the financial sector has led to very
large interest rate spreads and high rates compared with
those in the international market. Furthermore, in
Guatemala, a floating exchange rate policy with
occasional Central Bank intervention has not prevented
the quetzal from being overvalued. The overvalued
exchange rate also acts as an obstacle to the
competitiveness of Honduran exports.
3. CARICOM countries
Most of the countries of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) are small economies by any standard. Due
to their inherent characteristics, their overall
performance is highly correlated with that of the external
sector.9 Merchandise and service exports are an
important source of job creation, foreign exchange
earnings and economic growth.10 The relative size of an
economy has major implications for export performance
and defines the context for export promotion and
development policies.11 In general, the small size of
Caribbean domestic markets, added to insufficient
natural and human resources, justifies partnerships
between CARICOM countries to enable joint production
to benefit from economies of scale and complementarity
in tradable activities. Individually, each small economy
is confined to producing a narrow range of products.
However, there has been a major effort to diversify
services.12 Efforts to develop services as a key export
activity have been accompanied by a change in the
contribution of services to GDP, which rose from 35%
to 68% between 1970 and 1990. Moreover, with the
exclusion of oil, intraregional trade has fluctuated
between 5% and 8% of CARICOM members’ overall
trade figures.
Furthermore, the CARICOM countries are situated
in areas prone to natural disasters, have high transport
costs and their total tax revenues depend to a large extent
on import and export performance. In many cases, tariffs
are easier to collect than other income or consumption
taxes. For this reason, even though some countries have
attempted to apply reforms aimed at reducing the effect
of tariffs on the tax budget, such reforms have not always
been successful, and in many Caribbean economies,
more than 50% of tax income derives from trade tariffs.
The problem is made even more complex by heavy
public sector involvement in promoting production and
export activities through infrastructure projects and fiscal
incentives (ECLAC, 1998).
8 Like Honduras, Nicaragua is in need of monetary and fiscal discipline to enable it to formalize an agreement with the International
Monetary Fund as a vital first step in establishing the prerequisites for access to international cooperation funds and to entitle it to benefit
from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. This would write off some of its foreign debt and relieve fiscal policy by reducing
interest payments, even though social spending needs to be increased significantly.
9 CARICOM has 15 member states (see chapter II).
10 Small economies such as Singapore, Taiwan province of China, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China) and Luxembourg
have fostered efficient links with the global economy.
11 Smallness is generally defined in terms of population and the dividing line fluctuates between 1.5 million and 10 million, although some
authors use a combination of population, GDP and surface area (Briguglio, 1995; Atkins, Mazzi and Easter, 2001; Armstrong and Read,
2000 and 2003; Davenport, 2001; WTO, 2002i).
12 One of the main objectives voiced by CARICOM governments is to diversify exports. As an example, see Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Medium Term Economic Strategy, 2002-2004. Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, p. 5. Another recent example is the
Grenadian authorities’ efforts to diversify organic farming (NERA, 2003).
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C. Characteristics of export promotion and
development policies in Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean
1. Mexico13
Institutional framework for promoting exports
In Mexico, export promotion began in 1937 with
the creation of the National Foreign Trade Bank
(BANCOMEXT), a State development bank for
promoting non-oil exports. Since its inception,
BANCOMEXT has devoted itself to financing
productive export and import activities, as well as
organizing producers and creating a series of
independent institutions, the objectives and functions of
which are to promote export production and marketing.14
At present, the Ministry of Economy, formerly the
Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development
(SECOFI), is the entity responsible for defining foreign
trade policy, as well as regulating and promoting
domestic trade. One of the Ministry of Economy’s most
important tasks has been to negotiate and sign free trade
agreements. Mexico has free trade agreements with more
than 32 countries, in addition to 18 reciprocal protection-
of-investment treaties, which have been the central plank
of Mexico’s policy of integration into international
markets since it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1986, after a process of unilateral
liberalization.
In the mid-1980s, a framework law was promulgated
on BANCOMEXT to concentrate in a single institution
all the different programmes that had been established
in previous decades to promote exports, thereby avoiding
duplication of effort and endeavouring to enhance their
effectiveness. In addition, it was decided that
BANCOMEXT should act as a banking institution for
developing foreign trade, coordinating Federal
Government financial and guarantee support and serving
as both a first- and second-tier bank. Furthermore,
BANCOMEXT provides a large number of non-financial
services, including: international promotion services;
participation in international trade fairs and exhibitions
abroad; buyers’ missions; individual visits; missions of
foreign investors visiting Mexico; assisting exporters via
the “Mexico Exports” programme, directed at small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provides
integrated services on the basis of a diagnosis of their
international competitiveness and an analysis of a
product’s export potential; assisting suppliers via the
Mexico Exports programme; training; and Exportanet,
an on-line advisory system to capture customers abroad,
to mention but a few.15
Mexico is the only country in the region where
export promotion has been strongly linked with
financing, by placing export promotion in the hands of
a State development bank, without making it contingent
upon the bank’s financing activities. BANCOMEXT
competes in the market with private banks to provide
financing to export firms.16 Indeed, in recent years the
loans it offers to Mexican firms have lost competitiveness
compared to foreign banks with subsidiaries in Mexico.
The competitive pressure to which BANCOMEXT
is currently subject and the losses that the bank has
incurred in recent years have prompted some to question
the advisability of continuing to finance export
promotion activities. There has also been criticism of
the effectiveness of BANCOMEXT in promoting exports.
Both of these factors have forced BANCOMEXT to sell
services to raise funding for export promotion. However,
it recovers no more than 20% of the cost of the non-
financial services it provides.17
13 The information on Mexico and Central America is based on Alonso, 2003a.
14 See on this and other points “Exposición de Motivos de la Iniciativa de Ley Orgánica del Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior”, Diario
Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, January 1986.
15 BANCOMEXT Annual Report, 2002.
16 However, BANCOMEXT does finance activities that commercial banks do not finance, especially in the small and medium-sized enterprises
sector and in other sectors where commercial banks have no involvement. More than 90% of the BANCOMEXT portfolio is in projects
where no private banks are involved.
17 While the costs of providing promotion services are around US$ 40 million per year, revenues from the sale of services totalled only
US$ 8 million in 2002 (BANCOMEXT, 2002).
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The Ministry of Economy also carries out export
promotion activities by means of a business information
system, as well as organizing trade missions and other
promotion activities, closely linked with the free trade
agreements that Mexico has signed. There is also a
presidential directive for the creation of an
Undersecretary’s Office for the Promotion of Exports
and Investment.18 The Ministry of Economy is also
responsible for administering the various export
promotion regimes. The Mexican Government has set
out a Foreign Trade and Investment Promotion
Programme (PCEPI) for the 2001-2006 period.
The activities of the Ministry of Economy also
include a comprehensive programme for promoting and
developing small and medium-sized enterprises  (SMEs),
in coordination with other public and private entities,
together with the one-stop procedures bureau (Ventanilla
Única de Trámites), which includes the electronic
processing of foreign trade formalities, as well as a
programme to foster competitiveness.
The programme to foster competitiveness consists
of making operational the Economic Policy for
Competitiveness.19 To boost and consolidate the
competitiveness of its domestic industry, Mexico’s
Federal Government set up the Presidential Council for
Competitiveness, whose members are representatives of
the Government, the private sector and the “social sector”
(which includes various groups representing labour, local
government, small-scale farming, professional groups,
etc.). The Council studies the concrete strategies and
activities which firms consider as priorities for improving
the competitiveness of Mexico’s production sectors,
presenting them to the Quality Growth Office set up by
the Federal Government. The Council has defined two
types of strategy for improving competitiveness: sectoral
strategies and structural (or cross-cutting) strategies.
Incentive schemes for export promotion
Various incentive programmes for domestic and
foreign firms were developed to boost Mexico’s non-
petroleum exports.20 In 1985, legislation was promulgated
to govern the Temporary Import Programme for the
Production of Export Items (PITEX).21 PITEX enabled
producers of goods destined for export to temporarily
import without paying the general import duty, the value-
added tax or countervailing duties. PITEX is designed
for firms that directly or indirectly export goods and
services, with the aim of promoting the development of
local suppliers to export firms.
The Federal Government has fostered the
development of Mexico’s maquila industry since it came
into existence more than 35 years ago.22 The most recent
legislation on the firms operating under the maquila
regime was promulgated in 1998.23 Such firms receive
basically the same advantages as PITEX firms, except
that the maquila regime relates exclusively to exports.
Trading companies also receive preferential treatment.
Referred to as Foreign Trade Companies (ECEX),
trading companies are allowed to buy goods VAT-free
from domestic suppliers under definitive exportation
treatment.24
Another programme for promoting exports is the
Heavily Exporting Firms programme (ALTEX), whose
objective is to support the operations of heavy exporters
via administrative and fiscal facilities. The beneficiaries
are producers of non-petroleum goods whose direct
exports are demonstrably worth US$ 2 million annually,
or represent 40% of their total sales; firms producing
non-petroleum goods that can show indirect annual
exports equivalent to 50% of their total sales; and Foreign
Trade Companies validly registered with the Ministry
of Economy. Such companies receive the following
benefits: refund of VAT credit balances; free access to
the Business Information System administered by the
Ministry of Economy; exemption from the requirement
for a second inspection of export goods at the customs
office of exit, when the goods have already been cleared
by an internal customs office; and permission to appoint
a customs representative for a number of customs offices
and a variety of products.25
18 Unlike BANCOMEXT, the Ministry of Economy does not charge for the promotion services it provides.
19 Ministry of the Economy, Economic Policy for Competitiveness. See www.economia.gob.mx.
20 In the past there were Certificates of Fiscal Promotion (CEPROFI), granting tax credits on the FOB value of exports. There was also a law
on free trade zones which was repealed in 1990.
21 Executive decree of March 1985. This decree was amended in May 1990, May 1995, November 1998, in October 2000 and in December
2001, to adapt it to changing circumstances.
22 A maquiladora is an industrial enterprise dedicated to the processing, manufacture or repair of goods destined wholly for export. This is
the definition of maquila used in this document. See on this point: “Generalidades de la industria de la maquila”, www.economía.gob.mx.
23 Decree on the Promotion and Operation of the Maquiladora Industry, published in Mexico’s Official Journal (Diario Oficial de la
Federación) in June 1998. A number of reforms were introduced in November 1998, October and December 2000 and May 2003.
24 Decree on the establishment of Foreign Trade Companies of April 1997.
25 To enjoy these advantages, users of the ALTEX programme must provide to the relevant departments of the Federal Public Administration,
a copy of the ALTEX Certificate issued by the Ministry of Economy and, where required, confirmation of its validity.
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There is also a register of national export suppliers
(PRONEX) for firms operating under the PITEX,
maquila and ECEX regimes, which extends definitive
exportation treatment to the sale by national suppliers
of domestic or definitely imported goods, for the
purposes of VAT exemptions.26 Such companies must
register as PRONEX firms, in addition to an application
from PITEX, maquila or ECEX firms that will be
receiving goods and services from PRONEX firms.
A drawback regime also exists, whereby exporters
are reimbursed for the value of any duties charged on
the importation and subsequent exportation of the
imported inputs incorporated into the exported product;
goods that are returned abroad in the same state as they
were imported; and goods imported for repair or
alteration. However, the duty drawback regime has been
little used, given the existence of the PITEX programme
and administrative difficulties involved with government
tax rebates.
The relative importance of the above regimes,
especially the PITEX and maquila regimes, has changed
with the recent entry into force of a number of provisions,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). NAFTA establishes that eight years after it
comes into force (that is, from 2001), temporary import
mechanisms in member countries must be modified to
avoid distorting NAFTA tariff preferences, equalizing
the tariff treatment which Mexico extends to non-North
American inputs and machinery used for the production
of goods destined for the three countries of the North
American market.
By virtue of the above, the PITEX and maquila
programmes, as originally conceived, no longer apply
to trade between NAFTA member countries. In their
stead, the Mexican Government established the Sectoral
Promotion Programs (PROSEC), which allow firms to
import goods at a preferential ad valorem tariff, for use
in making specific products, regardless of whether the
goods to be produced are destined for export or for the
domestic market.27 The benefits of the programmes
apply only to imported goods from the sector involved.
This means that in producing a good it is not permitted
to import goods which come under another sector.
Beneficiaries of PROSEC programmes that comply with
the obligations of the Decree may apply to be included
in further sectors and receive authorization to
manufacture the goods related to those sectors.
As a result of the withdrawal of the incentives in
the PITEX and maquila regimes, since 1998 the Trust
for the Development of the North of the State of Nuevo
Leon (FIDENOR) has been negotiating the promulgation
of a law on free trade zones. This legislation was
submitted to the Mexican Congress in December 2002
and is in the process of being approved. The proposed
Law on Strategic Economic Zones is designed to allow
virtually any type of business to set up and operate in
established strategic zones, benefiting from tax
incentives, chiefly VAT exemptions.28
Since the incentives for firms in strategic
economic zones are not contingent upon export
production, but instead relate to importation onto
Mexico’s domestic customs territory, subject to
payment of the respective duties, and since the
development of strategic economic zones will be
restricted to Mexico’s relatively less developed areas
for at least the first five years, the Law on Strategic
Economic Zones does not appear to contravene
international trade rules or NAFTA provisions. With
this legislation, Mexico aims to re-establish its former
legal framework on free trade zones and to put itself on
an equal footing with the Central American countries as
regards investment incentives.29
26 The legal basis for this provision can be found in the general rule on foreign trade “Regla de Carácter General en Materia de Comercio
Exterior”, section 5.2, para. 2002 of the VAT legislation.
27 Decree establishing the various sectoral promotion programs, published in December 2000, and its reforms of March, May, August and
December 2001. Basically, it consists of a reduction in import duties for companies making an definitive importation into the country.
28 For the first five years after the law comes into existence, the strategic economic zones may be developed only in Mexico’s northern and
southern border zones and in new and existing ports on the coasts of the Pacific, Atlantic, Caribbean and Sea of Cortez. After this period,
firms may set up in any part of Mexico.
29 A reform of the customs law permitting the establishment of strategic bonded areas has been introduced, with exemptions for the importation
of machinery and raw materials. The reformed law is acting as a pilot project pending approval of the Law on Strategic Economic Zones.
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2. Central American countries
Institutional framework for promoting exports
In spite of the differing historical, geographical and
cultural characteristics of the five Central American
countries, there are strong similarities in the way
structural reforms have been implemented and integrated
into the global economy. Costa Rica was the first country
in the region to undertake far-reaching structural reform
to transform its economy, as a consequence of the foreign
debt crisis of the early 1980s. However, in the other
Central American countries, market opening and
deregulation occurred in the early 1990s. Nicaragua
acceded to GATT in the 1950s, and the other four Central
American countries did so during the Uruguay Round.
In the 1960s, only a few years after the process of
economic integration began in Central America, the
governments of the region created governmental
institutions to carry out programmes for promoting “non-
traditional” exports to markets outside Central
America.30 The objective was to gradually shift
domestic-market oriented production to international
markets, showing that regional economic integration was
an instrument that served to achieve better integration
into the world economy in the long term, with a more
diversified foreign trade structure. Guatemala created
the National Export Promotion Centre (GUATEXPRO),
Nicaragua the ‘Exportemos’ programme, and Costa Rica
the Centre for Export and Investment Promotion
(CENPRO). These institutions were attached to the
ministries of economy, which were responsible for
economic integration in Central America. All the Central
American countries also created foreign trade bureaux,
which were responsible for foreign trade policy. In El
Salvador and Honduras, these bureaux were also
responsible for export promotion.
Using this institutional framework, the Secretariat
for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA)
developed the Central American Export Programme
(PROMECA), whose purpose was to promote exports
from Central American countries to foreign markets.
However, it was not until the widespread economic crisis
in all countries of the region in 1980 that it became clear
that efforts were needed to increase and diversify exports.
The Central American governments received technical
and financial assistance from the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) with a view to
creating a new institutional framework for promoting
exports and investment. These institutions acted as
private entities.
The Central American countries applied, and
continue to apply, a number of different export incentive
regimes, such as free trade zones, temporary admission
(also known as the maquila regime) and direct subsidies
for firms exporting outside the region, which include
exemptions from income tax and from duties on
imported inputs and equipment.
Export incentives are basically customs regimes that
endeavour to offset other distortions in the economy that
affect the international competitiveness of firms.
However, in Central American countries such regimes
have been supplemented by fiscal incentives or subsidies
for creating jobs and countering distortions in the
economy which, in addition to import duties, undermine
the international competitiveness of firms. Such
distortions include utility costs, social security charges,
currency surpluses, inadequate port, airport and
telecommunications infrastructure, administrative
procedures in State agencies and transport costs. Another
reason for establishing additional incentives has been
competition to attract direct foreign investment to the
Central American and Caribbean countries.
(a) Costa Rica
Institutional efforts to promote Costa Rican exports
began in 1968, with the creation of the Centre for Export
and Investment Promotion (CENPRO). However, it was
not until 1984 that the economic crisis prompted the
creation of the Export and Investment Programme of
the Presidency of the Republic and Ministry of Exports
(MINEX), financed by USAID to boost exports and
export investment. In 1996 this programme became the
Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX), which defines
Costa Rica’s foreign trade policy and conducts
international trade negotiations. In addition, USAID
created the Costa Rican Investment Board (CINDE) as
a private entity responsible for promoting export
investment via the Export and Investment Programme
30 For a detailed analysis of the institutional framework and export incentives in place in Central America in 1980 (De la Ossa and Alonso,
1990).
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(PIE). The Policy Training Programme (PROCAP) and
the Private Agriculture and Agribusiness Council
(CAAP) were also created, the latter to promote
agricultural production. CENPRO continues to exist in
parallel, as an entity responsible for promoting exports
and administering special export incentive regimes.31
In 1986, the Foreign Trade Commission (VUCE)
was created as part of CENPRO, but in the years that
followed it was consolidated when it a number of other
public entities delegated to it the tasks of processing
documentation on Costa Rican exports and imports and
developing the system for the electronic processing of
export documentation, which greatly simplifies export
formalities.32 In addition, when the Export Contract was
promulgated in 1984, the National Investment Council
(CNI) was created as a mixed entity, with members from
both the public and private sectors. The CNI is
responsible for defining foreign trade policy and
approving export contracts and CENPRO acts as its
technical secretariat.33
Furthermore, the law on free trade zones had created
the Free Trade Zone Corporation, which was the
institution responsible for administering the free trade
zone regime and State-owned free trade zones. This
organizational structure was maintained until 1996, when
CENPRO and the Free Trade Zone Corporation were
merged into a new institution called the Foreign Trade
Corporation of Costa Rica (PROCOMER).34
The decision to create PROCOMER sprang from
the conviction that Costa Rica should have a permanent
State institution for promoting exports, with the right
characteristics to guarantee efficient export promotion.
These characteristics are: administrative flexibility, since
its resource management is not subject to the legislation
governing other State institutions, even though the Office
of the Comptroller General of the Republic carries out
post audits; hiring of personnel under the same
conditions as in the private sector, which enables
PROCOMER to recruit staff at private sector salaries;
and self-financing by charging a levy from firms
operating under the free trade zone regime35 and a
statutory US$ 3 for customs declarations on imports and
exports.36
The PROCOMER annual budget is currently around
US$ 6 million, which has enabled it not only to finance
its activities, but also to set up offices abroad.37 To date,
PROCOMER has independent trade offices in Canada,
Chile, the United States, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the
Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago.
PROCOMER has approximately 90 employees.
The creation of PROCOMER signalled the end of
the National Investment Council, and coordination
between the public and private sectors was
institutionalized by means of the PROCOMER Board
of Directors, whose members include the Minister of
Foreign Trade (who chairs the board), three
representatives from the Executive Branch, appointed
by the Council of Government, four representatives of
the chambers of industries, commerce, agriculture and
exporters, in addition to one representative of small
exporters, appointed by the Costa Rican Union of
Chambers and Associations of Private Enterprise
(UCCAEP). The composition of the Board of Directors
therefore guarantees the existence of a forum for
consultation, coordination and communication between
the public and private sectors in the fields of foreign
trade policy in general and export promotion policy in
particular.38
The creation of PROCOMER as a permanent,
properly financed institution drew together many
disparate activities that were formerly carried out by
separate institutions,39 without pursuing sectoral interests
and whilst continuing to be an essentially technical
institution.
31 CINDE continues to concentrate solely on activities to attract investment, but its scope of activities is much more limited than before
because in 1995 the institution stopped receiving funding from USAID.
32 The Automated System of Free Trade Zone Customs Declarations (SADAZF) was designed to process import and export documentation
for the free trade zone regime and is considered to be one of the best documentation processing systems in the hemisphere.
33 CNI members were the Treasury Minister, the Minister of Foreign Trade, the Minister of Economy, and representatives of the Chamber of
Commerce, Chamber of Industries, Chamber of Agriculture and the Costa Rican Chamber of Exporters (CADEXCO).
34 Law No. 7,638 of November 1996 on the Creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and of the Foreign Trade Corporation of Costa Rica.
35 Twenty-five cents per square metre of industrial building, for firms in industrial parks under the free trade zone regime, and 50 cents per
square metre of industrial building for firms not in industrial parks.
36 The said charges were established as the institution’s sources of finance.
37 This financing scheme has also been used to finance activities to defend Costa Rica’s trade interests abroad, by means of international
trade negotiations. Indeed it is useful in meeting the Ministry of Foreign Trade’s growing need for funding to conduct negotiations on
free trade treaties.
38 Interestingly, most of the members of the Board of Directors, which is responsible for appointing the General Manager, are from the
private sector.
39 Even so, some chambers have export promotion programmes, such as the EUROCENTRO programme of the Chamber of Industries, and
other export promotion programmes by the Costa Rican Chamber of Exporters (CADEXCO).
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Since its creation, PROCOMER has sought to ensure
that its programmes evolve to match user needs ever
more closely. To do so, it has progressed from its original
concept of providing general services, such as: business
information services; production and dissemination of
country, market and product profiles; arranging
participation in international trade fairs; organization of
trade missions abroad, sectoral export promotion
programmes and training courses. Although it continues
to provide such services, in addition it offers
supplementary services that it has identified as meeting
the specific needs of firms.40
In the process, PROCOMER has developed a
business intelligence methodology consisting of
providing services in three phases: (i) identification of
the access conditions for certain markets for a product
from a specific firm (transport logistics, distribution
channels, customs duties, technical rules, and so on);
(ii) identification of the export potential of the products
(origin and total amount of imports, destination and total
amount of exports, market size and segment, market
trends, number of firms involved, characteristics of firms
involved in the market, analysis of the sector’s
competitiveness, etc.); and (iii) product pre-sale
activities, via its trade offices abroad (contact with
potential importers, products or brands, opinions on
products, degree of competitiveness, prices, critical
success factors and penetration strategies). In addition
PROCOMER schedules individual business
appointments and arranges participation in trade
missions abroad, participation in foreign buyers’
missions held in Costa Rica, and participation in trade
congresses dealing with subjects of interest to firms in
each sector.41
Furthermore, PROCOMOR administers the export
incentive regimes, the VUCE, with its electronic
documentation processing system, and the Automated
System of Free Trade Zone Customs Declarations
(SADAZF). SADAZF was designed to further speed up
the customs operations of firms in free trade zones.
For evaluation purposes, PROCOMER has
developed a methodology with indicators of the
efficiency, quality and effectiveness of the services
provided to exporters. Export promoters, organized by
sector, have to get together a portfolio of customers to
which they intend to offer export services, based either
on the export potential identified by the offices abroad
or on requests from exporters for export services. For
example, there are quantitative targets for the number
of market surveys a promoter has to arrange per year.
Depending on the product on offer (market access
studies, potential market studies for the product,
promotion of export goods, or trade promotion services),
after the product has been supplied, the exporter is asked
to complete a form with a series of questions to gauge
customer satisfaction with the service received. In
addition, after carrying out any activity (participation in
international trade fairs, participation in trade missions,
training programmes, etc.) there is an assessment of
customer satisfaction with the product received. The
indicators for efficiency, quality and effectiveness are
drawn up on the basis of pre-defined targets.
(b) El Salvador
In 1974, El Salvador created the National Foreign
Trade Council when it promulgated the Export
Promotion Law, although only public sector
representatives participated in the Council. This
legislation also created the Salvadoran Foreign Trade
Institute (ISCE), an entity responsible for implementing
the foreign trade policy defined by the National Foreign
Trade Council. In 1986, the Ministry of Foreign Trade
(MICE) was created by the new Export Promotion Law,
and the legislation creating the National Foreign Trade
Council and the ISCE was repealed.42 In addition, the
National Export and Investment Development
Commission (CODEXI) was created, made up of a
number of Government ministers and private sector
representatives. In 1989, the legislation creating MICE
was repealed and export promotion responsibilities were
transferred to the Ministry of Economy, leading to the
creation of the Directorate for Investment and Export
Promotion and the Fiscal Incentives Department,
together with a Free Trade Zones Directorate.
In 1990, a mixed public/private sector group drew
up a national export strategy, with the technical
assistance of USAID, proposing specific export
40 PROCOMER does not charge for its general services, although it does charge for the more specific services it provides to firms or groups
of firms.
41 Yet another export promotion instrument is the exhibition of products in showcases at the International Airport, which are changed every
three months. Pymexporta Centre, an integrated system of programmes and services for small and medium sized businesses, has been in
operation for a number of years.
42 The MICE was created in 1980 by decree of the Revolutionary Governing Junta and, in practice, had already assumed the responsibilities
of the ISCE and other institutions such as the National Sugar Institute (INAZUCAR) and the National Coffee Institute (INCAFE). For a
detailed description of the institutional framework, see Arriagada (1992).
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development measures. One of these measures was to
formally create, by means of an Executive Decree, a
National Commission for Investment and Export
Promotion (CONAEXI). The Commission functioned
satisfactorily in the years that followed, but at present
no mechanism exists for coordination with the private
sector. In 1983, USAID supported the creation of the
Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social
Development (FUSADES), to serve as a highly credible
think tank and research centre. FUSADES also ran
specific programmes for promoting agricultural
production, as well as for promoting exports and
investment via the Investment Promotion Programme
(PRIDEX). PRIDEX contributed significantly to
attracting foreign investment to El Salvador under the
free trade zone regime. After 1997, USAID substantially
reduced its aid to FUSADES.
Another point worth mentioning is that, in 1973, El
Salvador’s private sector created an Export Commission
within the Salvadoran Manufacturers’ Association (ASI).
In 1985, this Commission became a chamber of
entrepreneurs called the Exporters’ Corporation of El
Salvador (COEXPORT). In the 1990s, COEXPORT and
FUSADES played a leading export promotion role in
El Salvador. COEXPORT helped to arrange El
Salvador’s participation in trade fairs and missions,
developed databases with business information for the
general public and has been the country’s most active
informal export promotion organization.
Another private organization active in the field of
export promotion is the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, via its Information Service on Foreign Markets
(SIME) and the Programme of Support and Training for
the Internationalization of Salvadoran Enterprises
(AFIS). This programme is being renewed with
cooperation aid from Spain. In the first AFIS phase,
companies have to carry out a self-diagnosis, which leads
to the implementation of an export plan in the second
phase. Fifty firms from various sectors are already
enrolled for the new edition of the programme, 25 of
which will be selected to enter the second phase.
Cooperation aid pays 80% and firms pay 20% of the
cost of the technical assistance they receive.
From 1997 onwards, in particular after 1999, there
was a resurgence of Government interest and the
Government started boosting export promotion activities,
this time to promote competitiveness. In 1996, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs became responsible for
export promotion, arranging the participation of
Salvadoran firms in international trade fairs and
providing a market prospection service abroad via its
network of commercial attachés, although this is now
experiencing budgetary problems.43 Furthermore, the
Ministry took over the task of FUSADES in attracting
investment, and later this task was delegated to the
PROESA programme, a public/private organization
chaired by the Vice-President of the Republic. PROESA
took over the tasks of promoting and attracting
investment to El Salvador and its members are from both
the public and private sectors.44 Ongoing initiatives
involve activities for developing production and adapting
products for export; developing partnership
arrangements among potential exporters; promotion
(information, market surveys); export financing;
strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises, and
more. In combination, all these activities are designed
to provide a comprehensive service to export firms and
potential export firms.
The Ministry of Economy itself was responsible for
promoting competitive production and exports in order
to strengthen small and medium sized businesses. In
1996, the National Competitiveness Programme
(PNCES) was created, with the financial support of the
World Bank. Another element of the export promotion
programme is competition intelligence. This is an
organizational unit responsible for analysing specialized
information to support decision-making and the design
of public and private sector strategies to make exports
more competitive. There is also the Export Promotion
Fund (FOEX), a pilot project with a matching grants
programme, aimed at small and medium-sized
enterprises, both individually and in partnership. FOEX
funds up to 50% of projects in the field of export market
prospection, entry and consolidation, up to a maximum
of US$ 15,000 for individual firms and US$ 20,000 for
partnerships. The fund received initial financing of
US$ 500,000 in the first year, this year (the second) it
has US$ 400,000, and hopes to receive US$ 700,000
from USAID next year.
In addition to PNCES activities in the export
promotion field, CENTROPYME, a private non-profit
foundation created by the Government in 1998 with
European Union aid, acts as a sales and marketing
department for SMEs in both the local and international
markets. CENTROPYME has close links with the
Government through the Multisectoral Investment Bank
(BMI), an entity which commissions CENTROPYME
to carry out marketing programmes for SMEs, this being
43 It is acknowledged that many commercial attachés lack technical training.
44 Executive decree No. 3 of February 2000.
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its main source of financing (70%). It derives the rest of
its financing from the commission paid by firms for
successful business deals.45 In order to improve the
supply of products that SMEs wish to market with its
assistance, CENTROPYME has set up agreements and
negotiates the required technical or financial assistance
with these institutions.46 There are also plans to create
an export promotion agency that would pool or
coordinate all the current efforts of the various
institutions to promote exports.47
Lastly, El Salvador has a one-stop export bureau,
called the Center for Export Procedures (CENTREX).
CENTREX was created in 1987 by the Export Promotion
Law. Since September 1989, CENTREX has been
administered by the Central Reserve Bank. CENTREX
operates the Electronic System for Foreign Trade
(SICEX), which uses the Internet to link exporters, State
institutions and foreign trade organizations with
CENTREX in order to carry out export formalities.
SICEX is considered to be the most flexible and
functional system for export document processing in
Central America.
(c) Guatemala
Guatemala’s National Council for Export Promotion
(CONAPEX) was created in 1986 to propose foreign
trade policy, and the National Export Coordination
Commission (CONACOEX) was created to implement
it.48 Both organizations are still up and running. Both
include members from the public and private sectors and
decisions are taken by consensus. Thanks to these
cooperation organizations the legislation on export
incentives was promulgated, the Centralized System for
Exports (VUPE) was created and the Air Freight
Warehouse Committee (COMBEX) was set up to
properly organize the handling of imported and exported
air freight. Also thanks to these organizations, a one-
stop investment office (Ventanilla Única de Inversiones)
was created for coordinating the public and private
sectors.
The Union of Exporters of Non-Traditional
Products, attached to the Chamber of Industry, was
created in 1982 to implement export promotion policies,
as the private sector’s response to the closure of the
national export promotion centre, GUATEXPRO, the
same year. Later the Union became independent, with
the financial support of USAID, and was renamed the
Association of Producers of Non-Traditional Exports
(AGEXPRONT). Its Technical Services Division was set
up to cater to the needs of export firms. It does this
through its Market Documentation and Information
Center (CEDIME) and School of Foreign Trade which,
with the involvement of export entrepreneurs as teachers,
offers diplomas, courses, seminars, workshops,
demonstration days and so on to teach participants the
skills and expertise they need to assimilate the general
export context, international marketing techniques,
specific export procedures, negotiation techniques and
other aspects. In addition, the Technical Services Division
carries out a trade promotion programme to promote and
coordinate activities to assist exporters by providing
information on export prices, products and markets and
arranging the participation of Guatemalan entrepreneurs
in international trade fairs and trade missions abroad, as
well as other promotion events in Guatemala.
The Division of Decentralized Services is
responsible for two important activities delegated by the
Guatemalan Government to AGEXPRONT. They are to
run the Electronic Export Authorization Service
(SEADEX), which is part of Guatemala’s Centralized
Export System (VUPE), and to administer the special
customs regimes.49 Although Government officials
implement them, the Government has delegated their
administration to AGEXPRONT to guarantee their
smooth operation and ensure that the export process is
facilitated rather than hindered. AGEXPRONT provides
the physical premises and the respective electronic
systems have been set up with international cooperation
aid, AGEXPRONT being committed to guaranteeing
their maintenance and updating by charging exporters
for services.
45 The CENTROPYME annual budget is US$ 230,000.
46 In July of this year, a joint Government/USAID project was launched to promote exports from micro, small and medium sized businesses.
The project, called EXPRO EL SALVADOR, aims to help El Salvador’s micro, small and medium sized business to increase their exports
to the United States and other markets (Nathan Associates, Inc., 2003).
47 In 2000, the Salvadorian Government announced a national policy for micro and small businesses. It is CONAPYME, the National Policy
for Micro and Small Businesses, October 2000. For a detailed description of policies for promoting productive sectors in Central America,
see Alonso (2003b).
48 Government Accord No. 367 of June 1986. The accord was amended in 1990 to include in the Council the Ministry of Transport and one
more private sector representative.
49 The VUPE was created in 1986 by Government Accord No. 790-86, centralizing all the public institutions concerned with export formalities
into a single entity. In 1998, the Government issued a new Government Accord (No. 575-98), delegating the administrative management
of VUPE to AGEXPRONT, and creating the Electronic Export Authorization Service.
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Moreover, the Division implements an Integrated
Agricultural and Environmental Protection Programme
jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and
Food, to ensure that agricultural products comply with
the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations of the
importing country. At the same time it promotes the
application of agricultural and manufacturing practices
that make rational use of natural resources to safeguard
the environment. In addition, it promotes an Agricultural
Research and Development Programme to support
exporters and producers in carrying out agricultural
research with immediate applications in order to improve
the quality of agricultural exports.
Further programmes being carried out jointly with
other public and private institutions include participation
in the Council of International Transport Users of
Guatemala (CUTRIGUA) and the Commercial Attaché
Programme for Investment and Tourism (PACIT). The
aim of CUTRIGUA is to defend the interests of five
Guatemalan production sectors (manufacturing, trade,
sugar, coffee and exporters) in dealings with international
transport enterprises, advising the sectors on negotiating
better transport conditions. The aim of the PACIT
programme is to use the network of commercial attachés
to promote Guatemalan products abroad. AGEXPRONT
and other private entities, such as the Chamber of
Industry, help to select the commercial attachés from
the Guatemalan Foreign Office and to identify key
countries and cities for promoting Guatemalan exports
(Miami, Los Angeles, New York, Washington, D.C.,
Mexico, D.F., Tapachula, Germany, Canada and the
Dominican Republic). The Programme started in 1999
and the coordinator of the commercial attachés in these
foreign cities is based at AGEXPRONT and partially
financed by AGEXPRONT. Even though the Programme
is currently being carried out with support from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the intention is that
it should become consolidated and operate permanently.
An interesting aspect of AGEXPRONT is the way
in which its institutional continuance has been
guaranteed. Based on a philosophy of providing services
to export firms, where export firms define the services
they require from AGEXPRONT, the firms participating
in the various programmes undertake to pay the costs
for the services they receive. The services provided to
exporters must meet their needs, and the fact that
exporters are willing to pay for AGEXPRONT services
shows that they value them.
Sixty percent of the AGEXPRONT annual budget
of approximately US$ 5 million is contributed by export
firms, whilst 40% comes from selling services and from
international cooperation aid. In addition, AGEXPRONT
has capital from past donations that is not generally used
to fund the organization’s operating costs.
AGEXPRONT has become a well-established
institution that is acknowledged to represent the interests
of exporters, which promotes, manages and facilitates
Guatemalan exports. It has filled an institutional void in
export promotion and provides a very interesting
example of a private export promotion organization.50
AGEXPRONT has around 200 employees and has been
able to maintain a technical and apolitical stance whilst
aiding the export sector, which has earned it recognition
and support from both exporters and the Government.
To evaluate its management, AGEXPRONT uses a
“balanced scorecard” methodology for measuring
different indicators every month.
(d) Honduras
In the 1980s, Honduras had an Export Promotion
and Investment Bureau and a National Council for
Export and Investment Promotion (CONAFEXI). In
1984 it created, with support from USAID, the
Foundation for Investment and Development of Exports
(FIDE), the initial mandate of which was to take over
the task of promoting exports of manufactured goods.
This reduced the importance of the Ministry of
Economy’s Export Promotion Bureau and of
CONAFEXI. Apart from FIDE, USAID helped to create
the Honduran Foundation for Agricultural Research
(FHIA) and the Federation of Agro-industrial Producers
and Exporters (FEPROEXAAH), also known as FPX,
an entity responsible for promoting non-traditional
agricultural exports. The law on the Temporary Import
Regime (RIT) was also promulgated in the 1980s.
After two years of efforts to promote exports, the
results did not prove satisfactory, especially in the
manufacturing sector, mainly because agricultural and
industrial products were not of export quality. Another
problem was that production volumes could not keep
up with demand in international markets. FIDE regeared
its activities towards promoting export investment,
particularly to attract foreign investment with strong job-
creation potential. In the years that followed there were
no major efforts to promote exports.
FIDE promoted the promulgation of legislation on
industrial processing zones and free trade zones, and
arranged visits with entrepreneurs and Honduran public
officials to other countries in the region to examine
50 There is also an Export Promotion Bureau in the Ministry of Economy. However, due to its small budget, it plays only a limited role in
export promotion.
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infrastructure programmes and developments for
attracting investment to free trade zones. In addition,
FIDE developed a comprehensive strategy for
developing northern Honduras, taking advantage of the
proximity of Puerto Cortés and the international airport
at San Pedro Sula to expand the textile maquila
industry.51 In recent years, FIDE has resumed its
activities in the field of export promotion, filling an
institutional vacuum. It is also in response to pressure
from companies and the Government, despite the fact
that since 1993 FIDE has received no funding and has
had to draw on its capital reserves.
In addition to the Business Information Centre (CIC),
firms can be included in the Honduran Exporters Register
(REXHON), which supplies information on Honduran
exporters. Firms that join the register must pay an annual
fee to appear on the FIDE web site and in the printed
Exporters’ Directory. This entitles them to receive regular
information on trade opportunities and FIDE information
and promotional publications, in addition to benefiting
from promotion and marketing programmes. They are also
invited to participate in assistance programmes and events
or seminars. FIDE has also set up a network of Business
Information and Development Centres (CIDEs) and
operates EUROCENTRO, with European Union support,
to promote trade with firms from across the Atlantic. In
recent years, FIDE implemented the Programme to
support the Productive Sector and Small Business
(ASPPE), with support from the IDB Multilateral
Investment Fund (FOMIN). ASPPE aims to promote the
competitiveness of small and medium sized businesses,
and does not exclude activities to promote exports, such
as identifying export markets and devising international
marketing plans.52
In line with the current trend in all Central American
countries and Mexico, Honduras has also been working
on the creation of a National Competitiveness
Programme (PNC), with the support of the World Bank,
IDB and Canadian and Japanese cooperation agencies.
In 2002 it created the National Competitiveness
Commission (CNC), coordinated by the Vice-Presidency
of the Republic, of which FIDE was appointed the
Technical Secretariat.53 Given the scarcity of export
promotion activities in Honduras, and prompted by the
conviction that competitiveness must be developed in
order to promote exports, the PNC has raised high
expectations, since its aims are precisely to overcome
the main weaknesses standing in the way of Honduras’s
productive development and exports.
In addition, the Centre for Export Procedures
(CENTREX) had already been created in 1987 at the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (SIC) in order to
centralize the processing of export formalities in a single
organization, together with all the respective
authorizations (certificates of origin, phytosanitary
certificates, animal health certificates, etc.).54 CENTREX
is manned by public officials from the Customs
Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry
of Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In addition,
CENTREX provides advice on the tariff classification
of export products and on the details of preferential
access schemes. However, it does not have the financial
resources to undertake the electronic processing of
export documentation.
(e) Nicaragua
It was not until the start of the last decade that the
Export Promotion Bureau was created at the Ministry
of Economy and Development (MEDE) and new
legislation was put forward on export promotion and
free trade zones in Nicaragua. The law on export
promotion created the National Export Promotion
Commission (CNPE), a mixed public/private entity
governing the system to manage and administer the
export promotion regime. The CNPE is responsible for
administering export incentives and boosting
coordination among institutions and with the private
sector in order to develop and implement the export
promotion policy.55 In 1994, the Government created
the Centre for Export Procedures (CENTREX) and
attached it to the CNPE, redefining the responsibilities
of CNPE and confining them more clearly to
administering the Temporary Admission for Inward
Processing Regime, which was promulgated in 2001.56
In addition, when the Law on Free Trade Zones was
promulgated, it created the Free Trade Zone Corporation,
51 The average annual wage of workers in the maquila industry exceeds US$ 2,500, compared with the country’s average annual per capita
income of only around US$ 600.
52 The ASPPE programme came to an end in August this year.
53 Executive decree No. PCM-004-2002 of April 2002.
54 Decree law 180-87 of December 1987.
55 Decree law 37-91 of August 1991.
56 Decree No. 30-94 of June 1994. Unlike its counterparts in most other Central American countries, CENTREX lacks resources for
development, especially computing resources to enable it to provide services for the electronic processing of export documentation. Law
No. 386 of April 2001.
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whose mandate is to administer State-owned free trade
zones.57 It also created the National Commission for Free
Trade Zones to govern Nicaragua’s free trade zone
regime, to which interested companies must apply to
join the regime. The Law on the Promotion of Foreign
Investment was also promulgated, giving foreign
investors the same legal rights and means for exercising
those rights as Nicaraguan investors. Foreign investors
are also free to the buy and sell foreign currency under
the same conditions as Nicaraguan investors, and need
only register their investment with the Ministry of
Development, Trade and Industry (MIFIC).58
In 1992, MEDE and the Superior Council for Private
Enterprise (COSEP) created the Export and Investment
Centre (CEI), which was intended to become the
country’s key agency for promoting exports and
investment. The general objective of the CEI was to help
to increase investment and joint investment, as well as
to broaden, diversify and consolidate the export base
and export markets by providing services such as market
intelligence, market surveys, answering enquiries,
assisting with export management, formalities and
logistics, networking producers with potential buyers and
holding training seminars. In 1996, the CEI acquired
corporate status when it became a private non-profit
organization.59 In 2000, the project was extended with
financing from the same international organizations that
financed it previously. This was an exit strategy by those
organizations to guarantee the operation of a so-called
basic CEI while the Government gradually took over
financing the CEI, with supplementary private-sector
revenue from donations and selling CEI services.60
Although the Government still supports the CEI
politically, it was unable to meet its commitment of co-
financing the institution. Furthermore, it was not possible
to obtain the amount of private sector funding required
to guarantee institutional continuity.
CEI never had much impact on the implementation
of export promotion policies, due to its scant resources.
At present the Centre is facing an uncertain future. First,
the project for financial aid from international
organizations ended in March 2003, meaning that the
CEI no longer has international cooperation funding.
Second, the Government is assessing whether the CEI
should continue to promote Nicaraguan exports and
investment, or whether another project should be
instituted involving the creation of a new organization.
Responsibility for investment promotion has been
transferred from CEI to the ProNicaragua organization,
which heads the investment promotion programme
administered by the Presidency of the Republic.
Furthermore, an entire export promotion component is
being envisaged within the IDB Project on Strengthening
Foreign Trade Management, which is being implemented
in Nicaragua. The conceptual and operational framework
for Nicaragua’s future export promotion activities is in
the process of being defined.
Incentive schemes for export promotion
(a) Costa Rica
Costa Rica’s export promotion policy started with
the promulgation of the Export Promotion Law in 1972,
which also created the temporary import regime,
authorizing the introduction of certain goods into the
country for a period of no more than 12 months, to allow
them to be incorporated into export goods produced,
manufactured, or assembled in Costa Rica.61 The law
was reformed in 1976, and in 1981 the Law on Export
Processing Zones and Industrial Parks was
promulgated.62 In 1990, the Law was repealed and
replaced by the Law on the Free Trade Zone Regime of
Costa Rica.63 The new Law enables a private firm to
develop and operate industrial parks under the free trade
zone regime in any part of the country, to enable
processing companies and export services to be set up
in industrial parks, including international marketing
outside the Central American market. Under certain
circumstances, the new legislation also allows firms
outside an industrial park to join the free trade zone
regime.
57 The Corporation administers only the Las Mercedes Free Trade Zone, close to the international airport, Nicaragua’s largest free trade
zone.
58 Law No. 344 of March 2002.
59 Initially CEI received technical and financial aid in part from USAID, and later mainly from donations from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). It also earned revenues from selling services.
60 At present CEI has a staff of 15, of whom nine are professionals and five are support staff. The budget assigned to CEI was rather
small –US$ 2.3 million for the three years of the project, with international organizations contributing around 50% and the Government
and private sector the remainder.
61 Law No. 5,162 of December 1972. In the case of machinery, the maximum permitted period is 10 years.
62 Laws No. 5,909 of June 1976 and No. 6,695 of December 1981.
63 Law No. 7,210 of December 1990.
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The Law on the Free Trade Zone Regime has been
amended several times in recent years. A major
amendment was made in 1998 wherein, if a firm reinvests
25% of its original investment within its first four years
of operation, it receives an income tax exemption of 75%
after the eighth year of enjoying the benefits. As from
the twelfth year of operation it will receive a 50% income
tax exemption for four years.64 Another major
amendment was made regarding the minimum amount
of investment for firms established under the regime of
free trade zones outside industrial parks. For such firms,
the minimum amount of investment was increased from
US$ 150,000 to US$ 2 million.65 Another amendment
was to abolish income tax exemptions for new companies
developing industrial parks.66
The promulgation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) in early 1984 and the urgent need to create export
promotion mechanisms led to the introduction of new
export incentives as part of the Law on the Financial
Balance of the Public Sector.67 This new legislation
created the Export Contract, a mechanism designed to
guarantee tax incentives to firms in exchange for export
commitments. The Export Contract also guaranteed that
these incentives would not be altered by any future
legislation that might change the rules of the game agreed
under this legislation.68 In addition, the new legislation
created the Temporary Admission Regime, which
allowed goods destined for export to enter the domestic
customs territory, entirely duty free, after being subjected
to processes of repair, reconstruction, mounting,
assembly, incorporation into more technologically and
functionally complex assemblies, or for use in equipment
for transport or other purposes, including samples,
models, patterns and similar articles for demonstrative
research purposes or for exhibition at trade fairs,
equipment and spare parts for production, and so on.69
The incentives included in the Export Contract and
temporary admission regimes have been changed
repeatedly in recent years, basically in response to
growing criticism of the fiscal cost of such incentives to
the State, especially the income tax and tax credit
certificate incentives.70
The income tax exemption for firms under the
Export Contract regime was abolished in 1992.
However, it was abolished for new export contracts
only, allowing firms with a contract predating the
promulgation of the new law to remain exempt, in
compliance with the commitment made in the Export
Contract.71 In 1999, all the legislation on the Export
Contract and the associated incentives to firms
expired, meaning that firms that had come under the
Export Contract would no longer benefit from any
sort of fiscal incentives. However, firms were
permitted to opt into the Inward Processing Regime
or the Duty Drawback Regime, created by the General
Customs Law.72 These two regimes basically grant the
same incentives as the Temporary Admission Regime
described above, with the exception of income tax
exemptions.
However, once the Export Contract expired, firms
started to join the regime of free trade zones outside an
industrial park, since the application requirements
specified only an investment of US$ 150,000 and there
was nothing in the law to stop a firm applying to join
the free trade zone regime after benefiting from Export
Contract incentives. This meant that many firms did in
fact join the free trade zone regime after enjoying the
benefits of the Export Contract. The trend for firms to
change regimes diminished when the requirements for
investment outside industrial parks were modified in
1998, raising the minimum investment to US$ 2 million,
as mentioned above.73
64 Law No. 7,830 of October 1998.
65 This amendment was made to remedy the fact that firms that previously came under the export contract regime were opting to apply for
the free trade zone regime when the export contract expired, which extended the period during which they enjoyed income tax exemption.
66 Law on Exemptions 7,293 of April 1992.
67 Chapter III of Law No. 6,995 of February 1984.
68 Despite the fact that the original aim was to grant the incentives on the basis of firms’ export commitments, in practice they were granted
unconditionally, based on export volumes.
69 Under the regime, raw materials are permitted to remain in Costa Rica for six months, extendible to one year, while machinery and
equipment are allowed to remain longer.
70 Income Tax Law No. 7,092 of April 1988 and Law on Exemptions No. 7,293 of March 1992.
71 Law on Exemptions No. 7,293 of March 1992.
72 Law No. 7,557 of November 1995.
73 Currently the Government is under pressure from firms in free trade zones to maintain the incentive of income tax exemption at least until
2007, when it is due to be dismantled in accordance with existing international agreements. Since this is not legally permitted, firms tend
to change their registered name and invest the minimum required but since they are still the same firms, they continue to benefit from the
incentive.
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(b) El Salvador
The first law to deal specifically with export
promotion in El Salvador was the Export Promotion Law
of 1970.74 The Law provided for a series of fiscal
incentives (import tax and income tax exemptions) to
be granted to production and marketing firms exporting
non-traditional products outside Central America.75 A
second Export Promotion Law was promulgated in
1974.76 An Export Recovery Law was promulgated in
1996, completely repealing the 1986 legislation. It
underwent a number of amendments over the decade,
the latest of which was in 1997.77
In addition to the Export Recovery Law, El Salvador’s
first law on free trade zones was promulgated in 1990.78
It aimed to create the possibility for domestic and foreign
firms producing export-related goods and services to set
up in industrial parks under an exception regime. In
addition, it aimed to allow such firms setting up in bonded
areas outside an industrial park to obtain the same
benefits.79 A new law on free trade zones was promulgated
in 1998, called the Law on Industrial and Marketing Free
Trade Zones, to update the existing legislation.80
(c) Guatemala
Two export incentive regimes are in force in Guatemala,
both created in 1989. They are the Law on Free Trade Zones
and the Export Promotion and Maquila Law, which created
four different regimes for the export of non-traditional
products: (i) temporary admission; (ii) duty drawback;
(iii) duty-free inventory restocking, and (iv) export.81
The temporary admission regime “... allows the
admission onto the domestic customs territory, free from
customs duties, import taxes and value-added tax (VAT),
of goods destined for export or re-export within one year
of being processed or assembled.”82 Firms that come
under the Temporary Admission Regime are categorized
as either maquiladoras or export companies.
Maquiladoras are firms whose production contains at
least 51% of foreign goods destined for re-export outside
Central America. Export companies are firms whose
production contains less than 51% of foreign goods
destined for export outside Central America.
The duty drawback regime “...once export or re-
export has taken place, allows the reimbursement of
customs duties, import taxes and value-added tax (VAT)
paid as a deposit on imported goods, products contained
in them or products consumed while processing them,”
with no restriction on the value-added generated.83
The duty-free inventory restocking regime “...
allows imports to be made, free from customs duties
and import taxes, for a value equivalent to the customs
duties and import taxes paid by indirect exporters. This
duty exemption is used to restock raw materials, semi-
finished goods, intermediate goods, materials,
containers, packaging and labels associated directly with
their production process.”84 This regime is designed to
promote the incorporation of domestic goods into
products that export firms export outright.
The total added component export regime applies
to “...firms that use only national or nationalized goods
in the process of manufacturing or assembling export
products.”85
The Law on Free Trade Zones provides incentives
for firms established on physically circumscribed areas,
overseen by the customs authority, which produce or
market goods or provide services related to international
trade.86 The Law’s incentives also apply to public or
private enterprises that invest, organize, develop or
administer free trade zones.87
74 Legislative Decree 148 of December 1970.
75 For a detailed description of the legislation on export incentives up to 1990, see Arriagada (1992).
76 Legislative Decree 81 of September 1974.
77 Legislative Decree 460 of March 1990.
78 Law on the Regime of Free Trade Zones and Bonded Areas, Legislative Decree 461 of March 1990.
79 The bonded areas mentioned in the law are areas of the national territory subject to special customs treatment, consisting of waivers of
taxes and duties on imported goods to be re-exported after undergoing processing, manufacture or repair, but which receive the same tax
incentives as firms under the free trade zone regime.
80 Legislative Decree 405 of September 1998. In addition, the law provides for Inward Processing Warehouses, formerly called bonded
warehouses, which were created for firms which, for technical reasons, are unable to set up in a free trade zone. Inward processing
warehouses enjoy the same benefits as free trade zones.
81 Legislative decrees 65-89 of November 1989 and 29-89 of June 1989, Diario de Centroamérica, Guatemala, 19 June 1989.
82 Article 5 of Legislative Decree 29-89.
83 Article 5 of Legislative Decree 29-89.
84 Article 5 of Legislative Decree 29-89.
85 Article 5 of Legislative Decree 29-89.
86 Firms are authorized to sell a maximum of 20% of their production on the national territory, with such sales being considered as imports onto
the national territory subject to the full range of import taxes in force in Guatemala, as if they were imports from outside Central America.
87 Enterprises that administer free trade zones are those that apply for admission to the free trade zone regime for firms wishing to set up in
the free trade zone.
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(d) Honduras
Honduras made its first move to promote exports in
1976, when it promulgated the Law establishing the
Puerto Cortés Free Trade Zone (ZOLI).88 This legislation
was designed to create jobs in a depressed area of the
country, although its objectives also included exports.
In the years that followed, the tax incentives granted to
ZOLI were gradually extended to other areas of the
country, where individual firms could opt to join the
regime. In 1998, with the promulgation of the Law on
Promoting Production and Competitiveness and
Supporting Human Development, the ZOLI law was
extended to cover free trade zones nationwide, allowing
firms to set up anywhere in Honduras that was outside
an industrial park.89
In 1984, the Temporary Import Regime (RIT) was
promulgated to create an additional mechanism for
attracting investment, fostering employment and
boosting exports to markets outside Central America.90
RIT was amended in 1986, improving its implementation
and abolishing export taxes.91 It was further amended
in 1994, abolishing income tax exemptions, and also in
1996, allowing firms to sell goods imported duty-free
into the country subject to only a 1% tax on the CIF
value of the imports.92 The latest amendment was in
1997, to allow firms to sell to the Central American
market.93
Firms that export 100% of their production are
entitled to import, free of any import tax or surcharge,
raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods
directly related to the productive process, under the
following regimes: subcontracting (where firms
subcontract to other firms); complementation (where
firms supply inputs to export firms); and transfer (where
firms sell inputs or intermediate goods or end products
to other firms under the same regime).
In 1987, the Law establishing Industrial Export
Processing Zones (ZIP) was promulgated to foster the
development of industrial parks and wholly exporting
firms that set up business in industrial parks under a
specific regime for changing production patterns, in
exchange for various tax incentives.94 The Export
Promotion Law was also promulgated in 1987, creating
the Export Promotion Certificate (CEFEX) for exports
of non-traditional products to markets outside Central
America.95 The Certificate was granted for up to a
maximum of 15% on the FOB value of exports, in line
with the value-added to the country, under a classification
system defined by the Export Promotion Commission
(COFEX). COFEX was created by the same law, with
members drawn from both the public and private sectors.
In addition, the Export Promotion Law laid down export
duty exemptions. The Law was repealed a few years after
it was promulgated.96 Following the 1998 amendment
to the Law establishing the Puerto Cortés Free Trade
Zone, granting income tax exemptions for an indefinite
period, the other export promotion regimes have declined
in importance.
(e) Nicaragua
In 1990, Nicaragua resumed its export promotion
policy, albeit within a context of focusing priorities on
bringing peace to the country and reducing the high
inflation rate. Indeed, whereas total exports from
Nicaragua peaked in 1978 at US$ 646 million, they
declined substantially until 1992, when they totalled only
US$ 223.1 million, rising again after 1993.97 Nicaragua’s
export promotion policy began with the promulgation
of the Export Promotion Law and the Law on Industrial
Free Zones for Export, both in the second half of 1991.98
The aim of the Export Promotion Law is to promote
exports of traditional and non-traditional products to
markets outside Central America, granting exemptions
from import taxes and duties, in line with the percentage
of production destined for markets outside Central
America.99
88 Legislative Decree 356 of June 1976.
89 Legislative Decree 131-98 of April 1998.
90 Legislative Decree 37 of December 1984.
91 Legislative Decree 190-86 of October 1986.
92 Legislative decrees 135-94 and 175-96.
93 Legislative Decree 39-97.
94 Legislative Decree 37-87 of April 1987.
95 Legislative Decree 61-87 of 1987. Non-traditional exports include all exports of goods other than bananas, coffee, meat, cotton, sugar,
tobacco and wood, which are considered to be traditional export products.
96 The Export Promotion Law was repealed by Decree 18-90 in 1990.
97 Both Guatemala and El Salvador benefited from the Caribbean Basin Initiative as soon as it was promulgated in 1984, whereas Nicaragua
did not benefit from the Initiative in the 1980s and, moreover, suffered a trade and economic embargo by the United States.
98 Decree laws 37-91 of August 1991 and 46-91 of November 1991. This Law repealed that of 1976.
99 Export taxes were abolished prior to the promulgation of this Law.
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In addition, a partial income tax exemption was
introduced for a period of six years for non-traditional
exports, amounting to 80% in 1992 and 1993, and
dropping an annual five percentage points each
subsequent year to 60% in 1997. Furthermore, the law
provided for a Tax Incentive Certificate (CBT) to be
granted, equivalent to 15% of the FOB value of exports
until 1994, dropping to 10% in 1995 and 1996, and
finally to 5% in 1997, when all these incentives expired.
The aim of the Law on Industrial Processing Free
Zones is to promote domestic and foreign investment
and export of goods and services under a separate tax
and customs regime, within a physically circumscribed
zone established anywhere in the country. The Law
allows for industrial zones to be developed and
administered by private or State-run companies.
When the Export Promotion Law expired in
1997, Nicaraguan companies not under the free
trade zone regime were at a disadvantage compared
with export firms in neighbouring countries, even
though import tax exemptions and exemptions from
the general sales tax (IGV) were still in force. It
was not until 2001 that a new export promotion law
was promulgated, entitled Law on Temporary
Admission for Inward Processing and Export
Facilitation. The objective of the new Law is to
permit the entry of goods onto the domestic customs
territory and their purchase locally, either totally
exempt from taxes or duties or by subsequently
refunding the taxes or duties, where such goods
undergo processing, manufacture, repair or other
procedures.100
3. Caribbean countries101
Institutional framework for promoting exports
In the Caribbean economies, the State plays a
leading role in defining export promotion and
development policies. The expenditure of Caribbean
governments is almost double that of other small
economies, reaching around 30% of GDP. The public
sector is also the largest employer, generating nearly 30%
of total jobs. The governments also define economic
policy, since the monetary authorities are under their
jurisdiction. In other words, the governments are the
main actors and architects of export promotion and
development policies, owing to the historical evolution
of the CARICOM economies and the underdeveloped
state of legislation, export promotion and development
institutions and the Caribbean private sector. The
liberalization movement and ideology of the last decade
has not substantially affected the importance of
government activities in the Caribbean economies,
principally in the service sector. In this sense, the
institutional structure of the CARICOM economies
differs distinctly from those of Latin America.
However, the importance of the government in the
economic life of Caribbean countries contrasts with the
underdevelopment of existing regulations and
institutions. The lack of competition laws, which enhance
the transparency of government procurement, has
weakened the response capacity and initiative of private
agents. Also, as already stated, the small size of
Caribbean economies is a constraint on the expansion
and diversification of private sector activities.
Incentive schemes for export promotion
To a large extent Caribbean export promotion policies
have been shaped by the specific features of small
economies. Export promotion objectives focus first on
guaranteeing access for goods and services exported to
Caribbean markets and outside CARICOM, and secondly
on promoting export activities capable of attracting direct
foreign investment and foreign exchange earnings. Export
promotion instruments are steered by governments and
include fiscal incentives, public investment, regulations,
financial assistance and trade diplomacy. However, at the
intraregional level, the principal promotion instrument is
the Common External Tariff (CET). The CARICOM
economies are still endeavouring to capture new niche
markets, and have lost market share in the United States
and Europe, in spite of preferential access conditions. By
contrast, the intraregional market has expanded
significantly, under a protection regime that includes
tariffs, non-tariff barriers and rules of origin.
Fiscal incentives are mostly intended to develop
non-traditional exports, including manufacturing and
100 Law No. 382 of February 2001.
101 This section is based on Perez, 2003.
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services sector exports. The principal legislation dates
back to the Fiscal Incentives Act and the Hotel Aids or
Ordinance Act of 1970. A range of tariff and duty
exemptions are also granted under the Conditional Duty
Exemptions of the Common External Tariff, while others
are extended by governments on a case by case basis. In
some cases (such as that of Dominica and Saint Kitts
and Nevis), these exemptions are complemented with
the extension of residential rights to attract direct foreign
investment.
Countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS)
In the case of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, fiscal legislation grants tax exemptions
according to definite criteria, including local content and
the export orientation of production. Fiscal incentives
also allow the duty-free importation of machinery, spare
parts and raw and packaging materials.
Dominica has also approved the Aid to Development
Enterprises Act, which grants customs duty exemptions
for raw materials and inputs, materials, tools, plant,
machinery and building materials which are used in the
production of manufactures; the construction, erection
and alteration of factories; fitting out hotels and product
packaging, amongst other production and manufacturing
activities. The Hotels Aid Act and Income Tax Act No. 37
of 1982 gave approved hotel and resort developments a
tax holiday of up to 20 years. Companies that are
registered under the International Business Companies
Act are exempt from the payment of taxes, duties and
fiscal charges for a period of 20 years from their date of
incorporation (WTO, 2001a). In general, approved
projects are granted tax exemptions at source on
dividends, interest payments and other relevant types of
external payments in Antigua and Barbuda and
Dominica.102 For Grenada, the Hotels Aid Act grants a
10-year exemption from profit tax to hotels, apartments
and guest houses. It also provides exemptions from
customs duties on articles of hotel equipment, service
vehicles, materials for construction and repair,
renovation and extensions to hotel properties.
Between 1996 and 2000, firms in the tourism sector
accounted for 53% of all firms receiving fiscal incentives,
followed by the manufacturing sector with 45% (see
table III.1).
Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines have broadened tax concessions still further.
Grenada has provided tax relief on the export profits
made on external sales of approved manufactured
products. The authorities also permit firms that do not
qualify for the benefits of the Fiscal Incentives Act, and
whose production has a local value of at least 40%, to
obtain import duty concessions as provided in the List
of Conditional Duty Exemptions of the CARICOM
Common External Tariff. Saint Lucia has developed a
similar set of provisions. In 1999-2000 the Saint Lucian
authorities announced further stimulus by exempting
manufacturers from the payment of customs service
charges and the introduction in the next fiscal year of a
consumption tax rebate. Lastly, in Saint Lucia, primary
producing agricultural enterprises are exempt from
income tax.
(a) Guyana
As in the case of the Member States of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS),
Guyana uses a broad range of fiscal incentives to develop
its export potential. Fiscal incentives in Guyana are
focused on investment and capital, which is an indirect
way of promoting exports. The incentives can be general,
special or targeted at selected sectors of the economy.
The general incentives include exemption from customs
duty and consumption tax on equipment, machinery and
raw materials. They also include the unlimited carry over
of losses from previous years and accelerated
depreciation of plants and equipment, as well as full and
unrestricted repatriation of capital.
The special incentives are export subsidies, and
consist of exempting from tax a percentage of profits
from the export of non-traditional products outside
CARICOM. This percentage is liked to export
performance, as shown in table III.2.
In addition, Guyanese legislation provides
incentives to the productive sectors. The agricultural
sector benefits from exemptions from  customs duty and
102 In Dominica, the Hotels Aid Act was promulgated in 1984. In Saint Lucia, the Tourism Incentives Act was promulgated in 1996.
Table III.1
DOMINICA: DISTRIBUTION OF FISCAL INCENTIVES
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1996-2000




Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review -
Dominica - Report by the Secretariat” (WT/TPR/S/85/DMA),
Geneva, 7 May 2001.
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consumption tax on equipment, packaging material for
fruit and vegetable exports, importation of agro-
chemicals and agro-processing equipment. Tax rebates
are also granted for non-traditional exports and the
improvement of land for agricultural purposes.
The manufacturing sector receives exemptions from
customs duty and consumption tax, for packaging
equipment and materials, vehicles imported for use in
manufacturing, and plant equipment and raw materials.
Manufacturers can also discount capital expenditure
from tax. The forestry sector receives similar incentives
to those extended to the manufacturing sector, and
exemptions from customs duty and consumption tax on
milling equipment, logging, land development
equipment and woodworking equipment, and outboard
engines.
The mining sector is provided with exemptions from
customs duties and consumption tax on all equipment,
processing material and spare parts used in mining,
outboard engines, and the importation of vehicles for
the production process. It also benefits from a
preferential consumption tax of 10% on aviation fuel.
According to legislation, tax incentives will be
maintained for a period of 15 years. In addition, royalties
paid on bauxite are lower than the rates for precious
metals and minerals. Special additional concessions are
extended to medium- and small-scale mining (lower
royalties, lower rates for income taxes and exemptions
from customs duty and consumption tax for vehicles
and machinery). Petroleum exports enjoy similar fiscal
incentives.
The tourism sector enjoys customs duty exemptions
and consumption tax concessions for basic furnishings,
plant equipment and building materials. These
concessions are granted once every five years and are
limited to 50% of the value of the investment.
The fisheries sector receives the general incentives
and is exempted from customs duty and consumption
Table III.2
SPECIAL INCENTIVES FOR FIRMS EXPORTING
NON-TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS, 2003
Export sales as a Percentage of profits








Source: Guyana Office for Investment, Go-Invest [on line], Georgetown
(http://www.goinvest.gov.gy/), 2003.
tax on trawlers and fishing vessels, equipment, freezers
and other refrigeration equipment. The housing sector
also benefits from the general incentives and tax
concessions on the construction of new houses. It is
exempt from customs duty and consumption tax on
selected building materials.
The information and communications technology
sector benefits from the general incentives, a tax holiday
of 10 years, and an exemption from the consumption
tax and customs duty on building materials for
construction. It also receives assistance to secure grants
to train personnel in information technology. Finally,
the textile sector is also entitled to the package of general
incentives plus a tax holiday for up to five years,
exemption from  customs duty and consumption tax on
raw materials for the manufacture of garments and
textiles, training assistance where necessary and an
exemption from consumption tax in the sale of selected
products manufactured in Guyana (including curtains,
towels, table cloths and rugs).
(b) Barbados
A third example of broad application of fiscal
incentives is Barbados. The Government of Barbados
offers fiscal incentives to the manufacturing and services
sectors. Manufacturing firms which produce an
“approved product” or belong to the category of
“approved firms” can receive special incentives that are
detailed in the 1974 Fiscal Incentives Act.
Tax holidays are given to firms according to the
percentage of local value-added in their manufactured
product. When the local value exceeds 50%, approved
firms receive a tax holiday equivalent to 15 years. When
the local value-added represents between 25% and 50%
of the total, the tax holiday is 13 years. When it accounts
for between 10% and 25%, the holiday is 11 years. After
the expiration of the tax holiday, firms can receive tax
rebates contingent upon their export potential. Firms can
also carry forward their losses. Highly capital intensive
firms with an investment of at least US$ 25 million enjoy
a 10-year tax holiday. Lastly, manufacturing firms
exporting outside the CARICOM region enjoy the same
benefits as an International Business Company (see
table III.3).
The financial services sector is coordinated by
the Central Bank. A number of incentives are in place
for international business, including lower corporate
tax rates and tax exemptions. In addition, the
legislation states that 35% of the remuneration of
qualified personnel of international business
institutions can be paid free of income tax and in any
foreign currency.
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The fiscal and tax incentives in the case of tourism
were originally extended through the Hotel Aids Act of
1967, which was replaced by the Tourism Development
Act of 2002. The underlying principle of the tourism
act is that firms in the tourism sector must be supported
throughout their life cycle and not only at the start stage.
The most important features of the Tourism Development
Act are as follows: (i) a hotel is defined as any building
containing not less than 10 bedrooms, which is valued
at US$ 87,000; (ii) hotels are allowed a 150% write-off
against income tax on interest payments associated with
the refurbishment of an existing establishment, the
construction a new hotel with conference facilities
having at least 250 rooms, and the consolidation of hotels
coming under group administration; (iii) hotel owners
are given 15 years to write off capital expenditures
against income accruing to the business for hotel
properties worth more than US$ 1 million. An additional
year is allowed up to a maximum of 20 years for every
US$ 10 million above US$ 100 million; (iv) tax-free
payments of dividends to the owners of a tourism
product; (v) 150% tax write-off on expenditure on
tourism research, enhancing tourism capacity,
organization of trade fairs, development of linkages with
other sectors, development of community tourism
programmes and development of computer software to
measure the performance of the tourism industry. Similar
tax concessions are available to restaurants, villas,
attractions, sports and recreational facilities.103
Public investment
In all CARICOM countries, export promotion
efforts and instruments are complemented by public
expenditure in the guise of the public sector investment
programme. The public investment programme is an
outline of the major projects the Government plans to
undertake over the medium term. It is geared to building
the required infrastructure for exports, including
buildings, airport facilities and transport and other
communications. It also seeks to reduce transport costs.
An example of the latter is provided by the Shipping
Incentives Act of Barbados and its amendments, which
grants and extends concessions to shipping companies
and vessels (Barbados, 2002).
Public sector investment programmes are financed
mostly from official foreign aid and loans. In some cases
they fill the gap left by a private sector that is too small
and finds it unprofitable to undertake major
infrastructure projects. An illustrative example is that of
Table III.3
BARBADOS: TAX INCENTIVES IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, 2002
Tax-exempt International Offshore Societies
insurance business banks with restricted
companies company liabilities
Tax rate 0 2.5%-1% 2.5%-1% 2.5%-1%
Withholding tax
Dividends No No No No
Interest No No No No
Royalties Yes No No No
License required Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exemption from exchange controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exemption from import duties No Yes Yes Yes
Requirement to file financial statements
with regulatory agency Yes Yes Yes No
Financial statements open to public scrutiny No No No No
Exemptions from taxes and duties on sale
of securities and assets Yes Yes Yes No
Source: Esteban Pérez, Export Promotion Policies in CARICOM Caribbean Economies (LC/CAR/G.757), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), November, 2003.
Note: The corporation income tax is 40%.
The personal income tax ranges from 10% to 40%.
The withholding tax ranges from 12.5% to 40%.
The value-added tax is 15%.
The hotel accommodation tax is 7.5%.
103 Jamaica is another example, since its manufacturing exports (textile and apparel) have benefited from a number of incentives. The Export
Industry Encouragement Act grants income tax exemptions and tariff concessions for ten years. The Modernization of Industry act grants
relief to manufacturing companies from the General Consumption Tax on capital goods and equipment.
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Antigua and Barbuda. The country’s Medium Term
Economic Strategy (2000-2004) states that the
Government has always played a critical role in the
development of the tourism industry, in particular by
facilitation of foreign investment, marketing and
infrastructure development. The Government’s role in
the development of the industry includes the construction
of hotel rooms to ensure international air service from
the larger air carriers; the expansion and maintenance
of the country’s one international airport; and the
provision of all infrastructure services necessary to support
the industry. Given the small size of the economy it is
expected that this role will continue in the medium to long
term.
Table III.4 shows the distribution of public sector
investment programmes by economic sector and subsector
in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the period 2002-
2004. More than half of the total is earmarked for
economic infrastructure, chiefly energy and transport and
communications, while about a third is for social services.
Table III.4
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES, 2002-2004
(In percentages)
Sector 2002 2003 2004
Economic infrastructure 51.53 58.97 53.05
Agriculture 14.31 13.29 16.64
Energy 35.29 42.64 18.73
Transport and communications 32.28 32.77 49.32
Tourism 1.94 1.70 3.80
Other economic sectors 16.19 9.59 11.51
Social services 33.10 25.52 26.00
Education 43.71 35.01 35.09
Health 11.00 11.70 18.87
Commercial services 45.29 53.29 46.05
Public administration 9.74 9.44 7.61
Source: Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Medium Term Economic Strategy 2002-2004.
However, government spending can be a weak
instrument due mainly to implementation and
monitoring problems. The rate of implementation of
public sector investment programmes is around 25% in
many of the Caribbean countries under study. In addition,
public expenditures are often used as an adjustment
leverage to keep expenditure under control and guarantee
compliance with targeted macroeconomic criteria,
thereby depriving public sector investment programmes
of their developmental role (Jamaica, Ministry of
Finance and Planning, 2003).
Export financing schemes
As is the case with most export promotion
instruments, financing schemes are government-led.
Examples are provided in the cases of Barbados and
Jamaica. In the former case, the Central Bank of
Barbados administers programmes for export financing,
insurance and export guarantee. It also provides
insurance against payment default by foreign importers
and against commercial and political risks.
The manufacturing sector also benefits from the
assistance provided by the Barbados Investment and
Development Corporation, which facilitates non-sugar
exports. These include rum, electronic components,
building materials, food products, insecticides, plastic
bags and plastic bottles, paper products, cement, paints,
pharmaceuticals, boat sails, intra-ocular lenses,
handicraft, metal cans, agricultural produce, cut flowers,
and baby chicks. The major export markets are
CARICOM, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the European Union.
Besides providing export facilitation services, which
include export market research, market identification, and
marketing support, the Barbados Investment and
Development Corporation offers an Export Grant Incentives
Scheme. The scheme is directed at firms, which have the
potential to export and have an export development or
marketing plan. It is a reimbursable grant scheme and
supports a variety of export activities at different stages of
their development, ranging from marketing studies to sales
missions. The scheme offers two refund categories. The
first one provides export assistance equivalent to 50% of
the direct costs of each approved export promotion activity.
The second is addressed to exporters involved in
Corporation-sponsored projects for exporting to non-
CARICOM countries, first time exporters and small
businesses. It provides grants of up to a maximum of 75%
of the direct costs of each corresponding approved activity.
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Table III.5
BARBADOS: NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES OF THE EXPORT GRANT INCENTIVES SCHEME
AND AVERAGE VALUE OF GRANTS RECEIVED, 1998-2003
Year Number of companies benefiting from the Estimated value of grants received per company
export grant incentives scheme per year in US dollars
1998 37 3 330
1999 30 3 832
2000 29 3 385
2001 32 3 466
2002 39 3 382
2003 9 5 471
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data provided by the Barbados Investment and
Development Corporation (BDIC).
Table III.6
NATIONAL EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF JAMAICA: PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVITIES
RELATED TO EXPORT PROMOTION, 2003
Title of the programme Description of the programme
Export credit insurance Covers foreign receivables against the risk of non-payment by foreign buyers.
Foreign currency lines of credit for Covers imports of raw materials, equipment, capital goods, spare parts by firms involved
short term trade credit in manufacturing, distribution, agriculture or service provision.
Cuban line of credit Aimed at facilitating the entry of Jamaican products into Cuba.
Export factoring programme Assists in the development and diversification of non-traditional exports.
Export credit facility Provides working capital support in domestic currency to exporters of non-traditional
products.
Loans are granted for a maximum of 120 days on a revolving basis.
Bankers’ export credit facility Provides shipment finance in domestic currency to exporters of non-traditional
goods.
Loans are granted for a maximum of 120 days, on a revolving basis.
Pre-shipment facility Includes prepaid shipment financing in domestic currency to exporters of non-
traditional products.
Loans are granted for a maximum of 90 working days to purchase local raw material
for export.
Export loan Provides loans of up to two million Jamaican dollars on a short or medium term
basis and on concessionary terms of financing.
CoPack Facility [loan scheme targeted The facility has a capital of 20 million Jamaican dollars, operates on a revolving basis
at agro-processors] and consists of working capital loans that allow access to one short-term low cost
pre-shipment financing.
Ornamental fish farming Grants funding to farmers (existing and new entrants) in the export trade of
loan programme ornamental fish and to farmers providing vital linkages to exporters.
Modernization fund for exports Provides loans of up to 25 million Jamaican dollars to exporting firms or foreign
exchange earners.
Small business facility Provides working capital finance at a preferred rate of interest small and medium
sized businesses (less than 50 employees), with total net assets not exceeding five million
Jamaican dollars and total sales for the previous financial year not exceeding 25
million Jamaican dollars.
Source: Official data from the Ministry of Commerce, Science and Technology, Kingston.
The Barbados Investment and Development
Corporation operates with 290 companies. Only 23% of
the total have shown a real export potential. The export
assistance provided by the Corporation is far from being
significant enough to shape and facilitate the export
success of the member companies (see table III.5).
The National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica is a
Government development bank providing loans at an
average of 12% or six percentage points below the
market rate and many other schemes to finance exports
and other programmes (see table III.6). The Export
Credit Facility, Apparel Sector Financing, and loan
facilities granted through the Jamaica Manufacturers’
Association and the Jamaica Exporters’ Association
provide additional channels to finance the development
of manufacturing exports.
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D. Final considerations
An assessment of the institutional framework for
promoting exports in Mexico, the countries of Central
America and CARICOM and an analysis of the domestic
and external constraints on export promotion show that
export promotion activities play an important role but
are not in themselves enough to increase exports. The
small economies of the Caribbean have lost market share
outside CARICOM. In the absence of a suitable
macroeconomic environment, certain aspects of systemic
competitiveness are essential, such as physical and
technological infrastructure, financial intermediation,
human resources development, trade facilitation and
non-price aspects of competitiveness (rules, international
standards, quality). Furthermore, the recent
diversification of Mexican, Central American and
Caribbean exports has been determined more by the
decisions of foreign firms and preferential access to the
United States market than by traditional export
promotion and development instruments. This means
that export promotion activities must be seen as part of
the institutional structure of business services, whose
existence facilitates, but does not determine, the decision
of firms to export.
The institutional framework for export promotion
was designed to steer production from the domestic
market back to exports. However, as mentioned above,
since their economies were opened up, exports from
Mexico, Central America and some Caribbean countries
have come not from a pre-existing supply of export
products, but from a new supply generated by foreign
investment and preferences in the target markets. In turn,
this new specialization, which is based on international
production-sharing arrangements, has been criticized as
having too few linkages with the rest of the economy
and no sunk costs. This situation gives firms a great deal
of mobility, while giving the host countries little
bargaining power in relation to these firms (Kuwayama
and Durán, 2003).
Although some institutions have impact assessment
systems, the effectiveness of export promotion activities
is very hard to gauge. Export performance hinges on
the national and international economic environment;
as a result, export development policies, however well
designed and appropriate, may not lead to an increase
in external sales. In times of global economic slowdown,
indicators such as export growth or growth in the number
of export firms may decline even though sound export
promotion policies are in place. Similarly, in boom
periods, exports and the number of export firms may
increase without export promotion being the trigger.
Analysis of the institutional framework for promoting
exports
The export promotion activities implemented by the
different institutions have changed significantly,
progressing from such activities as business information,
arranging participation in trade fairs and missions and
basic export training courses, to a broader export
promotion concept that includes preparing firms and
their products to compete in both local and international
markets, identifying and taking steps to overcome the
competitive weaknesses of firms and products, especially
in small and medium-sized enterprises, which are
starting to receive special attention in all countries.
However, export promotion institutions have
adopted such activities in the absence of horizontal
policies or even sectoral policies for promoting export
production and competitiveness throughout the different
chains of production. It was not until very recently that
programmes started to be implemented to enhance
competitiveness generally, regardless of the export target
market (because so few domestic firms were involved
in exports, especially small and medium-sized
enterprises), and so derive more benefits for national
economies. In some cases, competitiveness programmes
come under the ministry of economic affairs (El
Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua); in other cases they come
under existing export promotion organizations
(Honduras); while others (Costa Rica and Guatemala)
have no formal competitiveness programmes, even
though export promotion and other institutions do
implement various activities for enhancing
competitiveness (AGEXPRONT and PROCOMER).
As a result of economic liberalization,
competitiveness has become important for production
targeted at both the local and international markets.
This poses major institutional challenges in catering
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for the competitive needs of exporting firms and non-
exporting firms alike, within the context of policies to
promote the competitive development of production
sectors.
Implementing a new institutional framework to
promote competitiveness, which includes enhancing the
production and development of a genuine supply of
exportable goods, will inevitably change the sort of
activities that export promotion institutions have been
implementing in recent years. Export promotion
institutions will need to specialize strictly in export
promotion, performing the conventional activities of
providing information on prices, products and markets,
as well as arranging participation in international
promotional events. They must maintain and improve
their capacity to offer specialized services geared
specifically to the needs of firms for accessing new
markets.
Given current budgetary constraints in all the
countries of the region, the best way to resolve the
problem of financing promotion institutions is the
collection of revenues to finance export promotion
activities by setting statutory amounts linked with foreign
trade procedure. This respects individual country’s
decisions on whether to have such promotion activities
carried out by public or private entities, whilst providing
mechanisms to assess the private sector’s level of
satisfaction with the services received. All firms engaged
in foreign trade have to provide funding to promotion
entities, since this mechanism guarantees the provision
of services to small and medium-sized businesses and
incorporates them into the countries’ foreign trade
system, creating a significant redistributive effect and
reducing the burden on public finance.
In Costa Rica and Mexico, the task of export
promotion has been assigned to State entities, whilst in
El Salvador the idea that State entities should be
responsible for export promotion is gaining ground. In
order to ensure smoother relations with the private sector,
export promotion institutions operate under different
regulations as regards their administrative management
and staff recruitment than other public sector institutions.
By contrast, in the Caribbean, the State continues to be
chiefly responsible for export promotion and
development, with no clear regulatory framework. At
the other extreme, in Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua, export promotion is carried out by private
sector institutions.
There are both advantages and drawbacks in having
State institutions conduct export promotion activities.
One advantage is that inter-agency and governmental
coordination can be established for export financing and
facilitation. Another advantage is that promotion
institutions are able to defend the interests of export firms
within the government itself. Promotion institutions
become allies of export firms, by dealing with them and
supporting them in their export efforts. What is more,
they are better able than other government entities to
understand and interpret the obstacles that export firms
face and how those obstacles can be overcome. A further
advantage is ease of coordination between foreign trade
policy and export promotion policy, including market
access negotiations. The export promotion institution is
in a position to provide opportune information to the
institution responsible for international trade negotiations
and to warn it of any problems that exporters face in
certain markets, as well as to inform it of opportunities
for the export sector that could be considered in
negotiation strategies.
The greatest drawback faced by State export
promotion entities is the risk of politicization and
vulnerability to policy swings in relation to staff
appointments and ideas on how the institution should
be run, as well as budget funding where institutions have
no independent budget. Unless export promotion
institutions have funding that is independent from annual
budget setting processed, such as an earmarked tax or
charge on foreign trade firms, they run the risk of
underfunding. This effectively removes one of the
advantages of having a public institution handle export
promotion and development, which is to provide public
services free of charge, since, in order to be self-
financing, the institution must make firms pay for its
services. Again, the active involvement of the private
sector and an assessment of the services of export
promotion institutions based on customer satisfaction
rates, become important factors for raising the
management quality of export promotion institutions and
for maintaining an acceptable cost/benefit ratio.
In Mexico, BANCOMEXT is a State development
bank with administrative flexibility, which enables it to
hire suitable staff for promotion activities. Also, since it
is a development bank, export promotion can be
supplemented with the respective financing from export
production activities. BANCOMEXT is the only export
promotion institution in the region able to offer export
firms, on the one hand, financial products to facilite their
access to pre- and post-export financing mechanisms
and, on the other, credit insurance and other products.
In Mexico the State does not allocate funding for export
promotion activities, however, with the result that
promotion costs have to be paid out of BANCOMEXT
profits, which affects the bank’s profitability.
In Costa Rica, PROCOMER is a public service
institution operating as a private company. The law
establishing it exempts PROCOMER from a series of
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administrative controls and procedures that are usually
applicable to public service institutions, making
PROCOMER easier to administer. Furthermore, labour
relations are governed by the Labour Code, which gives
the institution operational flexibility and enables it to
hire suitable staff at market salary rates. The State does
not allocate funding for running PROCOMER, since its
funding is guaranteed by revenue from customs
declarations and free trade zones.104 However, while
most of the members of the Board of Directors are from
the private sector, in practice it is the Executive Branch
that appoints and dismisses the General Manager, which
introduces politics into the institution’s operation.
In El Salvador, the Ministry of Economy has
embarked on a wide range of institutional initiatives to
promote exports. However, the great majority of export
promotion activities in El Salvador are still in their
infancy, are not institutionalized and have no permanent
funding, with the result that their continued existence is
not guaranteed. The project to create a State export
promotion entity which would draw together or
coordinate all the existing initiatives, and to endow it
with the respective funding, has not yet come to fruition.
Guatemala is the only case in the region where
private entities successfully carry out export promotion
activities. Whereas in the other countries the private
sector has been either unwilling or unable to contribute
funding to develop export promotion activities, in
Guatemala the private sector not only finances them, it
also defines which activities are to be developed. In fact,
the Association of Producers of Non-Traditional Exports
(AGEXPRONT) has taken over some typically
government-run activities, such as administering special
development regimes or the Centralized System for
Exports (VUPE). Guatemala’s experience shows that the
private sector has the capacity to finance export
promotion activities, and that it is important for firms
themselves to define which activities they need most.105
In Honduras, the Government has not taken a strong
role in export promotion, but neither has the private
corporate sector, nor would it appear feasible for it to
finance these activities. As described earlier, FIDE
(Foundation for Investment and Development of
Exports), which initially promoted exports, shifted its
approach towards attracting foreign investment, and in
recent years has resumed export promotion activities.
However, FIDE has received no foreign funding since
1993 and has had to take on these promotion tasks with
inadequate resources. In the case of Nicaragua, the
Government appears to be interested in engaging in the
process, but apparently has no financing capability.
Neither does the private sector appear willing or able to
finance it.
Analysis of export incentives
The countries of the region have all used similar
export incentives. All the Central American countries
have provided export subsidies by giving export firms
exemptions from income tax and from import duties
contingent upon export production, although exports to
the regional market are excluded from these incentives.
Since 1985, Mexico’s incentives have consisted mainly
of import tax exemptions, although its incentive systems
have virtually disappeared, primarily due to NAFTA
requirements.106 Globalization and regional integration
have tended to reduce the economic and policy flexibility
enjoyed by the CARICOM countries. The tariff reduction
resulting from these processes force the countries to
expand their tax base, thereby limiting their ability to
offer tax incentives and, in general, to implement a
discriminatory economic policy.
In the context of the Doha Round ministerial meeting,
a procedure was established for extending the transition
period provided for in the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (article 27, paragraph 4). Under
this procedure, export subsidies, which are prohibited
because they are contingent upon export production, must
be gradually phased out starting in 2008 and must be
completely eliminated by the end of 2009. In the case of
the Central American countries, such subsidies consist of
income tax exemptions for export firms.107
104 Indirectly it is the private sector that finances PROCOMER activities, even though this financing is laid down in law and operates as a
specifically earmarked tax.
105 In Costa Rica the private sector can be said to finance export promotion activities. However, in practice these activities are funded via a
specifically earmarked tax. What is more, most of the firms in free trade zones do not require export promotion services, but instead
receive only administration services.
106 Nevertheless, the planned promulgation of a new Law on Strategic Economic Zones again aims to provide similar incentives to those
offered in Central America for export investment. The new proposed legislation for creating strategic economic zones would appear to be
compatible with international trade rules, because the incentives are not contingent upon export production and because, for the next five
years at least, they are limited to relatively less developed zones. In any case, the incentives provided for in the law would be granted
“without prejudice to the provisions of any International Treaties involving Mexico”. Article 12 of the Bill on Strategic Economic Zones.
107 According to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures part of WTO agreements, the ban on subsidies shall not apply to less developed
countries, although in the Central American region only Haiti is classified as such.
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A compelling argument for changing the types of
export incentives offered is that even though export firms
are the most successful and fastest-growing sector of
the economy, they do not contribute to fiscal income.
Currently, income tax exemptions apply to two different
categories of export firms: (i) foreign firms that operate
on a cost-centre basis and do not generate profits, for
which the income tax exemption is irrelevant, as the tax
is paid in the country of origin, where the profits are
generated; and (ii) foreign firms that do generate profits
but do not pay income tax in the host country, paying it
instead in the country of origin under the global income
concept. In view of these circumstances, a sensible
solution would be to negotiate double taxation treaties
providing for the payment of income tax in the country
in which the profits are generated, with a corresponding
reduction in the income tax payable in the firms’
countries of origin. There are also domestic firms that
do not pay income tax because they operate under special
regimes, and these are the ones that really reap the full
benefit of the exemption. As countries cannot extend
income tax exemptions to all firms, they should set their
income tax rates at internationally competitive levels.
Moreover, in order to boost the production of goods
for export, incentives should be designed to promote
domestic production regardless of the target market108
and of whether the products are traditional or non-
traditional. This would not only bring them into line,
but would also help to make more national products
available for export directly and automatically, without
demanding that they meet special requirements, and
indirectly by creating a network of suppliers for the
export sector production. It would also be a way to
overcome one of the main obstacles that have prevented
existing incentive schemes from having a “knock-on”
effect on the country’s other productive activities and,
in the case of the Central American countries, would
even strengthen regional trade. When incentives are
granted solely for export production109 –that is, when
imported inputs are exempted from tariffs and other
specific taxes– it is very hard for domestic firms to
become suppliers for export firms. Local companies have
to pay taxes and other charges on imported inputs, and
although some countries offer rebates on such taxes, the
procedures tend to be so complicated that foreign firms
prefer to import their inputs. It is often easier and cheaper
for companies operating under special regimes to import
inputs from abroad than to purchase them locally.
The adoption of incentive schemes not contingent
upon target markets and compatible with international
trade rules would also encourage the establishment of
joint export promotion programmes, especially in the
Central American countries. The enhancement of
competitiveness, which is considered the prime objective
of policies to boost production sectors, requires the
construction of a new institutional framework in the
countries of the Central American subregion and Mexico.
This institutional framework should coordinate
simultaneous actions to promote production and place
exports on international markets.
108 In the Central American countries, export incentives are directed at exports to countries outside the Central American market, independently
of subregional integration agreements.
109 In Central America, incentives are provided only for exports to countries outside the region.
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Chapter IV
Policies to promote service exports in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Introduction
Trade in goods –defined as a transaction that links a product produced in territory A with a
consumer who lives in territory B– provides the baseline for discussion on export promotion.
Trade in services also refers to transactions between residents of different countries, although
the modalities of supply are more varied. For instance, individuals can temporarily leave their
country of origin to effect a service transaction in another country, be it to acquire services
(international tourists) or to offer services (a singer who performs temporarily outside his/her
own country). Trade in services that can be converted to digital format or recorded on physical
media is identical to trade in goods; e.g., transactions conducted through electronic or other
more traditional means of communication. The World Trade Organization’s General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) acknowledges as well the possibility of trade among residents
within a given country, where the service provider is a foreign-owned company; this occurs
when delivery of the services requires a permanent, physical proximity (commercial presence)
to the consumer. Thus, the four modes of international service delivery defined under GATS
are: cross-border trade (mode 1); consumption abroad (mode 2); commercial presence (mode
3); and temporary movement of the service provider (mode 4).
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Services are not only multi-modal but also multi-
functional. This is an outgrowth of the critical role of
services as a cornerstone of economic and social life
(transport, financial services, distribution, education,
healthcare, communication), as a vehicle for the
exchange of goods and services, and as services in their
own right (professional services). At the current
economic juncture, value added is created along
production chains precisely in service activities; this
includes services provided within goods-producing
firms and services sold on the market by independent
companies (ECLAC, 2001b). The production of data
and knowledge used in producing goods and services
is concentrated in services linked to the design of
products and processes, information technology,
research and development, and consulting and
management services, to name just a few. Accordingly,
Latin America and the Caribbean will be able to
improve its international position only through public
policy actions that enable the countries to move forward
in the production and trade of services, especially those
that are knowledge-intensive.
Many countries of the region already have specific
policies in place for individual sectors (e.g,. tourism,
audiovisual services, computer programs, and consulting
and engineering services), although they lack an
integrated policy to promote the export of services.
Promotion and development are assigned to specific
ministries: tourism is promoted by the tourism ministry,
audiovisual services by the ministry of culture, and
computer programs by the ministry of science and
technology. Generally speaking, however, these
mandates are not linked to the government agency
responsible for promoting goods exports.
This chapter draws on regional experiences to
propose some generic tools for promoting service
exports. It identifies differences between the promotion
of goods and services and, given the recent shifts in
global flows of trade, production and employment, puts
forward the main arguments for basing efforts in this
direction on customized tools and institutions. It is
suggested that anti-export biases need to be eliminated,
and possibilities are explored for reducing transaction
costs by means of greater transparency, liberalization
and legal security in the sector. A number of guidelines
are then presented for promotion activities at the
national level, together with others for the regional
level. A group of logistical support measures is also
reviewed. Lastly, some Latin American experiences in
the promotion of exports of non-traditional services
(audiovisual services, computer programs and
outsourcing) are set out.
1 See United Nations-European Commission-IMF-OECD-UNCTAD-WTO, 2002.
A. Some arguments for promoting service exports
During the 1990s, world trade in goods and in services
performed in a similar manner, posting annual average
growth of 5.8%. Between 1991 and 2002, world
exports of services rose from just over US$ 826 billion
to over US$ 1.5 trillion, while goods exports grew
from over US$ 3.5 billion to US$ 6.424 trillion.
Accordingly, the ratio of global service exports to
goods exports remained constant at around 23%
(WTO, 2003).
These figures understate the performance of trade
in services, however, which is strongly influenced by
data on travel and transport inasmuch as these two
headings account for roughly 60% of the figure compiled
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
methodology used by IMF to compile its balance-of-
payment statistics suffers from a number of serious
deficiencies that are documented in the literature.1 For
instance, it is impossible to disaggregate and identify
the various services that are included in the recorded
value of goods exports (training, storage, business
services, maintenance, financing, insurance, and others).
There are also shortcomings in the calculation of the
item Other business services, which leaves out a
significant number of transactions. Lastly, there are no
reliable data on sales of services through multinational
branch offices and subsidiaries, bearing in mind the well-
known problems involved in obtaining statistical data
on intra-firm trade (OECD, 1999).
As indicated earlier, the quality and diversification
of the national productive apparatus is increasingly
dependent on the availability and quality of services. This
“dematerialization” of value added is mirrored in the fact
that over 70% of economic activity in the industrialized
countries, and roughly 67% of regional GDP in Latin
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America, is attributable to services, which also generate
the bulk of new jobs.2 Some of the smaller Caribbean
economies are in fact true service economies, based
essentially on hotels, restaurants and financial services.3
Foreign direct investment is flowing increasingly towards
the services sector, and technological advances are
helping to create new services as well as to adapt and
upgrade traditional services. It is worth recalling,
however, that corporate conglomerates are still
responsible for over 50% of global service flows.4
The gradual dismantling of artificial and natural
obstacles to the full integration of Latin American and
Caribbean countries into the world economy, coupled
with the large-scale incorporation of information and
communication technologies into productive and
commercial activity, have triggered a restructuring of
productive activity on the basis of new relationships
that spring up between geographically distant sites
(Ventura et al., 2003). As a result, large companies are
now able to design, manufacture, market, distribute and
provide after-sales service more efficiently for both
goods and services. In such a scenario, services are
the key link in a new brand of specialization and
division of labour within large international production
chains. The more dynamic economies are those that
have been best able to lock into these globalized
circuits, which today account for the bulk of world
production and trade, although the impact of such
integration on domestic growth and development of the
economies is not yet fully understood.5
In addition to the important role of services, or
perhaps because of that role, a reason for promoting
service exports from Latin America and the Caribbean
is that the region has a strong deficit in trade in services.
The main exporters of services are also major importers,
as described below (see section D).
This scenario poses daunting challenges to the
countries of the region in terms of devising and
harnessing innovative tools to foster the development
of service activities and promote their export. The
objectives of services export promotion parallel those
for promoting goods exports; i.e., to increase the number
of exporting companies and boost export value, diversify
target markets, and enhance the quality and value added
of exportable supply. However, the development and
promotion of services entails a further unique, and
complex, aspect. Most service transactions involve the
sale of an intangible that cannot be stored or digitalized,
and they generally require contact that is more or less
direct and simultaneous between the service provider
and the consumer, as shown by the various modes of
international service transactions.
This multi-modality means that strategies to
mainstream services into the global economy require
countries to address and reconcile aspects as varied as
foreign investment policy, migration policy, competition
policy, dispute-settlement mechanisms, policy on
education, technological development and the protection
of intellectual property rights, technical standards and
criteria for accreditation of service providers, as well as
a number of issues closely tied to the sphere of domestic
regulation. All these interrelationships touch upon
sensitive areas, such as culture, security and national
sovereignty, and could even go so far as to challenge
the legitimacy of national public policy objectives.6 At
the same time, since services are also exported indirectly
by way of their inclusion in the value chain of goods
and services exports, actions to promote their production
and to encourage goods producers to substitute imports
should also be part of a service export strategy.7 In other
words, a sound promotion strategy should link tools and
institutions in medium- and long-term scenarios with a
view to creating competitive advantages, as well as using
existing ones (Prieto, 1991). It is therefore difficult to
separate policy actions that promote production from
those that promote exports.
2 Under the expanded definition of services, which includes construction. In the classification of national accounts, services include:
electricity, gas, water and sanitation services; construction; trade services, restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communications;
financial establishments, insurance, real estate and business services; and community, social and personal services.
3 Other Caribbean economies are based on natural resources (Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago (ECLAC, 2002b)).
4 In the United States, firms with fewer than 500 employees accounted for over 50% of jobs in the services sectors, but large firms are the
exporters of services (http://www.unzco.com/basicguide/c8.html).
5 See Ventura-Dias, 2003; Ventura-Dias and Durán, 2001 and the related bibliography.
6 Overcoming many of these obstacles will depend on a concerted effort to harmonize and guarantee reciprocal acknowledgement of
accreditation, licences and technical standards. The most difficult issue has to do precisely with the “necessity test”, which legitimizes
the public policy objectives of such regulations and avoids the creation of unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
7 For example, although Brazil’s exports of computer programs may not be significant per se, many exported products –from cellular
telephones to the aircraft manufactured by the Brazilian Aeronautics Corporation (EMBRAER)– are sold packaged with Brazilian computer
programs. “Tesouro escondido”, Exame, 25 June 2003.
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In this regard, the debate on selectivity versus
neutrality in production-development and export-
promotion instruments is especially valid for services.8
The most dynamic services operate in a highly
competitive setting in which things quickly become
obsolete. The life expectancy and competitiveness of
services vie constantly with the emergence of other
actors in an ever more open and more globalized market.
It is unlikely that the State will be able to identify a
priori and pursue activities that can be winners long
enough to amortize the resources invested in promoting
them.9 The existence of a transparent and open market
is what makes it possible to select and wager on services
deemed to be winners, always bearing in mind, however,
the need to cultivate an enabling environment for
dynamic segments –especially those based on knowledge
and information technologies– to grow and diversify
towards services with greater value added (Kagami and
Tsuji, 2003).
Unlike investment in goods production, the
development of service activities needs a suitable urban
setting. The commercial value attached to specific
components of the quality of urban life can be
determining factors in decisions on where to locate
domestic and international service firms, which in turn
generate demand for other types of services. Safety,
information and communications infrastructure, quality
of schools, entertainment and cultural life are but a few
of the factors that influence decisions on where to set
up a given service activity. These considerations, coupled
with such other aspects as the local business climate,
availability of qualified professionals and the country’s
economic and legal stability, are determinants of
agglomeration economies that attract knowledge-
intensive services. This realization has led authorities
of several cities on the continent to promote and market
their cities as quality products and brand names worthy
of market positioning.10 Many transnational firms have
responded to this call and moved their regional
headquarters to such cities as São Paulo, Monterrey and
Santiago. This has led to growth in other activities,
including convention centres, hotels, restaurants,
transport, professional services, and a wide variety of
other services required by these business offices.11
B. Tailoring of instruments and institutions to promote
  trade in services
The process of trade liberalization that most of the
countries of the region have embarked upon has helped
to diminish the anti-export biases associated with the
previous years of strong protection.12 Access to imported
inputs and equipment at lower cost has placed the region’s
business sector in a better competitive position. This
notwithstanding, a significant number of domestic
obstacles remain that translate into higher costs and less
competitive prices, essentially in the area of
administrative procedures required for foreign trade in
services transactions. For the most part, these are the result
of poor adaptations of practices used for trade in goods,
and they often entail costs that ultimately exclude small
business operators. In some instances, the situation is
compounded by the levying of different taxes on domestic
and foreign-purchased services, creating a bias in favour
8 For instance, while ECLAC (1995) affirms that trade policy should, as a rule, be highly selective, the same document acknowledges the
serious limitations of the State in the area of information and management. The proposal for comprehensive trade reform later qualifies
the general rule, indicating that it is better to support broad categories of activities without trying to identify “winners”.
9 One success story here would be EMBRAER, which was developed by taking advantage of the State’s purchasing power. The creation,
expansion and consolidation of EMBRAERin proximity to the Aeronautics Technology Institute and the National Space Research Institute
made it possible to mobilize and integrate an array of service providers with high value added into the production process at the technology
pole of São José dos Campos.
10 Santiago (Chile) invested US$ 4 million to promote its brand image on international markets, the highest amount recorded for a medium-
sized city (Abarca, 2003).
11 Santiago expects to host 96 international conventions through 2010, thanks to the work of the Tourism Promotion Board’s Chile Convention
and Incentive Bureau, an effort launched by private industry and the Government of Chile (El Mercurio, Editorials Section [Pedro M.
Fahrenkrog, President, Hoteleros de Chile A.G.], 11 October 2003). Just one of these events (World Congress of Gynecology and Obstetrics,
FIGO 2003) assembled 7,000 people and brought nearly US$ 60 million into the country. “Santiago tendrá un 95% de ocupación hotelera”,
El Mercurio, Finance and Business Section, 8 October 2003.
12 Trade policy has traditionally focused on managing five basic instruments: tariffs, import quotas, non-tariff barriers, subsidies and
national-content requirements. The multilateral trade system has been progressively reducing the importance and scope of these variables.
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of imported services. Also, some tax rules encourage the
internalization of services by goods-producing firms
–i.e., self-supply of services– rather than the outsourcing
or purchasing of services from independent firms.
At least three factors are crucial in a policy to
promote service exports:
(i) Explicit inclusion of services in the design and
implementation of microeconomic policies to
promote a country’s production and exports. Aside
from a few traditional services (e.g., tourism,
transport, telecommunications, construction and
engineering), economic policies tend to focus their
attention on companies that produce and export
goods (mining, fisheries, agriculture and industry).
(ii) Strengthening of telecommunications and
technological infrastructure, coupled with long-term
investments to build human resources capacity over
time. Costa Rica is a prime example of a country
that has fostered the development of its service
industry through long-term investments in education
and infrastructure.
(iii) Updating of the rules and standards specific to each
service sector, strengthening prudential  standards and
rules that encourage competition on domestic markets.
Generally speaking, the main institutional problems
faced by non-traditional service firms can be traced to a
basic lack of knowledge of their unique features. In most
countries of the region, service exporters must grapple
with ambiguity and imprecisions in exchange
requirements, procedures for the entry of foreign
exchange and customs procedures. The central bank –
or other foreign trade oversight authority– and the
customs service are the two institutions whose
mechanisms and criteria are often ill-suited to
international service transactions. Admittedly, the
intangible nature and the difficulties in assessing the
value of such transactions pose a challenge to those
responsible for formalizing them, making them eligible
for tax benefits, or authorizing the repatriation or
remission of foreign exchange. One of the unintended
outgrowths of these difficulties is an increase in
unrecorded services. In other words, the bulk of
transactions that cannot fulfil the requirements of
oversight institutions remain in the informal sector.
The first step towards updating the criteria on
classification and gathering of data on international
service transactions is to address the four modes of
service delivery, i.e., cross-border movement of services
without movement of persons (mode 1), temporary
movement of individuals to another country to consume
services (mode 2), establishment of a commercial
presence in the country in which the provider wishes to
deliver services (mode 3), and temporary movement of
individuals to another country to provide services (mode
4).13 These criteria should also include, as a minimum,
the 10 major service categories identified in the extended
classification included in the Balance of Payments
Manual of the International Monetary Fund (Fifth
Revision), and allow not only for the proper recording
of transactions but also information on their origin and
destination.14 The methodology proposed by the IMF, it
should be noted, has not yet been implemented in some
Latin American countries.15
Financial institutions –public and private alike–
have also failed to respond to the needs of service
exporters. Service firms tend to be mainly small or
medium-sized businesses, with limited physical and
financial assets that could be used as collateral; in many
instances, the real assets are intangible, such as human
resources, prestige and organizational capital.16 The
financial products on offer are unsuited to the needs of
these firms. In the view of Chile’s Ministry of Economic
Affairs, the general lack of familiarity with the service
industry on the part of institutions involved in the export
process (e.g., private and public financial entities) is
one of the biggest hurdles service exporters face in
order to gain access to export support mechanisms.
Subjecting services to procedures designed for goods
has an adverse impact on the valuation of service firms,
thus undermining the formal processes set in place to
attain that objective (Chile, Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Energy, 2001).
13 For further details on service classification criteria and related issues, see Mattos, 2001.
14 The extended classification includes: transport, travel, communications services, construction services, insurance services, financial
services, computer and information services, royalties and licence fees, other business services, and personal, cultural and recreational
services. Each of these categories is broken down into several subcategories, which allow for a much greater level of detail in the
breakdown of service transactions (IMF, 1993).
15 Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Mexico are still in transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Revision. Brazil and Chile have adopted the
Fifth Revision but are not following all the recommendations made in the manual.
16 See, for example, the Australian Productivity Commission’s analysis of information-technology firms, which in many countries suffer
from high bankruptcy rates owing to investor difficulties and costs in assessing risks of businesses whose assets are intangible (intellectual
capital) (Australia, Productivity Commission, 1995).
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C. Strengthening the region’s export capacity
The overarching concern should be how best to
mainstream service exporters into the formal economy,
drawing on the four modes of service delivery as the
basis for defining support instruments. At the same
time, the instability of public resources available for
promoting exports makes it advisable to monitor
constantly the quality and effectiveness of any measures
taken.17 Sustainable export development requires a well
thought out strategy. This means taking account of both
demand (better market access and lower transaction
costs, inter alia) and supply, so as to boost the
technological content of services and reduce the
dispersion of productivity across sectors and across
businesses in the same sector.18
Institutional strengthening in such areas as
electronic signatures and e-invoicing, document
encryption, computer literacy and better access to
information and communication technologies is crucial
in order to take full advantage of e-commerce and other
ways of reducing transaction costs and resolving
information asymmetries.
Lastly, special mention needs to be made of regional
action to expand service exports. The natural target
market for the region’s service exporters is, for the most
part, the region itself, as the case of most Latin American
service exporters confirms. This is a result not only of
geographic proximity but also of cultural affinity, both
of which are determining factors in the acceptance of
services from other countries. A number of actions could
be undertaken at the regional level to facilitate trade in
services, including the following priority areas:
• exchange of experiences: through meetings and
contacts among government officials responsible for
implementing development policies;
• cooperation in the field of trade intelligence and
development of a regional image; dissemination
throughout the region of the main sources of trade
intelligence available, thus averting duplication of
effort in market studies and other areas; and
• government action to promote and expand, at the
regional level, agreements on reciprocal recognition
of licences, accreditation and technical standards;
double taxation and double payment of social
security contributions; investment protection and
promotion; and the temporary circulation of
businesspeople (e.g., regional business visa).
1. Easier access to external markets: trade agreements,
transparency, legal certainty and liberalization
Dismantling barriers to trade in services requires
concerted action by governments, principally with
regard to cross-border movements of service providers.
To this end, a number of countries in the region signed
economic integration agreements during the 1990s.
These were mainly free trade agreements, although some
looked more ambitiously to the possibility of a common
market arrangement and included disciplines on
services.19 Some agreements, such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are considered to be
17 The criteria proposed for evaluating the performance and effectiveness of support actions are: (i) efficiency: promotion costs must reflect
the impact of foreign exchange earned by service exports; (ii) quality control and feedback; (iii) impact of support actions on the
exporter’s business plan and objectives; and (iv) relevance.
18 In 1998, the Brazilian Government launched a special programme for service exports as a tool to manage its service-export promotion
policy and facilitate coordination of public and private action in the service sector. Nineteen sectors with export potential were identified,
along with 15 thematic areas that were intended to address issues identified in advance and which shared the special features of service
exports. No information is available on the programme’s outcomes (see Programa Especial de Exportações under Programas e Ações on
the website of the Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (http://www.mdic.gov.br) (Portuguese only)).
19 The Trade Unit of the Organization of American States identified a total of 14 agreements containing subregional or bilateral provisions
on services between countries of the Western Hemisphere up to 1999; three more were added by 2002 (OAS, 1999). These agreements
have been examined and evaluated comparatively in the light of WTO parameters and standards (Prieto, 2000). Some 169 sector agreements
have also been signed in the region, mostly for air and maritime transport.
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“third generation” in that they contain clauses offering
greater protection for the rights of private investors and
service provider companies. These agreements typically
establish broad commitments and lists of exceptions
that exclude specific services, as well as conditions
governing the liberalization sought under the
agreement.20 For instance, chapter 16 of NAFTA
addresses the cross-border movement among the three
signatory countries of businesspeople, professionals and
specialized employees of subsidiaries of transnational
corporations. Under certain conditions (e.g., possession
of an advanced degree or presentation of appropriate
documentation), citizens of a NAFTA signatory country
may remain in another signatory country to work during
a specified period (e.g., to conduct market research,
negotiate contracts or take orders).21
20 For an econometric evaluation of the impact of third-generation agreements, see Adams et al., (2003) and Matoo and Fink, (2002).
21 See the website of the Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/cross-en.asp).
22 Article XV is confined to recognizing that, in certain circumstances, subsidies may have distortive effects on trade in services, and it
mandates members to enter into negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive
effects. However, the timeframes for complying with this part of the “built-in agenda” have been extended on several occasions. Currently,
the idea is to have some sort of outcome by the year 2005, which is when the Doha Round is due to conclude.
23 Even in this last case, it is possible to maintain such discriminatory subsidies, provided they have been stipulated in the conditions and
limitations on obligations deriving from Article XVII of GATS (national treatment) in the respective column of national lists of
specific commitments.
24 In Chile, exporters of printing and publishing services have benefited from this type of arrangement in the past.
25 For an evaluation of the operation of export processing zones in Latin America, see ECLAC (1995) and Granados (2003).
26 Duty-free zones for exports and other forms of production support are being increasingly opposed by WTO rules on subsidies
(Granados, 2003).
27 In Chile, deferred payment on exports of manufactured goods is to be eliminated in 2003, since it contravenes WTO rules on goods.
2. Tax relief
The countries of the region have long used tax benefits
to promote goods exports. In many instances, these
measures seek to “complete” domestic factor markets
by promoting job training, access to and adaptation of
technologies, infrastructure and new long-term financial
products. All these measures enhance systemic
competitiveness and strengthen export production
linkages with the rest of the country’s activities,
especially non-tradable goods and import substitutes
(Ffrench-Davis, 2003). They can also be used to promote
the export of services. This is of particular interest
considering that these benefits are prohibited under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
for trade in goods or can be brought before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body. The situation of subsidies for
services is less clear, inasmuch as the GATS has yet to
define disciplines in this area.22 For the time being, the
only objectionable item is the discriminatory subsidies
applied to sectors or subsectors where the countries have
assumed specific commitments.23
The principal arrangements currently in place that
could be extended to services are as follows:
(i) Simplified drawback: this instrument, designed for
small and medium-sized businesses, is little used in
Latin America, and the countries that do use it (e.g.,
Chile) had to dismantle it in 2003 in order to
conform to WTO disciplines on goods.24
(ii) Reimbursement of value-added tax (VAT) or other
indirect taxes.
(iii) Export-processing zones and special warehouses for
exports: these could be adapted for service firms
that rely on imported inputs, such as computer firms,
call centres, record production firms and printers/
publishers.25 Provided with high-quality services
and infrastructure, they could serve as development
poles for the export of services with high
technological content and added value.26
(iv) Deferred payment or exemption from import duties
on capital goods.27
Tax relief in the form of tax allowances or tax credits
is important to the development of services. The former
allow larger deductions against specific items of taxable
revenue, while the latter are calculated as a specific
percentage of identified expenditures incurred by the
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firm and are deducted from the income tax to be paid.
These measures favour the incorporation of certain
services (as inputs) into the research and development
(R&D) phase or into the productive process. They can
be used not only to promote R&D that generates
technological capacity and market penetration but also
in the dissemination of technical standards and training
of human resources –activities that carry strong
externalities (Tussie and Lengyel, 1998).28
Under a tax allowance arrangement, specific R&D
expenditures result in higher income-tax deductions than
would normally be allowed against the taxable revenue.
This incentive can be used horizontally or sectorally.29
For example, Australia has a 150% tax concession for
R&D expenditures on computer hardware, software and
related service industries. This is felt to have brought a
net benefit to the Australian economy, despite some
shortcomings; e.g., the credit is not available to
companies that do not report taxable profits, a not
uncommon situation among information-technology
firms, which typically incur losses during their initial
years. In such cases, it has been proposed to replace the
tax concession with a tax-exempt grant (Australia,
Productivity Commission, 1995).
3. Financing mechanisms
A considerable number of exportable services require
financing in order to conduct business abroad, e.g.,
construction and engineering services, which often
must present financial guarantees to perform work in
another country, including the transfer of equipment,
personnel and working capital. This financing usually
comes from the commercial banking system or from
government agencies that offer very concessional
terms.30 Small and medium-sized service firms, in
particular, may have to resort to collateral financing
by government agencies in order to gain access to the
private commercial financial system.
As mentioned earlier, the intangible nature of many
services, their heavy reliance on assets that are both
intangible and difficult to valuate (e.g., entrepreneur
prestige and knowledge), and the short life cycle that is
typical of many service firms often preclude their access
to traditional financial products in the local banking
system. In contrast, the more advanced countries have
made notable progress in developing new forms of
financing that are better suited to the needs and features
of service firms.
Some of the arrangements traditionally used for
trade in goods could be adopted to promote trade in
services, such as:
(i) Financing for purchases in external markets of national
services: government agencies provide access to
domestic credit lines for foreign companies that require
services of national origin.31 Some Latin American
countries, for instance, have programmes to finance the
sale of engineering services. In Chile, the Productive
Development Corporation (CORFO), in association
with the Andean Development Corporation, administers
financing to promote the export of Chilean engineering
and consulting services.32 In Brazil, the National Bank
for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) and
Banco do Brasil’s Export Financing Programme
(PROEX) provide financing for the export of goods and
services (see chapter III).33
(ii) Financing of investments abroad: many service firms
can only go international by establishing a commercial
presence in the target country. Arrangements exist that
grant credit for setting up offices, warehouses and
business centres, among others.
28 This type of instrument is not used much in Latin America and the Caribbean (OECD, 2002). In Brazil, a similar type of support was
implemented to promote investment in the audiovisual industry, as will be discussed further on.
29 In Chile, the National Training and Employment Service, under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, grants businesses
in a specific income-tax category a tax discount or reduction to recover investments in staff training.
30 WTO prohibits financing from public funds and subsidized interest rates for trade in goods.
31 WTO does not oppose this type of financing for trade in goods, provided the financial conditions are the same as on the international market.
32 This arrangement could easily be extended to other business services, such as news services, advertising, environmental services, training
and R&D, and equipment maintenance and repair.
33 PROEX financing is available for services such as studies, project preparation, consulting services, turn-key projects, computer programs
and audiovisual products, including the sale of rights to reproduce and market Brazilian-produced works outside the country.
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(iii) Export insurance: very little is available in the way
of private insurance for service exports. In the few
countries of the region where this instrument is used
with some form of government support –Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico– it is generally limited to trade
in goods.
(iv) Development of new financial products: special
mention should be made of venture capital
arrangements, where access to capital is pegged to
innovative ways of sharing the risks associated with
the financed activity.34  The financier “partners” with
the service provider in such a way that the cost for
using the capital is based on the financier’s
participation in the equity and expected profits of
the firm. This arrangement, still very underdeveloped
in the region, is perceived as an imperative for small
and medium-sized service firms to gain access to
the financial system.
4. Logistical support
Increasingly, the private sector is overlapping with and
complementing government action in this sphere. In
some countries, export promotion agencies are
developing into independent bodies with high private-
sector participation and the services they provide are
financed by the users themselves. This trend can be seen
as a guarantee that the services offered will respond to
exporters’ needs and that their cost is justified in terms
of the expected benefits. In the smaller Caribbean
countries, however, the public sector continues to be the
principal export promotion agent for goods and services.
(a) Establishment of service exporter federations
For a country to promote its trade interests, its public
and private sectors need to work together and engage in
ongoing dialogue. Such two-way feedback helps to
identify hurdles and also ways to address trade issues
entailed in accessing external markets. Despite the varied
interests and features of service firms, the effectiveness
that can be achieved by a service firm association, along
the lines of the business associations that exist in the
manufacturing and farming sectors, could be crucial in
the framing of policies to benefit members. Although
associations exist in some service subsectors, a
federation of service associations and entrepreneurs
would offer a stronger platform for addressing the
common challenges facing the sector as a whole
(International Trade Centre, 1998). These institutions
act as entrepreneurship mentors, given that most business
operators lack awareness of how to undertake foreign
trade operations.35
Such federations –or coalitions, as they are known–
already exist in some Latin American countries; e.g.,
Unión Argentina de Entidades de Servicios (Argentina)
and Coalición de Exportadores de Servicios (Chile).
(b) Dissemination of government support measures
for trade information and intelligence
Business operators often limit themselves to
domestic markets out of sheer lack of knowledge of
the international market. It is interesting to note that
one of the first items offered to new service-firm
operators in developed countries is a step-by-step guide
on how to export their services. These guides describe
each step the operator must take in order to access
external markets, and some provide assistance in
formulating an export strategy and answers to the most
common problems encountered by service exporters.36
34 The development of this type of financial product is felt to have been one of the determining factors of Silicon Valley’s success in
becoming a world centre of information and communications technology, although it took 40 years for it to become a hub of
intellectual activity.
35 The United States Coalition of Service Industries (USCSI) was a pioneer in these efforts and played a key role in the United States taking
the leadership in including services in the agenda of the Uruguay Round, which led to the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). Similar coalitions exist in other countries: British Invisibles, Hong Kong Coalition of Service Industries, Irish Coalition of
Service Industries, South Asian Service Industries Forum, Swedish Coalition of Service Industries, etc.
36 See the website of Export Development Canada (www.edc.ca); Industry Canada’s subsite entitled “Take a world view... Export your
services” (strategis.ic.gc.ca); the website of the Australian Trade Commission (www.austrade.gov.au), beginning with an “Export capability
tool” which examines various factors and aspects that help assure the success of new exporters; and “Exporting of services”, geared
towards small and medium-sized businesses in the United States (www.unzco.com/basicguide/c8.html).
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The website of the Colombian agency Proexport, for
instance, provides basic information and specifics on
exporting services.37
Coordinated action by the public and private sectors
can broaden the access of service firms to the information
they need. Most export promotion agencies have
networks of offices abroad and inside the country. This
gives them privileged access to trade intelligence that is
vital for conducting business abroad and allows them to
track exportable supply in the various regions of the
country. The private sector, on the other hand, with its
networks of international trade-association contacts, can
tap public and private databases on the Internet to create
trade intelligence networks that promote export firms
and the services they offer.38 They can also provide free
access to a broad range of trade information, e.g., market
access conditions, key legislation on the movement of
persons, taxation, accreditation, pricing, specifications
for services in greatest demand, export contacts and
calendars of international fairs.39
(c) Organization of and participation in
international fairs and matchmaker events
There has been a growing trend at trade fairs to promote
exchanges among firms offering different kinds of services.
Electronic media and business-to-business networks help
in the task of tracking down information by sector and by
country. Direct contact with potential clients allows service
providers to share information on company background,
explain work procedures and arrangements, indicate the
quality of services offered, give an overview of client
portfolios, and present documentation on successful past
contracts. Such events are also an excellent vehicle for
forging strategic partnerships with firms in other countries
and sharing trade intelligence on market features, the
specifics of demand for services in those markets, and key
cultural considerations for successfully launching services
in new markets.
Chambers of commerce in a number of countries
organize trade missions for their members at low cost,
with financing from programmes set up by the export
promotion agencies.
(d) Broader use of quality certifications
Certification that attests to the quality of services
and their compliance with international standards is a
useful way to allay external consumers’ lack of
confidence in new agents. Many operators are hesitant
to use such certifications, partly for cost reasons but also
because they are unsure of their ability to maintain
certification requirements over time and are fearful of
the repercussions of the possible loss of certification.
Experience with small-scale goods exporters shows that
participation by trade associations in publicizing the
importance of quality management systems encourages
operators to observe quality standards that gradually
modify management techniques, cost rationalization and
quality control measures to bring them in line with the
international standards in place in more demanding
markets (International Trade Centre, 2001; 1998).
National standards authorities have information on
the standards that apply to each specific service sector.40
Currently, most certifying firms are private concerns that
must be accredited or recognized by the government in
order for their certification to be valid in Europe, the
United States or Japan.41
37 According to Proexport, many Colombians export services without realizing it; others export knowingly but do not report their exports;
and yet others report figures well below the real ones. “Cómo exportar servicios”, Proexport-Colombia (www.proexport.com.co). In
Brazil, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade has prepared a paper containing basic information but it is not available
through the exporter’s portal but through the page on export barriers (http://www.mdic.gov.br/comext/deint/Barreiras/CartilhaServicos.PDF).
38 One example is the Ibero-American Association of Chambers of Commerce (www.aico.org).
39 A useful source is the TradePort website (www.tradeport.org), which offers trade intelligence, guidelines and business databases. It also
has calendars of business events, glossaries and reference guides.
40 The World Standards Services Network (WSSN) is a network of websites of standards organizations from around the world. Through the
websites of its members, WSSN provides information on international, regional and national activities and services in standardization
and related spheres (http://www.wssn.org) (International Trade Centre, 2001).
41 The situation of certification is very heterogeneous across the region, given the diverse productive and business conditions of the countries.
Brazil, for instance, has some 8,000 certifying firms in a wide range of areas, while Argentina has 4,000. Chile, one of the countries
whose foreign trade has a high impact on GDP, has only an estimated 350 certifying firms, although government projections indicate that
number will reach 1,000 in the year 2005. In Chile, most of these firms deal with products (mainly in the forestry, agriculture and
fisheries sectors), with only very few focusing on procedures in the environmental and labour areas (“Con permiso para crecer”, Agricultural
Supplement, No. 1,394, El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile).
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5. Other forms of trade support and facilitation
Trade in services is also fostered through a number of other
instruments, such as understandings and written agreements
between countries. Table IV.1 summarizes some of the
main objectives and features of bilateral agreements in
this sphere.
Table IV.1
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
Issue Objectives and features of the agreement
Prevent two States from levying similar taxes on the same economic instance. An international
agreement is signed stipulating the adjustments to be made to the internal legislation of the parties.
Various models exist. OECD has developed one of the most commonly used versions (OECD,
2003b), which seeks to avert double taxation of income and assets; it includes definitions, scope of




 Allow individuals to record their payments in both countries, making it possible to obtain parallel
pensions in either country. Some of the guarantees provided are: the right to request in the country of
residence benefits acquired in the other country; the right to receive economic benefits outside the
granting State, without requirement of residency or reduction in the benefit; the right to accumulation
of insurance coverage; and exemption from the obligation to make payments in the country of origin
during time spent residing in the other country.
Investment promotion
and protection 
Grant additional protection to foreign investment flows into and out of signatory countries on the basis
of specific stipulated principles, establishing minimum standards to be observed in case of expropriation.
This group of agreements ensures the free transfer of capital, profits and interest generated by foreign
investments and all other transfers of funds associated with such investments. Provisions are included
for dispute settlement between investors and the State of the other party; the investor must decide in
which jurisdiction to submit the dispute (country of origin or host country), and the selection of
jurisdiction is definitive. These agreements also give investors access to non-commercial risk insurance
offered by multilateral agencies such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the




This issue has been taken up under GATS,a but headway has been limited (Abugattas, 2003). Of
special interest is the implementation of an APECb business travel card by the Asia-Pacific Economic




These agreements are encouraged by most international treaties on services. Article VI (Domestic
Regulation) and Article VII (Recognition) of GATS contain provisions in this area. The multilateral work
is pending the conclusion of work by the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (Article VI.4 of
GATS). Thus far, greater transparency has been achieved only with respect to existing agreements
among members, with general principles set down for extending them to third-party countries. Little
headway has been made in the adoption of common criteria for reciprocal recognition, aside from a
non-binding guideline on recognition in accounting and auditing.
Source: Francisco Prieto, “Fomento y diversificación de las exportaciones de servicios”, Comercio internacional series, No. 38 (LC/L.2041-P/E),
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 2004. United Nations publication, Sales No.
S.03.II.G.201.
a  General Agreement on Trade in Services.
b  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Double taxation
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D. Some service export experiences from Latin America
Latin America and the Caribbean account for a
relatively modest share of world trade in services. The
region’s 4% share in 2001 was below its nearly 6%
share of world trade in goods. The main export
economies are Mexico and Brazil, which represent
approximately 37% of the regional total. As mentioned
earlier, the region is a net importer of services, mainly
under the heading “Other services”.
In 2001, 13 of Latin America’s 150 leading
exporters were service exporters,42 mainly in
construction, transport, trading, telecommunications,
communications, airlines, trade and utilities. Five
were Brazilian, five Mexican, two Colombian and
one Argentinean. The top service exporter, PMI of
Mexico (trading sector), recorded exports on the order
of US$ 12.611 billion, down 22.6% from 2000
(US$ 16.3 billion). This firm ranked third among the
principal exporters in all headings, immediately
behind Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Four of the six firms
for which information is available have the United
States as their principal market, while others are very
diversified throughout Asia, the European Union and
Latin America. Eleven of the firms included in the
classification are national; i.e., either State-owned or
privately held by nationals.
Table IV.2
TOP 13 SERVICE EXPORTERS AND THEIR RANKING AMONG THE
150 LEADING EXPORTERS OF LATIN AMERICA
Ranking
Firm Country Sector
Exports (US$  millions) Variation
Ownership a
2001 2000 2001 2000 01/00%
3 3 PMI Comercio Mexico Trading 12 611.7 16 300.0 -22.6 S
Intenacional
19 30 Grupo Cintra Mexico Transport 1 334.6 1 348.2 -1.0 P
50 - Carulla Vivero Colombia Trade 565.5 n/a - P
56 126 Coimbra Brazil Trade 539.9 339.0 54.5 P*
82 127 Avianca Colombia Airlines 380.2 336.9 12.9 P
88 105 ICA Mexico Construction 353.3 406.2 -13.0 P
103 78 Glencore Argentina Trade 300.0 573.0 -47.6 P*
104 194 TAM Brazil Airlines 299.6 163.7 83.1 P
105 106 Grupo Televisa Mexico Media 295.8 395.8 -25.3 P
110 217 Coimex Brazil Trading 277.1 137.1 102.2 P
114 82 Telmex Mexico Telecommunications 262.4 535.1 -51.0 P
141 - Cosan Brazil Utilities 206.6 n/a - P
145 - Recofarma Brazil Trade 198.3 n/a - P
Source: América Economía, 9-22 August 2002.
a S: State; P: Private - national; P*: Private - foreign.
n/a = not available.
42 According to Business Week Global 1000, over one half of the major global corporations are service firms. Business Week, 14 July 2003.
43 The Brazilian construction sector is noted for running a continuous surplus. The sector comprises engineering projects, industrial projects
and other on-request assembly processes (Valls Pereira, 2002).
According to IMF statistics compiled by WTO, all
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (with
the sole exception of Brazil) have their exports
concentrated in the headings of transport, travel,
communications and insurance. The few countries with
surplus trade in services include most of the Caribbean
countries plus Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay and
Uruguay. Of these, only Costa Rica, Panama and
Uruguay derive less than 50% of their exports from the
tourism sector; the rest obtain a very high percentage of
foreign exchange from these activities. Mexico alone
was among the 30 top service exporters in the world in
2002, ranking 28th and representing 0.8% of the total
(US$ 12.6 billion). Mexico and Brazil were among the
30 leading service importers in 2002, with Mexico in
position 23 (US$ 16.4 billion) and Brazil in position 29
(US$ 13.6 billion). As mentioned earlier, the region’s
major service exporters, Brazil and Mexico, are also
major importers, although Brazil runs the largest
negative balances (see also chapter I).43
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The relatively limited diversification of the
region’s service exports contrasts sharply with its
heavy reliance on imported services of very varied
kinds. Most of the countries report significant imports
under the headings of transport ,  travel,
communications, insurance, construction, financial,
computer and information services, royalties and
licence fees, other business services, and even
personal, cultural and recreational services.
The following sections discuss some specific
regional experiences with audiovisual services,
computer programs and international outsourcing.
1. The audiovisual sector and cultural industries: the need for
government support
Under the WTO classification, audiovisual services are
a subcategory of communication services. They include
the production and distribution of motion pictures and
video tapes, projection of motion pictures, radio and
television services, sound and image transmissions,
sound recording and others (which could include
multimedia products).44 Given the important place of
audiovisual services in a country’s social and cultural
life, government regulations and support programmes
play a pivotal role in this sector.45 Regulatory
frameworks promote domestic industry through various
measures and institutions, but also restrict foreign
investment and content (WTO, 1998b).46
(a) Government support for the film industry
Most countries in the region lend support of one
kind or another to their domestic film industries, using
such means as credit on favorable terms or interest rates,
direct subsidies for production and/or promotion and
training, tax breaks, screen quotas and even direct
participation by the State as a production partner.47
However, only 2% of the intake in Latin America comes
from the showing of movies produced in the region. The
fact is that Latin American cinema has yet to become a
true industry. Zuleta, Jaramillo and Reina (2000) note
the absence of a productive chain in the sector and draw
attention to the strong position of international
distributors. More often than not, film directors have
assumed the role of producer, financier and distributor
–and, by extension, all the investment risk as well. Recent
studies have shown that Latin American cinema lacks a
commercial structure capable of placing its
cinematographic products on international markets, even
within the region.48 The region’s producers have very
little bargaining power on international markets owing
to the absence of distributors who can represent the rights
of Latin American producers in a unified fashion.49
In Argentina, the National Board for Cinema and
Audiovisual Arts (INCAA) administers the Motion
Picture Development Fund, which provides financial
support for the various links of the cinematographic
44 See WTO, 1991 in Mattos, 2001.
45 The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama have assumed liberalization commitments in audiovisual services,
but only Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama have assumed the obligation to liberalize the production and distribution of motion pictures and
video tapes and the projection of motion pictures. The United States was the only country that assumed commitments in all the subsectors;
the United States, Japan and New Zealand were the only industrialized countries that included audiovisual services in their lists of
commitments (WTO, 1998b).
46 Several countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) had set legal quotas for programmes of national
origin on television networks. In October 2003, Brazil’s National Cinema Board (Ancine) was superseded by the National Cinema and
Audiovisual Board (Ancinav), reporting to the Ministry of Culture; the new board is to propose integrated guidelines for public policy in
the audiovisual sector as a whole (cinema, television, independent production and multimedia products) with a view to increasing the
national content of audiovisual products.
47 Australia assists its film industry through tax credits and direct subsidies from the federal and state governments. An evaluation of these
programmes has yielded mixed results, since support is often provided to firms whose films were never shown in public or had inflated
budgets (Gonski, 1997).
48 Buquet and Mota, 1998, cited in Zuleta, Jaramillo and Reina (2000).
49 The Conference of Ibero-American Cinematographic Authorities (CACI) was founded to represent member countries at international
gatherings and formulate regional proposals. At the initiative of CACI, the IBERMEDIA programme was set up as a development fund to
finance cinematographic activity, distribution of films in the regional market and training of human resources for the audiovisual industry
(http://www.ibermedia.com). One outcome of these Ibero-American initiatives has been the creation of the Ibero-American Federation of
Film and Audiovisual Producers (Buquet and Mota, 1998), cited in Zuleta, Jaramillo and Reina (2000).
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chain. INCAA makes funding available on favourable
conditions, both for production and for international
marketing. It also makes financing available to film
laboratories and projection firms. In Venezuela, the
National Autonomous Centre for Venezuelan
Cinematography (CNAC) provides backing for the entire
set of links in the cinematographic chain. Chile’s Support
Programme for Feature-Length Motion Pictures,
established in 1999, promotes film-related projects
through cofinancing for pre-production, filming, post-
production, distribution and marketing of feature-length
films for the domestic and international markets. The
programme includes specific support for international
promotion and marketing. Chile has gone from
producing one film a year to an average of 16, and the
national content of Chilean television now stands at 75%.
Chile also has one of the region’s largest technological
platforms for post-production.50
In Brazil, the Audiovisual Industry Act (Law 8,685)
of July 1993 created a mechanism to foster private
investment in the audiovisual sector by granting income-
tax deductions for investments made in the production
of independent cinematographic works through the
capital market. The remittance of profits and royalties
from the showing of foreign audiovisual works was
levied at 25%; up to 70% of this amount can be ploughed
back into the coproduction of works in Brazil. In 1996,
investments totaling US$ 40 million were promoted
through this instrument. As a result, openings of
Brazilian feature-length movies rose from 6 in 1995 to
40 in 1997, although revenue did not increase
proportionally: from US$ 6.7 million to US$ 16.9
million (Zuleta, Jaramillo and Reina, 2000).
In Mexico, the Mexican Cinematography Board
(IMCINE) is the national agency under the National
Council on Culture and the Arts (CONACULTA)
responsible for promoting and coordinating
cinematographic production in the three basic areas of
the industry: production, distribution/exhibition and
promotion/advertising, both nationally and
internationally.51 IMCINE coordinates two funds to
foster development of Mexico’s film industry: the
Investment and Promotion Fund for Mexican Cinema,
under the Education Ministry, and the Cinematographic
Production Fund.52 Although IMCINE does not directly
target broader exportation of Mexican cinema, its
activities and instruments ultimately have that effect. The
effectiveness of film support policies still needs to be
established in order to gauge their impact on Mexican
film exports.
Based on the scarce data available, it would appear
that the success of the efforts described above has been
relatively modest in terms of volume of business
generated at the global level. In fact, only two Mexican
feature-length films made the world list of the 2,250 films
with highest box-office takes between 1900 and 2003.
According to a specialized database, Como agua para
chocolate [Like Water for Chocolate] (1992) and Amores
perros [Life’s a Bitch] (2001) are on the list, ranked
respectively in positions 1,735 and 1,870.53 For the
former, the only available information is on box-office
revenue in the United States market (US$ 21.7 million),
while the latter took in US$ 5.4 million in the United
States market and US$ 19.6 million worldwide. The
Brazilian film Estação Central [Central Station] (1998)
managed to reach 2,025 in the ranking, with global
revenue of US$ 17.2 million, of which US$ 5.6 million
was generated in the United States market.
To place these figures in perspective, the biggest
box-office success of all history was Titanic (United
States, 1997), with global revenue of approximately
US$ 1.835 billion, of which over US$ 600 million was
generated in the United States market.54
(b) Entrepreneurial experience in the television
industry: the case of TV Globo
In most Latin American countries, television has
established itself mainly as a private industry with a
rather weak presence of public television. The more
powerful groups in the larger markets –such as Mexico
(Televisa, TV Azteca and González) and Venezuela
50 Joint programme of the Productive Development Corporation (CORFO), the Arts and Culture Fund, the Ministry of Education, and ProChile.
51 National Council on Culture and the Arts (CONACULTA) (www.conaculta.gob.mx).
52 Mention should also be made of the National Film Commission (CONAFILM), created in 1995 by CONACULTA, IMCINE and Estudios
Churubusco Azteca. With support from the Tourism Ministry, the Federal Government, the state governments, and public and private
organizations and institutions, CONAFILM and the network of state film commissions work to promote the production of television
films, programmes and commercials in Mexico; they also provide assistance to companies and producers interested in carrying out
projects in the country (http://www.conafilm.org.mx).
53 See the webpage of World Wide Box Office (http//www.worldwideboxoffice.com).
54 In 1996, the United States had approximately 30,000 movie theatres, while in all of the European Union there were fewer than 21,000. In
that same year, the number of visits to a movie theatre per person per year was 5.6 in the United States, 1.9 in Europe and 0.6 in Latin
America (Safir, 1997, cited in Zuleta, Jaramillo and Reina, 2000). Brazil, with a population of nearly 80% that of the United States, has
only 1,000 theatres (“O cinema descobre o Brasil”, Jornal do Brasil, October 2003).
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(Grupo Cisneros)– have expanded their operations into
small and medium-sized markets through the partial or
total acquisition of channels in Chile, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Peru and elsewhere.
The technological advances of the past few years
have led to a “media convergence” that has spawned a
new kind of business: communications, media and
entertainment (CME) firms.55 TV Globo is a classic
success story of international expansion based on
building a CME conglomerate along the lines of mega-
operators such as AOL/Time Warner. The latter, created
by a merger in 1999, owns HBO, Turner CNN and
Warner Brothers, making it the largest CME firm in the
world with invoicing of US$ 39 billion. The Globo group
is Latin America’s largest CME firm, with roughly US$ 3
billion in invoicing in 2001. The group comprises Jornal
o Globo, Rádio Globo, Rio Gráfica Editora, TV Globo,
the new pay television firms of Net Brasil and Sky, and
the Internet company of Globo.com, all of which are
linked to Globopar, the group’s financial arm.56 The
Cisneros and Televisa groups also control significant
segments of the region’s audiovisual services industry,
including cable and satellite television.
TV Globo began its foray into the international
sphere in the 1970s with the marketing of soap operas,
mainly in Latin America and Portugal. Penetrating the
Latin American market entailed dubbing voice tracks
in Spanish, but also meant competing with other
operators such as Televisa (the Mexican producer and
exporter of soap operas to the region) and Venevisión
(Venezuela).57 Between 1999 and 2002, TV Globo’s
international programming sales rose from 13,987
hours to roughly 23,800 hours, equivalent to a 70%
increase in just three years. Soap operas account for
70% of that revenue, with the rest coming from series,
mini-series and variety shows. A second thrust towards
internationalization has been to sell programming on
TV Globo Internacional, which broadcasts to 34
countries and has over 180,000 subscribers.
Programming is entirely in Portuguese and the main
market is Japan, followed by the United States. The
third avenue of internationalization involves removing
cultural barriers from products designed for the
Brazilian market by producing soap operas and
miniseries written originally in Spanish using foreign
casts, in order to make them more competitive
internationally. This last line of action may ultimately
include the creation of a news agency aimed at
marketing sensationalist-type news products, archive
material and documentaries.
55 This section is based on Salazar and Lopes, 2003.
56 Most of the Globo group’s revenue comes from network broadcasting.
57 These two firms have an exclusivity agreement with Univisión, the largest Spanish-language channel in the United States, which ensures
them 18 hours of daily programming.
58 See the website of the Colombian Federation of Software Industries and Related Information Technologies (http://www.fedesoft.org).
59 The Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which was introduced by the United States at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore
in 1996, is aimed at full and generalized liberalization (under most favoured nation arrangements) of trade in IT and communications
products. In Latin America and the Caribbean, only Costa Rica, El Salvador and Panama are signatories of the Plurilateral Trade Agreement
of the WTO. Interestingly, Mexico has not signed the ITA but it acceded partially through the NAFTA framework. Chile is in a similar
situation as Mexico by virtue of its agreements with Canada and the United States.
2. Information technology and related services
Information technology (IT) and related services are
subdivided into five groups under the WTO classification:
consultancy services related to the installation of computer
hardware; software implementation services; data
processing services; database services; and other (which
would include Internet-related services). The heading
Other covers consulting, education and training services,
hardware maintenance, software maintenance, and
consulting services for integration and network
administration, among others. Software is actually a
hybrid product: it is marketed as a good, subject to the
circulation and transfer of proprietary rights, although
purchasers are only granted a licence with limited rights.
At the same time, it is technically a service when it is sold
packaged with hardware customized to meet the needs of
given user.58
The world market for IT and communications is
regulated by GATS and the Information Technology
Agreement, a multilateral convention whose signature
is not mandatory for WTO members.59
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To compete on international software markets, firms
must observe high quality standards in processes as well
as for products. The capability maturity model for
software (CMM) is a model for enhancing processes. It
was designed as a means to assess the maturity of an
organization’s IT processes and identify key practices
that should be adopted in order to enhance the maturity
of those processes. CMM has five levels.60 Level 5 is
the top level and addresses the core processes that both
the organization and projects must comply with in order
to ensure continuous and measurable improvement in
IT processes.61
Several Latin American countries have instituted
programmes to support and promote their IT sectors,
with varying degrees of success; in others such as
Uruguay, progress in the sector has been achieved on
the basis of business activity.62
(a) Brazil: the rise of customized software
Brazil accounts for roughly one half of Latin
America’s IT market, estimated at approximately US$ 30
billion; it is followed by Mexico and Argentina. In 2003,
domestic sales of software and related services represented
an estimated 1.8% of GDP. In 2001, Brazil exported over
US$ 120 million in computer programs of various types.63
Although this amount is small in comparison with the
US$ 10 billion that India exports each year and with
Brazil’s imports of over US$ 1 billion in this sector, this
recent expansion is noteworthy and underscores the
importance of having a long-term policy for the sector.64
In 1992, the National Council for the Development
of Science and Technology, an agency of the Ministry of
Science and Technology, launched the Programme to
Promote the Excellence of Brazilian Software (SOFTEX)
in an effort to spur growth in the domestic IT industry. It
was not until 2002, however, that the programme was
considered a priority in terms of the incentives granted
under Law 10.176/2001.65  The SOFTEX programme
links universities, research centres and businesses, and
has nearly 1,000 participating entities and 200 companies
that act as seedbeds of technological innovation (MCT,
2002). It is coordinated by a civil society organization
classified as being in the public interest. Aware of the
difficulties in penetrating new export markets, SOFTEX
organizes trade missions to promote Brazilian products66
and offers a course through its website on how to export
software, thus assisting sector operators in exporting their
products and services.67
The over 5,400 computer firms active in Brazil are
working in data security, banking and industrial
automation, business management and e-procurement.
The software that makes it to market is of two types:
general applications and customized programs for
meeting specific client needs. Valls Pereira (2002)
estimated that the latter represented nearly 63% of
Brazil’s software exports between 1999 and 2001. While
90% of the exports of general application programs went
to the United States market, customized software was
exported mainly to the countries of MERCOSUR, North
America and the European Union.
(b) Costa Rica: public-private partnerships
The software sector in Costa Rica has enjoyed a
broad role as well as strong growth within the country’s
economy. The availability of trained human resources
weighed heavily in Intel’s decision to invest there.
60 See the website www.sei.cmu.edu/cmm.
61 India has the most companies (more than the United States) with CMM level 5 certification, one of the most important ones for IT firms.
This –coupled with the 220,000 IT engineers and computer scientists who graduate each year from Indian universities– help to explain
the country’s success in the international IT market.
62 Mexico spends the equivalent of 0.10% of its GDP on computer programs. The Government is looking to bring this level up to the world
average of 0.61%. The country’s Software Industry Development Programme falls within the framework of the sector competitiveness
programmes and the 2001-2006 National Development Plan. The goal is to achieve annual software production of US$ 5 billion and
make Mexico the region’s leader in the support and development of IT-based services. Uruguay estimates its 2002 software exports at
around US$ 85 million (see Uruguay en Red-Prensa, interview with the president of the Uruguayan Information Technology Board,
Enrique Tucci, in El Espectador, 2 September 2003).
63 Since several foreign companies with offices in Brazil conduct intra-firm transactions, their exports may be recorded against the main
office or parent firm. In 2002, sales by Brazil’s 200 largest IT firms came to over US$ 41 billion (Exame-Info, August 2003).
64 The Brazilian experience of promoting its IT industry through tariff protection and administrative measures was often cited in the 1980s
as an example of costly and erroneous selection of “winners”, although it did generate, as a side effect, software development capacity
(“É hora de agir”, Exame, 25 June 2003).
65 Executive Order No. 386 of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
66 “Softwares do Brasil para o mundo”, Jornal da Tarde, IT supplement, 7 August 2003, pp. 1D and 5D.
67 The course includes an outline of the stages of the software export process, model documents, exercises, a glossary of the most common
technical terms used in international trade, a module on exporting software to Germany, the United States, China and Argentina, etc. See
also the SOFTEX website (http://www.softex.br).
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Subsequently, the company also decided to set up a
centre for software development and support for the
design of semiconductor components in Costa Rica.68
Costa Rica’s Software Producers Board (Caprosoft)
has launched a three-pronged support programme for
the software sector: strengthen human resources
(education), strengthen firms’ quality management
systems, and strengthen its own institutional capacity.
The training project has received financing from the
Foreign Trade Promotion Agency69 and the Inter-
American Development Bank, as well as support from
the National Centre for Advanced Technology
Foundation.
In 2000, Costa Rican software exports totaled over
US$ 50 million, outstripping the country’s sugar
exports.70 Initially, these exports went to neighbouring
countries (Central American Common Market), but later
expanded to other countries in Latin America, Europe
and Asia. Roughly 50% of the over 130 software
development firms are active in the international market.
(c) Colombia: credit lines for technological
innovation
In 2000, Colombia established a national registry
of exporters of goods and services, extending to service
exporters some of the benefits in place for goods
exporters, provided contracts are registered with the
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism. Proexport,
the country’s export promotion agency, has approved
a support programme for special projects and plans to
export services that is built around the specificities of
this macrosector.71 The benefits include exemption
from value-added and withholding taxes on services
used exclusively abroad by firms that do not do business
or engage in activity in Colombia, provided the foreign
exchange in question is channeled through the
exchange market.72
In addition, the Colombian Government is working
to adjust domestic legislation to legally recognize the
four trade modes of WTO. With regard to software, the
new tax reform exempts the production of new computer
programs from income tax. In November 2001, the
National Foreign Trade Council approved a policy to
promote IT exports, and this has set the course for the
strategy to internationalize the sector.73
In 2000 and 2001, Colombia’s software exports
averaged just over US$ 21 million per annum,
accounting for approximately 20% of service exports
(not including travel, transport and freight). Most of
these exports went to countries of the Andean
Community and NAFTA.
68 See http://www.american.edu/initeb.
69 See the agency’s website (www.procomer.com).
70 See WTO, 2001b. In that communication, Costa Rica identified the following obstacles to its service exports: discriminatory tax treatment,
excessive taxation of the transfer and/or repatriation of capital, and restrictive or excessive requirements on the temporary entry/exit of
technical staff.
71 The public and private sectors have signed the following agreements on competitiveness: San Andrés tourism, Cartagena tourism, Santa
Marta tourism; engineering and consulting services; software and related services; international air cargo transport; specialized healthcare
services; engineering and consulting services; logistical services; and ground transportation. Sectors with high export potential were also
identified: software and related services; engineering, consulting services and construction; education; and specialized healthcare services.
72 The agency reported the following results: 24 IT firms reported exports of US$ 800,000 in 2001 and US$ 150,000 in the first quarter of
2002, mainly to the Spanish market. In the engineering area, contracts exceeded US$ 130 million, mainly in the markets of Central
America (including Panama). Healthcare institutions reported revenue from non-resident patients on the order of US$ 2.3 million.
73 Other financial options exist for selectively supporting the development of services in the Colombian economy. The National Productivity
and Competitiveness Programme and Proexport-Colombia offer two financing products: a rediscounted credit line with incentives for
technological innovation and the community and a line of cofinancing for technological innovation projects.
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3. Offshore business services
A number of non-core business activities or functions,
such as periodic or routine administrative tasks, technical
assistance, logistical support, consumer support and
after-sales service, can be provided remotely. Two
formats are commonly used: outsourcing (i.e.,
subcontracting to outside providers) and insourcing
(providing the service internally within the
organization).74 This category has gradually expanded
from routine, periodic or clearly complementary
activities to include specialized tasks that require high
levels of training on the part of the service provider. Even
so, they continue to be outsourced to companies in
developing countries through a shared service centres
model (insourcing) or outsourced to service providers
in developed countries.
Several countries in the region, including Chile,
have potential to provide offshore business services to
foreign companies.75 The offshore business service
centres currently in operation in Chile are basically of
the insourcing type, and the challenge now is to
encourage them to begin offering outsourceable services
and more complex business activities that bring greater
added value to the service provided. Call centres
represent one of the areas with especially large potential.
Such centres first appeared in Chile in the mid-1990s,
as a new service culture was emerging alongside
economic opening and deregulation of the
telecommunications sector. Outsourcing of this type of
services has expanded to a significant number of sectors
linked to internal demand, but only recently have new
centres been opened with an eye to global opportunities.
Currently, the national supply of outsourced call centres
consists of 36 firms, of which 94% are located in the
Metropolitan Region.76
Call centres in Chile handle over 170 million calls
annually, of which approximately 65% are inbound calls
(i.e., calls made to the company) and the rest are
outbound (i.e., calls originating within the company).
74 The financial industry is today an intensive outsourcer, as are the publishing industry, the media and, especially, IT services, call centres
and contact centres. Hollywood movies are now filmed in Australia or New Zealand and edited in Canada. Credit card applications are
evaluated in India, and many architectural projects for Manhattan are actually designed in offices in Prague or Budapest.
75 In Chile, CORFO has established incentives to bring investment in cutting-edge technology into the country (Iglesias and Stevenson, 2003).
76 The bulk of this supply comes from small firms of fewer than 30 positions (42%), followed by firms of 31 to 50 positions (25%), and then
firms with 101 to 250 positions (19%). In other words, medium-sized firms (those between 51 and 100 positions) play a very small role.
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Chapter V
Introduction
From Doha to Cancún: the development
dimension in world trade organization
negotiations
The new round of multilateral trade negotiations that kicked off in Doha at the end of 2001
raised strong expectations that a genuine development round was about to commence. During
the two years of preparatory work, however, and at the subsequent Fifth WTO Ministerial
Meeting in Cancún –which ended inconclusively on 14 September 2003– the developing
countries’ demands and proposals with respect to the tasks agreed upon at Doha received
only scant attention. At Doha, the Ministers had pledged to direct their efforts at extending
the benefits of the greater opportunities and progress in well-being generated by the multilateral
system of trade to all WTO members, through greater market access, balanced rules and
properly directed and sustainably funded technical assistance and capacity-building
programmes. The Doha negotiating agenda was designed to help achieve these goals by
affording priority to issues of interest to developing countries. Among these issues were the
need to address outstanding implementation issues, guarantee compliance with provisions on
special and differential treatment and correct and avoid restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets. The developing countries were also keen to see the reduction or
elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers to
their exports; and to define the application and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in order to benefit public health and
foster access to existing drugs, research and the development of new drugs.
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The failure to arrive at a consensus text in Cancún
shows how difficult it is to turn rhetorical intentions into
concrete actions that can effectively succeed in placing
the development dimension at the heart of the
multilateral trade system. The weakening of the
multilateral framework leaves developing countries with
the alternatives of bilateral or plurilateral liberalization
agreements. The geometry of these agreements varies,
but some contain significant asymmetries in bargaining
power and power relations that put developing countries
at even more of a disadvantage. A system of trade based
on clear-cut, universal rules can serve the needs of
development only if those rules are extended to all
countries irrespective of their economic and political
influence.
This chapter seeks to furnish a structured view of
how the multilateral trade system has dealt with a
number of development-related matters and to assess
the current state of the debate. The chapter is divided
into five sections, including the introduction. The
second section reflects upon the components of the
development dimension in the context of a multilateral
trade system that has expanded its sphere of action to
what are known as “trade-related issues”. Section B
examines the way special and differential treatment has
evolved, as well as changes in the multilateral system
of trade over time. Section C contains an analysis of
the positive agenda proposed by the developing
countries in the WTO. There follows a review of the
preparatory work for the Cancún conference and of
the international community’s failure to generate a
constructive response on that occasion. Lastly, a
number of considerations are set forth on the
governance of the multilateral system.
A. The development dimension within the constraints
of the multilateral trade system
Within the framework of WTO, the development
dimension encompasses at least two interrelated spheres:
on the one hand, the key factors in a beneficial integration
of developing countries into a hierarchical world
economy with asymmetric risks and opportunities and,
on the other, the features the system of multilateral
principles and rules must have in order to ensure that
liberalization and trade openness contribute to growth
and development. Both these ideas have been taken into
account in the formulation of special and differential
treatment for the implementation of disciplines in the
multilateral system. The voluntary and non-binding
nature of many provisions has detracted from the
effectiveness of the concept, however. In addition, the
undertaking to revise the contents of special and
differential treatment has expanded as the multilateral
trade system has extended its sphere of action from the
tariff instruments of trade policy to other domestic policy
instruments, as is reflected in most of what are known as
the Singapore issues.
1. The need for consistency beyond the bounds of WTO
The current debate has revealed the limitations of the
multilateral trade system with respect to the concerns of
the developing countries, principally in relation to three
sets of issues: (i) countries’ financial and institutional
capacity to meet the obligations contained in the
Uruguay Round agreements; (ii) the links between trade,
trade liberalization and individual countries’ financial,
monetary and technological policies; and (iii) the
implications of the multilateral trade system disciplines
for social issues such as poverty, employment, food
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security, rural development, environmental protection,
public health, culture, etc. (UNCTAD, 2003b). In global
terms, it is a matter of finding mechanisms –including
special and differential treatment, where appropriate–
for addressing the problems of economic and social
development (UNCTAD, 1999a). Since the Uruguay
Round the tendency has been to shift from special and
differential treatment towards building the capacity to
comply with standards.
The foremost concern is the matter of “coherence”,
which first arose during the work of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Countries
started to analyse the need for consistency in the
monetary, financial and trade spheres in order to
maintain international governance in a pro-
development agenda, be it in the context of the different
areas of negotiation and disciplines, the different
multilateral institutions involved or the national,
regional and multilateral processes and strategies. In
other words, a consistently pro-development approach
is needed to provide developing countries with the
means to lock into the benefits of trade liberalization
(Tórtora, 2003). In this respect, the debate is nourished
by discussions on the preservation and expansion of
policy space and by the current WTO work on trade,
debt and finances, and technology transfer.
2. Other unfinished business within WTO from the
development perspective
For many developing countries, the fulfilment of
commitments made in WTO agreements calls for broad
and costly reforms that constitute a veritable institutional
restructuring (Finger and Schuler, 1999). These demands
on countries’ scarce human and financial resources are
compounded by the vacuums in the Uruguay Round
regulations, the weakness of some of its
recommendations and compliance with the letter rather
than the spirit of those agreements on certain issues of
interest to the developing countries which, as will be
discussed later, come under the heading of special and
differential treatment.
Concerns over the development dimension therefore
transcend the framework of special and differential
treatment in the multilateral trade system to encompass
the architecture and structure of agreements conducive
to growth and development. The view taken by the
developing countries is that the results of the Uruguay
Round, on the contrary, were unbalanced in that the
rights and obligations favoured the more industrialized
countries.
In response to the concerns of the developing
countries, three working groups were established in
Doha to analyse: (i) the issues identified with a view to
better integration of small and vulnerable economies in
the multilateral trade system; (ii) the linkages between
trade, debt and finances; and (iii) the relationship
between trade and technology transfer. These issues
should be afforded the same priority as the formulation
of new disciplines in areas that interest the developed
countries, such as the link between trade and investment,
the interaction between trade and competition policies,
transparency in public-sector procurement and trade
facilitation (in other words the Singapore issues).1
Looking at the relationship between trade, debt and
finance means exploring the linkages between trade
liberalization and growth, trade –commodities and export
diversification– and financial markets, WTO standards
and financial stability, and increased consistency
between trade reforms and market access. In turn,
addressing the problems of technology transfer between
technology-exporting and -importing countries involves
examining the constraints on developing countries’
access to knowledge and how this prevents the
fulfilment of certain commitments on protection and
intellectual property. These elements demonstrate the
interdependence that exists among the multilateral
system, key aspects of trade from the perspective of
developing countries and the functionality of those
aspects in terms of development objectives.
1 They are termed “Singapore issues” because they are associated with the programme of work that resulted from the 1996 Ministerial
Conference held there.
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B. The development dimension and special and
differential treatment in the multilateral
trade system
Special and differential treatment has a history of its
own which merges with the development of the concept
and practice of economic and social development. As
Kenneth Dam has pointed out, the juxtaposition of the
interests of the industrialized and developing countries
changed GATT from the passive administrator of a
multilateral legal instrument into an institution actively
engaged in promoting developing country exports (Dam,
1970). Between 1947 and 1948, during the work leading
to the creation of the World Trade Organization, the
developing countries propounded the need for
recognition of the heterogeneity of the countries that
comprised the trade system. The cornerstone of the
multilateral trade system is, however, liberalization
without discrimination. In other words, standards must
be uniformly applied by all the contracting parties.
According to the edicts of trade theory, growth and
development were supposed to be a direct and
automatic consequence of non-discriminatory trade
liberalization. GATT was therefore expected to foster
development and growth by promoting freer and non-
discriminatory trade.
However, as well as the need for affirmative action
to compensate for the relative lag of the developing
countries, research on the relationship between
developing and developed countries suggested that the
trade policies of the industrialized countries were in fact
one of the main obstacles to their own development. For
different reasons, including the industrialized countries’
protection of markets of interest to developing countries,
trade has not become an engine of growth for the
developed economies (see chapter 8 in ECLAC, 2001b).2
1. The development question: from the Haberler Report
to Part IV of GATT
GATT 1947 did not recognize that developing countries
warranted special treatment despite the fact that chapter
III of the Havana Charter dealt with economic
development and reconstruction. Strenuous efforts by
developing countries led to the admission by legal
experts that, like at the domestic level, applying the
principle of equal conditions to profoundly uneven
economic and social situations actually deepened the
inequalities. For a period, economic international law
became understood as a compensatory law designed to
protect weaker States against stronger ones, by affording
more rights to the former and imposing more obligations
upon the latter. From the Havana Charter GATT inherited
article XVIII (Government assistance to economic
development and reconstruction), which had been
article XIII in the Charter. Between 1954 and 1956, this
article was revised and new provisions were
incorporated, in particular those contained in article
XXVIII on Modification of Schedules. This article
afforded the developing countries greater freedom to
impose quantitative measures and other restrictions in
order to protect their nascent industries and combat
balance-of-payments disequilibria.3
A decade after GATT came into effect, a panel of
experts concluded in 1958 that the barriers imposed by
the industrialized countries on imports from developing
countries were the main cause of the developing
countries’ trade difficulties.4 Committee III of GATT
2 For a discussion on asymmetries and special and differential treatment in the multilateral system, as well as their relationship with
concepts of economic development and the resulting strategies, see ECLAC, 2001b; ECLAC Subregional Headquarters in Mexico,
2001a; Michalopoulos, 2000; Corrales-Leal, 2003; and Whalley, 1999. See also UNCTAD, 1985b and WTO, 1999.
3 Until the Kennedy Round (1964-1967), only 25 developing countries participated in GATT, of which more than one third were
Latin American.
4 The panel members were Gottfried Haberler, James Meade, Jan Tinbergen and Roberto Campos.
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was created on the basis of the Haberler Report to identify
the trade measures that restricted exports from less
developed countries and to initiate a programme for trade
expansion through the reduction of those barriers. No
significant reductions in barriers ensued, however.5 In
1963, five years into Committee III’s activities, and with
no apparent progress, the developing countries managed
to secure under GATT a resolution calling for a
programme of action, which consisted of freezing all
new tariffs and non-tariff barriers, eliminating all taxes
on tropical commodities, eliminating taxes on goods
produced in developing countries and adopting a
calendar for the reduction and elimination of tariffs on
semi-processed and processed products. In general, these
countries were asking for nothing more than the
implementation of the General Agreement in a pure form
and greater consistency between the large countries’
trade policies and their trade liberalization discourse
(Dam, 1970). When the Uruguay Round began three
decades later, however, most of the barriers identified
by Committee III were still in place in the industrialized
countries.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) was held in 1964 and gave
rise to the organization of the same name. Part IV of
GATT (Article XXXVI to XXXVIII), entitled Trade and
Development, was approved in November of that year,
during the Kennedy Round, and went on to form the
legal framework for the activities of the Committee on
Trade and Development.6 These activities were confined
to a purely symbolic sphere, however. Later, in 1968,
the same countries established the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) under the auspices of UNCTAD.
GSP was established on a voluntary basis by the
industrialized countries and the preferences were not
consolidated under GATT (Michalopoulos, 2000).
2. Special and differential treatment in GATT between the
Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was
authorized under GATT in 1971, though it had operated
under UNCTAD since 1968,7 Subsequently, during the
negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the
developing countries secured the approval of the
enabling clause (Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries), which afforded
a more solid legal basis to differential and more
favourable treatment by industrialized countries.8
However, the commitments remained outside the GATT
consolidation system. Since the commitments were
voluntary, the developed countries could withdraw
concessions unilaterally and at will, with no right to
trade reprisals.9 The regimes established by these
countries within the framework of GSP were included
under GATT by means of an exemption from the most-
favoured nation treatment (waiver to article I).
In more general terms, the concept of special and
differential treatment was adopted during the Tokyo
Round and is being incorporated into various agreements
arising from it, although many of these accords have
remained plurilateral in nature. At the end of the Round,
a programme of work was established to examine the
protection measures affecting imports from developing
countries.
5 Articles XXXVI to XXXVIII of GATT.
6 Srinivasan and Park (1996) remark that some elements of this programme of action still figured on the negotiating agenda of the developing
countries twenty years later, at the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting.
7 Tariff preferences had been recommended since UNCTAD I, in 1964.
8 The Enabling Clause implicitly contained the concept of graduation, as it was considered that the developing countries would become
more fully integrated into the system as their economies strengthened (UNCTAD, 1985). Certain plurilateral agreements of the Tokyo
Round also contain this principle (WTO, 1999).
9 The Enabling Clause, which is entitled “Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries” constituted the legal basis for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and for the Global System of Trade Preferences
(GSTP).
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3. Evaluation of special and differential treatment under GATT
A key element of the discussion has been the non-
reciprocity of certain commitments. Intended to afford
more flexibility to developing countries, non-reciprocity
was incorporated into Part IV of GATT to help them to
move forward in their processes of development
supported by trade rules. Initially, the concessions
allowed the developing countries to maintain tariff
protection or trade restriction measures for balance-of-
payments purposes (Article XVIII). Subsequently,
preferential treatment, through GSP, took the form of
concessions granted by the industrialized countries to
allow developing country exports preferential access to
their markets.
Nevertheless, measures that distorted trade in
products of interest to the developing countries,
especially agricultural products and textiles, persisted
and even increased. GSP entailed uncertain conditions
for market access and excluded some sectors that were
important for the developing countries. In addition, the
level of preferences was eroded by tariff reductions
agreed upon in successive rounds of trade negotiations,
while newly created rules of origin were costly to
administer. Moreover, the usefulness of measures
granted to developing countries to aid development was
coming under review, since these countries continued
to depend on a small range of commodities and their
terms of trade were trending persistently downwards
(Michalopoulos, 2000).
The developing countries have achieved greater
integration into the international economy by means of
liberalization policies, especially since the 1980s. Their
share of world exports and of trade in manufactures has
also expanded. In addition, the reforms implemented in
the developing countries, especially in Latin America,
encouraged their involvement in the multilateral
system.10 All these changes occurred in parallel with
the Uruguay Round, the eighth Round of GATT
negotiations that began in 1986.
4. The results of the Uruguay Round with regard
to special and differential treatment
The Uruguay Round represented a shift in direction with
respect to the prevailing principles, since it established
medium-term reciprocity for all the participating
countries, with the least developed countries (LDCs) the
sole exceptions. The developing countries played a more
prominent role in these negotiations, took on broad
commitments in all the agreements reached at the Round
and have been actively involved in the implementation
and negotiation subsequent to these agreements. With
regard to special and differential treatment, however,
there has been a shift from preferential market access
and protection of rights towards facilitation of
compliance with WTO obligations, in order to lower the
costs of transition. This shift is significant because the
general approach of WTO corresponds to a system based
on rules, and these rules have increasingly encroached
upon countries’ domestic policies.11 At the same time,
the rules are governed by a more effective mechanism,
which ensures compliance through the WTO dispute
settlement system.
For many, the development dimension in the
Uruguay Round was confined to the belated
incorporation into the multilateral rules of two sectors
of interest to developing countries, namely agriculture
and textiles. Since it established reciprocity for the long
term, the shift with regard to special and differential
treatment triggered by the Uruguay Round was
accompanied by a more clear-cut distinction between
10 Until the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, only eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, Nicaragua,
Dominican Republic and Uruguay); four countries of the English-speaking Caribbean (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago) together with Suriname and Haiti were contracting parties of GATT. With the exception of Argentina, which acceded to GATT in
1967, the other six Spanish-speaking countries joined GATT between 1948 and 1951.
11 The rules cover issues such as subsidies and countervailing measures, contingent measures, measures relating to investment and intellectual
property, customs valuation and standards. The liberalization of services is largely related to the development of rules and regulations.
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industrialized countries, developing countries and least
developed countries.12 The permanent or longer term
exceptions for the fulfilment of commitments were
reserved for the least developed. Moreover, the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was not
consolidated.
According to the typology used by WTO, there are
six types of provisions for special and differential
treatment:13 (i) increased trade opportunities to be
provided by members to developing countries, especially
through market access; (ii) recognition and protection of
the interests of the developing countries; (iii) flexibility
in commitments, measures and the use of policy
instruments;14 (iv) periods of transition incorporated in
various Uruguay Round agreements, which provide
temporary exemptions from full implementation by
developing countries, particularly in agreements on rules;
(v) technical assistance, especially regarding those
agreements whose implementation demands greater
capacity; and (vi) special provisions for LDCs, in addition
to the treatment provided for developing countries.
These commitments are to be found in almost all
the Uruguay Round agreements, though they vary in
nature from one agreement to another, as shown in table
V.1. WTO identifies two types of commitments in these
instruments. First, those that usually provide positive
measures in favour of the developing countries, many
of which are not obligatory and, second, those that
provide greater flexibility and which the developing
countries may use if they wish. The first type of measure
is more common than the second (WTO, 2001a).
The post-Uruguay Round shift in special and
differential treatment towards compliance with WTO
obligations and capacity-building in developing
countries represented a change in emphasis from
demand-side to supply-side factors (from market access
to policy instruments and considerations for productive
development). To some extent, the provisions on
capacity-building in developing countries have
transformed special and differential treatment from an
instrument of development to one of adjustment
(Tórtora, 2003). The objective is the gradual but effective
integration of the developing countries into the
international system. This effort includes a particular
emphasis on technical assistance and longer transition
periods. There is no well-defined concept of how the
development dimension should be approached in order
to secure better conditions for development through
linkages with the international economy, however (see
ECLAC, 2001b).
12 In WTO, there is no definition of developing countries, their status is acquired by self-selection. Of the almost 140 members of WTO at
the end of 2000, more than 100 were  in this category, including around 30 least developed countries. WTO uses the designation devised
by the United Nations to identify the least developed countries. Currently, there are 49 countries on the United Nations list, 30 of which
have become members of WTO, including only one country in the region (Haiti).
13 An exhaustive review of these is to be found in WTO (1999) and an evaluation of their application in WTO (2001a).
14 The WTO report (1999) pointed out that this category included 43 of the 97 special and differential treatment provisions recorded. This
modality considers the exemptions or lower levels of commitments which the developing countries can claim. In the case of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), flexibility is worked into the general structure of the agreement.
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Table V.1
PROVISIONS FOR SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
IN THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS a
ISSUE- Increase Safeguard Periods of transitionc
AGREEMENT in trade interests of Flexibility Total by
(No. GATT article) opportunitiesb developing of commitments Developing Industrialized agreementd
countries countries countries
GATT ** ** X 30
Agriculture e X X ** 10 6 19
Antidumping
(Article VI) X X 1
Sanitary and
phytosanitary X 2 years 5
measures
Technical barriers
to trade (TBT) ** X 16
Safeguards
(Article XIX) X 2
Subsidies and
countervailing X ** ** 5 and 8 16
measures exempt LDCs
Textiles and apparel X 6
Customs valuation
(Article VII) 5 8
Investment
measures 5 2 4
(TRIMs) LDCs: 7
Trade in services
(GATS) X X 15
Intellectual property X 5 1 6
(TRIPs) LDCs: 11
Dispute settlement ** X 11
Total f 14 50 33 19 155 g
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), “High Level Symposium on Trade and Development”, Geneva, 17 and 18 March 1999; “Implementation of
special and differential treatment provisions in WTO agreements and decisions” (Wt/Comtd/W/77/Rev.1), 21 September, 2001.
a The provisions on technical assistance included in many of the agreements are not shown here. The (X) indicates that there are provisions and the
double asterisk (**) indicates a significant number of special and differential treatment provisions in the category and agreement shown.
b Particularly via market access.
c Number of years.
d Number of special and differential treatment provisions in each agreement, including technical assistance and aid to LDCs (WTO, 2001a).
e Includes the Decision on the effects of agricultural reform in the least developed countries and net food-importing developing countries.
f Number of provisions for each type of special and differential treatment (WTO, 2001a).
g Includes 14 technical assistance provisions and 24 assistance to LDCs provisions, which are not specified in this table (WTO, 2001a).
GATS = General Agreement on Trade in Services.
TRIPS = Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
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1. Problems of implementation and the effects of the Agreements
Ever since WTO was created, concerns have been voiced
over the effects of the Uruguay Round agreements on
the performance of the developing countries. Such
considerations include problems and challenges arising
from growing “neo-protectionism” in the developed
countries and the asymmetries generated by the
agreements themselves. “Neo-protectionism” refers to
the use of contingent measures and technical standards
in such a way as to exacerbate the uncertainties and
conditionalities of GSP. Asymmetries are to be found in
such areas as the following:
• the bias in favour of the industrialized countries in
the liberalization of sectors that are advantageous
to them, such as information technology products,
intellectual property and services;16
• agreements that promote practices and policies more
common in industrialized countries and which
therefore require policy adjustments or narrow policy
space for developing countries. This is the case of
agreements on industrial subsidies and TRIPs;
• the costs derived from greater requirements for
human and institutional capacities and from the
redesign of adjustment policies and mechanisms,
which can be much greater than the benefits derived
from the agreements;17 and
• developments in agreements established after the
Uruguay Round, which have favoured the interests
of the industrialized countries, such as in the area
of services (telecommunications, financial services),
and in the Agreement on Information Technologies
(AIT). This is in contrast to the limited progress in
mode four liberalization under GATS (movement
of persons) which was of interest to the developing
countries.
A large portion of the implementation work that
the developing countries have been actively calling
for at the recent WTO ministerial conferences, in both
Seattle and Doha, involves overcoming the obstacles
described above, in order to correct imbalances in the
Uruguay Round agreements.18 Many of these demands
concerned the agreements on rules –basically
subsidies– rather than questions of market access.
Advances in these areas also became a condition for
achieving an agreement on a negotiating agenda that
was broader than “the built-in agenda” of the Uruguay
Round. More specifically, developing country
concerns required provisions that would complete,
clarify, operationalize, accelerate and evaluate or
improve the provisions and contents of the various
agreements. In addition, there were calls for the
treatment of developing countries to be monitored
and improved, while ensuring that technical
assistance is available to help these countries meet
their commitments.
C. A positive agenda for developing countries
in WTO: from Geneva to Doha/Cancún15
As has been mentioned, developing countries’ demands
on the multilateral system go beyond the specific features
of special and differential treatment. In this regard, they
have raised broader concerns over the conception and
asymmetry of the agreements and biases in compliance,
which generated the programme of work agreed upon in
Doha. The expectations that progress would be made in
subsequent work remained unfulfilled, however.
15 See Silva (2001) for further background on this debate, especially from Seattle to Doha.
16 The structure of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) escapes this analysis in some degree, since it provides the flexibility
to assume commitments on national treatment.
17 The costs and requirements involved in implementing agreements on such issues as TRIPs, Customs Valuation and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures are examined in Finger and Schuler (1999).
18 More than 50% of the proposals at the Seattle Conference came from the developing countries. This was also the expiry date for many of
the transition periods for these countries to make the legislative, regulatory and institutional changes needed to meet their obligations.
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2. Towards a full review of special and differential treatment
In the circumstances described, an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the provisions on special and differential
treatment shows that the objectives have been only
partially achieved. The constraints and failings are
caused by a number of factors: (i) the weakness of the
recommendations; (ii) inadequate technical assistance;
(iii) limitations on the forms of implementation of
agreements of interest to the developing countries, such
as textiles and agriculture; and (iii) inadequacy of
transition periods –the most commonly used available
instrument– for the institutional changes developing
countries must set in motion.19 Consequently, work in
this field arising from the Doha Declaration was geared
towards examining the provisions for special and
differential treatment in order to strengthen those
provisions and make them more precise, effective and
operational, as set out in paragraph 44 of the Declaration
(see section D) (WTO, 2001b).
In other words, the special and differential treatment
provisions in the multilateral system are ineffective in
helping the developing countries to benefit from
integration into the international trading system. In recent
years, proposals have been made to incorporate the
development dimension into trade negotiations. These
have included ranking or differentiation of developing
countries, a sectoral or thematic focus and policy space.
A ranking of developing countries was clearly
established at the Uruguay Round with the distinction
of LDCs which, as described in the preceding chapter,
were permitted to act on a non-reciprocal basis.20 In
WTO (as in GATT), developing countries are those that
define themselves as such, whereas LDCs are identified
by the United Nations as countries whose per capita
income is less than US$ 1,000. The group of countries
with per capita income of over US$ 1,000 (all the Latin
American and Caribbean countries with the exception
of Haiti) have very dissimilar levels of development,
however. For this reason, there have been proposals for
a more sectoral or regional approach that recognizes the
specificity of domestic conditions as well as the need to
define eligibility using criteria that include non-
economic variables. Some authors have suggested that
the inter-sectoral heterogeneity within an economy
should be used as a basis for examination, as opposed to
a ranking based on global national criteria, since supply
constraints, level of competitiveness and institutional
capacity can be better evaluated at a sectoral level
(Corrales-Leal, 2003; Tórtora, 2003).
The proposal on development policy space cites the
need for a proactive effort to deal with problems and
identifies policy instruments which are governed by
multilateral rules, for example, subsidies or other
incentives, import restrictions, preferences in
government procurement and active mechanisms for
strengthening the domestic market. On the supply side,
special and differential treatment should give developing
countries scope for stimulating the competitiveness
of their businesses and locking into the benefits of
liberalization. The Uruguay Round limited manoeuvering
room for making discriminatory policies and thus the
autonomy of governments to channel subsidies to
specific businesses and sectors.
Lastly, other proposals have referred to the rules in
their totality, citing the difficulty of isolating special and
differential treatment from other development-related
aspects within the multilateral system.21 In this regard,
some kind of mechanism is needed to evaluate future
agreements in terms of their contribution to development
goals or their repercussions on implementation costs.
The non-automaticity of the single undertaking
implementation in developing countries also warrants
review.
19 An evaluation of the shifts in direction of the special and differential treatment and their results are contained in UNCTAD (1999a);
Whalley (1999); Laird (2000); Michalopoulos (2000); ECLAC (2001a and 2001b); WTO (2001a) and Tórtora (2003).
20 Strictly speaking, the different agreements contain other specific categories of countries such as: countries that are net importers of food
(agriculture), small suppliers (textiles and apparel), transition economies, special category of countries (annex VII to the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
21 The recommendations submitted by a group of developing countries –including Cuba, Honduras and the Dominican Republic– at the
Fourth Ministerial Conference may be viewed in this light (WTO, 2001e).
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D. From the Doha Development Agenda to the absence
of agreements in Cancún
The declarations and decisions that resulted from the
Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, which was held in
Doha from 10 to 14 November 2001, reflected the
magnitude of the concerns raised over special and
differential treatment, as well as the need for new ways
of effectively bringing the development dimension into
the multilateral system. The Ministerial Conference
opened up a broad negotiating agenda, which has been
denominated the “Doha Development Agenda”, giving
rise to a new round with wider-reaching contents than
the built-in agenda that followed the Uruguay Round
(WTO, 2001c).22 At the same time, the ministers agreed
to a special decision to address the “issues and concerns
[…] regarding the implementation of some WTO
Agreements and Decisions”.23
Other tasks deriving from the decision on
implementation referred to the improvement and
operationalization of special and differential treatment,
mainly by extending transition periods or simplifying
administrative procedures.24 The issues addressed
included, for example, the simplification of rules of
origin and the raising of textile import quotas, the
expansion of non-recurrent subsidies and the reduction
in the number of antidumping measures imposed by
developed on developing countries.
The linkages between different implementation
issues are also apparent in the proposal made by a group
1. The Doha Development Agenda
of developing countries at the Fourth Ministerial
Conference, regarding a framework agreement on
special and differential treatment: “Many of the
implementation proposals submitted by developing
countries, in the backdrop of uneven growth and
development in the years following the establishment
of WTO, can be viewed as an initial endeavour for the
extension and elaboration of an enhanced, effective and
binding special and differential treatment regime”
(WTO, 2001e).
Lastly, other decisions taken at the fourth Ministerial
Conference that were of interest to the developing
countries referred to more specific areas, affording them
increased flexibility for policy-making in certain areas.
These decisions encompassed: (i) intellectual property
and public health; (ii) the extension of the transition
period for certain countries with respect to the
prohibition of export subsidies; (iii) the authorization
of the Cotonou Agreement, which is a non-reciprocal
preferential accord between members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states and the
European Community; and a further decision that may
be included here is (iv) the resolution set out in the
Ministerial Declaration to negotiate improvements to the
dispute settlement system, regarding which a number
of proposals specifically considered the position of the
developing countries.
22 The negotiating agenda included eight sets of issues: (i) questions relating to implementation; (ii) agriculture; (iii) services; (iv) market
access for non-agricultural products; (v) trade-related intellectual property rights; (vi) WTO rules (including disciplines on antidumping,
subsidies and countervailing duties, and regional agreements); (vii) the Dispute Settlement Understanding; and (viii) trade and the
environment. The Cancún meeting evaluated the progress of several working groups and was supposed to arrive at a decision on whether
to negotiate the Singapore issues (WTO, 2001c). See also Silva (2001) and ECLAC (2003j).
23 This decision covered 11 Uruguay Round agreements and included particular provisions on special and differential treatment, with
almost 40 of the 100 issues that the developing countries had raised in their proposals. With regard to special and differential treatment,
the decision proposed to include the following tasks, which were mandated to the Committee on Trade and Development: to assess the
conversion of voluntary special and differential treatment measures into mandatory provisions; to examine additional ways in which
special and differential treatment provisions could be made more effective; and to consider how special and differential treatment may be
incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules. See paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12 of the Decision on
Implementation.
24 Aspects of implementation are also essential for improving the dispute settlement system.
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2. Preparatory work in Geneva
Up to mid-2003, real progress in the work arising from
the Doha agenda had been very limited. The dates by
which development agenda issues were to be carried
forward had been postponed and discrepancies had arisen
among the countries over how to resolve many of the
implementation tasks set.25 No specific progress had been
made with the discussions on special and differential
treatment up to the start of the Cancún Ministerial
Conference, with results also thin on the ground in other
areas of interest to developing countries, such as the
negotiations on agriculture and improvements to the
Dispute Settlement Body. Just two weeks before the start
of the Conference, an agreement had been reached on
intellectual property and public health, regarding how to
deal with the constraints faced by countries with smaller
productive capacity.26 But many developing countries
remained dissatisfied even with this area.
The Trade and Development Committee (TDC)
directed the post-Doha work on special and differential
treatment. The debates have been organized around
the following issues: (i) systemic and cross-cutting
issues;27 (ii) proposals on specific Uruguay Round
agreements (which numbered almost 90 in mid-
2003);28 (iii) technical and financial assistance and
training; and (iv) the incorporation of special and
differential treatment into the architecture of WTO
rules (WTO, 2002c; 2003j). The divergences in
country positions, which tend to take place along
North-South lines, arise over differences in
interpretations of the mandate and the potential need to
place the negotiations in a wider context in order to
maintain a balance between rights and obligations. The
institutional sphere within WTO in which such
discussions should be held and the order in which the
work should be carried out are also the subject of debate.
For the developed countries the priority was cross-cutting
issues, while the developing countries’ interpretation of
the mandate was that specific agreements should take
priority.
Something similar occurred with regard to
implementation, as major differences arose between the
scope of the Doha mandate and the implications of
renegotiation. By the same token, there has been debate
over how and where the work on the different issues
should take place.29 The tasks had been distributed
among the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and
its subsidiary bodies, according to the agreements on
which proposals had been made. Concrete results have
been very limited, however –with around five decisions
from among 40 possible actions. Some of the deadlines
were postponed until March 2004 and it proved
impossible, for example, to arrive at an agreement on
the special consideration that industrialized countries
would show to developing countries in the enforcement
of antidumping legislation. There has also been constant
concern over the costs associated with the
implementation of a growing body of agreements. Just
before the Cancún Conference a group of developing
countries made a new proposal to prioritize the
implementation issues within each of the respective
negotiating groups, create a negotiation group
specifically for cross-cutting issues and leave the
deadline for these decisions at March 2004.
Discussion is also warranted on a number of aspects
regarding the working groups set up at Doha to deal
with issues of interest to developing countries, namely,
small economies; trade, debt and finance; and technology
transfer. First, the work on the particular difficulties that
small economies face within world trade did not progress
very far, even though a large number of Latin American
countries were involved in the document used as a basis
for the discussions.
25 An account of the process up to Cancún can be found in ICTSD-IISD (2003), WTO (2003b), WTO (2003j), UNCTAD (2003b).
26 This was a decision reached by the TRIPs Council on an issue that the Doha Declaration had left outstanding. It will enable countries to
import cheaper generic medicines made under compulsory licensing if they are unable to manufacture the medicines themselves. The
decision takes the form of an interim waiver which will last until the TRIPs agreement is amended, and contains certain provisions that
make specific reference to developing countries (WTO, 2003a and 2003b).
27 These included: principles and criteria for special and differential treatment, the Enabling Clause, the proposal on an oversight mechanism,
transition periods, differentiation and ranking, among others.
28 In April 2003 the Chair of the General Council had organized 88 proposals on special and differential treatment into three categories:
those “early harvest” proposals on which there was most consensus and a greater likelihood of reaching agreement at the Conference,
those which required further study and were forwarded to subsidiary bodies and, lastly, those proposals on which divergence was widest
(WTO, 2003m). The first category formed the basis of the proposals considered in the successive drafts for the fifth Conference.
29 See ECLAC (2003c), table VII.3.
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Work has been most intensive in the area of trade,
debt and finance, since the respective group has
addressed problems relating to financial crises and
instability, problems of indebtedness, the role of
liberalization and the flow of foreign exchange into
developing country economies, the relationship between
these economies and domestic reform, market access,
commodities and deteriorating terms of trade, among
others (WTO, 2003f). The group made significant
progress in identifying key links between trade issues
and other matters dealt with in the multilateral system,
and thus addressed the need for consistency both within
WTO and in its relations with other institutions.30 The
right of developing countries to pursue development
policies and solve their adjustment problems has also
been discussed.
Lastly, with respect to the relationship between trade
and technology transfer, efforts have been directed at
identifying mechanisms that can strengthen transfer from
developed to developing countries and the role that WTO
may play in this regard (WTO, 2003g). To this effect, the
group has looked in particular at the links between
technology transfer and foreign direct investment (FDI),
intellectual property and multinational corporations,
market access mechanisms that may inhibit transfer and
the difficulties developing countries face in complying
with multilateral rules when they lack the necessary
technology. Although the debate has been interesting, the
group has not reached a consensus on the recommendations
and is likely to continue the discussions. One important
input has been receivers’ and providers’ experience of
technology transfer, and progress has been made in
reviewing the WTO provisions and other measures that
can stimulate these flows. The group’s work has also
capitalized on the efforts of other bodies both within and
outside WTO, which have afforded a broader perspective
to its considerations. Within WTO trade and technology
transfer has also been addressed in the context of the work
on special and differential treatment, especially in terms
of implementing the technology transfer provisions set
out in newer and more technically difficult accords, such
as agreements on intellectual property,31 services or
technical standards.
The Ministerial Declaration adopted at Doha
envisaged that these groups would report on their
progress to the Cancún Conference; they were not
expected to arrive at major decisions. Despite the
advances set out above, however, the groups’ work prior
to Cancún came up against differences, mainly between
the industrialized and developing countries, with respect
to the focus and scope of the recommendations they were
expected to produce. This prevented them from moving
closer to the more operational proposals invoked by the
developing countries.
3. The Cancún Conference
The lack of agreements on development-related and other
matters –agriculture and the Singapore issues– was
reflected in the successive draft declarations produced
during the preparations for the Conference and at the event
itself (see box V.1). The work at the Conference was
organized into five groups, coordinated by facilitators,
covering agriculture, market access for industrial products,
development issues, the Singapore issues and other matters
(which included services, environmental issues and
aspects of intellectual property). A group on the cotton
proposal was added later. The Conference Chairperson
(Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Luiz Ernesto
Derbez) was able to draw up a draft declaration on 13
September, following intensive consultations with the
facilitators and heads of delegation, but this failed to gain
the consensus of the delegations.
The group mandated to discuss development issues
at the Conference covered a broad range of subjects:
special and differential treatment, implementation
concerns, technical assistance, less advantaged countries,
the three areas of interest for the developing countries
that had formed the subjects of the working groups in
operation since Doha (small economies, links between
trade, debt and finance, and between trade and
technology transfer), concerns over commodity prices
and the proposal on cotton subsidies.32
30 Rather than proposals put forward by countries, this discussion has drawn mainly on presentations made by international agencies,
including United Nations regional commissions.
31 The operationalization of transfer to less advantaged countries was also part of the work relating to implementation. A decision was
arrived at in this regard, in fulfilment of the respective mandate (WTO, 2003a).
32 Cotton came to be treated as a subject apart, facilitated by the WTO Director General in person.
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Specifically on the subject of special and
differential treatment, the Cancún draft included more
issues with a likelihood of being resolved at the
Conference (denominated “early harvest”) than the
previous draft, but even so a number of developing
countries –including Cuba– took the view that those
issues were of little economic significance to them.
Efforts were therefore made to improve these measures
and the possibility also arose of setting a new deadline
of March 2004 for those issues. Some aspects of special
and differential treatment were also touched on in other
groups such as those dealing with agriculture and market
access for non-agricultural goods.
With respect to implementation, the possibility of
creating an ad-hoc task force gained acceptance. Many
of the discussions, however, were monopolized by the
extension of geographical indicators. Towards the end
of the Conference, the developing countries felt that their
concerns were not being reflected in the development
issues, including special and differential treatment and
implementation, in such a way as to correct the systemic
disequilibria that they perceived in the WTO agreements.
In addition, these subjects had occupied little time during
the discussions since priority had been given to the
debate on agriculture.
The lack of results on all these issues, combined
with the disagreements on agriculture –though progress
began to be made towards the end of the Conference–
and the demands inherent in the Singapore issues
prompted the developing countries (led by India) to
withhold support for the draft declaration circulated
by Chairperson Derbez.33 WTO and qualified observers
have cited this as one of the causes of the lack of results
at Cancún, aggravated by procedural issues in the
organization of the discussions. Also widely believed
to have been a culprit,  however, was the
interdependence of the results of the different issues
under debate.
Box V.1
THE FIFTH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN CANCÚN
Objectives
The tasks that resulted from Doha
were to take stock of: (i) negotiations
on items on the built-in agenda
–especially in agriculture– and other
issues begun at Doha (such as market
access for non-agricultural goods, rules
and dispute settlement); (ii) the
development of the Singapore issues
and the possible initiation of
negotiations; and (iii) analysis and
recommendations of the negotiating
groups, including those created at
Doha to work on issues of interest to
developing countries.
Landmarks in 2003
The consensus needed to draw up a
draft Ministerial Declaration was not
achieved. The drafts that were
distributed were drawn up first by the
Chairperson of the WTO General
Council, Ambassador Carlos Pérez del
Castillo, then by the Chairperson of the
Cancún Conference, Minister Luis
Ernesto Derbez.
Draft I, 18 July (WTO, 2003n),
contained 25 paragraphs covering 23
issues in skeleton form. These included
the issues contained in the Doha
Programme of Work (see WTO, 2001b),
except for matters relating to the
organization of this programme, plus
provisions on members’ access to
WTO.
Draft II, 24 August (WTO, 2003o) with
28 paragraphs covering 26 issues. It
contained the following additional
questions with respect to draft I: the
sectoral initiative on cotton, commodity
issues and coherence. In addition,
seven annexes dealt with the following
subjects: (A) modalities in agriculture;
(B) market access for non-agricultural
products; (C) special and differential
treatment, with recommendations on
24 potentially early harvest issues; and
the possible terms of negotiations on
the Singapore issues, namely (D)
relationship between trade and
investment; (E) interaction between
trade and competition policy;
(F) transparency in government
procurement; and (G) trade facilitation.
This second draft was complemented
with a covering letter from the officials
steering the process –the Director
General of WTO and the Chairperson
of the General Council– detailing the
different visions on the subjects
covered in the draft.
Draft III, at Cancún, 13 September
(WTO, 2003p). This contained 30
paragraphs on 28 issues. With respect
to draft II, it added access issues and
an additional reference to TRIPsa
(including their link to the Biodiversity
Convention). This version had only five
annexes, since changes were made
with respect to the previous draft on
the following issues: first, in the
contents of modalities and in the
number of subjects dealt with under
special and differential treatment
(which increased from 24 to 27);
second, it included annexes on only
two of the Singapore issues (annexes
F and G of the previous draft), with the
investment issue left for clarification
before negotiations could begin, and
competition policy to continue to be
examined in the framework of the WTO
ad-hoc group.
Outcome
The Ministerial Declaration issued on
14 September, containing only six
paragraphs, reflected the lack of
agreement among the members and
called for a meeting of senior officials
no later than 15 December 2003 to
continue the discussions. The
definition of the Sixth Session of the
Ministerial Conference was also left
outstanding.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of World Trade Organization (WTO) documents.
a Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
33 The communication from Kenya in response to the Cancún draft reflects much of this perspective (WTO, 2003k).
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As described in the previous section, during the
preparatory process for the Cancún Conference there
were already signs that results were likely to be scant.
Given the lack of results, the final declaration of only
six paragraphs in length requests the convening of a
meeting of senior officials in Geneva no later than 15
December 2003, which was too short a period in which
to expect great strides to be made. The failure to arrive
at decisions at Cancún made it unlikely that the Doha
Round would be concluded on target in 2005 and, though
the meeting of senior officials on 15 and 16 December
made some progress, it did not reach agreements capable
of getting the round back on track.34 In any event, in the
course of the work associated with the Conference, new
deadlines had already been defined or proposed for
concluding some of the unfinished business, such as the
issue of dispute settlement (May 2004) and special and
differential treatment (March 2004).
4. The negotiating agendas of developed and developing
countries35
From the Uruguay Round up to the Doha Ministerial
Meeting, the interest groups that formed were comprised
of countries of different levels of development, creating
coalitions whose geometry varied depending on the
negotiating process, but whose North-South lines had
become blurred.36 Things were rather different at
Cancún, however, as groups of developing countries
joined forces to strengthen their campaign in respect of
the uncompleted development tasks set at Doha. These
groups of developing countries were initially organized
in the framework of the agricultural negotiations leading
up to Cancún.
Questions about the Conference’s failure to produce
results abounded post-Cancún. Some explanations refer
to the phenomenon described in the previous section.
This is in addition to shifts in the composition of the
multilateral system, whose members are increasingly
developing countries, and in the structure of trade
relations. Trade flows also occur between these countries,
with the bulk of China representing a very significant
and dynamic market (see chapter VI). In order to nourish
the debate in this regard, a number of aspects of the
agenda and involvement of developed and developing
countries are set out below, highlighting specific
references to Latin American developing countries.
The stance of the industrialized countries
A number of positions taken by the developed
countries –although the main exponents, the United
States, the European Union, Canada and Japan, differ in
their stances– have been in opposition to the positions
of the developing countries. First, the developed
countries, in general, and the European Union, in
particular, have lobbied for the inclusion of new items
on the WTO negotiating agenda, such as the environment
and the Singapore issues.37 Similarly, though differing
in emphases, the United States, the European Union and
Japan have been unwilling to commit to a more deep-
reaching platform on agriculture, and have put forward
issues such as the multifunctionality of agriculture to
justify the maintenance of certain subsidies and
emphasized technical standards or the environment, thus
imposing tougher requirements on developing country
exports. Differences in perspective have also arisen with
respect to the issues of interest to the developing
countries addressed in the working groups formed at
Doha. While the developed countries have been in favour
of exchanging experiences, they have questioned the
value of the exercise and shown more interest in a
conceptual approach to such matters.
34 In his closing remarks, the Chairman of the General Council indicated that there was “a willingness to restart the work of the negotiating
groups” but “more time is needed in order to deal with the unfinished business”.
35 The overall visions of most of the WTO members at Cancún can be found in the WTO documents: WT/MIN(03)/ST, which are available
at the sub-site of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference. The position of the United States, which is not available on that site, can be
found on the web site of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in the section on the Conference. In addition, Silva
(2001) gives a systematized account of the members’ positions during the preparations for Doha.
36 The best known example is the Cairns Group, which was formed by agricultural product-exporting countries of varying levels of development
during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round to lobby for the liberalization of the sector.
37 The European Union has been supported by Japan in this effort.
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The developed countries’ agendas also have a
tendency to use bilateral or regional preferential
agreements to push forward issues which are not
governed by multilateral rules, or which exceed their
scope (denominated “WTO-plus commitments”). This
is the case of rules on intellectual property, competition
policy, environmental issues and electronic commerce.
Such agreements also tend to be based on reciprocity,
despite differing levels of development among the
parties. The developed countries are likely to rely
increasingly on this approach, given their frustration at
Cancún. This is true of the United States in particular,
which is prioritizing other levels of negotiation such as
bilateral agreements and FTAA. Even Japan, which was
the only exception to this trend, has entered into
negotiations on trade agreements.
Lastly, with respect to special and differential
treatment, the proposals of the developed countries have
targeted market-access issues, rather than reinforcing
supply-side factors, and given priority to the exports of
LDCs.38 This reinforces the categorization that came out
of the Uruguay Round, as mentioned earlier. This
approach is also manifested in the developed countries’
interest in differentiating and ranking the developing
countries, and in their calls for greater liberalization of
the markets of countries with an intermediate level of
development –by narrowing the gap between applied
and bound tariffs, for example. The developed countries’
preference for a shift from special and differential
treatment towards provisions on compliance with rules is
also reflected in the emphasis placed on capacity-building
and technical assistance. And, as mentioned earlier, they
have taken clearly different stances on issues of interest
to the developing countries, particularly with regard to
special and differential treatment. In this respect, there is
no single developed country stance, but they do tend to
differ from the developing countries in their overall
positions, even though they have responded favourably
to some specific requests from developing countries.
Participation, demands and proposals of developing
countries
The developing countries represent around 80% of
the 147 countries belonging to WTO today.39 The
discussions and negotiations of recent years have been
dominated by two major categories of countries within
the developing nations. These are the African and LDC
countries, in regard to special and differential treatment,
and the large, more proactive countries, such as Brazil,
Egypt and India, which were joined by China at the last
Ministerial Conference. These are heterogeneous
groupings of countries, which have aligned themselves
along North-South lines on some issues (for example,
the Cairns group, friends of antidumping, etc.) although
divisions persist over newer and more rules-based
questions, such as the Singapore issues. The Latin
American and Caribbean countries have assumed leading
roles and/or a majority weight in some of the organized
groupings, especially since Seattle.
In general, the developing countries have taken a
reactionary or defensive position in response to the
proposals of the developed countries, but have attempted
to take more proactive role in the negotiations –a positive
agenda, as UNCTAD terms it. Their efforts in this
direction include, as has been mentioned, the
identification of policy spaces, proposals to broaden such
spaces and opposition to rules that narrow them. They
have also put forward ideas for greater coherence in
international policies, recommendations for institutional
development within WTO and for the implementation
of agreements and decisions to improve the functioning
of the system.
A number of groups emerged during the period
before the Cancún Conference, in the weeks immediately
before and during the event itself. Among these, a group
led by Brazil and known as G-20 or G-22 became
particularly prominent (see box V.2). Such groups played
a key role in the discussions at the Conference, initially
in the sphere of the negotiations on agriculture.
The negotiating agenda of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries
In the 1990s the Latin American and Caribbean
countries deployed a major effort to negotiate from a
perspective of “open regionalism” in a number of
spheres. Initially, this meant focusing on consolidating
trade links with regional partners, often by deepening
integration within the longstanding regional blocks. Then
all the countries, with the exception of Cuba, became
involved in the negotiations to form the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) and most –either individually
or within their regional groupings– now participate in
preferential or reciprocal agreements or negotiations
with the United States and the European Union. Only
38 This trend has been in evidence since Seattle.
39 Nepal and Cambodia recently joined the system, the first LDCs to do so since WTO came into being. This confirms the universality of the
organization.
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two countries –Mexico and Chile, which also maintain
a broad range of bilateral agreements with a number of
partners– have also opened negotiations and reached
agreements with Asian countries. As has been mentioned,
many of the agreements include rules for which no
multilateral framework exists.
At the multilateral level, the countries of the region
have been involved in different interest groups at the
most recent ministerial conferences (see table V.2). In
general, they have been particularly keen to continue
with reform in agriculture, since a large number of Latin
American countries participate in the Cairns Group. But
they have also put forward more proactive proposals –a
positive agenda– in such areas as: widening of policy
spaces, improvement of rules (such as antidumping) and,
clearly, intellectual property and public health. Their
coordination with other developing countries during the
preparation and running of the Doha Conference was
very significant. Even within the region they have taken
part in different groups to coordinate positions on
liberalization strategy, specialization and export
markets, in accordance with their size and geographical
location. This also means that they differ in their
reluctance or enthusiasm with respect to new issues that
broaden the agenda, such as the environment or the
Singapore issues.
The Latin American and Caribbean countries
participating in the working groups created at Doha sought
a number of different objectives. With respect to the link
between trade, debt and finance, they had put forward
proposals that considered the impact on their economies
of commodity dependence and the importance of market
access for helping them deal with debt, problems of
exchange instability and the need for coherence in
international policies, among other subjects.40  With regard
to technology transfer they have attempted to define
working objectives in keeping with the Doha mandate,
explored agreements in the framework of WTO that can
provide for such a process, and made extensive
recommendations. Brazil, meanwhile, has shared its
experience in these matters and has criticized the TRIPs
agreement on its technology transfer provisions.41
40 The proposals put forward by these countries can be found in the documents WTO: WT/WGTDF/W/10, 20 and 18. WTO, 2002d; 2002e
and 2003q.
41 See WTO documents: WT/WGTTT/2 and 3, and W/2 and 6 (WTO, 2002f, 2002g, 2002h, 2003r).
Box V.2
GROUPS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AT CANCÚN
Chairperson’s draft of the official
Conference document.
G-33, which was formed one day
before the Conference, consisted
originally of 23 developing countries
representing an alliance in favour of
strategic products and a special
safeguard mechanism. These are two
specific measures within special and
differential treatment for the agricultural
sector, which were included in a
document drawn up by Chairperson
Harbison of the Committee on
Agriculture and presented on 18 March
2003. In this proposal, strategic
products were to bear smaller tariff
reductions than other agricultural
products, given their particular
importance from the point of view of
food security, rural development and
the guarantee of subsistence. The
United States rejected this proposal.
The special safeguard mechanism was
intended to protect farmers in
developing countries from sudden
surges in imports.
Similarly, the African Union, the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
The G-22, also known as “G-20+” was
originally formed by 17 developing
countries in response to the European
Union-United States proposal on
agriculture (13 August 2003), which
they found lacking in terms of
agricultural liberalization. This group
then became the G-20 which,
coordinated by Brazil, put forward a
proposal document (20 August 2003),
before becoming the G-21 at the
beginning of the Conference. Its
proposals called for the elimination of
certain subsidies (blue box and later
export subsidies), the establishment of
criteria and deadlines for an end to
other subsidies (green and amber
box), aid programmes incorporated
into special and differential treatment,
and well-defined possibilities for
smaller tariff reduction for developing
countries (especially with regard to
particular products). The countries
involved came to represent more than
60% of the world’s farmers. At the
request of the group, its text was
included along with the other
proposals and General Council
group of countries and the LDCs joined in
a “Grand Alliance” on the second day of
the Conference. This group –like G33–
called for a balanced framework for
agriculture based on the three pillars of
the agreement, with special and
differential treatment in strategic
products, a special safeguard mechanism
and the maintenance of preferences. This
proposal was welcomed by the G-22
countries. The negotiating priorities of the
Grand Alliance were: agriculture, market
access for non-agricultural goods, special
and differential treatment and the cotton
proposal. The countries were opposed to
the initiation of negotiations on the
Singapore issues. On 20 August, within
the African group, a subgroup formed by
the world’s poorest countries (Benin, Mali,
Chad and Burkina Faso) launched a
proposal to eliminate cotton subsidies,
with the support of a number of NGOs
and backed by a large body of research.
These subsidies are used in the United
States and the European Union and also,
albeit with a lower impact on international
prices, in China and other developing
countries.
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), briefing notes from the Fifth Ministerial Conference, Cancún, 10-14 September, 2003; International
Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD/CINPE); “Puentes”, Diario de Cancún, 10-15 September, 2003.
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As the Cancún Conference drew near, as the table
shows, practically all the Latin American and Caribbean
countries were represented in one of the three groups of
developing nations. They represent the majority and play
a leading role –especially Brazil and Argentina– in the
G-22, and this is likely to continue into the next period.
After the Cancún Conference, almost all the countries
negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States
withdrew from the group.
The communications submitted by the region’s
governments at Cancún referred in the main to
agriculture and to the importance of special and
differential treatment to address their economic and
social development needs. A number of countries
wanted to strengthen special and differential treatment
and make it binding. Institutional aspects of WTO were
also recurrent themes.42 They took very different
stances with respect to the Singapore issues, however.
CARICOM put forward an integrated vision for the
subregion, stressing the lack of progress in the Doha
agenda with regard to the vulnerability of its small
economies.
Table V.2
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES IN INTEREST GROUPS IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM a
(Formed in different processes)
Period Created or in existence during preparations Formed around Cancún, 2003
formed for Doha, 2001
Group G-7 Cairns Common interest G-22 AU/ACP/LDCs G-33
Composition 7 countries 17 countries 12 developing 22 developing Poorest countries 33 developing
countries countries countries
Interest Implementation Liberalization Developing Equitable –Balanced Framework for
proposals of agricultural countries and liberalization framework for SPsc and SSMsd
sector special and of agricultural agriculture in negotiations
differential sector – Opposed to on agriculture
treatment Singapore issues





Costa Rica V V
















countries (of ACP) V
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of public information.
V = country participating in the group shown; */ country speaking for the group shown; **/ country speaking for a group of developing countries (G-77
plus China).
a Approximate reference of composition. b AU = African Union; ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific States; LDCs = least development countries.
c
 Strategic products. d Special Safeguard Mechanism.
42 For reference, see Venezuela and CARICOM (WTO documents: WT/MIN(03)/ST/48 and 6). WTO, 2003s and 2003t.
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E. Reflections on the governance of the
multilateral system
Problems with the discussions, negotiations and the
decision-making process in WTO are the subject of
growing debate, as witnessed by a number of
communications at the last Conference. The lack of
results at Cancún is the latest in a series of difficulties
that have arisen with working procedures and decision-
making in the multilateral trade system. This is a
reflection of the new, more complex situation the
organization must deal with as the number of countries
and subjects under discussion widen. WTO faces
challenges with regard to transparency, working
procedures and their effects on the participation of its
147 members, the role of the Secretariat and the decision-
making process, and the dispute settlement system,
among others (see UNCTAD, 2003b; Evenett, 2003).
With respect to transparency, reservations have been
expressed about how ministerial conferences are conducted,
and proposals have been made to improve them. In
particular, a group of developing countries –including Cuba,
Honduras and the Dominican Republic– made a number
of recommendations with respect to agenda-setting, the role
of the plenary commission, the appointment of facilitators
and consultation procedure, among others (WTO, 2002c).
Some of these recommendations were welcomed at the
most recent conference. The way the negotiations are
organized has also worked against the interests of the
developing countries, by dividing up their concerns among
different negotiating groups, as happened with the
implementation issues and special and differential treatment
after Doha.
There can be no doubt that the number of members
and the need for consensus are among the main concerns
with respect to decision making, and the role of the
Secretariat is also a matter of discussion and questioning.
For example, CARICOM cites the need for increased
involvement of technical experts from developing
countries in the WTO Secretariat. The dispute settlement
system also presents problems for developing countries
in dealing with cases in which they are interested or
involved.43 In this regard, too, the Secretariat has drawn
criticism.44
The developing countries lack resources to attend
the many instances of discussion or negotiation, which
cover a constantly expanding range of increasingly
complex subjects. This means that they encounter
difficulties in dealing with the multiple demands for their
attention to the regular work, in addition to the
preparatory activities, formal and informal meetings, and
the green room practice which convenes specific
delegations (Khor, 2003).45 While some of their
recommendations were implemented at Cancún, this
type of problem with the system and the need for reform
have fuelled criticisms even from developed countries,
and indeed the European Union, given the lack of results
at the most recent conference.
In general terms, the situation has drawn attention
to the governance of the multilateral system and calls
for new approaches in order to deal with differences and
existing imbalances (Ortiz, 2002; Tórtora, 2003).
Both the governments and WTO have prepared
strategies to boost the credibility of the system, including
more extensive dissemination of information,
discussions with local actors, coordination with NGOs,
and so forth. This, in turn, ties in with domestic
governance, which certainly affects the countries’ ability
to prepare development strategies and defend the
proposals that will help them carry those strategies
forward in the negotiations at the multiple levels at which
they are involved.
As ECLAC has pointed out, multilateral, subregional
and national institutions in a number of areas can
complement each other to carry forward development
tasks (ECLAC, 2002b). Having acknowledged the
interdependence of the negotiations at these different
levels, societies and governments must strive to ensure
that the principle of beneficial complementarity is
inherent in their processes of insti tutional
development.
43 For example, developing countries have a smaller capacity for trade retaliation, given their smaller size. Also, no special provisions exist for
assisting those economies during dispute settlement, or helping them to deal with the high costs involved (ECLAC, 2003j, chapter 8).
44 The Doha Conference set in motion a process to improve the procedures of the dispute settling mechanism, which is the main binding element in the
multilateral agreements. The deadline of this process has not been met thus far.
45 In 2000, only 65 developing countries kept missions at WTO and 24 lacked a permanent presence in Geneva (Khor, 2003).
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Introduction
Chapter VI
The effect of China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization on economic relations
with Latin America and the Caribbean
Most studies show that the accession, on 22 December 2001, of the People’s Republic of
China to the WTO is likely to have a significant impact on trade. China stands to make
significant gains in market access to some of the world’s most dynamic economies, at the
expense of exports from other developing nations, especially low-income countries in south
Asia and the American hemisphere. Estimates show, however, that the impact is moderate.1
the group of recently industrialized Asian economies
(27.6%), which were followed by Japan (18%), the
European Union (15%), the United States (11%) and
the four major economies of the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (7%). This structure was
very similar to that of 1994.
Over the last couple of years, the share of intra-
Asian trade in the international economy has increased,
consolidating the new patterns of export specialization.
During the 2002-2003 biennium, trade in goods between
China and Japan totalled over US$ 120 billion,
prolonging the explosive growth that had continued for
five years in a row. Even more significant is the fact that
for the first time, China surpassed the United States as
1 See Bhalla and Qiu (2002); Naughton (2001); EAU (1997); Yang (2000); Fernández (2000); Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003).
At the time of China’s accession to WTO, its main
trading partner was the United States,  which
accounted for 20% of its exports; Japan was second,
with 16%. The recently industrialized economies of
Asia (Taiwan province of China, Hong Kong (Special
Administrative Region of China), Singapore and
Republic of Korea) accounted for 26.5% of its exports,
and the European Union followed, with 16%. This
composition clearly reflected the thrust of China’s
export policy. In 1994, the recently industrialized
economies accounted for nearly 34% of China’s
exports; they were followed by Japan (18%), the
United States (17%) and the European Union (12%).
In 2001, the main source of China’s imports was also
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the main market of origin for Japanese imports; during
that period, 21.3% of Japan’s imports came from China,
while China’s exports to the United States exceeded
United States imports from Japan. China has thus
consolidated its position as a major player in trade, given
its strong commercial relations with Japan, the recently
industrialized Asian economies, and ASEAN.
Projections of investments by major Japanese companies
show that the integration of production in northern Asia
is likely to intensify, over both the short and the long
term, stimulated by growing intra-industrial and
intracompany trade in the ICT-intensive industries.
This chapter deals with the implications for trade in
Latin America and the Caribbean of China’s accession to
WTO. The chapter consists of six sections, including the
Introduction. The following section describes the structure
of Chinese exports and imports, focusing on those that
are of special interest to the region. Section C describes
the concessions made by China with regard to its trade in
goods and services with different members of WTO and
the general implications this has for the growth of China’s
trade and investments. This is followed by an analysis of
negotiations between China and the Latin American
countries, and the impact the growth of Chinese imports
and exports has had on Latin America’s trade. The next-
to-last section identifies the challenges posed by
integration between China and its south-east Asian trading
partners. The final section describes the affinities between
China and Brazil, as well as the partnerships that have
been shaped in WTO around issues of common interest.
A. A profile of China’s competitive advantages
China is the fourth largest economy in terms of
international trade. In 2003, it accounted for 5.9% and
2.5% of world exports of goods and commercial services,
in that order (WTO, 2004). Some analysts believe that
the growth of production associated with China’s entry
into WTO will occur mostly in textiles and clothing, to
the detriment of agriculture and the automotive sector
(Deutsche Bank, 2001). China’s exports of capital- and
technology-intensive products specialize in labour-
intensive assembly operations. It appears that the main
reason behind the competitiveness of the Chinese
economy is the abundance of cheap labour; it is estimated
that there are 712 million workers in the Chinese labour
market, and that 499 million of them work in rural
farming areas in the interior of the country.
There is evidence, however, that China is gaining
market shares in capital- and technology-intensive goods
and that it is losing ground when it comes to labour-
intensive goods, including most of its main textile
exports. Thus, the considerable growth of Sino-Japanese
trade, mentioned above, has been stimulated, on the one
hand, by the expansion of Japanese exports of capital
goods and manufactured production inputs such as
semiconductors, electronic parts, metalworking
machinery and automatic cranes, as well as of traditional
exports of iron and steel products. On the other hand,
the growth of Chinese exports to Japan is headed up by
machinery, which for the first time is in first place,
displacing traditional textile products. Exports of office,
communications and telephone equipment also increased
significantly, bringing to light new patterns of export
specialization within the industry and China’s move
towards the production of more high-tech manufactured
products.
The structure of China’s imports shows a
preponderance of intermediate goods and spare parts.
With the exception of “other machinery” and oil (27%
of China’s imports), the seven leadings imports are
intermediate goods. The data also show that over the
last few years, China has increased its production
capacity in these categories, to the detriment of assembly
operations.
As will be noted later on, a less well-known aspect
of China’s import profile, and one that is very important
to Latin America and the Caribbean, is the fairly
important role of the east Asian economies in supplying
products for the forestry and agrifood industries. Thus,
the Republic of Korea is expected to benefit from an
increase in shipments of wood and of paper products, in
addition to the more predictable items, such as textiles,
petrochemicals and non-ferrous metals. Singapore
should benefit from a boom in exports of processed
foods, as well as electronic and petrochemical products
(Deutsche Bank, 2001).
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China’s accession to WTO has also enhanced the
competitiveness of its agriculture and forestry sectors.
This is happening against the backdrop of a steady
increase in agricultural exports even before China’s
accession; such exports had peaked at US$ 14 billion in
the mid-1990s. The trend is clearly towards a growing
surplus on China’s agricultural trade balance.
The products that are most important to Latin
America and the Caribbean are bulk agricultural products,
including cereals, oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits,
vegetable oils and sugar. China is also a net importer of
inedible animal products. Uruguay, in particular, is an
exporter of by-products from cattle farming. China’s
exports of fishery and vegetable products have also grown
considerably, with vegetables taking the lead among
agricultural exports (Feng, 2001). Nevertheless, China
does not seem to be competing in these categories with
Latin America and the Caribbean; rather, the foreign trade
profiles of China and the region seem to complement each
other, in keeping with a traditional Ricardian approach.
It should be noted that the sectors of agriculture
that show a trade deficit tend to fluctuate more on a year-
to-year basis. According to the experts, this is a sign of
administrative intervention in the distribution of bulk
agricultural products, especially in monopolistic state
systems (Feng, 2001).
B. China’s commitments upon acceding to WTO
1. China’s commitments in regard to market access
Trade in goods
China promised to reduce its nominal (weighted)
average tariff of 11.1% at the end of 2001 to around
6.9% over the first five years after its accession to WTO;
it also undertook to abolish many of its non-tariff barriers
(mainly restrictive quotas) by around 2006.2 However,
the positive impact of tariff reduction will be more
limited, since the tariffs in force in China at the end of
2001 were much lower than the nominal tariffs. The
changes brought about by accession to WTO tended
instead to be directed at correcting distortions in relative
prices. The Government was already offering a number
of concessions and tariff exemptions for imports made
by companies engaged in processing exports, high-tech
companies, strategic industries and a large share of
government purchases. Bearing in mind these
considerations, the actual reduction only amounted to
between 3.6% and 2.3%.
Assessments of China’s implementation of the
commitments it made in order to accede to WTO indicate
that tariff reductions have been adequately applied since
1 January 2003. In some categories, in fact, China has
reduced tariffs beyond the agreed levels.
According to China’s official assessment of its
compliance with the agreements, since 1 January 2001,
China has reduced import tariffs for more than 5,000
products. The overall average level of tariffs has fallen
from 15.3% to 12%; for some high-tech products, they
have been reduced to zero. In addition, quotas and
licenses for certain products were eliminated. China
has made corrections in 2,300 regulatory documents;
830 have been revoked, and 325 revised. The country
has opened up more sectors to foreign investment,
strengthened copyright protection, dealt with trade
disputes according to WTO rules, and provided
intensive training for corporate personnel
(www.china.org.cn).3
2 In manufactures, China undertook to abolish non-tariff barriers and to reduce tariffs from the 2001 level of 13.3% to 6.8% by the end of
the period of implementation.
3 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation; Xinhua news agency, 9 September 2003.
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As far as natural resources are concerned, tariff
protection is low in the forestry and fishery sectors
(3.1%) and high in “planted fibre” (67.7%), tobacco and
beverages (44.8%), processed foods (31.1%), grains and
oil-seeds (26.2%) (Bhalla and Qiu, 2002).
In the agriculture sector, China had reached an
agreement with the United States in order to gain access
to WTO. This agreement, which was signed on 17
November 1999 in Beijing and was ratified by the United
States Congress on 19 September 2000, opened the way
for greater access to the Chinese market. The Chinese
authorities also agreed to eliminate farm subsidies. In
particular, private companies will have access to the
quota system for bulk farm products (wheat, maize,
cotton, barley and other grains). At the same time,
agricultural companies will be able to make imports into
China and distribute their products without going
through State enterprises. In this sector, the commitment
to eliminate tariffs is important, given that the average
tariff on agricultural products was 17% in 2000 (Oviedo,
2003).4
Chinese imports of agricultural goods are expected
to increase, although as noted earlier, that growth will
not be as high as originally projected, since many farm
products will be continue to be protected during the
implementation period (Huang and Rozelle, World Bank,
2002; quoted by Ianchovichina and Walmsley). This is
shown by the figures on sectoral tariff barriers (Bhalla
and Qiu, 2002). Given the variance in tariff levels,
however, there have been significant reductions in foods
and beverages, as well as in primary resources. Post-
WTO reductions will be seen in increased imports of
foods and beverages in general, and of vegetable and
animal oils, high-grade wine and coffee in particular.
Moreover, the relaxation of restrictive quotas for bulk
agricultural products (such as maize and barley) will also
allow for more low-cost imports and better-quality raw
materials for the Chinese food and beverage industry.
Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand
will substantially increase their exports of agricultural
products to China. In the case of raw materials such as
steel and aluminium, import tariffs will decline.
At the time of its accession to WTO, China’s non-
tariff barriers were much more important than tariff
barriers, especially with regard to import quotas,
licensing and phytosanitary regulations. At present, it is
estimated that non-tariff barriers are equivalent to an
average tariff of 8.3%. The commitments made by China
should translate into a reduction of such barriers to a
tariff equivalency of 2.4% by 2006.
During the first year of implementation, the most
controversial non-tariff issues were Tariff Rate Quotas
(TRQs), China’s policy on genetically modified
organisms and end-use certification for certain products
covered by the Information Technology Agreement
(ITA). Bilateral contacts have facilitated some efforts at
agreement in these areas, but a number of controversial
points are still pending.
According to the United States Trade Representative,
complex procedures for granting import licences have
created obstacles for United States companies. Also,
problems with the implementation of tariff quotas
relating to agriculture may lead to the first case being
brought against China in the context of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. A number of serious barriers still stand
in the way of foreign companies’ investing in agricultural
biotechnology in China.
Trade in services
In services, China undertook to gradually relax
the legislation on property and geographic restrictions
to foreign investment in banking, securities,
telecommunications, professional services and
distribution and logistics (Deutsche Bank, 2001).5 In this
regard, compliance with commitments in regard to
distribution and maritime and air transport is especially
important for Latin America and the Caribbean,
considering the potentially positive impact it would have
for improving the scale and quality of trade (Matoo,
2002). China agreed to allow foreign companies to
obtain full marketing rights (beyond the right to import
inputs) for almost all products over a three-year period.
Foreign capital involved in joint ventures with minority
shareholder participation were to obtain full marketing
rights by 11 December 2002.
Assessments of implementation of the agreements
on the part of the United States stress the private sector’s
concern about effective authorization to foreign
companies to increase their activities, so as to ensure
compliance on the issues of distribution and marketing
rights. Marketing and distribution rights in China seem
to be in a state of flux. Some new regulations have been
issued, but companies are still not sure how full
distribution and marketing rights will be implemented
by 22 December 2004. Of special concern is the fact
4 The methodology applied by the United States for non-market economies in antidumping cases relating to imports from China will
remain in force for 15 years after the date of China’s accession to WTO (Gitli and Arce, 2001).
5 In terms of mathematical averages of tariffs, the reduction would be equivalent to a drop from 15.3% to 9% in 2006.
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that Chinese authorities may impose restrictions on those
rights according to product areas.6
A key issue that is still pending is that of how imported
products can be distributed in China. As things stand,
companies that operate with foreign investment are only
allowed to distribute the products they manufacture in
China and may only offer post-sale services for those
products. China holds that only companies with specific
distribution licences may distribute products from third
companies or imported products from a related company,
regardless of whether or not that company has marketing
rights. There are indications that the Chinese authorities
may be considering authorizing companies with foreign
investment to import and distribute products within
specific industries, but not on an industry-wide basis
(US-China Business Council, 2003).
2. The knock-on effect of China’s growth
6 The new provisional regulations published by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) in February 2003 do
not restrict distribution rights, but they are seen as a potential violation of China’s commitments, since marketing rights were to be
granted by means of notification and were not supposed to be subject to additional requirements relating to investment or approval.
7 Analysts stress the importance of legal and institutional reforms associated with China’s entry into WTO, which should improve legal
certainty and transparency and foster a climate of competition. There has been criticism to the effect that the commitment to transparency
has not been evenly implemented in all cases. It has also been noted that the Chinese delegation did not meet expectations for cooperation
and transparency during the first stage of the transitional review mechanism (US-China Business Council, 2003).
One of the main benefits of China’s accession to WTO
is the increased and enhanced access to its market that
has been possible as its economic growth rate has picked
up.7 This effect will increase as the allocation of
production resources is improved, thanks to increased
specialization based on comparative advantages, more
rapid and more efficient accumulation of physical
capital, and more accelerated growth of productivity
through technology transfers via the expansion of capital
and of imported intermediate goods. Deutsche Bank
(2001) estimates, based on China’s final commitments
to WTO, show that the effect will be an increase of
0.11 point in the annual growth of China’s GDP during
the period 2002-2006. Preliminary studies showed an
increase of 0.45 of a percentage point, although these
studies were based on potential commitments before
agreement had been reached on the access protocols.
The growth of Chinese demand has been a key factor
in the recovery of international commodity prices in
2003. With purchases of over three million metric tons
per year of copper, China has surpassed the United States
as the primary consumer of copper in the world (Diario
Financiero, 2003). According to the data for June,
China’s consumption increased by 20.7% this year.
China competes with developing countries in regard
to exports in labour-intensive market segments; this
competition is based on price differences. As regards
manufactures in general, China is more competitive in
terms of wages and labour costs per production unit than
Mexico, where wages are equivalent to 7.8 times those
of Chinese workers, or Bolivia (3.7 times) and Chile
(12.5 times). In the clothing industry, Costa Rica’s cost
in hourly wages is equivalent to 12.2 times that of China,
Guatemala’s is 3 times, and Mexico’s is 3.5 times
(Shafaeddin, 2002). Moreover, thanks to the adoption
of foreign technology by way of direct investment,
productivity in the textile, clothing and footwear
industries is estimated to vary from 30% to 62% in
collective enterprises and from 20% to 59% in state
enterprises (Ianchovichina and Walmsley, 2003).
China also has competitive potential in labour-
intensive agricultural products, strengthened by the
lifting of restrictions on foreign investment in agriculture
and agroindustry (especially in food processing). Foreign
investment is still weakened, however, by restrictions
on the purchase of land, a business climate of uncertainty,
and environmental policy, which is apparently limited,
however, to east Asia, especially south-east Asia
(EAU, 1997).
It appears, from the estimates that have been made
to date, that for a significant number of developing
countries, especially the non-Asian ones, the negative
effect of increased competition in large markets
(especially the United States and Europe) and its
implications for domestic production may outweigh the
benefits to be gained from the increase in exports to
China and the overall growth of demand that would be
brought about by the further expansion of the world
economy. This is particularly true in the cases of the
Dominican Republic, the Caribbean, and Costa Rica in
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Central America, especially in regard to textiles, footwear
and medical instruments (Gitli and Arce 2001). Net
losses have been more significant in the cases of India,
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam
in Asia, as well as Latin America as a whole (Deutsche
Bank, 2001) (Shafaeddin, 2002 and Ianchovichina and
Walmsley, 2003). The impact on the main South
American countries has not yet been established.
C. The impact of China’s accession to WTO on
trade in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Negotiations between China and the Latin American and
Caribbean countries
In 1994, the Latin American and Caribbean countries
began bilateral negotiations with China, following the
stricter and more complex modalities established by
WTO. This was after China had signed the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, known as the Marrakech
Agreement, and before the first meeting of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, held in the framework
of WTO in March 1996. Despite the misgivings of the
Central American and Caribbean countries about the
impact of Chinese competition on the textile, clothing
and footwear sectors, the negotiations for China’s
accession to WTO were difficult, to varying degrees,
only in the cases of Mexico and Argentina. Chile, on the
opposite side of the world, was the first country in the
continent to sign an accession agreement with China,
although most of the Latin American countries granted
China Most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. The last
Latin American countries to sign agreements with China
were Bolivia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala and México.
Chile signed the accession agreement in November
1999. The agreement included a tariff- consolidation list
of 115 products, mainly in the agriculture, fishery and
maritime, forestry and wood products, copper mining
and fertilizer sectors, and it provided for initial
negotiations on 25 products (Gutiérrez, 2002).
Negotiations between Argentina and China, which began
in 1994, also focused on priority lists of goods, with no
requirements being made regarding services. The talks
were limited to agricultural products with a high degree
of customs protection, difficulty of access in terms of
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and domestic
subsidies. The agreement was finally signed in March
2000. China granted Argentina concessions on a total
of 68 items, mostly agricultural products, plus a number
of fishery and petroleum products and rubber and
mineral manufactures. China also granted tariff quotas
for wheat, maize, soya bean oil and wool. The agreement
also included provisions relating to sanitary and
phytosanitary measures applied to exports of beef,
mutton and lamb. Subsequently, both authorities signed
agreements on these matters, as well as on dairy products
and poultry, along with other agreements relating to
sanitary conditions for pork and risk analysis in the case
of apples, pears and citrus fruits (Oviedo, 2003).
In a visit to Brazil in 1993, Li Rihuan coined the
phrase “strategic partnership” to define the potentialities
of the relationship between the largest developing
country in the American hemisphere and the largest
developing economy in the world. Brazil supported
China’s access to WTO because it felt that China could
help bring about fairer rules for international trade and
preferential access for developing countries to the
Chinese market (Altemani, 2002). Later, in August 2002,
a sanitary equivalency agreement was signed which
opened up opportunities for beef and poultry exports.
Negotiations with Mexico, the last country to
conclude them, went on until September 2001, just days
before the final meeting of the Working Party on the
Accession of China (González, 2002). These
negotiations were especially complex because of the
misgivings of the Mexican authorities about the
commercial impact on the maquila industry of
competition from Chinese products and what Mexicans
perceived as China’s aggressive policy for attracting
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foreign investment. Bilateral negotiations between
China and Mexico were only cleared up when President
Fox made an official trip on the occasion of the summit
meeting of leaders of Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). The Mexican authorities finally
came around to the view that an agreement with China
would be a good thing and that Mexico could not remain
completely isolated in the context of WTO. This was in
spite of the fact that a significant part of the business
sector did not want to accept any agreement with China
that did not include a commitment by China to waive,
over a period of at least 10 years, the right to resort to
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should Mexico
wish to impose countervailing duties in cases of alleged
unfair trade. The Mexican entrepreneurs wanted 20 years;
in the end, the agreement provided for a moratorium up
to 2008. Mexico has imposed countervailing duties of
up to 800% and 1,000% for certain Chinese exports that
dominate the domestic market, particularly in textiles,
toys and simple tools. According to Mexican analysts,
the Government –the Office of the President and the
Secretariats of Economic Affairs and Foreign Relations–
clearly understand the inevitable commercial and
economic interdependence between Mexico and China,
and they realize that China is their strongest competitor
for the main market, i.e., the United States. Likewise,
business and political leaders realize that Mexico needs
to find formulas for strengthening economic ties with
China, albeit without a free trade agreement for the time
being. For these sectors, there is no doubt that it is in their
best interests for China to be committed to observing the
rules of multilateral trade.
2. Overall assessment of the impact on Latin America and the
Caribbean
The area in which China’s accession to WTO will have
the greatest impact on Latin America is that of traditional
trade, which relies on the comparative advantages
inherent in the relative availability of production
resources. The net static effect on the region is the
outcome of increased trade with China as a result, firstly,
of improved market access and, secondly, of economic
growth, minus the effects associated with having to
compete with Chinese products, in both domestic and
third markets. The competitiveness of Chinese products,
as determined by the profile of imports of Chinese
products in Latin America and the Caribbean, will be
reflected in the substitution of local production of
textiles, clothing and footwear, as well as plastics and
rubber manufactures.
Except in the case of Mexico, the share of
manufactured goods, especially light industry products,
in Latin American exports is not as high as in most Asian
nations. However, Latin American exports go mainly to
the United States, which is also China’s main market.
Contrary to the situation with south-east Asia, where
complementary effects –increased intra-industrial trade,
cross investments, strategic partnerships– are significant,
the prospects for the Latin America and Caribbean
countries are fewer and more limited, as they are
confined to intra-industrial trade in certain links in the
chain of production in the automotive, electronics and
information technology sectors. Latin America and the
Caribbean also do not benefit directly from the growth
and liberalization of the infrastructure sector, including
ports and airports, except perhaps for a small group of
Brazilian and Argentine companies. This is also the case
with tourism and professional services, where physical
distance is accentuated by cultural distance.
As a backdrop for an analysis of the impact of
China’s access to WTO, it should be noted that estimates
had indicated that by 2005, the accession of China and
the elimination of restrictive quotas would increase its
share in the United States market for products in the
clothing industry by three percentage points. The
increase in China’s market share was expected to bring
about a reduction of approximately four percentage
points in the market share of “all others”, including
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean Basin
countries (Gitli and Arce, 2001). Moreover, private
sources had estimated that China’s exports would surpass
those of suppliers from east Asia, south-east Asia and
Latin America in previously restricted markets,
especially in clothing and textiles. Thus, the projections
showed that China’s share of United States imports of
textiles and clothing would increase by around 14%
between 2002 and 2006. During this same period, as a
result of its entry into WTO, Chinese clothing exports
were expected to increase by US$ 55 million, and
exports of those products to the European market were
also expected to increase.
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Similarly, in trade in final goods, China competes
with Mexico and Brazil in the market for machinery and
equipment, especially the United States market, which
is also the main market for those countries.
Thus, the panorama is varied throughout the
region. In some cases, such as those of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Peru, the positive impact of reforms
in access to the Chinese market and the acceleration of
the economic growth rate would work together to
outweigh the potentially adverse effect of competition
from Chinese imports with national and third-market
industries, although this effect has been considerable
in labour-intensive sectors and a significant number of
small and medium-sized businesses. In other instances,
such as those of Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean, the opposite would be the case, particularly
since they would lose part of their share of United States
market. As may be seen from analyses conducted before
China’s accession to WTO, four sectors in Central
America and the Caribbean were most affected by this
increased competition, namely, clothing, footwear,
machinery and electric appliances and parts, and
optical, photographic and musical instruments and
appliances (Gitli and Arce, 2001).
With China’s entry into WTO, by 2005 the
elimination of current quotas in the context of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing would enable it to
considerably increase its share in the world market; this
would have a significant effect on other regional
suppliers of those goods. China’s access to WTO will
lead to the abolition of quotas for Chinese textiles and
clothing exports to the European Union and the United
States in 2005. Thus, China will become a formidable
competitor, especially in the clothing sector. Indeed,
United States Government estimates indicate that with
the elimination of quotas, China could increase its share
in the world market by more than six percentage points
in 2005; this would help it maintain its position as the
leading supplier of clothing products, eventually
stabilizing that share at around 37% (Gitli and Arce,
2001, p. 97). However, China will be subject to additional
safeguard quotas for textiles up to 2007, although such
quotas can only be applied one year at a time, contrary
to existing quotas which are imposed for an indefinite
period (Ianchovichina and Walmsley, 2003).
The improvement of conditions for China to gain
access for its products to the United States market meant
reducing the preferential advantages enjoyed by Mexico
under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and by the Caribbean, under the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) (entry under special shared
production terms). This has changed the environment
in which a complex production chain has been developed
between Mexico, the Caribbean and the United States
in the textiles, clothing and footwear industry (Gitli and
Arce 2001; Fernández, 2000).
Preliminary figures for 2002 and 2003 do in fact
show the impact of Chinese competition in third
markets in the cases of Mexico, Central America and
the Caribbean. It has been especially intense in the
textiles, clothing and footwear industries, especially
the Mexican maquila industry, and somewhat less so
in home appliances and tools (Financial Times, 2003).
Unofficial estimates indicate that 85% of Mexican shoe
manufacturers have moved to China. The situation with
textiles and technology assembly plants is similar. In
particular, large corporations like Sony, NEC, VTech,
On Semiconductor and makers of Kodak X-ray film
have moved their factories. Just IBM and Microsoft
moved projects worth around US$ 1 billion to Asia.8
In 2002, thanks to the growth of exports of textiles and
electronics at low cost, China displaced Japan as the
third largest exporter to the United States for a group
of products representing 42% of Mexico’s maquila
production. According to a recent report by Merrill
Lynch, twelve of the 20 main exports from Mexico to
the United States are threatened by competition from
China; it is feared that China will displace Mexico as
the second largest supplier to the United States (Wall
Street Journal, 2003). According to studies conducted
by the National Council of the Mexican Maquila
Industry, the advantage that Mexico needs to exploit
now is that of the shorter time frames in the supply
chain. It is estimated that 300,000 jobs have been lost
in the sector over the last three years; this represents
an estimated loss of US$ 1 billion per year (Wall Street
Journal, 2003).
Relying on the fact that China has agreed to the
maintenance of countervailing quotas for some 1,300
products over a period of nearly six years, Mexico is
complying with its commitments to gradually eliminate
tariffs on Chinese products. According to Chinese
authorities’ estimates of the potential, Mexico could
eventually attract Chinese investments in textiles for
US$ 200 million.
During the first four months of 2003, China has been
displacing Japan as the second largest market of origin
for Mexican imports, surpassing exports from Central
8 It is estimated that in Mexico, these moves have caused 300,000 workers to lose their jobs since 2000 because of the difficulty of
competing with China, where hourly wages, including benefits and taxes, amount to US$ 0.27, which is four times lower than Mexican
wages. National Council of the Mexican Maquila Industry (Wall Street Journal, 2003).
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America and the Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI) together. Mexico’s trade deficit with China has
also risen sharply. In 2002, Mexico experienced deficits
in 94 branches of production, totalling US$ 5.832 billion,
and had surpluses in only five categories, totalling
US$ 3 million. The deficit rose by 55.4% in 2002. The
largest deficit was in the category of electrical apparatus
and supplies (US$ 2.224 billion). Deficits were
substantial in machinery, tools and mechanical apparatus,
according to figures published by the Secretariat of
Economic Affairs. It is estimated that inputs for the
maquila industry account for 51% of all imports of
Chinese products (Reforma, 2003). This balance is
corroborated by a report of the Mexico Committee of the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC),
which notes that this year more than 100 Mexican
products, from brooms to auto parts, will be displaced by
Chinese competition on the United States market.
3. The boom in exports from Latin America to China
In 2002, Mexico’s exports to China, which totalled
around US$ 456 million, included an interesting mix of
industrial inputs for the electronics sector and a relatively
diversified structure, with the top 20 products accounting
for 84.76% of all exports. Mexico also exports food and
beverages, including Corona beer (América Economía,
2003), and tools (LAIA, 2003).
In general, the growth of the Chinese economy and
its industrial reforms have had a strong knock-on effect
on the mining and forestry industries by generating
increased demand for inputs from those sectors. It
appears that this effect has been outweighed the effect
of reducing tariff barriers, given that in practice, tariffs
had already been substantially reduced prior to China’s
accession to WTO. The products that have most benefited
from the export boom brought about by the growth of
the Chinese economy are iron, copper ores, aluminium,
liquid natural gas and energy resources in general. This
is attested to by the initial figures on trade between China
and Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, in 2002 and the
first half of 2003 (Financial Times, 2003).
In 2003, Brazil’s exports to China showed strong
growth in products ranging from commodities such as
soya beans, chickens and iron ore, to industrial
manufactures such as small cars and patrol planes.
China’s demand for iron is expected to grow by 28
million tons. Brazil’s exporters of soya beans more than
doubled their shipments to China over the last three
years, and this year they expect to sell 5 million tons.
Expectations are also high for exports of paper, cellulose,
orange juice, sugar and coffee. In 2003, China became
the second largest market for Brazilian exports,
surpassing Japan. The ten main exports grew by 80%,
totalling over US$ 3 billion; especially noteworthy were
crushed soya beans (60%), flat-rolled products of iron
(420%), parts for motor vehicles (279%), crude soya
bean oil (118,4%) and internal combustion motors and
pumps (946%) (Brazil, 2003).
Brazil is the country that has made the greatest effort
to strengthen its economic relations with China, going
beyond traditional trading patterns. In November 2001,
the establishment of a joint venture between Vale do Rio
Doce and Baogang Metallurgic was announced. In
September 2002, a joint programme was set up by
Brazilian Aircraft Corporation (EMBRAER) and Chinese
Air Company (AVIC2). According to Brazilian and
Chinese analysts (Chengxu, 2001), China’s access to WTO
should create new opportunities for the further growth of
trade and complementary cooperation between the two
countries. There are definitely signs of a qualitative
improvement in Brazil’s economic relations with China
since China’s accession to WTO. As far as intra-industrial
trade is concerned, in the automotive sector, a five-year
contract for US$ 5.5 billion was announced, under which
Volkswagen Brazil will supply components for the
assembly in China of the Gol model. In regard to
investments, during the current year, EMBRAER will
finalize its plans to invest in the setting up of a regional
jet factory in the Chinese province of Harbin. This will
be the first foreign investment to be made by the Brazilian
aeronautical company, and it will be inaugurated by
President Luiz Ignacio da Silva. In the mining sector, the
largest company in the world, Brazil’s Vale do Rio Doce,
has announced that it will enter into a strategic partnership
with Shanghai Bao Steel Group Corporation, the largest
in China. This same Brazilian corporation is also
negotiating with Chinese investors the construction of steel
billet plants in northern Brazil.
Chile and Peru have also seen strong evidence of
the knock-on effect of China’s economic growth in
Chinese demand for copper ore, which has grown by
over 12%, twice as much as expected. International
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commodity prices seem to be rising, stimulated by the
explosive increase in Chinese demand (Diario
Estrategia, Chile). Chile has significantly increased its
exports, especially of copper by-products, during the first
half of this year, both to China (52%) and to Hong Kong
(Special Administrative Region of China) (68%)
(Direcon, 2003).
In the case of Chile, fruit exports to China fell by
42% during the last season owing to sanitary problems,
according to the National Federation of Fruit Growers,
which estimates the losses at US$ 5 million. Chile was
just about to sign a new agreement to sell prunes and
citrus fruits to China. In 2000, China allowed imports
of table grapes, apples and kiwi fruit. In 2003, the fruit
fly paralyzed exports, which are only allowed to enter
via Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of
China). Negotiations are underway to make shipments
through Shanghai (La Tercera, 2003).
Foreign trade statistics for the first eight months of
this year show that Argentina experienced a spectacular
growth in its exports to China –131% compared to the
same period in the previous year– amply surpassing
overall growth of exports to other destinations. In
general, during this period, east Asia and India became
the main export markets, along with MERCOSUR and
the European Union (INDEC, 2003).
Between January and December 2003, compared
with the same period in 2002, China was one of the
primary export markets for almost every country in Latin
America, especially the South American countries,
whose sales to China grew by around 80% (see table
VI.1 and figure VI.1), more than sales to Japan.
Table VI.1
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): MAIN DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS TO ASIA, 2002-2003
(Millions of dollars and growth rates)
Asia (including Japan) Japan China
Country/Destination
2002 2003 2003/2002 2002 2003 2003/2002 2002 2003 2003/2002
Latin America (16) 25 090 31 673 26.2 6 351 7 351 15.3 6 317 10 870 72.1
MERCOSUR 12 001 16 382 36.5 2 491 2 671 7.2 3 723 7 318 96.5
 Argentina 3 179 4 686 47.4 371 343 -7.5 1 092 2 659 143.4
 Brazil 8 566 11 422 33.3 2 098 2 311 10.1 2 520 4 533 79.9
 Paraguay 52 63 21.0 8 5 -33.7 8 9 12.4
 Uruguay 204 211 3.2 14 12 -11.4 104 118 13.6
Chile 5 158 6 624 28.4 1 955 2 297 16.0 1 224 1 941 58.5
Andean Community 4 950 5 425 9.6 1 282 1 604 25.1 738 906 22.7
 Bolivia 28 67 137.1 6 19 216.8 8 10 24.1
 Colombia 344 361 5.1 194 199 2.5 28 66 136.1
 Ecuador 411 345 -16.2 98 86 -12.7 15 15 1.3
 Peru 1 535 1 731 12.8 374 391 4.5 597 675 13.1
 Venezuela 332 468 41.1 145 304 109.6 91 140 54.0
Mexico 2 300 2 452 6.6 465 606 30.2 456 509 11.7
CACM 680 790 16.1 157 173 9.7 175 196 12.0
 Costa Rica 315 403 27.8 32 46 43.0 168 185 10.5
 El Salvador 41 49 18.7 11 14 27.4 3 5 57.4
 Guatemala 263 285 8.6 67 76 14.3 3 3 35.9
 Honduras 53 46 -14.7 41 31 -24.5 1 2 39.7
 Nicaragua 8 7 -7.0 6 5 -16.4 0 0 34.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics, for Paraguay, Bolivia and Central American
Common Market countries, 2003.
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D. Regionalism in East Asia and its potential
impact on Latin America and the Caribbean
Figure VI.1
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS TO CHINA, 2003
(Percentages of total)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
All the economies of east Asia have adopted active
policies on bilateral or subregional trade agreements,
although to date, other than the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the only free trade
agreement (FTA) that has actually been signed is the
one between Japan and Singapore. This is the only FTA
to be added to the three trans-Pacific treaties negotiated
since the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle,
namely: Chile-Korea, Singapore-New Zealand,
Singapore-United States. Over the next two years,
however, a free trade area is likely to be established
between China and ASEAN; negotiations between these
two parties have advanced much more than the talks
between Japan and Korea with the same economic bloc.
In November 2001, the heads of government of China
and the members of ASEAN decided to create a new
framework for economic cooperation, based on a free
trade area to be established within ten years. A few
months later, during an official trip through the region,
Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, proposed
to the members of ASEAN the creation of a
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Even though the
planned FTA may not become a reality for quite some
time, Latin America will find its opportunities limited
over the short term, since a preferential tariff reduction
for imports of fruits and other agricultural commodities
from ASEAN member countries will soon go into effect.
The creation of a free trade area would change the
scene in east Asia. Held together by its linkages with
the Chinese economy, the region would be an economic
bloc on the international scene, thus consolidating the
integration process that began in the 1980s and is now
stimulated by intraregional investment and the growth
of intra-industrial trade. A preferential trade regime,
accompanied by increased standardization of rules
relating to trade disciplines, investment, services,
technical and phytosanitary standards, trade facilitation
and mobility and other issues, would give a decisive
impetus to the deepening of regional integration and
consolidate the remarkable growth experienced by the
Asian economies in recent years. The region’s trade has
surpassed US$ 60 billion dollars, having grown by over
250% since 1996; the ASEAN countries’ main exports
are machinery and electronic equipment, mineral and
agricultural products and prepared foods, plastics, and
textiles and clothing. Even more important is the fact
that the Chinese market opened the way for these
countries to overcome their recession to the point that
their imports totalled US$ 33.8 billion in 2000, more















186 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
China’s share in the foreign trade of the south-east
Asian bloc rose from 2.1% in 1994 to 3.9% in 2000
(Ávila, 2002). A future free trade area integrating Japan
and China with ASEAN would greatly stimulate
intraregional trade. Preliminary estimates indicate that
ASEAN exports to China would grow by 48%, while
exports from China would increase by 52%. Above all,
this would have a significant impact on the economic
geography of Asia and the Pacific. A free trade area made
up of ASEAN and China would account for a combined
product of at least US$ 1.6 trillion and if Japan were to
be included, of US$ 5.5 trillion, making east Asia an
integrated pole vis à vis North America and Europe.
This potential scenario has significant implications
for Latin America and the Caribbean, owing to its impact
on international flows of direct investment and the
substantial diversion of trade that would take place in
those categories in which exports to China face serious
competition from the east Asian economies.
Table VI.2 shows the top 30 products that China
imported from Latin America and the Caribbean (37
countries) in 2001. The first column shows the ranking
of products by order of priority; the second column
shows the four-digit classification according to the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
Revision 2; and the third column lists the products. Next,
the table shows the total CIF value of Chinese imports
from Latin America both in terms of overall trade (on
the first line) and of individual products, as well as total
imports of the same product from all the world. The next
three columns show the specific product’s share of total
Chinese imports from Latin America and the Caribbean,
the same share in cumulative terms, and finally, the share
of imports of that product from Latin America as a
percentage of total Chinese imports from all the world.
The following columns show the five main countries
supplying that product and their share in total Chinese
imports of the product (2001). The last column indicates
the share of those five suppliers in total imports of the
product in question.
In 2001, the Asian economies were serious
competitors for a large basket of products representing
US$ 4.328 billion worth of exports from Latin America
and the Caribbean. These products included 20 of the
30 main exports from Latin America and the Caribbean
to China, including products from the mining (copper
and iron), petrochemicals, electronics, automotive,
forestry and agriculture sectors (see table VI.2). Asian
exports of these products to China totalled US$ 832
million, which is equivalent to 19% of Latin American
and Caribbean exports. Japan is the main competitor for
17 products in the electronics industry and mining
manufactures. It is followed by Taiwan province of
China, in petrochemical and electronic manufactures,
and then Korea, with a varied basket of products. Among
the main Latin American countries affected by this
situation are Brazil, with nine products, including sugar
and tobacco with Thailand; motors with Japan; and
cellulose with Indonesia. Chile and Peru also compete
with China in sales of five products each (refined copper
and metal salts, among others).
Latin American and Caribbean countries have been
especially affected by the agreements that China has
signed with its border countries –Kazakhstan, Russia
and Mongolia– to promote the development of its interior
regions. In the specific case of copper, imports from
those neighbouring countries benefited from tariff
reductions and a value added tax equivalent to 50% of
the cost of completing customs clearance. This has
affected sales of copper concentrates and refined copper,
considering that China imported nearly US$ 20 million
worth of such products from Mongolia in 2001, as well
as its steel imports from Kazakhstan. As a result of
discussions conducted outside WTO, in the context of
bilateral trade meetings, China agreed to revoke
preferential tax treatment policies for 20 products it
trades with border countries. This represents a significant
step towards equal treatment for products imported
through normal trade, although China has not abolished
preferential treatment for all the products it trades with
neighbouring countries. Thus, for example, preferential
treatment for integrated circuit products manufactured
in China continues to discriminate against imported
integrated circuits.
Latin Am




CHINA: 30 MAIN IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2001
(In millions of dollars)
Latin America and the Caribbean World Country of origin of imports and percentage of total
Main products SITC Rev.2 and description value % % % value Country of origin % Country of origin % Country of origin % Country of origin % Country of origin % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (8)
Taiwan Prov. Republic
Total 6 651 100.0 2.7 243 553 Japan 17.6 of China 11.2 United States 10.8 of Korea 9.6 Germany 5.7 55
1) 2222 Soya beans 1 605 24.1 24.1 57.1 2 810 United States 42.6 Argentina 35.1 Brazil 22.1 Canada 0.2 Russian Fed. 0.1 100
2) 2815 Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated 585 8.8 32.9 27.1 2 159 Australia 43.5 Brazil 25.0 India 17.5 South Africa 10.9 Peru 1.6 99
3) 6821 Copper and copper alloys, crude 580 8.7 41.6 36.8 1 576 Chile 35.5 Japan 20.4 Kazakhstan 7.4 Philippines 6.5 Russian Fed. 6.0 76
4) 2517 Chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate 384 5.8 47.4 22.6 1 699 Indonesia 24.1 Russian Fed. 19.4 Canada 17.5 Chile 14.1 Brazil 8.5 84
5) 2871 Copper ores and concentrates; copper mattes;
cement copper 373 5.6 53.0 41.6 898 Chile 34.6 Australia 20.6 Mongolia 19.6 Canada 7.7 Peru 6.3 89
6) 0814 Flours and meals of meat, of fish or of crustaceans
or molluscs, unfit for human consumption; greaves 353 5.3 58.4 69.4 509 Peru 57.6 United States 15.2 Chile 11.2 Russian Fed. 9.1 New Zealand 3.8 97
7) 7599 Parts, n.e.s., and accessories for machines Taiwan Prov.
falling within subgroup 7512 or group 752 295 4.4 62.8 4.4 6 716 Not specified 21.0 Japan 15.0 of China 12.9 Thailand 9.9 United States 9.2 68
8) 2816 Iron ore agglomerates (sinters, pellets,
briquettes, etc.) 244 3.7 66.5 71.0 344 Brazil 59.6 India 23.3 Peru 8.2 Mexico 3.2 Canada 1.7 96
9) 6114 Other bovine leather (including buffalo) and equine Republic of Taiwan Prov.
leather (other than leather of subgroup 6118) 151 2.3 68.7 8.9 1 699 Korea 27.4 of China 26.0 Italy 12.1 Not specified 4.2 United States 4.0 74
10) 0611 Sugar in solid form, unrefined 115 1.7 70.5 44.4 258 Cuba 35.2 Thailand 31.9 Australia 19.9 Brazil 9.2 South Africa 3.7 100
11) 1212 Tobacco 108 1.6 72.1 53.7 201 Brazil 53.7 Zimbabwe 44.2 Not specified 1.7 Thailand 0.3 Italy 0.1 100
12) 7849 Other parts and accessories, n.e.s., of the
motor vehicles of groups 722, 781, 782 and 783 98 1.5 73.6 3.9 2 514 Germany 45.5 Japan 31.1 Canada 4.4 Brazil 3.7 United States 3.1 88
Taiwan Prov.
13) 6512 Yarn of wool or animal hair (including wool tops) 97 1.5 75.0 20.4 478 Not specified 22.8 Australia 20.1 Uruguay 12.7 Italy 10.7 of China 8.5 75
14) 6782 Seamless tubes and pipes; blanks for tubes
and pipes, of iron (other than cast iron) or steel
(excluding high pressure hydro-electric conduits) 58 0.9 75.9 12.4 465 Japan 54.0 Germany 13.4 Argentina 8.5 Mexico 3.9 Austria 3.1 83
15) 2483 Wood of non-coniferous species, sawn, planed,
tongued, grooved, etc. 54 0.8 76.7 5.9 904 Indonesia 35.5 United States 11.2 Malaysia 10.8 Thailand 6.7 Germany 5.7 70
Taiwan Prov. Republic of
16) 7764 Electronic microcircuits 53 0.8 77.5 0.3 16 591 Japan 23.5 of China 18.3 Malaysia 10.1 United States 9.1 Korea 8.3 69
17) 2789 Minerals, crude, n.e.s. 50 0.7 78.2 48.4 102 Venezuela 46.4 Italy 7.0 Turkey 6.1 Myanmar 5.9 United States 5.8 71
18) 2882 Other non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s. 46 0.7 78.9 3.1 1 499 United States 26.1 Japan 15.8 Hong Kong 14.8 Germany 6.6 Kazakhstan 4.8 68
19) 2875 Zinc ores and concentrates 45 0.7 79.6 31.7 140 Australia 26.3 Peru 20.3 United States 10.7 Mexico 9.2 Canada 8.3 75
20) 2731 Building or monumental stone, not further worked
than roughly trimmed or merely cut by sawing 38 0.6 80.2 9.2 417 India 22.8 Egypt 13.3 Brazil 9.2 Italy 8.6 Spain 8.5 62
21) 7923 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, mechanically
propelled (other than helicopters), of an unladen
weight exceeding 2,000 kg but not more than
15.000 kilograms 38 0.6 80.7 3.1 1 203 Russian Fed. 69.7 Germany 13.7 Canada 6.8 United States 6.6 Brazil 3.1 100
22) 3345 Lubricating petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, other heavy petroleum oils
and heavy oils obtained from bituminous minerals Republic of
(other than crude), and heavy preparations, n.e.s. 37 0.5 81.3 2.1 1 777 Korea 38.8 Russian Fed. 11.5 Singapore 11.2 Japan 9.5 United States 3.4 74
23) 3330 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous Islamic Republic
minerals, crude 36 0.5 81.8 0.3 11 661 of Iran 17.7 Saudi Arabia 14.0 Oman 13.7 Sudan 8.0 Vietnam 6.2 60
24) 5232 Metal salts and peroxysalts, of inorganic acids Republic of Taiwan Prov.
(other than those that fall within subgroup 5231) 35 0.5 82.4 25.0 142 Chile 24.7 United States 20.8 Japan 14.4 Korea 13.0 of China 7.5 80
25) 7762 Other electronic valves and tubes (including Republic of Taiwan Prov
television camera tubes) 33 0.5 82.9 1.9 1 738 Korea 45.1 of China 24.4 Japan 10.9 Malaysia 4.1 Not specified 3.8 88
26) 7139 Parts, n.e.s., for the internal combustion piston Taiwan Prov.
engines of subgroups 7132, 7133 y 7138 33 0.5 83.4 5.4 606 Japan 41.6 Germany 20.1 United States 7.9 Italy 3.4 of China 3.3 76
27) 0573 Bananas (including plantains), fresh or dried 33 0.5 83.8 33.2 98 Philippines 64.1 Ecuador 25.1 Colombia 7.0 Vietnam 2.5 Costa Rica 1.2 100
28) 6746 Sheets and plates, rolled but not further worked, Taiwan Prov. Republic of
of a thickness of less than 3 mm, of iron or steel 31 0.5 84.3 1.2 2 630 of China 24.8 Japan 22.7 Korea 20.5 Russian Fed. 7.9 Kazakhstan 6.9 83
Taiwan Prov. Republic of
29) 5834 Polyvinyl chloride 31 0.5 84.8 1.6 1 881 of China 29.0 Japan 20.6 Korea 11.4 United States 8.9 Russian Fed. 6.7 77
30) 7649 Parts, n.e.s., and accessories suitable for use Republic of
solely or principally with the apparatus of division 76 30 0.4 85.2 0.4 7 986 Japan 20.2 United States 12.5 Not specified 11.0 Korea 8.6 Finland 6.3 59
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
Note: Column (1) shows the top 30 products imported from Latin America and the Caribbean by China in 2001, ranked by value in descending order. Column (2) shows the value of imports of those products. Column (3) shows the share
of the product in total imports from Latin America and the Caribbean. Column (4) indicates the cumulative share of those products in total imports from Latin America and the Caribbean. Column (6) shows the share of the product
imported from Latin America and the Caribbean in total imports of the product from all the world. Column (7) shows the top five suppliers of the product in the world and their share in total imports from the world. Finally, column
(8) shows the share of those five countries in the total value of China’s imports from the world.
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The Chinese press (People’s Daily) recently
announced that China and MERCOSUR would begin
negotiations on an FTA in mid-October. It should be
noted, however, that these will be preliminary talks in
anticipation of relatively protracted negotiations on a
partial-scope trade agreement similar to the one being
initiated by Brazil and India. Negotiations on a future
free trade agreement covering a significant proportion
of bilateral trade and not discriminating between
economic sectors would represent a difficult exercise in
collective diplomacy on the part of MERCOSUR; light
industry manufactures would be a particularly sensitive
issue. An alternative would be to negotiate a limited list
of items for tariff reductions, along with a parallel
agreement on other key issues such as procedures
relating to rules and technical standards, phytosanitary
procedures, taxation, and investment, as well as
important cooperation projects in the fields of
aeronautics and space technology, in the case of Brazil.
On the question of the international insertion
strategy being considered in the capitals of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries, some clear
differences are coming to light against the backdrop of
China’s accession to WTO and its own international
insertion strategy. At one end of the spectrum, Chile has
opted for open regionalism built on a network of
agreements with its main trading partners, the strategic
objective being to lay the foundation for increasing
exports of goods and services based on natural resources
and developing its potential as a business platform in
South America. At the other end is Brazil, which seems
to be heading towards isolating itself from the process
of establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), while trying to enhance its economic insertion
in the South American subregion, beginning with
MERCOSUR, as long as Argentina is able to consolidate
its budding recovery. Brazil is also considering forming
strategic partnerships such as those it has outlined in its
contacts with China and India, not only with regard to
bilateral trade agreements but also multilateral
negotiations. Central America and the Caribbean, for
their part, are trying to deepen their ties with the United
States so as to maintain the prospects for growth of their
light industry and deepen their integration into the
relevant chains of production and marketing.
As far as Chinese investments in Latin America and
the Caribbean are concerned, Argentina does not seem
to be considering any projects with China for the period
2001-2002, according to statistics compiled by
Fundación Invertir (www.invertir.com), which only
mention Japan and Korea. Chile also has no plans for
investments from China between 2001 and 2002 (Comité
de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIE, 2003)). In South
America, the few Chinese investments that have been
made are concentrated in Venezuela (energy resources)
and Peru (mining). In 1992, in the context of Peru’s
privatization programme, China Shougang Trade
International & Engineering Corporation bought Hierro
Perú, the largest iron mine in the country. China initially
invested US$ 120 million and promised to invest another
US$ 150 million. Although Chinese investment has risen
to US$ 140 million, it is way below the amount promised
(Berríos, 2002). The Chinese authorities have repeatedly
expressed their interest in investing in the copper mining
industry in Chile, but that has not yet happened because
the Chinese are reluctant to take on the risks involved in
prospecting and setting up extraction operations.
Executives of large firms in the machine tool and
metalworking, equipment and electronics industries have
made frequent visits to the country, but no arrangements
have been concluded yet. It seems more likely that some
investments will be made in Brazil to take advantage of
state incentives, the high degree of development of
support industries and the size of the domestic market.
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E. The new affinities
The new affinities and potential complementarities
between the Latin American and Caribbean region and
China lie in their common positions on serious issues
on the agenda being negotiated in the multilateral
economic system, especially the Doha Round of WTO.
At the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of WTO, held in Cancun
from 10 to 14 September 2003, there was strong
agreement with the positions of Brazil and 11 other Latin
American countries concerning the agricultural agenda
and the Singapore issues. Brazil acted as leader and
spokesman for a coalition of developing countries,
known as G-20+, which felt that the joint proposal of
the European Union and the United States seriously
limited the scope of the Doha mandate and compromised
the negotiations as a whole. These countries submitted
an alternative proposal for negotiations on agriculture
that envisaged an ambitious plan for the elimination of
subsidies and a formula for market access that entailed
differentiating between developed and developing
countries. The establishment of this group and its
continued existence, despite the desertion of several of
the 12 Latin American countries that originally belonged
to it, is seen in Brasilia and Beijing as a victory for the
developing countries (Carta de Ginebra, 2003; Hakim,
2003; Lu Fuyuan, 2003) (see chapter V).
The case of Brazil is practically the only one in
which China became, throughout the 1990s, not only
one of the main destinations for exports and source of
supply for imports, but also an actor with a common
approach to many of the key aspects under discussion
in international trade organizations and regional free
trade initiatives, especially the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). In both China and Brazil, large
segments of the population fear the establishment of
regional protectionist arrangements that would restrict
the external insertion of stakeholders (Altemani, 2002;
Ricúpero, 2003). As noted earlier, during the 1990s, the
increase in trade between the two countries occurred in
the context of good political relations. In 2003, Brazil’s
exports to China had already surpassed those of Japan
and were higher than those of ASEAN. Imports were
only surpassed by Japan and the Republic of Korea.
According to Laffer (quoted in Altemani, 2002, p. 12),
Brazil and China are important poles of influence in the
developing world and deserve to play an active role in
the consideration of the major issues affecting all of
mankind. The participation of all major stakeholders is
crucial to the building of a new order and a new global
architecture as this century begins.
This relationship is reminiscent of an affinity vis à
vis the developed countries that goes back to the 1970s,
when there was agreement at international political
forums, and voting patterns were similar. Since 1988,
the two countries have attempted to organize bilateral
initiatives in science and technology through a
partnership agreement aimed at producing two satellites
to conduct research on the Earth’s natural resources (The
China Brazil Earth Resources Satellites Project
(CBERS)). This project was expanded in 1995, when
two more satellites were added. The first satellite was
launched in 1999, but the second launch, in September
2003, failed. This dimension of cooperation in science
and technology was emphasized during the
administration of Itamar Franco. At present, the
administration of Lula da Silva is seeking to extend the
scope of cooperation to include biotechnology,
information technology and new materials development,
as well as to promote the fight against AIDS through the
production and marketing of traditional and generic
medicines and the search for new medications. At the
academic level, Brazil leads Latin America in cultural
exchanges with China; there were 124 Brazilian students
in China in 2000, compared with 62 from Mexico, 28
from Peru, 23 from Colombia, 20 from Cuba, 16 from
Chile, 14 each from Venezuela and Bolivia, and 9 from
Argentina (Official data from People’s Republic of
China, cited by Oviedo, 2000). It used to be said that
Brazil’s foreign policy gave priority to relations with
Japan in the economic sphere and with China in the
political sphere. Today, China is proving to be the main
actor in east Asia when it comes to trade, investment
and cooperation in connection with research and
development.
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole benefit
from the adoption by China of WTO trade disciplines and
from the fact that they are able to take their complaints
regarding practices that infringe their rights to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body. In those areas in which no
multilateral regulations exist or where they are incomplete,
as in the case of agricultural subsidies and antidumping
practices, the region and China share an interest in
reforming the rules and eliminating those that are too
restrictive or arbitrary. As has been demonstrated in recent
WTO studies, China can indeed be a helpful ally.
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